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Abstract 
This study seeks to shed light on problems associated with current views of social inequality 
as they have been applied to the Early Bronze Age in Crete. The aim is to elucidate the 
epistemological status of the concept of inequality in Aegean archaeological discourse and to 
disclose the tacit assumptions that have made problematic our dealings with the phenomenon 
of inequality. My critique of classic approaches to inequality stems from two facts: first, from 
their inclination to treat inequality as a phenomenon limited in time and space and second, 
from their largely untheorised treatment of the relationship between wealth and relational 
inequalities when it is exactly this relationship that needs to be brought into the open. 
Wishing to deal with critique in a constructive manner, I suggest a few ways in which one 
may go beyond current approaches to inequality, toward a new and more rewarding way of 
inquiring into the matter. This is supported with an archeological example from the Early 
Bronze Age cemetery at the site of Mochlos. 
The central argument is that inequality is a universal social fact and that by continuing to 
pursue its origins we perpetuate the arbitrary and misleading ethnocentric constructions of 
modernity. There is no such thing as a division between egalitarian and hierarchical social 
formations but rather societies as moral communities. Being is not fixed but is recursively 
formed through processes of valuation always presenced within the realm of social practice 
and interaction. Both power and what we call 'status' are transactional affairs as well as 
practical accomplishments. People do not simply find themselves in relations of power; they 
achieve, perpetuate, reinvent or resist debts and structures of influence. The value of different 
resources, the efficacy of debt obligations and structures of influence are realised in usage. In 
the case of resources this is achieved in the manner of their employment, in that of debts and 
influence this is attained as lived commitments among agents. Drawing upon the concept of 
performance, I suggest that an alternative approach can enable us both to rethink inequalit~ 
along more productive lines and to answer questions that previous accounts have been proved 
incapable of dealing with. 
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Setting the scene: Inequality in Aegean archaeology 
It was in a small comer of the European map - on the island of Crete - that the Bronze Age 
witnessed the original establishment of an economically 'stratified' society. Replete with 
evidence of social inequalities and rigid structures of power, the Minoan 'civilisation' was the 
first of a long lineage of great European civilisations. This statement constitutes one of the 
most common assumptions of prehistoric archaeology in Europe. But let. me continue. As 
early as the beginning of the twentieth century, the excavations of Sir Arthur Evans at 
Knossos brought to light a cultural landscape adorned with impressive architecture. The site 
appeared to document the existence of. an advanced cultural development during the Bronze 
Age, the first that could be logically described as a 'civilisation'. Reclaimed from the earth 
after centuries of being buried in darkness, Knossos however was not lost from human 
memory. The myths of king Minos, Theseus, Ariadne and the terrible Minotaur remained 
lodged in the fabric of Greek folklore. Influenced by the myth of the legendary Minotaur, 
Evans interpreted the complex spatial order of Knossos as the residence of the fabled king, 
who, according to legend, built the celebrated labyrinth to house the monster - the Minotaur. 
Inspired by the myth, it was Minos's name that Evans gave to this earliest of.civilisations. 
It may well be true that Knossos - even before its rescue from oblivion by archaeologists 
- was a partial reflection of a world in which a powerful leader had left his stamp. In any 
event it is probably one of the rarest cases in history in which an entire past society has been 
so firmly associated with the character of a single ruler. Minos became the enduring symbol 
of the Cretan Bronze Age, a crucial period in human history which is taken to mark the 
emergence of a world divided into rulers and the ruled. Hierarchical society was finally 
personified. At the same time, Early Bronze Age non-state, non-palatial societies were viewed 
either as completely lacking structures of power or as evolutionary stepping-stones containing. 
the early but steadily blossoming seeds for the social asymmetries observed during Palatial 
times l . 
The mam argument of this thesis takes a different approach. This study seeks to 
demonstrate that while the issue of social inequality as a topic of pursuit has a long history in 
1 See for example, Cherry (1983, 1984)~ Watrous (1994)~ Branigan (1988)~ Halstead (l988)~ Renfrew 
(1972)~ Sales (1988). 
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Aegean archaeology, it is a poorly conceived and only superficially understood phenomenon. 
It is a common assertion that inequality is the basic ingredient of so called complex social 
formations. Yet the concept itself has not seen any serious theoretical investigation. I will 
argue that the idea of inequality is vested with a series of taken for granted and unwarranted 
assumptions that completely ignore the most significant issues. More precisely, I challenge 
the current archaeological practice of dealing with inequality that begins with questions of its 
historical emergence. I centre the review of this evolutionary model of inequality on the Early 
Bronze Age because in the accounts of the transition from Early Bronze Age to Middle 
Bronze Age (MMIB) one confronts in a clear way the logic and fallacies of the evolutionary 
agenda. Inequality, as I hope to show, is a universal social fact and the hunting down of its 
origins is a. trivial and meaningless task - one loaded with ethnocentric mythologies that I 
suggest should be abolished from our research agendas. Thus instead of trying to prove the 
existence of paradise lost, I argue that there were never such paradises to be regained. From a 
political standpoint, this may seen to be an unpleasant or even conservative premise. 
However, to my mind, it is nothing more than an argument against the illusions and utopias of 
mass consumption inherited from our mod_ern condition. 
I have divided this analysis into three parts. The first part is offered as an exercise of self-
awareness for Aegean scholarship. It traces the way we have come to study inequality as well 
as the tacit assumptions inherent within· it. The most problematic one revolves around the 
relationship between wealth and inequalities of power. This relationship is usually taken for 
granted resulting in narratives that spirit away any understanding of its workings. For the 
most part wealth is taken to transform automatically into power, yet the· meaning and the 
details of such transformations usually remain elusive. The second part seeks to reveal the 
impact of modernity in our dealing with inequality and to offer future directions for 
inequality's pasts in archeological research by establishing a new theoretical and 
methodological agenda. Central to my thesis is the abandonment of the current language of 
inequality. The . language of inequality not only deals with asymmetries in a descriptive and 
static manner that cut us short of understanding their active constitution, but also perpetuates 
the fictitious division between single and complex societies. The concept of performance is 
subsequently offered as a more robust tool in dealing with inequality. The third part provides . 
an extended case study staged in the Early Bronze Age site of Mochlos in e~stern Crete. Here 
I show that an alternative way of dealing with inequality is applicable and ~ore rewarding for 
understanding the very fine grained details of past social life. 
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PART I: 
AEGEAN ARCHAEOLOGY 
AND THE STUDY OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES 
WHAT WENT WRONG? 
The legacy of Renfrew 
Chapter 1 
The legacy of Renfrew 
Introduction 
All roads in the study of Aegean prehistoric society lead to Colin Renfrew's The Emergence 
of Civilisation. This work has captured the imagination of archaeologists working on social 
change and the rise of social inequalities for over three decades. There are two different yet 
linked ways of approaching Renfrew's work on social inequalities. One of them is to look at 
his general theoretical and epistemological agenda inspired by the neo-evolutionary and 
systems paradigms of the sixties. The other one is to concentrate on the specific models he 
proposed under the influence of this agenda in order to explain the emergence of 'palatial' 
society in Bronze Age Aegean. For most of us working on the Aegean Bronze Age, Renfrew 
is better known for the latter rather than for the fonner aspect of his work. This is quite 
understandable since our field of enquiry is the Bronze Age societies of this particular corner 
of the world. On the other hand, it is this aspect of Renfrew's work that makes the 
geographical area of our interest, namely the Aegean archipelago, central in discussions of a 
wider archaeological latitude (Plate 1). For Renfrew saw society in the Aegean Bronze Age, 
most notably in Crete, as the first hierarchical society in Europe. In Be~et's words, the 
significance of Cretan Bronze Age archaeology 'lies in its status as explaining the origins of 
European civilisation' (2002: 215, emphasis in the original). 
Although I am concerned mainly with Renfrew's work on the Aegean, his models have 
been the product of a particular theoretical background. This cannot be taken· for granted in 
the examination of his Aegean research, for it dictated its character, conceptual foundations 
and logic. Renfrew's perception of social inequality is deeply rooted in evolutionary theory. 
Thus before presenting his models for the emergence of palatial society I will tum to -, the 
rarely explored! aspect of Renfrew's work, namely, the neo-evolutionist paradigm in order to . 
reveal its intellectual underpinnings which not only gave shape to his Aegean models but also 
directed the research questions and priorities of a whole generation of Aegeanists. There is no 
doubt that Renfrew's work left us an impressive patrimony. However, the time has arrived for 
its heirs to assess its worth and make the best of it in the light of new intellectual 
approaches. 
1 But see Hamilakis (1995, 2002) for a thorough critique of Renfrew's neo-evolutionist paradigm. 
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-The legacy of Renfrew 
Renfrew's journey to civilisation 
I have come to believe that [the] widely diffusionist view, that the Aegean civilisation was 
something borrowed by Europe from the orient, is inadequate ... Despite the many contacts which 
clearly did occur between the early Aegean and the Orient, it no longer offers a satisfactory 
explanation for the first emergence of civilisation in Europe (Renfrew 1972: xxv). 
These were the words used by Colin Renfrew in his germinal work The Emergence of 
Civilisation to dispute the long-held conviction of an ex oriente lux explanation of the 
formation of Aegean palatial societies. According to his view, Aegean civilisation could more 
appropriately be seen as an indigenous development that owed little to influences from an 
external more complex culture in the East. But what did the emergence of civilisation consist 
of? For purposes of explanation it seems useful to confme Renfrew's description of the 
content of social change experienced in the Aegean during the second millennium BC to a 
small number of basic tenets, even if this entails some degree of simplification. 
To begin with, Aegean prehistoric societies are seen to move from a series of absences to 
a series of presences both socially and technologically. Renfrew (1972) portrays both the 
Neolithic and dawn of the Early Bronze Age communities as small farming villages of a few 
families making their living by cultivating cereals and legumes. For Renfrew, these 
communities display no motive towards, or indeed convincing evidence of social inequalities, 
craft-specialisation and division of labou~ beyond the family unit. Each household produced 
enough food for their own needs with limited scope for overproduction and wealth 
accumulation. On the other hand, the large architectural complexes of the Middle and Late 
Bronze Age commonly known as palaces are taken to represent a larger social landscape with 
central places of political authority, a state apparatus, a highly structured economy, apparent 
indications of social differentiation, wealth disparities, division of labour, te~hnological 
developments and craft and agricultural specialisation. Drawing on the above proposed 
differences, Renfrew charted prehistoric Aegean societies according to a scheme of multiple 
binary oppositions: simple/complex societies, barbarism/civilisation, stateless/state societies, 
societies characterised by mechanical solidarity/societies characterised by organic solidarity, 
egalitarianlhierarchical societies. 
Most significantly, the Minoan palaces, 'the very heart of Minoan civilisation.' (Renfrew 
1973: 216), are seen as the material manifestation par excellence of relationships of inequality 
(Plate 2). According to Renfrew, not only do Minoan 'palaces' suggest agents of a central 
power but also their construction signifies the historical emergence of marked social 
inequalities. Moreover, civilisation in a generalised sense is taken to be a specific cultural 
stage, a particular sort of culture that has evolved, developed and progressed. The transition 
from non-state to state societies is seen as a narrative of gradual growth or 'ascending 
plotIine'; the advanced stages of the Early Bronze Age are viewed as the evolutionary 
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Plate 2 
~ 
-
a) Plan of the palace of Knossos (source: Marinatos 1993: 41, Fig. 34) 
b) Knossos, view of the South Propylaeum (source: courtesy Efi Kartsonaki). 
The legacy of Renfrew 
stepping-stones towards the supposed state social formations and inequalities of the Middle 
Bronze Age. Thus, between the 'simple village subsistence economy' and the 'full palace 
civilisation', Renfrew (1972: 52) hypothesised an intermediate stage more advanced than the 
former but not yet possessing the qualities of the latter. This intermediate stage, termed phase 
IV by Renfrew and corresponding to the Early Bronze Age, was felt to hold the key to the 
transformation of the simple farming communities of prehistoric Crete to full palace 
civilisation: 
At [the] beginning [of phase IV] the Aegean was the home of rather isolated communities without 
the effective use of metal and without any evidence for a developed economic or social structure. It 
is during phase IV that all these features emerged, so that at its end we see the emergence of palace 
civilisation in Crete ... the focus of attention ... falls therefore upon this phase IV (Renfrew 1972: 
52-53, emphasis added). 
The underlying assumptions about the content and tempo of social change in Cretan 
prehistory that Renfrew first' systematically outlined persist today in Aegean archaeology. Of 
course this smooth and upward-swinging evolutionary model of social change is common not 
only in Aegean archaeology (Plate 3a). It is characteristic of every archaeological theatre 
which deals with state societies, from Mesoamerica to Mesopotamia. As Stephen Shennan 
(1993) has summarised, the assumptions that ground these approaches imply a teleological 
view of non-state societies as containing the seeds of future states. Under such a conceptual 
framework, non-state societies are examined not for themselves but rather as supposed links 
to so called more complex social formations. Significantly, the evolutionist paradigm is 
founded upon several unwarranted assumptions about human history that have further 
implications for the study of early social formations and their structures of inequality. This is, 
of course, too large a topic to embark upon here in detail but some brief comments can be 
made. 
Firstly, evolutionist narratives carry an ethnocentric understanding of different historical 
realities as parts. of a single grand history of cumulative growth and continuous progress. This 
poi l1t of view sees different social contexts determined by a finite number of general historical 
processes (Trigger 1989) that forced them to follow a specific direction towards 
characteristics reflected in contemporary Western society such as increased· economic 
advancement, social complexity and more rigid structures of power. Ironically, evolutionary 
models of society have failed to recognise that human history and particularly Western history 
is more a series of radical and unpredicted dislocations and transformations than one of 
continuous progress (Giddens 1984a; Barrett and Damilati 2002, forthcoming). Equally 
important, the belief that social change is determined by a finite number of general historical 
processes has given rise to models that depict social change as the outcome of cross-culturally 
operating stin:~li or mechanisms. More specifically, when social change is seen to involve the 
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rise of social inequalities, there has been a common tendency in different archaeological 
contexts to look for an explanation in a limited array of so called prime movers, most notably 
those associated with surplus food production or the invention of metallurgy. 
Secondly, by assuming a particular pattern of history as an inevitable and progressive 
journey towards more complex and advanced forms of society, evolutionary approaches try to 
render history predictable. But if history is the interaction of social structure and human 
action (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984a) we cannot avoid asking: does the evolutionary 
paradigm make history comprehensible? I doubt that it does, for human actors are seen as 
merely living in a time-vessel that journeys towards a fated change, which follows an 
independent logic unto itself. Hence, time becomes identical with change and change 
becomes identical with cumulative progress and complexity. In Shanks and Tilley's words, 
the perception of time apparent in evolutionary narratives aims to lend 'justification to the 
idea of necessity in the historical process, that things [cannot] be otherwise, they [have] to 
happen this way' (l987a: 147). Approaches to history that make human agency central to the 
question of social processes are alien to· the evolutionary paradigm. Instead, in evolutionary 
narratives as Abrams (1982: 6) has ap~ly put it, the only sensible action available to 
individuals is to adapt their behaviour to the laws of evolution. Consequently, neo-
evolutionist models propose not only universal but also impersonal mechanisms of change 
where human intention and creativity play little or no role at all. We may note here that 
among the most oft-cited mechanisms of change that appear in neo-evolutionist accounts have 
been the nature of the environment or the way environment structures behaviour (cf. McGuire 
1992: 179). Linear models of social change are unable to account for the internal destruction 
of social institutions by their subjects. Moreover, they are unable to deal with the-dynamics of 
historically specific cases (Gailey and Patterson 1986) which elude the anticipations of the 
evolutionary model of change. A more detailed elaboration on the last issue will be provided 
later on in tIns study, by examining the cemetery of Mochlos, a characteristic null case within 
the Aegean archaeological context of evolutionary narratives2• 
Finally, in evolutionist accounts such as that of Renfrew's, we confront another 
intellectual fallacy, that of 'homological compression' (Giddens 1984a). This is clearly 
evidenced when he suggests that 'the savage hunter lives in an environment not so different in 
many ways from that of other animals' (1972: 11). Most evolutionists belie~e that there is 'a 
homology between the stages of social evolution and the development of human personality' 
. (Giddens 1984a: 239; Shennan 1993). This is why, for many evolutionist scholars like 
Renfrew, 'the transmutation of animal man into the human being represents a movement from 
primitive barbarism to civilisation' (Giddens 1984a: 240). When not quite perceived as an 
2 See chapter nille. 
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animal, the so called pnmltlve woman or man is depicted as lacking adult intellectual 
maturity and displaying a type of cognition and rationality similar to that of a child (Giddens 
1984a: 239-241). Most significantly, the childish idiosyncrasy attributed to so called 
primitives is held to permeate all aspects of their life, their social being and most commonly 
their economic choices. Thus, we intellectually mature Westerners arrive at ethnocentric 
evaluations of primitive socioeconomic institutions. Arguably however, these evaluations do 
not reveal (as many of us mistakenly believe) their economic irrationalities but rather stand as 
obstacles to our understanding of both their otherness and sameness. More specifically, 
ethnocentric perceptions of 'primitive' societies' economic structures constitute a serious 
source of misunderstanding concerning their socio-political make up, given the common 
assumption that the base determines the superstructure. On the other hand, when we deal with 
economic structures of early 'civilisations,' we tend to write what Moreland has called 
histories of the Same, namely 'primitive version[ s] of our present, which teleologically evolve 
into it'(2000: 2). For example, Renfrew wrote the history of the Greek Neolithic and early 
phases of EBA as a history of the 'Other' whereas the mature phases of the EBA and the 
Middle and Late Bronze Age were tho~ght to resemble the modem acquisitive societies 
where the saying 'the more you have, the more you want' (Renfrew 1972: 499) applies. 
Renfrew on inequality 
Arguably, according to Renfrew, the emergence of inequality is closely linked with the 
emergence of civilisation. In fact, it has been taken to epitomise the most fundamental 
parameter of the social change that he tried to explore in the context of Cretan prehistory. For 
Renfrew, 
When all relationships are symmetrical we are dealing instead with an egalitarian society 
characterised by what Durkheim called mechanical solidarity ... the exercise of power in societies 
implies asymmetry, then and it is moreover, the kind of asymmetry which results from centrality 
(1984: 25). 
The term 'simple egalitarian' society is held to refer to a society of equals in which no one 
outranks anyone, to a community of people where social integration in Durkheim's (1933 
[1893]) view is based on a shared cosmos of rules and guidelines within which inequalities 
have not yet been constituted. This state of common conscience is supposed to bring society 
together at that 'stage'. On the other hand, 'complex societies' according to the conventional 
wisdom are those where, as a natural law, mechanical' solidarity is replaced by organic 
solidarity (Plate 3b). Organic solidarity is based upon interdependence among the 
unique/differentiated individuals which the division of labour tends to generate by eroding the 
old form of integration which was based on likeness. At this point, it is useful to inquire 
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further into the way social relationships are assumed to be performed in societies in which, 
according to Durkheim (and, thereby, to Renfrew), mechanical solidarity operates. In the 
archaeological literature, these societies are assumed to present no division of labour beyond 
the household unit and thus no division of labour among households. They have been thus 
associated with Sahlins's (1972) Domestic Mode of Production: 
The domestic mode anticipates no social or material relations between households except that they 
are alike. It offers society only a constituted disorganisation, a mechanical solidarity set across the 
grain of a segmentary decomposition. The social economy is fragmented into a thousand petty 
existences, each organised to proceed independently of the others and each dedicated to the 
homebred oflooking after itself (Sahlins 1972:95 cited in Renfrew 1982a: 270). 
Here we can see a paradoxical way of integration; although individual households are 
autonomous they are alike. In Rousseau's words, '[their] needs, far from bringing [them] 
nearer [their] fellows, drive [them] away' (1964: 221-222 cited in SaWins 1972: 96). Thus 
there is a lack of need for cooperation. At this 'stage', society coheres because of an 
individuality based on likeness. Individual households share similar needs but pursue them 
independently so there is a lack of interaction and competition which prevents the 
destabilisation of society. The moral/social order is sustained exactly because there is no need 
for cooperation since there is autarky and independence. This independence together with a 
lack of differentiation in fact makes society, cohere through incoherence. In Herbert Spencer's 
(1969 [1876]) words, this kind of social integration (which in Durkheim's vocabulary is 
known under the term mechanical solidarity) is called incoherent homogeneity. I focus on this 
term because I think it is more indicative and descriptive than that suggested by Durkheim of 
the structure of social relations assumed for so called simple societies. On the other hand, the 
term coherent heterogeneity is again more indicative of the form of structure assumed for the 
so called complex societies. The structure at this 'stage' becomes, through the division of 
labour, heterogeneous, that is, differentiated: 
Structural differentiation is a process in which different tasks or functions are increasingly 
separated out from one another and attached to specific social positions or roles (Abrams 1982: 
22). 
In simple words this means that people become speCialised; the producer of pots, for 
example, is not also the producer of tools, the craftsman is not also a farmer, a merchant is not 
also a cra~sman; and it might also be the case that the producer of grain is not also the 
producer of other kinds of food staples. In becoming more specialised, however, people 
become more involved with and dependent on one another. Social integration is now rooted in 
interdependence. Paradoxically, the individual becomes at once more individual and more 
solidary (Abrams 1982). In Durkheim's (1933 [1893]) view, the only common imperative for 
the division of labour to generate structural differentiation (and thus the replacement of 
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mechanical by organic solidarity) is the natural tendency of people to exist as umque 
personalities. This brief resume leads to the commonplace assumption that the distinction 
between so called simple and complex social formations can be traced in the ways they 
integrate; that is in the coordination of individual action within a society. However, the 
historical connection between the two distinct types of society is reduced to a law of 
evolutionary necessity concerning human nature, namely the struggle of people to become 
full individuals. This general law stands as an explanation for the emergence of the division 
of labour - the latter is conceived as the natural outcome of the former. In Durkheim' swords, 
It is a historical law that mechanical solidarity which first stands alone, or nearly so, progressively 
loses ground, and that organic solidarity becomes, little by little preponderant (1933 [1893]). 
Quite clearly, the above account speaks about a historical law, but it is profoundly 
unhistorical. Durkheim does not establish at all the historically specific details of the shift 
from the one type of society (characterised by mechanical solidarity) to another (social 
configurations characterised by organic sol.idarity). The natural tendency of people to exist as 
unique personalities, giving birth to the division of labour, does not explain by itself anything. 
Rather the division of labour seems to arise in some natural, spontaneous way. The question 
remains: if the struggle for existence as a true individual is a universal feature of all 
humankind, why does it stimulate the division of labour and the rise of a new social formation 
at a given time and in a given social milieu? The answer is reduced to a consideration of 
societies as mechanical agents or automata, willy-nilly proceeding towards a state of social 
being which constitutes an inevitable fate. In a nutshell, for Durkheim, the central motor 
towards inequality, namely the division of labour, arises as a natural law, divested of any 
historical value and spontaneously promoted by the desire of people to acquire a true 
individuality. On the other hand, following Durkheim's intellectual journey Renfrew (1972) 
sought to explain in a more elaborate way the emergence of inequality, complexity and 
centrality in the Aegean, as this seemed to culminate in the establishment of the so called 
'Minoan palaces' which he thought to be the hallmarks of civilised and complex society. In 
trying to interpret the rise of structural differentiation in the Aegean, he pursued specific 
mechanisms that might have promoted specialisation necessitating interdependence. At the 
same time, by perceiving social change as the transition from structural homogeneity to 
structural differentiation, Renfrew saw structural differentiation as a temporally limited 
phenomenon that could be traced in some societies and not in others. Furthermore, he 
assumed an original state of autonomy (incoherent homogeneity) that societies have to 
surpass if they are to become complex. This assumption constitutes a key theme that, as we 
shall see below, reappears in most Aegean accounts of the 'emergence' (see for example, 
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Gilman 1981; Gamble 1979, 1981, 1982; Halstead and O'Shea 1982) through the fiction of 
the historical erosion of the self-sufficiency of the Domestic Mode of Production. 
Behind the overt concern with different forms of social integration and, by extension, with 
a taxonomic distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' societies, the debate on inequality 
has a hidden theoretical agenda, always present but scarcely raised explicitly. I only mention 
it here in passing, and will elaborate later on its implications: inequality is held to have a 
spatial and temporal locus of origin. Hence, it can be present in specific spatial and temporal 
contexts, yet absent in others. The Emergence of Civilisation is remarkably indicative of the 
attraction of the above view since civilisation, inequality, centrality and complexity are 
conceptually conflated. Similarly, more recent Aegean accounts of inequality perpetuate 
Renfrew's assumptions by continuing to frame the issue of inequality around starting points. 
The logic which directs Aegeanists' enquiry into social inequality is obvious in the statement 
offered by Soles: 
Any discussion of social ranking in Prepalatial Crete must begin by demonstrating its existence. 
This is necessary since it is currently being argued either that there is no evidence at all for ranking 
in this period or, what is very much the same thing, that whatever evidence there is appears only 
very late in the period, perhaps in the last 200 years before the palaces themselves appear (1988: 
49). 
Perhaps it would make sense to seek inspiration in Renfrew's book, and follow its plan in 
dealing with inequality and the issue of social integration in the Aegean Bronze Age. What 
was it that held that particular society together - the specific mechanism that forced 
interdependence and brought about inequality? As I have already pointed out, the central 
argument of The Emergence was that social change, the transition from 'simple' farming 
villages to 'complex' hierarchical societies must be seen as a local development. In one sense, 
the tendency to view change as internally generated has been strengthened by the scientific 
achievements prior to the publication of The Emergence. Radiocarbon· dating ~n particular 
proved that cultures that were previously held to be younger inspirations of more complex 
neighbours were in fact older than them. To use Renfrew's words, 'it came as a shock to 
learn' that the impressive megalithic tombs of western Europe once believed to be an 
architectural concept borrowed from the 'more advanced Egyptian civilisation' had actually 
been built many centuries before the pyramids (1973:16). Similarly, the new dating showed 
that the Mycenaean civilisation could no longer be seen as the forerunner. of the British 
Bronze Age. The sophisticated monumental structure of Stonehenge on Salisbury Plain for 
example, was unlikely to have been an inspiration of Aegean architectural prototypes since it 
had been already completed before Mycenean civilisation had even begun (Renfrew 1973). 
Consequently, it was felt that local cultural developments should be sought through 
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mechanisms that were internal to native societies themselves rather than in any kind of 
diffusionist scenario. 
At the same time, drawing on systems theory Renfrew viewed society as a system 
consisting of several interacting subsyste~s that were supposed to represent various fields of 
activity; the subsistence subsystem, the tecIillological subsystem, the social subsystem, the 
projective or symbolic subsystem and the trade and communication subsystem. According to 
the point of view adopted, social change, in terms of the rise of individuality or of social 
inequalities, was explained by the multiplier effect in action: 
... this mutual interaction in different fields of activity, this propensity of human systems that an 
innovation [and its adoption] in one subsystem favour innovation in another, this interdependence 
among subsystems which alone can sustain prolonged growth (Renfrew 1972: 488). 
Renfrew did not limit himself to a theoretical description of the mechanism of change; he 
identified several positive couplings of the subsystems, and tried to offer a detailed account of 
the rise of Aegean hierarchical societies. Two models, known as Craft SpecialisationlWealth 
and Subsistence/Redistribution, have dominated the attention of Aegeanists. The latter in 
particular, had a profound impact on the construction of subsequent narratives about the rise 
of inequalities. This might not be a surprising finding in itself. What other subsystem could 
provide, as . a starting point for studying interactions and mechanisms that promote 
interdependence, a more internal look at the workings of the system, and at the same time 
exemplify a more secure materiality towards the construction of objective scientific 
statements? Both these were the core components, the principal imperatives of the new 
research programme that Renfrew proposed under the influence of the 'New Archaeology' .. 
Furthermore, the decades after the Second World War, when the 'New Archaeology' and 
'New geography' made their first steps, were an era of economic and material innovation. 
This betterment was conceived in economic and technological terms; man' s mas~ering of his 
environment (Trigger 1989: 289; Urry 2000: 10). More significantly, by this time the USA, 
where 'New Archaeology' with its neo-evolutionist spirit of economic determinism first 
developed, had become a powerful political hegemony, entering a period of prosperity, 
innovation and industrial expansion. Within this intellectual environment, Renfrew saw 
civilisation as a stage where humans manage nature rather them being part of nature. In his 
words, 
. .. whereas the savage hunter lives in an environment not so different in many ways from that of 
other animals ... civilised man lives in an environment very much of his own creation. Civilisation, 
in this sense, is the self made environment of man, which he had fashioned to insulate himself from 
the primeval environment of nature alone (Renfrew 1972: 11). 
In view of what has been argued, it is not surprising that social domination was associated 
with the domi&ation of nature (Rowlands 1989). Notions of inequality were commonly 
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founded on modernist perceptions of difference constructed around the dualism of woman 
and nature; the subordination of nature to human ends and the progressive control of the 
material world seemed to replicate the subordination of one person to another. As humans 
convert their relationship to nature from one of encompassment to one of bringing nature 
under their control, they become hierarchised; this process differentiates the agents 
themselves whose achievements may be compared (Strathern 1987: 278-285). External trade 
is not abandoned in the writings of Renfrew, but is treated circumspectly and never as a 
possible motivation towards change. In other words, perceiving culture as a bounded system 
leads to stressing spatial isolation at the expense of long-distance interactions and historical 
influences from outside. 
At the same time, putting emphasis on the causal association of agriculture as a food 
production technique with the rise of inequalities has denied the existence of inequalities in 
societies like hunter-gatherers where the practice of fanning does not constitute a subsistence 
regime (cf. Bender 1989). Farming is traditionally viewed as a precondition, a starting point, 
and an attribute of complexity and inequality. This has been provided under the following 
reasoning: fanning implies sedentism and _ labour inputs - in the fonn of preliminary 
preparatory work - on which there are delayed returns. This in tum means that people create 
bonds with each other, they have to cooperate, to depend on one another during the 
agricultural cycle, since agriculture is a lasting activity because of its delayed production. 
Moreover, agriculture demands storage of the product as well as management of both the 
tasks and the product (Meillassoux 1972, 1978a, 1978b, 1981). Thus, agricultural production 
appears to present a strong case for the emergence of social inequalities since it is seen to 
enable economic interdependence and social integration. On this score, as Bender 
summarises, 'the great epochs of human progress have been identified more or less 'directly 
with the enlargement of the sources of subsistence'(l989: 83). brought about through 
significant changes in the forces of production. 
To summarise~ so far, I have sought to disclose some of the basic neo-evolutionist 
assumptions inherent in Renfrew's programme on inequality that bear significantly on our 
current understanding of inequalities as well as on the methodological direction Aegean 
scholarship has so far followed towards their exploration. This programme can be defined in 
three points: 
1) Inequality IS an evolutionary phenomenon associated with increased social and 
technological complexity. It has emerged historically as a consequence of local 
developments that promote social integration. 
2) Social integration should be sought in mechanisms of economic interdependence that 
erode an assumed original state of domestic self-sufficiency opening the road from 
egalitarian to' hierarchical societies. 
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3) The erosion of self-sufficiency is played out in the subsistence sector of society. 
In the next chapter I shall present three popular narratives that have explored the issue of 
social inequalities in the Aegean along these lines. 
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Chapter 2 
Three 'green' stories or 
the subsistence discourse 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present three different models that have been proposed by Aegeanists to 
account for the rise of inequalities in Bronze Age Crete. Their common point of reference is 
concern with the role of subsistence in promoting economic interdependence, and in tum 
transforming a supposed simple egalitarian society into a complex hierarchical one. Although 
there are now several models that follow a similar path in accounting for the emergence of 
social inequalities in the Aegean, in this chapter I choose to concentrate on the works of 
Renfrew (1972), Gilman (1981) and Halstead and O'Shea (1982). This is not only because the 
models proposed are the most representative in revealing the subsistence bias in the search for 
origins, but also because they are the most detailed and theoretically informed. 
In Renfrew's Subsistence/Redistribution model the division of labour envisaged in the 
specialisation of agriculture eroded the domestic mode of production and brought about 
interdependence between individuals, making society cohere in a novel way. Subsequently 
Gilman as well as Halstead and O'Shea have proposed mechanisms, which they argue 
promoted economic interdependence in an alternative way. For Gilman (1981) it was the 
adoption of capital intensive techniques, such as the cultivation of tree crops resulting in 
changes to property relationships, which brought into being a stratified society. For th~ Social 
Storage model proposed by Halstead and O'Shea (1982), the decisive factor for social 
integration' was the risky heterogeneous environment of southern Aegean. This environment 
demanded a specific survival strategy that promoted cooperation and interdependence 
between individual households. 
Each model has attempted to explore the moral character of elites' power as well as the 
nature of the relationship between rulers and their subjects. For Renfrew, the emergence of 
BA leaders is linked to their role as benevolent and dedicated public servants. In other words, 
leadership emerges in order to serve the smooth functioning of society; it is a problem solver 
in the service of the common good. In contrast, Gilman sees BA leaders to have acquired their 
position due to their coercive and exploitative features. Gilman draws on Marxism to argue 
that the emergence of ruling classes can be understood without reference to collective well-
being. Finally, Halstead and O'Shea, while they do not fully reject an altruistic component 
regarding the character of BA elites, also stress the element of exploitation as integral to the 
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foundation of their power. Be that as it may, the important thing to keep in mind is that the 
three models in question structure the study of inequality around detennining its temporal 
origins within the BA sequence. In this scheme, Neolithic communities appear as the lost 
paradises of an original self-sufficient state of being. It is then held to be significant to 
discover how the self-sufficiency of domestic units was undermined giving rise to 
considerable social inequalities. However, as I will argue below, the question is a red herring. 
The principle of insufficiency exists at the very basis of human life and is not a matter of 
historical emergence (cf. Bataille 1998). My argument will be that insufficiency is inherent to 
the unfinished nature of human bodies. 
The subsistence redistribution story 
Presentation of Renfrew's model 
Colin Renfrew's Subsistence/Redistribution (SIR) model has been perhaps the most 
influential explanation ever proposed for the emergence of social inequalities in Aegean 
prehistory. Influenced to an extent by Durkheim, Renfrew's formulation of the appearance of 
social asymmetries was explained as the outcome of processes, internal to the Aegean, that 
could have eroded the autonomy of the Domestic Mode of Production, producing 
interdependence and thus organic integration. To support this model of indigenous 
development, Renfrew introduced the idea of Mediterranean Polyculture. According to this 
theory, the introduction and systematic exploitation of olives and grapevines, supplementing 
the cereal dominated agriculture of the Neolithic, was fait accompli as early as the beginning 
of the Bronze Age (third millennium Be). 
To support his premise, Renfrew pointed to archaeological evidence from t?e Aegean 
archipelago. Specifically, evidence that suggested the domestication of olives included two 
vessesls he interpreted as oil lamps and a small jug which contained trace amounts of oil all 
found in a Naxian grave of the Keros-Syros culture (EBII). To this he added two olive stones 
, 
recovered from EMIlEMII deposits at the Royal Road in Knossos and Myrtos respectively 
(Renfrew 1972: 285). The early domestication of vines in southern Aegean was inferred 
mainly from samples of grape pips found in EHII Lerna, EMIl Myrtos, and EBII (Korakou 
culture) Aghios Kosmas. An additional source of evidence consisted of a couple of vessels 
assumed to be either wine containers (a pithos from Aghios Kosmas) or equipment for wine 
manufacture (a vat from Myrtos). At the same time, the proliferation of drinking vessels 
during the Early Bronze Age was seen as a further indication of wine consumption and thus 
vine domestication (Renfrew 1972: 281-284). 
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Building on this evidence, Renfrew maintained that the rise of the palatial institutions was 
the result of diversification and the intensification of crops, particularly the extensive 
cultivation of olives and vines. Additionally, he emphasised the prominence of an olive, vine 
and cereal based diet in most of the southern part of the country today. He then suggested that 
modem figures for diet in Greece seemed to indicate a 'subsistence pattern [that] corresponds 
precisely to the extent of the Minoan-Mycenaean civilisation' (Renfrew 1972: 302). Most 
significantly, it was asserted that the soil and climatic conditions of southern Greece, being 
particularly suited for the cultivation of olives and vines could have enabled their early 
domestication. This idea had important implications for how Renfrew chose to explain the 
cultural diversification between the south and the north 'observed' during the third 
millennium Be. According to current consensus, the northern regions did not follow the 
cultural and economic headway of the south (see Halstead 1994; Renfrew 1972; Van Andel 
and Runnels 1988; Webster 1990). Instead, they entered a period of cultural decline. 
Remarkably, these northern regions (Macedonia and Thessaly) have been viewed as focal 
points for economic advancement during the latter stages of the Neolithic (see Halstead 1994; 
Van Andel and Runnels 1988). Renfrew ~ttempted to highlight the reasons behind the 
different historical trajectories between the north and south. He assumed a causal link 
between the suitability of the south with its Mediterranean climate, which was beneficial for 
the adoption of new plant species, and the region's cultural and economic advances: 
The terrain in south Greece is such that a single village can be within reach of both arable land and 
of hill slopes suitable for olive cultivation and viticulture. The suggested consequence is that a 
redistributive system emerged within the village, favouring the emergence of local chieftains 
(Renfrew 1972: 481-482). . 
Let us now take a closer look at the line of reasoning that prompted Renfrew to suggest a 
casual link between the adoption of Mediterranean Polyculture and the emergence of social 
inequities in southern Greece. The Mediterranean Polyculture permitted a new flexibility in 
subsistence strategies and brought with it a rapid population growth. More precisely, the new 
species encouraged the exploitation of ecologically diverse areas, as well as an intensification 
and an increase of production. Olives and vines can be cultivated in more marginal 
environments such as hill slopes and therefore they do not compete with pulses and cereals 
for land and human labour. Hence, previously marginal land was now brought under 
exploitation. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the introduction of olives "and vines was 
the diversity they brought to the subsistence system by increasing the range of crops 
produced. The diversity in the subsistence system promoted specialisation of single 
conunodities in local contexts which was then followed by regional specialisation since some 
crops were better suited in some areas than in others. In simple words, the producer of olives 
was not the progucer of grapes or the producer of grain. This radical transformation of the 
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homogeneous Neolithic farmscape subsequently produced economic inter-dependence where 
producers of specialised commodities were forced to enter in exchanges to maintain a 
balanced consumption of goods. In turn, this situation stimulated the need for a central 
organisation to reallocate agricultural products among locally specialised individual units of 
production. Elites therefore emerged in order to carry out the function of the regulation of 
exchange and redistribution that became necessary due to the economic interdependence 
brought about by agricultural specialisation (Renfrew 1972: 304-307). 
The morality of SOCial integration and inequality: The altruistic leader 
The SIR model led to a predominantly managerial definition of the so called palaces and their 
residents. To Renfrew, evidence of a system of documentation and accounting consisting of 
seals, sealings and tablets, reflected empirically both the organisational requirements of a 
redistributive system and a prehistoric lifestyle of managers and public servants. Similarly, 
the storage facilities of the 'palatial' complexes strongly reinforced their interpretation as 
economic institutions whose primary role was the performance of the central administrative 
function of redistribution. Thus, the need for _redistribution was considered as a causal factor 
in the evolution of social inequalities. In Renfrew's words, 
The real significance for the Aegean prehistory of the 3rd millennium redistributive system is that it 
clearly enhanced the status of the elite, the leaders, with consequences at least as important socially 
as they were economically (1972:464). 
Under this notion, BA elites were seen to be responsible for the collective well-being of their 
subjects. The basis of their power was their managerial skills in terms of the economic control 
of the redistribution (Renfrew 1973: 231). It should be noted that the link between increased 
productivity, ecologically determined agricultural specialisation, redistribution and the 
emergence of a benevolent central authority was not a novel idea in modern research. 
Renfrew drew on Elman Service's (1962) original thesis for Hawaii according to which 
certain productive technologies operating in ecologically heterogeneous environments result 
in specialisation and redistribution. 
We may now examine how Renfrew's model is related to Emile Durkheim' s theory of 
social integration. First and most obviously, Renfrew is at one with Durkheim in seeing the 
division of labour as the source of social inequalities as well as the moto! towards the 
transfonnation of 'simple' to 'complex' societies. Where Renfrew and Durkheim part 
company most decisively however, is in their view of the historical connection between 
'simple' and 'complex' societies. A few pages back I argued that for Durkheim, the 
emergence of the division of labour and the transition from 'simple' to 'complex' society 
were matters of a law of evolutionary necessity regarding human nature. Durkheim felt that 
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chronologically or historically this transition was a matter of anticipation; societies sooner or 
later move from simple to complex because the division of labour will develop as a self-
activating response to the natural tendency of people to become full individuals. In this 
respect however, Durkheim's account seems to be a transhistorical generalisation and 
therefore unhistorical, for if the battle for individuality is a universal human trait one might 
ask why it stimulates the division of labour in some societies earlier than in others. Taking his 
cue from Durkheim, Renfrew attempted to trace the historically specific details of the 
emergence of the division of labour and the shift from one type of social formations to the 
next. Hence, in the Aegean version of Durkheim's paradigm of social change, structural 
differentiation in southern Greece is held to be the outcome of the division of labour reflected 
in agricultural specialisation. Most significantly, as we have already noted, Renfrew suggests 
that the division of labour was facilitated because of specific ecological conditions operating 
during the Early Bronze Age only in south Greece. On the other hand, it was felt that the 
societies of northern Greece, lacking the suitable climate for the domestication of olives and 
vines, stagnated rather than developed. The cooler environment of the north worked as a 
brake on agricultural specialisation and its ~oncomitant division of labour, and so northern 
Greece failed to see the emergence of 'palatial' elites that was symptomatic of complex 
cultures. 
Nonetheless, Renfrew's driving force ot the Aegean Bronze Age history, namely the 
stimulus towards the division of labour, is reduced to a combination of new agricultural 
practices and ecological conditions - the introduction of new crops and the favourable 
environmental diversity of south Greece. In this sense, he represents a continuation of the 
Durkheimian tradition in that he constructed a mechanistic scheme where human agency is 
dropped from view. It is useful to stress here that although Durkheim attributed individuality 
to peoples of 'complex' societies he did not however offer them the status of active authors in 
the creation of their history. His view of history and social change was rather naturalistic. For 
Durkheim appeared to assume that the only contribution of human actors to the making of 
history, actually the only action available to them, was to follow gradually their psychological 
motive of attaining a unique personality. Consequently, history was portrayed as a self-rulini 
subjectless process. 
Returning to Renfrew's account of the emergence of the d~vision of labour ~n the Aegean, 
both its emphasis on environmental stimuli and its focus on a taken for granted human 
response to these stimuli manage to perpetuate the shortcoming of the Durkheimian legacy of 
a passive portrayal of human agency. Thus, Renfrew advances a reductionist materialist type 
of argument where social change is seen as the mere outcome of environmental drives and 
people's adaptation to them. Apparently, in the absence of environmental drives BA social 
actors would have remained self-sufficient and autonomous following the destiny of their 
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Neolithic predecessors. Stated simply, humankind's striving for individuality remains latent 
until external factors crop up and create problems in the maintenance of self-sufficiency. 
Notably, it is only in this way that Renfrew can substantiate his argument for the historical 
emergence of inequalities. More particularly, inequalities and leadership are depicted as 
functional necessities since they are seen to . emerge in order to solve a critical-resource 
allocation problem 1. Yet, as Godelier has aptly remarked, 'as soon as a society exists, it 
functions, and it is tautological to say that a variable is adaptive because it fulfils a necessary 
function in the total system' (1972: xxxiv). 
One cannot avoid the impression that Renfrew's argument appears to rationalise or 
sanctify the existence of dominant classes. This functional perception of hierarchical order -
that has been strongly criticised by Marxist theory of social change - betrays another common 
stance between Renfrew and Durkheim. For the French sociologist, social integration was 
perceived as a matter of morality - 'of the coordination of individual activity within a social 
system on the basis of personal commitment to collective standards and rules' (Abrams 1982: 
23). And although he believed that so called simple societies were a morally cohesive world 
whereas the complex society and by analogy_the civilised world is a world of moral anomy 
and antagonistic instincts he was reluctant to accept that social integration and coherence 
evaporate in the competitive and egotistic industrial world. His main concern was the pursuit 
of coherence because he believed that society exists only through coherence. In his view, 
although the division of labour undermined the old type of social solidarity, it would 
eventually bring a new type of solidarity based on interdependence between individuals with 
distinct roles. The stress on a well-integrated society continues in the work of. Renfrew. By 
now it should be clear that Renfrew saw the emergence of hierarchical societies as the 
outcome of an invariable common response of people to their envirorunent - one which was 
thought to serve the collective good. Yet, this is a 'postdiction' characteristic of functionalist 
models where explanation is given by reference to ends that determine the course of a 
phenomenon and not by references to causes which bring about the phenomenon in question 
(Hempel 1959). 
Arguably however, if there is no justification in social theory for the emergence of 
inequalities, as I shall try to show later on in this study, there is even less in arguments that 
hold that inequalities exist in order to serve the common good or that rule;s are benign 
parental figures2• Significantly, Earle's (1977, 1987a, 1987b) re-examination of Service's 
1 However, it is not clear why a system already in equilibrium should itself move towards a 'more 
equilibrated one' (Lemonnier 1992: 10). 
2 As Paynter (19.89: 374-375) remarks, palaeopathological studies reveal that participation in large 
political units had usually a negative effect on the health of commoners. Moreover, there are well-
known cases where elites arranged settlement patterns to serve their interests, thereby creating 
significant transportation burdens on their subjects. 
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theoretical assumption and the ethnographic evidence that seemed to validate it has refuted 
the idea that leadership is a problem solver in the service of collective well-being. It is worth 
mentioning that redistribution may cover several institutional forms, among them 
mobilisation which involves the concentration of services and goods for the benefit of a group 
not conterminous with the contributing members (Earle 1977). To return to the Aegean BA, 
Cherry (1978), Halstead (1988, 1992a, 1992b) and Killen (1994: 67) have convincingly made 
the point that the Linear B texts appear to suggest upward mobilisation - which involves the 
gathering of services and goods for the benefit of rulers - rejecting the altruistic profile of the 
ruling elites proposed by Renfrew. 
Agricultural specialisation and the erosion of self-sufficiency: Critical 
comments 
As we saw, for Renfrew, the introduction of Mediterranean Polyculture was thought to bring 
changes that undermined the self-sufficiency of prehistoric households and compelled them to 
enter into exchange relations. However, Ills idea that local specialisation is the logical 
outcome of subsistence diversification can be seriously disputed. Notably, it comes in direct 
contradiction to his own argument that diversification stimulates subsistence security and so 
is likely to have been a goal for most farmers. On this score, subsistence diversification 
should have promoted economic autonomy rather than economic interdependence (Halstead 
1988: 522). Renfrew's assumption that farmers will have preferred to specialise in single 
commodities rather than pursuing subsistence security gained from the cultivation of many 
different species seems questionable. Agricultural specialisation is a risky practice since· it 
increases immediate output at the expense of long-term security. This is more so in vulnerable 
environments (Colson 1979). Equally significant, Renfrew failed to recognise that local 
specialisation cannot be adequately performed without the benefit of a market economy 
which guarantees security in consumption to specialist producers since other crops can be 
bought in the market place (Halstead 1988: 522; Hamilakis 1999: 43, 2000). 
In fact, agricultural diversification rather than specialisation has been documented 
throughout contemporary rural communities, in Greek Neolithic (Cherry 1984; Hansen 1988) 
and classical antiquity (Osborne 1987). It is worth considering for a moment the historical 
evidence from the cities of ancient Greece. Osborne's detailed research ha~ shown that 
ancient farmers aimed at subsistence self-sufficiency by cultivating a variety of crops. The 
same strategy was also utilised by cities. By diversifying their. subsistence resources, farmers 
21 
-Three 'green' stories or the subsistence discourse 
can have a little of everything and this promotes autonomy rather than interdependence3 . 
Besides, as Halstead's ethnographic testimony makes clear, 
. .. if one talks to rural Greeks today about how they operate their broad-based economy, most of 
the villages tend to have territories exploiting a wide range of the environment, and in that situation 
the broader the base - one could argue - the more cushioned they are against the sort of situations 
demanding greater social organisation. This would be the opposite of [Renfrew's] viewpoint - only 
in situations where you get villages exclusively on mono crop land might one expect a forced 
exchange of products between communities, ultimately encouraging more complex social 
organisation (1977: 63). 
Equally important, Earle (1977, 1987a, 1987b) showed that there is no direct link between 
ecological heterogeneity and agricultural specialisation. Thus, despite the ecological 
heterogeneity of Hawaii, different villages were not in fact specialising in particular 
commodities. Accordingly, Renfrew's argument that subsistence specialisation was the 
natural outcome of the introduction of olives and vines because individual households would 
have selected whichever crop was best suited to their own land, seems empirically unfounded. 
We may also point out that Renfrew's premise for local specialisation ignores the edaphic and 
climatic tolerances of most Mediterranean crops (Halstead 1994: 210). Stated simply, 
although we can trace throughout Crete or the Mediterranean as a whole several distinct 
microenvironments, each best suited to specific species, this fact does not inevitably lead 
towards monocrop agriculture since other crops can be also grown alongside those for which 
the particular microenvironment is best suitable4• If this is so, it seems more realistic to 
assume the existence of communities which produced lesser or greater quantities of the same 
subsistence goods. Finally and perhaps more importantly, the textual evidence from the 
Aegean palatial centres does not document local subsistence specialisation. Halstead (1992a) 
has plausibly shown that the selective concern of the archives with wool, olive oil and cereals 
implies specialisation but only on the part of the palaces. 
3 One may note here, Golson's (1982) ethnographic research which has shown that the introduction of 
new species advocates a democratisation and not a tendency towards wealth inequalities in subsistence. 
Golson made a further interesting point. Unlike Renfrew who did not explain why Aegean farmers 
adopted the vine and olive, Golson traced the reasons behind the introduction of sweet potato in New 
Guinea. He found that the new species was introduced in order to feed pigs. This was a social demand 
due to the prominent place of pigs as valuables in ceremonial exchanges. 
4 For example, cereals can be grown on a wide range of soils. Additionally, as Halstead (1988) 
remarks, there is little, if any cultivable land in Greece which is suited exclusively to vines, or olives or 
cereals. For a detailed account of various examples of inter-cropping see Hamilakis (1995). 
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A Machiavellian device 
Presentation of Gilman ~ model 
Nearly ten years after the publication of The Emergence, Renfrew's emphasis on the 
beneficial integrative role of elites came into question. Several archaeologists, such as Gilman 
(1981, 1991), Gamble (1979, 1982) and even Renfrew (1982a) himself suggested that the 
emergence of central authority in Europe could be understood without reference to a common 
good. Gilman, in particular, sought to evaluate the reality of the functionalist view where 
ruling elites come to aid societies in the management and supervision of irrigation systems, 
warfare and redistribution of subsistence goods. His research demonstrated that activities that 
might offer benefits to the mass of the population do not necessarily demand a central 
authority for their organisation and supervision. For instance, ethnographic parallels suggest 
that irrigation systems - an asset which increases material security - can be built and operated 
by farmers themselves. Most significantly, according to Gilman, when a central authority 
appears to be involved in the organisation of irrigation, redistribution, andlor warfare, it is 
actually to the authorities' own advantage and does not benefit the majority of the population. 
For Gilman, this is clearly indicated in the European archaeological record itself. In his 
words, 
In the cases for which [managerial] theories developed, managerial functions are at least plausible: 
these are cities, large public works, etc. In later prehistoric Europe, virtually the only evidence for 
social complexity is the wealth of the elites themselves (Gilman 1981: 3). 
All of this led Gilman to question functionalist interpretations of the origin of social 
inequalities in the European Bronze Age. Drawing from ethnographic analogies, he offered 
his own theory on the evolution of social inequalities. He began with the premise that 
individuals in non-stratified societies could aspire to high status and positions of authority. 
These societies, according to Gilman, did not lack leaders but lacked a permanent ruling class 
and as a consequence leadership was fragile with the social order remaining broadly 
egalitarian. Gilman suggested that the maintenance of an egalitarian social order was attained 
by the facility with which an undesirable leader can be abandoned by his followers. His 
thinking is aptly described by Mann: 
Egalitarian peoples can increase intensity of interaction and population density to form large 
villages with centralised, permanent authority. But they stay broadly' democratic'. If the authority 
figures become overmighty, they are deposed. If they have acquired resources such that they 
cannot be deposed, the people turn their backs on them, find other authorities or decentralise into 
smaller settlements. Later, centralisation may begin again with the same outcomes (1986: 68). 
In this sense, lineage segmentation and village fission seem to operate as 'safety valve' by 
which the self-agg~andisement of 'big-men' is checked. Gilman thus suggested that in order 
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to understand the fIse of Bronze Age hereditary leadership we need to explore the 
mechanisms which impeded the social fission characteristic of tribal societies. Moreover, he 
stressed that the non-functionalist variables of the argument on the significance of exchange 
in the origins of social stratification propos~d by Engels and later taken up by Childe, suffered 
from empirical difficulties at least in the context of prehistoric Europe. More precisely, 
according to these accounts, elites were seen to act in their own interest rather than as public 
servants. Yet it was also held that their positions of power and wealth were based on the 
control of networks of exchange (mainly in metals or foodstuffs) in which they participated as 
middlemen. Gilman thought that for exchange or trade to underpin the rise of social 
stratification, it had to involve essential goods. In his words, 'goods which the middleman can 
deny the household ... must be required for the household's livelihood' (Gilman 1981: 4). He 
then went on to propose that essential goods could be metal tools necessary for agricultural 
production or subsistence goods. However, since the majority of metal objects uncovered 
seem to have been luxuries having little if any utilitarian value, their nature as essential 
commodities was ruled out. Metal, Gilman asserts, should rather be seen as an index of 
inequalities in Bronze Age Europe and not as their stimulus. We are thus left with only 
subsistence goods. However, according to his thesis, the probability of foodstuff trade seemed 
slight since communities were apparently self-sufficient and the material record advocated 
that trade was mainly restricted to luxuries. Additionally, the very fact that subsistence goods 
are bulky creates a considerable obstacle given the primitive transport technologies of Bronze 
Age communities (Gilman 1981: 5). 
Building on this reasoning, Gilman regarded the processes of subsistence production 
rather than the exchange of goods as the key to understanding the emergence of social 
stratification. 'Capital-intensive subsistence techniques' such as plough agriculture, irrigation, 
offshore fishing, and Mediterranean Polyculture were then proposed as mechanisms that 
prevented village segmentation by tying people to the soil. Subsequently, the adoption of such 
techniques which entailed a great investment of labour and delayed returns implied that the 
ambitions of aspirants to high status would be harder to check: 
The investments of labour to insure future production would have to be defended. But the value of 
these same assets would dampen the potential for social fiction, so that it would be difficult to 
check the aspirations of those to whom the defence had been entrusted. In the face of a protector 
whose exactions seem excessive, the household's choices are limited ... and over the long term 
consistently favour the protectors. In the end there would have arisen a permanent ruling class 
(Gilman 1981: 7). 
Among the capital intensive techniques suggested by Gilman, the one which was taken to 
be of key significance for the development of social stratification in the Aegean, was the 
adoption of Mediterranean Polyculture first addressed by Renfrew. Gilman did not oppose the 
significant role "of Mediterranean Polyculture" in the Aegean development of social 
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stratification. Instead, he shifted its emphasis. In the first place, Gilman argued, the adoption 
of Mediterranean Polyculture increased the material security of producers. 
However, for him, the most prominent feature of Mediterranean Polyculture was the 
transformation of property relations. In contrast to Renfrew, Gilman suggested that the basis 
of elite power was not invoked throught its involvement with managerial transactions 
concerning the regulation of exchange, since foodstuffs are bulky and consequently their 
movement would not have been substantial given the primitive Bronze Age transport 
technologies. He believed that Mediterranean Polyculture constituted a 'capital-intensification 
of subsistence' since tree crops required an input of preparatory work,for several years before 
reaching maturity and yielding fruits. Accordingly, the investment of work into assets only 
realised over the long-term, which could not easily be relinquished, tied Early Bronze Age 
farmers to the land, cutting off their means of ignoring aspirant rulers. The implications of 
this perspective have direct relevance on Gilman's rejection of the functionalist view of ruling 
groups as public servants. Now elites were seen to emerge as more productive agricultural 
techniques developed without the elites' beirig required to set up and manage the productive 
improvements. 
The morality of social integration and inequality: The coercive protector 
The puzzling question of how social coherence came about continued in Gilman's work. Yet, 
the rosy image of an integrated society based on a consensus of interests like the one 
Durkheim dreamed of, and Renfrew so vividly depicted for Aegean prehistory, is far from 
that viewed by Gilman. According to him (Gilman 1984), Durkheim and his successors' 
views of society are problematical since they overlook the divisions and strains underlying 
social solidarity. With Gilman, Aegean archaeology embraces a Marxist view of social 
integration. 
Unlike functionalists who believed that social institutions appear in order to contribute to 
the proper functioning of society, Marx perceived society to cohere through coercion. In 
Marxist theory the division of labour occupies a central position. However, its most salient 
feature is taken to be, not the production of functional interdependence linking people in a 
well-ordered family, as in the Durkheimean paradigm, but its association with profound social 
inequalities. For Marx, the division of labour was essentially seen as tanta!llount to the 
division of men and society (Abrams 1982: 36). More important still, in opposition to 
functionalists who believed that stability and equilibrium c0!lstituted natural tendencies of 
social formations, Marx emphasised that societies are constantly subject to change. To him 
social change was the outcome of contradictions and conflicting interests and not of a general 
consensus, working as functionalists championed, to correct likely abnonnal deviations from 
the assumed nonn. of homeostatic stability. By refusing to see social stratification, and by 
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extension leadership, as a functional need of the social system and by stressing change and 
conflict, rather than stability and consensus, Marx put forward not just an intellectual position 
but also a political one. The fate of all rulers is challenged given the fact that change or 'social 
anarchy' (the product of dissension) is not in the interests of the ruling classes (cf. Shanks and 
Tilley 1987b: 53). Moreover, the mere presence' of institutions that have appeared throughout 
history could not anymore be considered legitimate or justified as necessary by assuming their 
phantasmatic contribution to the smooth functioning of society. This comes in direct 
opposition to the functionalist view of social institutions whose theoretical standpoint may 
legitimise even dictatorial authorities by assuming that since they existed, they existed to 
serve the functioning of the system. 
In Marxist theory, therefore, the emergence of social institutions like leadership cannot be 
explained as a benevolent contribution to the needs or stability of social systems since 
societies are not and cannot be stable and persistent structures. Simply put, there is no need 
for stability because societies do not function in this way as they are inherently unstable. It is 
the dialectic between contradictory interests 'and continual conflicts among social actors or 
the unity of the opposites, that brings change in the form of new institutions, such as 
leadership or the state (Hodder 1986: 57). As Bloch writes, 
. .. dialectic means that the process of movement which characterises human history is not a 
smooth development but a development caused by conflicts and contradictions which lead to 
temporary resolutions, like two people arguing with each other (1983: 29, emphasis added). 
From this point of view, society is seen as a battlefield of dissensus, which hinges on force 
exercised by some of its members over others. It is not viewed as a 'voluntary association of 
people who share certain values and set up institutions in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of cooperation' (Dahrendorf 1969a: 488). By running the risk of 
oversimplification I may schematically summarise, drawing on Dahrendorf (1969a), the 
differences between the Marxist and functionalist views of society as in the table below: 
Durkheim and Renfrew Marx and Gilman 
Consensus theory of society Conflict theory of society 
Functionalist approach N on-Functionalist/Marxist app roach 
I.Society is a stable structure of elements. I.Society is constantly subject to change. 
2.Society is a well-integrated system. 2.Society is characterised by dissensus. 
3.Every element in a society has a function, 3.Every element in a society contributes to 
i.e., renders a contribution to its stability. its disintegration and change. 
4.Every functioning social system is based 4.Every society is based on the coercion of 
on a consensus of values among its members. some of its members by others . 
.. 
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At this juncture, it seems useful to take a closer look at Marx's view of the dialectic 
between oppositions as the source of social change. What kind of contradictions, in a 
dialectical intercourse, brings about change? The above discussion has probably led us to 
suspect a particular type of contradiction,. namely that between the interests of different 
groups of social actors. As Hodder (1986) notes, this type of contradiction re~ers to class 
divisions in which a dominant group of people controls the means of production and 
appropriates the product of other people's labour to their own advantage. Here 'the interests 
of the two classes are contradictory since the expansion of the one class is at the expense of 
the other' (Hodder 1986: 580). Moreover, in Marx's theory, while in capitalist societies the 
extortion of surplus by the dominant group is taken to be achieved through control of the 
means of production, in precapitalist societies (where producers are usually found in 
possession of their own means of production) surplus is seen to be extracted through the 
exercise of power which may take the form offorce (Wolf 1981; Gilman 1991). 
As well as the first type of contradictions (incompatibility of interests), Marx suggested a 
second one that is held to underlie and be" linked to the former. This type involves the 
contradictions between the forces and relations of production. The forces of production 
consist of the means of production (environment, technologies) and the organisation of the 
labour force participating in production. The social relations of production are those which 
determine the division of labour (who works and who does not), the use of the environment 
according to the technology available, and the forms of the product's appropriation and 
allocation (Friedman 1974: 446; Hodder 1986). 
Drawing on Marxism, Gilman criticised Renfrew's functionalist account of the emegence 
of prehistoric chieftainships. Consistent with his Marxist standpoint, Gilman tried to trace the 
dialectic of contradictions between the forces and relations of production that brought about 
social stratification and pcrmanently established ruling classes. Looking closely at the model 
we see that it represents an archaeological application of Marx's dialectic betwecn the 
contradictions of the means and relations of production as the source of social change. 
Prehistoric farmers are seen to adopt Mediterranean Polyculture in order to maintain or 
increase their material security and thus be self-sufficient. This obviously promotes further 
the maintenance of the egalitarian order for its goal is an ideal Domestic Mode of Production 
and consumption, which does not require exchanges that can. create obligatiol1s and debts 
among households. In this sense, producers can remain independent. However, the new 
agricultural technology adopted, while on the one hand can be seen as a 'remedi for the 
strengthening of the self-sufficiency of the Domestic Mode of Production and by extension 
for the negation of inequalities, bears a series of changes in relations of production. 
Mediterranean Polyculture was risky because it invited land disputes and raiding. In order to 
ensure the success of the new technology and the rewards of security and independence that it 
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facilitated, land had now to be guarded and required protectors. This led to internal 
contradictions between the means and relations of production within the system which 
resulted in social change; the new technology which aimed to promote the security of 
individuals (and by extension, the maintenance of an autonomous way of living) left farmers 
unprotected to relations of subjugation. Most significantly, to Gilman, the rise of leadership 
and social inequalities is a problem creator rather than a problem solver. 
Be that as it may, Gilman's argument is as one-sided as that of Renfrew. The architecture 
of coercion is usually fragile and short-lived. In other words, although we should not naively 
see ruling elites as nurturant and altruistic figures, equally we should not lose sight of the fact 
that it is difficult to employ naked force to ensure the submission of subjects to dominant 
groups over the long term (cf. Kus 1982). The ideal for most societies, as Wiessner (1996: 7) 
points out, is the protective and generous leader, not the bully or the despot. Yet,' protection 
and generosity alike can be used as subtle strategies to exert influence rather than expressions 
of disinterested affection. 
Mediterranean Polyculture as capital intensive technique and self-
sufficiency: Critical comments 
According to Gilman, ruling elites did not e~erge due to the erosion of Neolithic self-
sufficiency. Yet, it was the striving of prehistoric farmers to maintain self-sufficiency that 
apparently, made them adopt the labour intensive technique of Mediterranean Polyculture. In 
his view, the high productivity potential of olives and vines would have been highly attractive 
to BA farmers seeking subsistence security and political autonomy. Nevertheless, the new 
technology brought about the unpleasant effect of tying people to their land cutting off ~heir 
means of escaping aspirant leaders who sold protection. However, one may wonder as Hicks 
(1981: 12) remarks, from whom did the farmers seek to be protected. Gilman has not .clarified 
this question in any detail. On the other hand, although he thought Mediterranean Polyculture 
.' 
would increase material security, it seems to be a risky choice for farmers. Olives do not yield 
fruits for ten to fifteen years and vines for three years after planting. On this score, we may 
ask why farmers would adopt such a practice. The profits of this form of agriculture, ~hich 
are so temporally distant and force people to remain on the land, exposed them to predation 
by others. One may wonder why farmers would adopt Mediterranean Polyculture·rather than 
moving on to other places. On balance, is the choice to move on to new land really a 
substantial risk? 
Furthermore, it is not clear why Gilman connects the emergence of chieftainship 
particularly to the adoption of capital intensive techniques, such as Mediterranean 
Polyculture, since every form of agriculture entails investment, delayed returns and lasting 
bonds between cooperative units that impede social segmentation (see Meillasoux 1972; 
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1981). Bietti Sestieri (1981: 9) has made a similar point. Contrary to Gilman, she stresses that 
even slash-and-burn agriculture demands investment and thus can prevent social 
segmentation. More specifically, slash-and-burn agriculture promotes territorial fixity for 
several years, if farmers are to fertilise the soil by burning tree stumps at fixed intervals 
(Mann 1986: 45). 
Finally, Runnels and Hansen's research has marked a turning point in our perceptions 
concerning the traditional causal link between the domestication of olives and the rise of 
ruling elites. As it was proposed, the pollen evidence indicates that for most areas of Greece, 
olive cultivation did not constitute an intensive agricultural technique until the end of the BA. 
Thus, as for th.e Early and Middle Bronze Age, Runnels and Hansen (1986) argued that the 
scarcity of ecofacts implies an opportunistic use of olives and does not confirm its rise to 
economic prominence. This notion is also reinforced by the absence of durable tools for 
processing olives for olive oil. Undoubtedly, the above realisation seems to shake the 
foundations of both the SIR model as well as Gilman's Marxist take. 
Social Storage 
Presentation of Halstead and O'Shea ~ model 
A more recent economic consideration concerning the emergence of social inequalities and 
the development of central authority in the Aegean Bronze Age world has been established 
through the concept of Social Storage (O'Shea 1981, Halstead and O'Shea 1982, Halstead 
1981a, 1988, 1989). According to this model which was developed through a rewor~g of 
the notion of redistribution and the Childean idea of surplus, the emergence of social 
disparities on Crete is held to be based upon reciprocal relations of provision and repayment 
of subsistence relief amongst prehistoric farmers. The bare outlines of the social storage 
>. 
model can be summarised as follows: 
Parting company from the rosy images of primitive societies (such as hunter-gatherers) as 
the 'original affluent society' where everyone can find an abundance of food (Sahlins 1972), 
the Social Storage model emphasises recurrent shortages in food resources as a universal fact 
of life with which people have to cope if they are to survive. To minimize the risk of famine, 
if agricultural yields were insufficient because of periodic climatic variations, Bronze Age 
farmers could have stored the surplus from good years. However, the primitive storage 
teclmologies at this time made the asset of direct storage - especially in the case of a run of 
bad years - impractical. A second safeguard against periodic scarcity is by using some surplus 
grain to feed livestock. By this form of indirect storage, normal surplus from a good year can 
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be converted to animal food for subsistence in the event of a future harvest failure. An 
alternative solution is provided by the practice of 'social storage', under which 'surplus grain 
can be given to needy neighbours in the expectation that help will be reciprocated when 
circumstances are reversed' (Halstead 1988: 524). Hence, under the imperative of assuring 
survival, people can be locked in a situation of interdependence which in tum provides the 
germ of social differentiation. 
More than this, the system of social storage, which is taken to be stimulated mainly by the 
heterogeneous environment of South Greece, involves transactions whereby foodstuffs may 
be exchanged for more valuable tokens (craftgoods) and/or labour that can later be re-
exchanged for food in times of need. In the long-run, however, as it was suggested, social 
storage could have promoted further the growth of successful farmers' fortunes at the expense 
of the rest, as these amassed promises of repayment for subsistence relief which would have 
to be made in the form of craft valuables and/or labour. These unbalanced transactions 
amongst households seemed therefore to have set the scene for the rise of social inequalities 
since 'some social groups will have been net lenders and others net borrowers' (Halstead 
1988: 525). In addition, the status of successful farmers could be further reinforced by the 
power of persuasion - through their ostensible capacity to mediate with supernatural forces in 
order to stop crop failure. In such ways, then, an elite could have developed, which 
increasingly expanded its power within society. 
The morality of social integration and inequality: The successful farmer 
Social Storage continues the tradition of previous models in that it brings to the fore the 
question of why Aegean prehistoric people gave up independent living in egalitarian 
communities for controlled life in state-ordered, hierarchical societies. Arguably however, it 
appears to provide a more balanced scenario based on cooperation and persuasion c~ncerning 
the moral foundation of BA inequalities and leadership than those proposed by Renfrew and 
Gilman. Although the ··view of the imposition of power as functional necessity is not radically 
left behind, the model is more realistic in its assumptions for human nature. Leaders do not 
need to be necessarily altruistic parental figures motivated by the best intentions for their 
subjects, yet on the other hand, naked force or exploitation may not be particularly effective 
in the imposition and rationalisation of powerful elites . 
. As already noted, Social Storage suggests that ruling elites came into being through the 
transformation of initially reciprocal exchanges of food relief among prehistoric farmers. We 
may presume that what was involved at that stage was a communal commitment to a common 
good. However, this reciprocity is then seen to transform over time by the repayment for 
agricultural foodstuffs by non-food tokens and labour into an unbalanced relationship of 
dominance and subjugation. Under these circumstances, unlucky farmers preferring equality 
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to oppression will regrettably have starved. On the other hand, successful farmers could give 
food relief to their needy neighbours not so much motivated by pure altruistic instincts but 
rather driven by the opportunity to accumulate debt obligations by giving food they did not 
need anyway and thus develop into agents of power. Halstead further stressed the persuasive 
power of religion for the legitimation and reproduction of elite status. As Halstead himself 
remarks, the Social Storage model proposes 'a state redistributive system which provides 
quite tangible benefits for the many and at the same time mobilises resources for the few' 
(1988: 524). Finally, according to the point of view adopted, over time, the provision of food 
relief might have given way to an economy more and more dominated by exploitative 
mobilisation (Halstead 1988). This shift probably reduced palatial elites' capacity to cope 
with subsistence crises and subsequently provoked violent popular reaction which led to the 
collapse of the palatial institutions (Halstead and O'Shea 1982; Halstead 1988). 
To support this theory, Halstead (1988) argued that the combination of archival, 
archaeological and analogical evidence implies a specific type of redistribution namely, one 
which incorporated both pooling and mobilisation. The palatial institutions seemed to have 
been involved in an alternative pooling system with a relief function buffering society in 
cases of extreme subsistence crises. Nevertheless, the most obvious function of palatial 
redistribution - which in contrast to the likely opportunistic redistribution of food relief 
documented in the Linear B archives - appears to be the mobilisation of resources for the 
benefit of palatial elites and their courtiers. This upward channeling of goods fmanced 
activities directed by the ruling elites for the legitimation of their own status. Halstead 
(1992b: 74) has suggested three types of such activities: the giving of craft-goods to reward 
service, the exchange of prestige objects as guest gifts with foreign elites and the perfo~ance 
of ritual ceremonies. Besides, as the documentary evidence reveals, the palatial authority was 
promoted by the levy of taxes in a range of non-staple commodities and perhaps 9f labour 
services. According to Halstead (1 992b, 1994), the collection of taxes might have been 
decentralised. Still, taxation could be considered as an indirect coercive obligation for the 
population in a wider psychological sense5• Nevertheless, the specific obligation appears to 
have been kept upon a basis of tacit agreement. Its coercive nature might have been masked 
by the relief function of the palaces or other mechanisms of persuasion within a channel of 
cooperation between the palatial and non-palatial sectors. It is also likely that the palaces gave 
out specialised craft-goods or intangible services. It is worth noting however, that palatial 
generosity in the form of the provision of subsistence relief and other tangible and intangible 
resources could be considered as an effective vehicle for political domination bearing in mind 
5 According to Denni~ Wrong (1974: 27-28), the term force is not confined to physical force but also 
includes what one may call psychological force or moral violence. 
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that generosity entails the obligation of repayment. Additionally, as Halstead's review of the 
evidence suggests, the palatial control of economic activities was only partial. Thus, several 
commodities were produced in the non-palatial sector. On this score, cooperation between the 
elites and the population may be considered as a basic feature of their relationship. Still, it 
was also asserted that the centralised palatial mechanisms of risk buffering were only brought 
into play for major food crises whereas local institutions coped with minor shortages. 
Accordingly, the centralised 'emergency' mechanisms would have been vulnerable to failure 
since they were rarely used. 'To ensure their maintenance through a run of good years, they 
might have been embedded in other more regular institutions, such as religious festivals or 
ceremonial feasts' (Halstead 1988: 525). In this sense, the performance of rituals and festivals 
could be considered as an important component of the palatial ideological apparatus serving 
the embellishment of ruling authorities. 
In a nutshell, Social Storage provides a more flexible and empirically sound answer 
regarding the moral basis of BA inequalities, since it strongly suggests that the distinction 
held by previous accounts between pure coercion, persuasion and cooperation as the basis of 
elite power constitutes a vain task. Undoubtedly, they co-existed and each of them played its 
part in games of power. Coercion, persuasion and cooperation might have been concealed one 
behind the other and altogether enabled the. outcome of social discourse that made the 
dominant vehicle effective. 
On the other hand, Halstead and 0' Shea do not directly address how and why the initially 
reciprocal exchanges and sharing of food, which according to them promote egalitarian 
relations, were transformed through time into accumulation or hoarding of wealth for 
exploitative loans. In a more recent paper, Halstead (1995) suggests that such a 
transformation can happen because social norms are open to reinterpretation. We may note 
here, that inherent in this view is the long-established anthropological tendency to see forms 
of exchange as the basis for pigeonholing different societies' political structures on an 
evolutionary ladder from simple to complex. Echoing Fried (1967: 35), Halstead appears to 
suggest that the move from egalitarian to rank societies is basically a shift from an economy 
characterised for the most part by sharing and reciprocity to one giving prominence to 
redistribution, mobilisation and accumulation (1995, 1999). Interestingly, the shift in question 
is also perceived in moral terms as a shift from brotherly egalitarian relations to increased 
exploitation escalating in relations of domination. The notion of religion with its implications 
of moral solidarity and integration and unambiguous boundaries is projected by traditional 
accounts in the profane arena of life through the concept of reciprocity (Weiner 1992: 28-31 
and 40-43). However, as recent advancements in anthropology have clearly revealed, this 
projection is based upon unwarranted assumptions (see Douglas 1990; Schneider 1974; 
Weiner 1980, 1992'; Weissner 1996). More specifically, not only does the idea of evolution 
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from sharing and reciprocity to keeping and mobilisation find no real historical credibility but 
also sharing and reciprocity do not constitute philanthropic, interest-free acts. Following 
Weiner (1992, 1980), I suggest that reciprocity instead of neutralising power and cementing 
social cohesion forms the very core upon which hierarchy resides. As anthropologists have 
begun to make us aware, what promotes reciprocity is its opposite, namely the urge to keep 
something back from the pressures of give and take. Significantly, that which is not 
exchanged establishes difference between persons or groups. In Weiner's words, 
The seemingly linear aspects of reciprocal give and take are merely overt attempts to become part 
of, to participate in, or conversely, to snare, what is not part of that exchange. Difference denies the 
concept of homogeneous circumstance in which the gift given merely elicits a reciprocal return 
without thought of an inalienable possession's radiating presence [and] political energy (1992: 42). 
Climatic heterogeneity and the erosion of self-sufficiency: Critical 
comments 
It should be clear that according to Social Storage, the decisive factor threatening domestic 
self-sufficiency was the risky heterogeneous environment of southern Greece. This called for 
a 'social storage' solution which subsequently resulted in the emergence of social inequalities. 
Yet, is it true, as Halstead and O'Shea (1982) argue, that social storage networks which 
promote economic interdependence occur in areas of heterogeneous environment? This, of 
course could be part of the story but the real test lies in how we are able to explain 'null 
cases'. In fact, the generalisation does not seem to hold true since there is no convincing 
empirical evidence. In other words, if we are to limit the existence of inequalities to societies 
that saw palaces or other monumental manifestations of inequality, why does palatial 
civilisation not find parallels throughout the Mediterranean, in areas characterised by a regime 
of precipitation similar to that of Crete. The question has been posed in the past by Cherry 
(1984) and Lewthwaite (1983). So far there is no satisfactory answer. Barker'.s (1981) 
examination of the case of central Italy suggests that the natural relief of central Italy, despite 
being Mediterranean, 'presents differences compared to that of Crete. Still, this study does not 
examine the issue of climatic heterogeneity that holds a prominent place in Halstead and 
O'Shea's model. Instead, it attributes the absence of palaces in central Italy to the late 
appearance of polycultural systems and the limited opportunities of the specific landscape for 
regional specialisation and redistributional mechanisms needing easy transport. Clearly, 
Barker's comparison between Central Italy and Crete relies on Renfrew's questionable model 
of agricultural specialisation and Mediterranean Polyculture an~ therefore cannot be used to 
substantiate Halstead and O'Shea's theory6. As for Sardinia, Lewthwaite (1983) commented 
6 Halstead (personal communication) remarks that Central Italy is situated at a higher latitude and 
therefore may experi~.nce more precipitation so that yield variability should be less. Yet, this 
suggestion has not be tested so far. 
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that it does not display the heterogeneity observed for Crete but rather its inter-annual 
precipitation is similar to Thessaly, so the non-appearance of palaces there may validate 
Halstead and O'Shea's theory. On the other hand, the cases of the environmentally 
heterogeneous Corsica (Lewthwaite 1983) and Cyprus7 where palatial societies did not 
emerge strongly indicate that the Social Storage model is not of general validity. . 
Be that as it may, there is a further question in my mind, most specifically whether 
climatic heterogeneity could have automatically undermined subsistence self-sufficiency in 
Crete itself as assumed by Social Storage. Arguably, if heterogeneity was extreme in the 
sense that bad years could have affected some people within the community and not all, we 
could imagine together with Social Storage the appearance of wealth inequalities at an intra-
communal level. However, although at first sight such a scenario appears to be a possibility, 
one may ask why farmers would have chosen to be involved in exchanges of food that 
inflicted debts and dependence and not practice agricultural diversification which could offer 
them subsistence autonomy. 
By agricultural diversification I do not mean simply the cultivation of a variety of crops in 
a given plot. No doubt, such a strategy may' operate as a safeguard against yield failure. 
Nevertheless, under severe widespread climatic conditions, all the crops cultivated on the 
same plot may perform badly, and this can be ~een as the result of the severity of the climatic 
perturbation in combination with the particular topographical and environmental 
susceptibilities of the locality. It is interesting to consider a different kind of diversification 
not discussed in detail in Social Storage, namely the growing of a variety of crops in a variety 
of places. The adoption of this practice means that really bad years will be forfeited since it is 
extremely unlikely that there will be a year in which all the crops will perform badly in all 
places (Osborne 1987). In fact, the practice of fragmented holdings is well known to modern 
fanners of Crete and most significantly its roots can be traced back to classical antiquity. 
Osborne (1987) has intimated its prevalence in southern Greece and the islands. And I can 
remember my grandparents keeping scattered lands in their village on eastern Crete. To the 
sceptical reader such a strategy may appear ineffective because of the energy spent walking to 
the fields and the time needed for travel from parcel to parcel. However, as Osborne remarks, 
'for the subsistence farmer it may be much more important to avoid years with no crops at all 
than to save time, a commodity which the family supplies in plentiful quantities'·(1987: 38). 
For us the essential point is that, given the climatic heterogeneity assumed by Social Storage 
for· Crete, the practice of fragmented holdings could. have prevented economic 
interdependence among farmers since shortages' in one plot could be balanced out by 
7 Cyprus presents a picture of great environmental and climatic heterogeneity and moreover is an island 
of similar size to Cret.~. The great rainfall variability in Cyprus is clearly revealed by records of rainfall 
that are available for areas much more smaller than the nomoi of Crete (see Christodoulou 1979). 
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sufficient yields in other plots at the level of individual households. This is not to say that 
exchanges between different households did not take place at all, but rather that exchanges 
might not have been driven primarily from the risk of food dearth. At the same time, we 
cannot ignore that the success of the practice of keeping scattered plots varied among 
individual units depending on the size of their labour force. The point to be emphasised is that 
availability of a labour force rather than competition for land of any kind would have 
constituted the decisive factor concerning variations in yield histories among different 
households, given the small population figures of most EBA communities. At this juncture, 
one may raise serious doubts concerning the likely existence of the practice of keeping 
scattered plots I have assumed for BA farmers, since there is no empirical evidence to support 
it. Still, it is worth considering the answer given by present-day Cretan fanners to the question 
of why they keep scattered plots: 'that's the way our grandfathers did it'. This 'grandfather 
response' (Allad 1975 cited in Forbes 1989) very often legitimises agricultural practices 
pursued by fanners 'which appear to the field researcher as survival mechanisms' (Forbes 
1989: 87). However, even if we find it difficult to accept that fragmented land-holdings were 
maintained in the remote prehistoric past, holdings consisting of a number of small plots 
scattered widely would possibly come about through inheritance and marriages, whether 
endogamous or exogamous. Exogamy, in part~cular could have reinforced the situation still 
further so that people might have kept plots not only in their own village but also in other 
places from which their partners came. Interestingly, exogamy not only produces alliances but 
also holds great economic potential since it expands the territory of resource exploitation and 
widens the exchange and sanctuary range of the community contributing to its perpetuation 
under adverse circumstances (Fried 1967). Unfortunately we cannot be certain about the ,exact 
form of post-marital residence patterns, since we do not know the particular rules of 
inheritance or the structure of kinship which would have determined place of residence after 
marriage and consequently the shifts of people and landed property in the landscape. 
Arguably however, there is no reason to rule out the possibility of the existence of an 
exogamous partner network given the small size of the majority of EBA communities8• 
On the other hand, one may argue against an even distribution of inheritance among all 
the offspring. Certainly, the issue of which members of the sibling groups were the 
beneficiaries is a crucial one and we cannot rule out the possibility that only the offspring of a 
particular sex or seniority had rights to the parental property. This could have brought 
significant disparities among individuals in wealth. At this point however, we could mention a 
widespread and long-held practice in Crete regarding the inheritance of scattered plots. 
8 Early Minoan II Myrtos for instance consisted of around six households (Whitelaw 1983). Similarly 
Vasiliki does not seerp. to have had a population of over 200 people at that time. Thus the residents of 
such small communities should have been forced to look for partners in a wider region. 
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Parents are reluctant to give to one child a whole plot of land situated in a specific place and 
to the others different whole plots situated in other localities. Rather they prefer to divide each 
individual plot of land into smaller shares as all the offspring retain a part of the parental 
property in each locality. I cannot help asking why this is so, or postulate likely reasons, such 
as justice of inheritance, sentimental principles or just tradition. However, such a practice 
seems to prevent significant inequalities in inheritance as far as the quality of land is 
concerned. Importantly, although we do not need to take for granted the idea of justice in 
inheritance that has prevailed 'as a moral code' for centuries throughout Greece and Cyprus9 
(Christodoulou 1959), we may assume a relatively balanced division of land among offspring, 
bearing in mind the significance of agriculture in pre-industrial societies. This is not 
surprising, since in Greece and Cyprus until recently agriculture was nearly the only form of 
living and land the only fonn of capital (Christodoulou 1959: 86). In short, if we assume a 
similar situation for prehistory, we would expect inheritance to be divided - in tenns of both 
quality and quantity - relatively evenly. All the children should have had some land to till and 
taste its fruits. One may remark that such an imperative for the division of land would have 
resulted, together with the acquisition of land by marriages, in a field layout of fragmented 
and diffuse land holdings, which could have spread the risk of total or extreme yield failure 
that undermines household subsistence autonomy. 
Finally, in discussions I had with local agriculturists and old fanners at the neighbouring 
villages of Episkopi and Kato Horio in eastern Crete, I asked them about the scale of 
heterogeneity that they and their co-villagers experience in a single year. While they admitted 
that an uneven distribution of rainfall may lead to different yield figures amorig individual 
households, they stressed that these are not that extreme. Moreover, they added that the, scale 
of heterogeneity in most cases has not to be seen so much as the product of climatic 
calamities but as the result of a combination of factors including not only climate, but also 
human management and lack of human labour through death or disease. In particular, elders 
practicing agriculture before the fifties could recall lean years owing to extremely poor 
precipitation or other serious climatic perturbations, but stressed that these bad years were not 
really common and were experienced relatively evenly by individual households within the 
village. Besides, the most significant subsistence crisis documented by the local people was 
not the result of a natural perturbation but of the Gennan occupation during the Second World 
War. However, as they intimated, even in that case the states of starvation on the island were 
not as severe as those recorded for the urban areas of Greece. Forbes's (1989) fieldwork on 
9 As Christodoulou has pointed out 'parents are disinclined to wrong any of their children and children 
will not miss even a square food of their due share in the family property ... [moreover] ... every child 
will be given a portion of the property to start him off in life, ot in the case of the girl, to marry her oir 
(1959: 86). .. 
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Methana confirms the fact that serious subsistence crises more usually than not are the 
outcome of social perturbations. To return to my local informants, they could not see how a 
serious natural disaster could have produced great variability in the availability of food within 
the same community. Most of them pointed out that even in exceptionally bad years some 
food is harvested and that indeed some farmers may cover minimally their alimentary needs 
while some others may do a little better. That more food is harvested by some households in a 
bad year does not mean however, that it is enough to cover through exchange the needs of the 
more unfortunate promoting thus significantly the fortunes of the givers. Bearing in mind the 
accounts of the local informants, it may be said that at least at a village level it is difficult to 
accept Halstead and O'Shea's theory of the existence of extreme inequalities in yield figures 
that could have seriously undermined subsistence self-sufficiency giving rise to village ruling 
elites. Plainly, this fact poses a serious challenge to Social Storage. This is especially so 
keeping in mind Haggis's apt observation that the picture of the Late Prepalatial society on 
Crete demonstrates the centrality of ritual in games of power, still the cemetery itself 'was 
clearly viable on the local level' (1999: 68, emphasis added). 
The body as unfinished project: A replacement for self-sufficiency 
I suggest that the historical question of inequality has been grounded on the fiction of a self-
sufficient Domestic Mode of Production that can be undermined historically by the 
peculiarities of a specific environment and changes in this environment. In other words, 
people are forced to adapt and passively accept dominant elites imposed by outside forces 
which jeopardise their physical survival. People's insufficiency is recognised in subsistence 
because they are held to be above all bodies in a strictly organic sense. I would like to 
challenge this idea. 
We should not ignore that the human body is simultaneously biological and social. One of 
the most obvious truIsms about human beings is that in one sense they are bodies like any 
other animal. One noticeable feature of our corporeal existence is that it involves us in a daily ~ 
'labour of eating, washing, grooming, dressing and sleeping' (Turner 1984: 1). Traditionally, 
and as the Aegean models presented above exhibit, the physical needs of the body have been 
seen as constraining factors that people have to deal with in order to survive. Our· bodies need 
food if they are not to perish as well as security and shelter in order to be protected from 
natural and extra-natural forces. Accordingly, my physical needs inherent to my biology mean 
that I am not a finished product or a self-sufficient entity at birth but rather a project to be 
constantly tended. and laboured upon throughout my life-cycle as if towards a sense of 
completeness (cf. Ingold 2000; Shilling 1993). We might say that people's physical needs 
stimulate a various 'range of practices to take place. These might include food gathering, the 
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clearance of fields, the cultivation of plants, the breeding of animals, foraging for raw 
materials, the fashioning of tools and pots as well as innumerable other activities that involve 
a coming together of individuals, groups and resources. Yet, it would be misleading to argue 
that the human body's incompleteness and seeking of a sense of finality are merely the 
outcome of its needs, if we are to perceive needs narrowly as biological necessities. A 
common doctrine of social analyses is to see needs as necessities and desires as luxuries. 
However, this notion which bears significantly on the popular distinction between nature and 
culture and emanates from the idea that failure to satisfy needs results in biological 
malfunction and impairment is difficult to maintain. As Turner (1984: 27) has pointed out, the 
distinction between needs and desires is a value-judgement since what we take to be needs are 
in reality constituted by culture and more specifically by cultural expectations about what is 
normal or natural. More than this, we need to recognise that facts which point towards the 
body's incomplete nature such as biological reproduction or maintenance as well as the 
body's subjection to processes of birth, aging and death are not at all simply biological - in 
fact they are strongly embedded in society. 
Above all, social action cannot be reduced to logistics of self-preservation and adaptation 
in a physical environment. All of this is not to say for example that people will not starve if 
they do not eat. Still, what they will chose to eat (even in periods of food scarcity), when, how 
and how much is not determined just by the physical instinct of hunger and may vary 
according to spatio-historical contigencies. 'People do not eat species, they eat meals' 
(Sherratt 1991: 221). Eating has a social dimension in the sense that people do not eat just to 
survive; they also eat to offer themselves gastronomic pleasure, to socialise, to 'celebrate, to 
display generosity, to make a statement about their identity, to remember an event .or to 
indicate a religious belief (by having specific meals). It is noteworthy that there are cases 
where even in periods of food dearth10 people may abstain from food which is considered to 
be taboo or to contain a special meaning within their cultural milieu. One may recall the 
Jewish and Muslim food and drink prohibitions. Food consumption therefore is a socially 
meaningful arena and a communication code (Hamilakis 1999). Similarly, while caring for 
dress might appear as a need enforced by our organic nature, it is actually not merely a means 
for protection but also a medium of symbolic display culturally acquired (cf. Giddens 1991). 
Finally, the fact that the body changes, develops and perishes organically throughout one's 
lifecyc1e constitutes a theme of various social elaborations invested with work and meaning. 
It may be that the very fear and inevitability of death motivate a need to fmd or fabricate 
10 The case of the Bantu Bemba people in Africa is illuminating regarding this matter. As Pearson 
notes: 'The Bemba tribe ... keeps chickens, but they do not use these for food, except for ceremonial 
occasions, or as presents of respect~ nor do they ever eat the eggs. Pigeons are kept but very rarely 
eaten even in times of hunger ... "we like to see them flying about the village" says the native, "it is a 
sign ofa man of rank;" (1957: 336). 
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answers to ontological questions and create theories of existence, namely cosmologies. They 
also light up the desire to secure pennanence and immortality, to make memory persist, to 
transcend deterioration in a serial world that is constantly subject to loss and decay (Weiner 
1992). 
Accepting the unfinished nature of the body at birth enables us to recognise that all human 
bodies are socially constructed (Shilling 1993) and therefore non self-sufficient. Human 
babies are not born walking or talking (Ingold 2000: 377) or having table manners. It was the 
genius of Marcel Mauss (1973 [1935]) who first referred to the techniques a/the body. That 
is, the socially and culturally specific ways according to which human beings know how to 
use their bodies. Seemingly natural bodily activities such as walking, jumping, running, 
swimming and even spitting are learned through socialisation and practice. Equally important 
was Mauss's conclusion that the techniques of the body can vary not only by age and gender 
but also from culture to culturell . In a nutshell, the human body is an unfinished project that 
demands people to invest themselves and the world around them with work and meaning. For 
as Shilling (1993: 101-102) succinctly remarks, unlike animals whose instinctual structure at 
birth is specialised and directs them into a world with more or less completely determined 
possibilities, humans are very loosely programmed to survive within their environment. Their 
instinctual make-up at birth is not as specialis~d as that of animals and therefore their world 
and its territories and dangers are relatively open. Consequently: 
Humans must make a world in order to survive. . .. Humans must free themselves in action from 
the dangers to their survival which is inherent in the unfinishedness of their embodiment. This 
action consists of both physical intervention and investments of meaning. Because the world is not 
pre-set for humans, as it is for animals, humans need to manage the superabundance of data that 
threatens to overwhelm their senses. In effect, humans need to create a meaningful world for 
themselves by saturating their environment with meaning and shape. They must do this in order for 
there to be a world they can physically act on, in order to survive in (Shilling 1993: 102). 
Up until now, I have simply spoken about bodies as if they operated in a dimension unto 
their own. Bodies are more than simply objects. They are conditions that relate us to our 
environment, other people and things (Harrison 2000). Above all, bodies are mediums 
through which the world is interpreted. At this stage, I would like to touch on some of the 
finer points of embodiment. Firstly, the Cartesian dualism between body and mind - a 
prevailing theme for discussion in Western philosophical traditi~n - is inadequat~. The body 
is not the shelter of the mind but rather, understanding is a corporeal phenomenon; the mind is 
embodied (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Crucially, the body is a basic means of self-
identification (Giddens 1991). Notably, the exploration of the properties and contours of the 
body constitutes one of the original explorations of the world by the child. The child does not 
11 Mauss (1973 [193~]) was able to demonstrate the cultural contigencies of the techniques of the body 
by studying the different ways of marchin~ between the French and British infantries. 
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understand the body as a separate entity 'because self-consciousness emerges through bodily 
differentiation rather than the other way round' (Giddens 1991: 56). Equally important, the 
body holds a significant role in the process of social interaction by sending out messages of 
intent through facial expressions, body movements and postures (Goffman 1990 [1959]). 
These entail a shared code of communication within a given social context. 
Human beings therefore, embody the world as sensory organs. Engaging with others and 
the environment around them, they selectively relate to and make distinctions between 
objects, people, places that come into their sensory array in order to create understanding. For 
Bataille (1998) bodies are contextual in the sense that they found their perception of the self 
upon a web of interrelationships with other people and their environment. According to him, 
unlike animals which are entire to themselves and only communicate in a rudimentary way, 
human beings separate themselves as they start to defme themselves as a species. This is a 
process of objectification, which as Bataille suggests implies a relation of subordination. The 
incompleteness of human body at birth helps us understand that human beings are not self-
sufficient ready-made entities. People, I suggest, wish to bind themselves to others and things 
seeking to heal the absence and incompleteness they feel in themselves. On the whole, when 
we communicate with other people, we do so with the realisation that we are incomplete 
beings, not relating directly but communicating across the gap of our mutual incompleteness 
and insufficiency (Bataille 1998). 
The course of history can no longer be seen as a gradual ascent from an original Eden of 
an isolated domestic self-sufficiency that celebrated freedom to a self-sufficiency achieved 
through a poisonous socialisation that trades liberty for subjugation and· dependence. 
Inequalities do not emerge because ecological stimuli force people to recognise suddenly the 
common good, or wake up their latent egotistic interests and Machiavellian characters. The 
issue is not whether inequalities emerge because of an awareness for common· good or 
because people are inherently bad and manipulative, but whether the question of emergence 
has any justified basis. Interdependence is universal and we do not need to invent either a 
heterogeneous climate or an ecologically driven subsistence specialisation to account for it. 
For even if households can be self-sufficient in subsistence matters and therefore without the 
need for economic exchange, an opening towards other people is necessary for the 
reproduction of the productive unit. Unlike the productive cycle; as Meillassoux (1978b: 162-
163; see also Friedman and Rowlands 1977; Paynter and Cole 1980) has long ago remarked, 
the reproductive cycle is not self-sufficient. Domestic units as portrayed by Sahlins may be 
capable of appropriating the environment and reproducing technologies. However, production 
requires labour fo!ce as well as raw materials and tools to transform the raw material. Thus, 
domestic units are not self-sufficient, if they are to reproduce the conditions of tlleir existence. 
In other words, 'we need a notion of household that can transform raw materials with 
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reproducible labour force and technologies' (Pa)nter and Cole 1980: 91). Accordingly, as 
Paynter and Cole (1980) point out, the logic of the household economy does not contradict or 
negate society it requires society. Notably, so called domestic values such as biological 
reproduction and nurturance as well as cosmologies underwrite political and economic actions 
in material ways that decisively break down the traditional domestic/public boundaries 
(Weiner 1992: 4). For all these values do not bring just people and ideas or questions of 
ontological security together but also resources which are not simply ideologies located 
outside material production and consumption. One may note here that cosmologies are 
material in the sense that they consist of sacred objects and other material implements. 
Equally, the exchange of wives or various initiation rites marking the social becoming of 
bodies cannot be thought, or acquire efficacy, without the production and manipulation of 
specific material possessions. 
Moreover, I would like to suggest that once we recognise societies as moral communities 
in the sense that human beings have always evaluated and acted on their evaluations in order 
to create a meaningful word to act upon, the question of the emergence becomes redundant. 
Every society must produce and reproduce certain elements of value in order to achieve 
continuity (Weiner 1980). Evaluation, I believe, is closely linked to our incomplete and non-
sufficient nature at hirth. The association be~een value and inequality will be examined in 
detail in a later chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The materiality of inequalities 
and the problematic of wealth 
Introd uction 
The primary aim of the previous chapter was to reveal the intellectual linkage between different 
models of the emergence of social inequalities arising from a tendency to lay a great emphasis on 
patterns of economic interdependence originating from the subsistence sector of everyday life. 
Notably, the above models seem to assume a kind of unequal control and distribution of wealth 
built into the agricultural domain of economy. This in turn is thought more or less to have 
promoted, or at least translated into, the inequalities whose material manifestations are witnessed 
in the Minoan archaeological record in the form of 'palaces', golden ornaments, exotic imports, 
etc. Looking critically at this perception one can of course agree that wealth may bring about or 
manifest power. However, the automatic correla.tion of wealth with power that many Aegeanists 
tend to employ in their models of the emergence of inequality, requires further reflection. For 
instead of creating a solid platform for research, it utilizes a series of taken for granted 
assumptions that begs more questions than it answers and undermines the fruitful study of 
inequality. 
What is missing from most of the above accounts is a detailed examination of political 
economy. I argue in this chapter that although models of the emergence of inequality are 
concerned with the implications of economic action in the creation of relations of pow~r (namely 
with the domain of political economy) in fact they usually offer accounts of the domain of 
economy restricted to economic processes 1 in the sense of agricultural technologies. At this 
juncture, it must be noted that for years there has been much discussion among economic 
anthropologists about the kinds of activities that can be defmed as economic (see Firth 1965 
[1939], 1967; Godelier 1972, 1978; Nash 1966; Schneider 1974). At the moment, I will not 
attempt to offer my view on what the term economic may encompass but comply ,,:ith a popular 
defmition offered by the economic anthropologist Maurice Godelier (1978). For Godelier, the 
economic domain is comprised by operations whereby people produce, distribute and consume 
1 Economic processes constitute a different type of economic phenomenon from economic relationships 
(Cohen 1974: 22). This will be discussed in detail below. 
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the material means of their existence as well as services which involve use and exchange of 
material means. 
To return to the Aegean models of inequalitY, the introduction of new species,. the production 
of different food staples such as grapes, olives, pulses and grain, agricultural specialisation, 
capital intensification practices, the management and distribution of specialised products, the 
storing and exchange of a normal surplus - all these appear to be economic activities if we follow 
the above definition. People undertake such activities (certainly not without any risks involved) to 
secure and/or enlarge their material means of existence that are necessary for achieving various 
goals. This is to say that the ends pursued in the economic domain are in agreement with 
ambitions in other fields of everyday life (Nash 1967: 9). Furthennore, it is not out of place to 
remark that successful carrying out of economic activities such as those mentioned above may 
result in increased material outputs that is a kind ofwealth2• 
Despite the fact that someone has accumulated wealth as a result of economic activities, this 
accumulation cannot spontaneously offer the individual high status or put other people under the 
shadow of their power. In other words, it does not go without saying that wealth and power or 
status are synonymous (cf. Godelier 1999: 205; McKay 1988: 135; Pader 1982: 31). Unequal 
distributions of wealth may inform us about economic inequalities among different people (that is 
the 'distributive' aspect of inequality), but unfortunately they do not say a lot about the 
'behavioural expression' (Berreman 1981) of those inequalities or their bearing on relations 
between people (the 'relational' aspect of inequality)3. This has to be an object of investigation. 
In simple words, I suggest that the passage from an economic to a political economic 
approach is necessary to the study of inequality - particularly if one speculates that there is a kind 
of association between wealth and relational inequalities. However, this can only be achieved by 
showing what this wealth (the likely product of economic activity) can promote or entail in 
political terms. Thus, what we need are narratives that can account for the 'relational' aspects of 
wealth and inequality not just their 'distributive' ones. Hence, if one accepts that wealth can be 
the basis of authority they should illustrate its operation by dealing with two key questions. First,. 
how established wealthy elites acquired their wealth in the first place and second and most 
importantly, how wealth is transformed into power over other people. In this chapter, I will try to 
show that the above questions which concern what I call the 'how' problem of the link between 
2 That is not to say, as I will attempt to show later on, that wealth is defined merely as a quantity of goods. 
3 For the distinction between the 'distributive' and 'relational' aspects of inequality see Beteille (1 969a, 
1977, 1981) and below chapter 5. 
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wealth and relations of inequality have rarely received any serious consideration. Instead, wealth 
is usually seen to convert into power in an automatic way. 
It seems to me that these are questions·· of political economy since they refer to the 
instrumentality of wealth in the formation of political relations. The reason that they have not 
been very thoroughly explored by current accounts - with the exception of Halstead and O'Shea's 
(1982) Social Storage model - is that wealth is seen to acquire instrumentality only in the hands 
of already established elites. The presence of elites is taken to signal the presence of political 
economy; conversely, before elites there is no political economy, but simply subsistence 
economy. In subsistence economies people are assumed to be solely involved in the hunt for 
security and survival, and therefore have very limited economic interests." Over time, 
mysteriously, something suddenly takes place and people become more conscious in economic 
terms. Nevertheless, although people now appear to have more advanced economic interests, 
these are not directly related to the political structure, namely they do not directly shape or inform 
a field of political action. In short, human actors have reinvented themselves as economic animals 
but not yet as political ones. 
No better demonstration of this enigmatic process can be found than in Renfrew's 
Subsistence/Redistribution model. At the end ·of the story we fmd elite minorities who now 
understand how to use their resources and economic profits in order to legitimate their authority. 
Economic interests and material assets appear at this juncture suddenly to relate to the political 
structure. It is only at this stage that Renfrew triumphantly discovers man the p~litical animal. 
The transformation of Homo sapiens into Homo economicus into Homo politicus has been 
completed. Like Renfrew, Gilman perpetuates the idea of an emerging political economy. To 
him, however, the route of human evolution is from a Homo politicus to a Homo economicus. 
Yet, in both accounts we gather the impression that for a great part of human history Homo 
economicus and Homo politicus cannot coexist in the same human body. They are therefore seen 
to constitute two different species. Then all of a sudden, a single species, Homo economicus-
politicus, emerges out of an inexplicable immaculate conception and finds its shelter in the bodies·. 
of the higher echelons of society. In other words, political economy is seen to emerge and evolve. 
It is the victim of the evolutionary paradigm of understanding social phenomena in the same way 
that wealth and inequalities are. 
However, the problematic treatment of wealth by current accounts is not exhausted by the 
'how' problem. There is a further problem. The recognition of some apparent types of wealth in 
the material record encourages an arbitrary point of insertion for the incipience of social 
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inequalities into a chronological timeline. This has additionally resulted in what I call the 'when' 
problem, regarding the relationship of wealth. and inequality. 
There is a widespread assumption among archaeologists (not only among Aegeanists) that a 
ranked society is one which expresses ranking in material wealth (cf. McKay 1988; Webster 
1990) and that this wealth should take particular forms of material manifestation. Significantly, 
although most Aegeanists concur that there is a baseline, namely wealth from which we can 
measure the rise of asymmetrical social relations, they are not in agreement when this happens. In 
the following chapter I will try to show that the controversy rests on different poorly conceived 
understandings of how wealth transforms into power as well as on the visibility (in material 
terms) of this relation. I also hope to show that the two issues - the 'how' and 'when' of wealth -
are closely related in the Aegean accounts of inequality; and that seeking to reveal the 
assumptions to one of them may offer some answer to the other. 
An obvious conclusion may be drawn from the above discussion: If our aim is to reveal the 
ways relational social inequalities are produced by drawing on material resources that is a study 
of political economy, we cannot afford to postpone anymore an analysis of wealth. As Foucault 
has aptly put it, 'the analysis of wealth is to political economy what' general grammar is to 
philology and what natural history is to biology' (1989 [1966]: 182). In ending this preliminary 
discussion about wealth, one last point needs to be brought into the open. Paradoxically, the 
reader has been left with a salient absence; we have encountered wealth throughout the text but 
we have not defmed it clearly. Here, as we will later see, the aim has been to. be purposely 
provocative. Following most Aegean accounts, the question of what wealth may include has been 
presented as an unproblematic given. Only Renfrew (1972: 370, 1986a) begins to make an 
attempt to defme it: as the ownership of desirable transferable goods. Yet even here, it raises the 
question of how certain goods and not others acquire this necessary desirability, which transforms 
them into wealth in the fIrst place. The question is far too encompassing to deal with in the short 
space available here as it deals directly with the way value systems are constructed. For the time 
being we' will deal with the more modest issue of what types of desirable goods are taken to, 
represent wealth in the archaeological literature. 
The usual suspects of wealth and inequality 
I have already had the occasion to mention that according to current consensus, a particular 
architectural form, the so called palace, constitutes the material indicator par excellence of 
inequalities and power in Cretan prehistory. Along with this there are other types of architectural 
appearances (,villa.s', elaborate tombs), objects called 'valuables' and tangible traces of more or 
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less prosaic projects (storehouses, craft workshops, meeting places, shrines, transportation 
systems/roads) where inequalities are supposed to be reflected by their material image. In 
common parlance, we are used to referring to the above types of material culture as wealth 
repositories or 'valuables' because we perceive them to indicate, concentrate, absorb and store a 
kind of value. This value may be anchored in the skilful workmanship of objects; in the skills 
required for the procurement of raw material; in the labour consumed for their construction and in 
the scarcity and/or distant origins of both the fInished product and its raw material. At the same 
time, mere possession of some types of objects is held directly to confer high status. For example, 
metal daggers or golden diadems are taken to operate like language, bestowing power and 
authority to their holders (Hodder 1994). That is, they act as symbols of power in themselves in a 
more direct way without always making reference to the time or skill invested in their 
manufacture. On the other hand, projects of a labour intensive nature imply political organisation 
on a larger scale; they do not only declare the 'personal glory' of high status people but also attest 
to political unification and a central agent of power able to initiate, plan, finance and maintain 
such projects as well as to afford, coordinate and mobilise manpower (Trigger 1974: 197). 
SignifIcantly, it is in this latter context that inequality is commonly held to emerge in its most 
dramatic form by escaping the boundaries of a so called segmentary, autonomous and cellular 
domestic level, and realising a spatial implication of centrality associated with the emergence of 
the state. All the above categories of material culture constitute not only a kind of wealth but also 
the usual suspects for tracing inequalities both distributive and relational. Most imp~rtant1y, their 
fIrst appearance in the archaeological record is traditionally taken to reflect the fIrst appearance of 
inequalities. 
However, for some scholars the importance of wealth does not stop in its dimension as a 
carrier of infonnation (see Renfrew 1972: 370, 494-499; Halstead and O'Shea 1982; Halstead 
1987; Pullen 1992: 53; Cosmopoulos 1995: 31). It does not only signify the existence of 
inequalities and their 'initial' emergence but also how inequality comes about. Wealth may 
constitute the basis and not only the material indicator of inequalities. It is a means of building -
social status and relations of power. Unfortunately, most of these scholars have not elaborated on 
the specific ways whereby the particular process is realised. It is also worth stressing that 
according to Aegean models of inequality different types of physical wealth, such as those 
mentioned above, constitute material transfonnations of agricultural surplus wealth. Put simply, 
one type of economic value is held to convert into another. Before discussing this transformation, 
I will explore how agricultural wealth is seen to come into the hands of the elite minorities in the 
ftrst place. 
46 
The materiality of inequalities and the problematic of wealth 
Transforming wealth into power: the 'how' questions of wealth 
How wealth is acquired in the first place 
In a penetrating paper Webster (1990) has made the point that while most recent accounts of the 
emergence of social stratification in Europe emphasise the differential command and 
management of material wealth and resources by elite minorities they fail to show or neglect to 
detail how elites come to control material wealth in the first place. Webster (1990: 337) argues 
that such models are problematic, for elites would appear to need the prior existence of power to 
acquire, use and defend capital investments and material wealth. Moreover, he attacks prevailing 
theories of social stratification because, as he points out, they arbitrarily assume that since 
stratified social formations are characterised by uneven distributions of material wealth these will 
have been the primary motors behind their initial creation. Webster's position is that material 
wealth should rather be seen as the privilege of established chieftainships instead of the 
determining factor in their constitution. He finally claims, taking his lead from the African 
ethnographic record, that control over human -labour constitutes the fundamental resource of 
power. Webster's model puts an emphasis on chiefs as accumulators of a 'greater retinue'. Most 
importantly, differential command of the labour . force was seen to precede differential command 
of material wealth. In Webster's words, 
This interpretation does not deny the eventual importance of dominance and/or control by later'palace 
elites' of trade, technology, agricultural and craft production, and redistribution ... it ~oes, however, 
support the argument that, in the Aegean, labour control preceded and provided a basis for such 
prerogatives of power and hence the rapid development of stratification (1990: 345). 
One of the author's major points is that labour control is of fundamental significance in the 
emergence of stratification, yet, as stratification matures the control of wealth a~d capital 
becomes more important. According to this point of view, what made one a leader in the fIrst 
place was their skill to recruit and control the surplus labour of both kin and non-kin. The larger 
and the more economically productive a family was the greater the chances it had to attract 
greater retinues and establish with them a patron-client dependency. Moreover, Webster felt that 
the development of social stratification is more possible and rapid under particular environmental 
circumstances such as agricultural risk, high productive potential, socio-epvironmental 
circumscription, and diversity in natural conditions. 
At first glance Webster's essay appears to offer some interesting insights into the 
relationships between wealth and power and between labour and power. In particular, the 
argument that command over human labour power should be seen as basic in the creation of 
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relational social inequalities adds an important parameter of investigation to the study of power. 
One cannot avoid to stress the importance of the mobilisation of labour especially during palatial 
times in view of the large amount of energy consumed in the construction of the so called palaces. 
Furthermore, the author's thesis that aspirants to high status and power can be found in all 
societies proposes a productive avenue to follow in the study of social inequalities. Its main merit 
rests on the fact that instead of seeing human agency to evaporate under the needs and rationality 
of a subjectless system it invites us to consider individuals as purposeful and intentional 
protagonists and makers of their lives. Long ago Claude Levi-Strauss went even further by 
throwing into relief the psychological dimension of leadership, stressing that political 
anthropologists should pay more attention to the idea of 'natural leadership' (1967). He felt, in his 
own words, imperiously led to the conclusion that there are leaders in every human group because 
there are always individuals who unlike their fellow human beings find pleasure in prestige for its 
own sake (Levi-Strauss 1967: 61). At the same time, Webster's point about going beyond 
material wealth as the basis for power relations ~nd for tracing how wealth is acquired - although 
not pursued in detail by the author - invites us to recognise that more light needs to be shed on 
the largely neglected issue of·wealth production. Nonetheless, Webster's paper is not without its 
problems4• 
For instance, like older accounts Webster's model frames the study of inequality around 
starting points. Underlying Webster's view is the old issue of origins. Although the author 
maintains that aspirants to high status occur in every society, one cannot avoid the impression that 
there is an implicit assumption throughout the essay that real inequalities of power are those 
which are crystallised along class lines. For Webster, this happened during the second millennium 
BC. Non-state tribal societies are seen to contain only seeds of real power - a kind of pseudo-
power that emerges, evolves, only to become a real power once it matures. As a consequence, 
non-state social formations are treated as stepping-stones to state-societies. In bare essentials 
therefore, like previous models, Webster's narrative of inequality has been built on an 
evolutionary theoretical edifice. The only difference with previous accounts is that the origins of . 
embryonic power relations are traced back to the Neolithic. Accordingly, truly egalitarian 
societies should be sought earlier than the petty chiefdoms of fifth and fourth millennium Europe. 
Most significantly, the distinction between wealth and labour is quite crude since it is 
presented as an unanalysed given. It might be said that such a distinction is not so sharp (cf. 
4 Here I am mainly concerned with aspects of the essay which are directly related to the issues of wealth 
and inequality. For a detailed critique on various aspects of Webster's account see the comments following 
Webster (1990) in Current Anthropology 31 (4), pp. 347-355. 
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Gilman 1990: 349; Hamilakis 1995: 66; and Milisauskas 1990: 353). I would justify this 
statement by proposing that the distinction between material wealth and labour is not as acute as 
Webster seems to assume if we recognise that material wealth is a particular type of tangible 
transformation of human effort (labour). In other words, it is not simply the product of human 
labour but labour (human effort and time) materially congealed. That said, it is worth pointing out 
that not all materially congealed labour can be thought of as wealth. For example, take the large 
plastic rubbish bin outside almost every house in the UK. Although it apparently constitutes a 
form of materially concentrated labour it can hardly be thought of as wealth - at least in this 
context. At the same time, labour can be thought of as a potential materially uncongealed form of 
wealth. In addition, Webster's distinction between wealth and labour control and ·the proposed 
priority assigned to the latter becomes even more perplexing if we keep in mind that wealth may 
be thought of as one of the two principal ways by which people can buy access to labour. As 
Ossowski (1963: 23-32) echoing Marx has shown, access to other people's labour can be gained 
through wealth or power (even in the form of physical force6). In particular, the connection of 
wealth with labour can be thus seen in two complementary ways that form a cyclical relationship 
rather than a sharp distinction. It is not only that individuals or groups who have command over 
other people's labour can make a profit and thus become rich, but also that wealth itself is 
instrumental in permitting access to human labour which in turn is crucial for further expansion 
of wealth: 
Wealth or physical force are the sources of exploitation [of man by man] .... the labour of the worker 
multiplies the wealth or power of those whose wealth or power compel him to labour on for their 
benefit. This [is] a vicious circle (Ossowski 1963: 26, emphasis added). 
Ironically, Webster's insistence on the causal primacy of labour over wealth is shaken by the 
model itself. Here, it is more apparent than Webster would admit, that it is property and wealth 
(mainly in the form of land and agricultural produce) that enable patrons to hire the labour of a 
non-kin external clientele. That is, without the wealth variable Webster's model is at pains to 
explain the expansion of power beyond kin units: 
5 One of course needs to note here that according to Marx the capacity of wealth to buy labour is not an 
inherent quality of wealth but rather it emerges historically with capitalism. To Marx, labour is a capability 
of people, not a commodity for sale; the only reason for people to offer their labour for sale is when they 
have been deprived of the means of production (Wolf: 1982: 77). However, anthropological perspectives 
(Nash 1966; Meillassoux 1978a: 146) suggest that the provision of wealth in the fonn of gifts and food 
constitutes a way to mobilise (buy) labour in simple societies, although the tactics of such exchanges deny a 
sale character to the transaction. . 
6 The point that brute force can be used as a way for the recruitment of labour force has been also made by 
Gregory (1982: 119-120). 
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... non-kin clients typically exchanged their surplus labour for protection, and more important, for 
indirect use rights to the lands and herds to which the patron kin-group possessed direct hereditary 
rights (Webster 1990: 340). 
Keeping these in mind, we could say then that Webster's corrective to previous accounts, 
(namely the substitution of labour for wealth) is problematic since it is based on a distinction 
which upon closer consideration does not seem to be so acute. Instead of being per~eived as the 
parts of a distinction where priority has to be assigned to one of them, wealth and labour can be 
more profitably examined as parts of a vicious circle, as Ossowski puts it, where they constitute 
conditions for each other. 
Despite these problems, I think that Webster puts his fmger on something important when he 
points out that current discussions of the emergence do not specify the precise processes which 
could throw light on the ways in which some human actors transform themselves into agents of 
power through material wealth in the first ~nstance. His main point is that adherents to an 
approach that sees wealth as instrumental in the formation of power relations would need to 
elaborate on how some individuals managed to amass wealth in the first instance. As I noted 
earlier, this constitutes a significant question, yet, as I shall try to show at the end of this section, 
it needs some rectification. What is more important is that Webster's essay prompts us to 
recognise that there is something problematic regarding the treatment of wealth in the existing 
archaeological literature. Although he pinpoints the problem, he does not push his argument far 
enough and by offering a similarly problematic substitution of labour for wealth he ends up 
perpetuating the problem that he intended to resolve in the first place. Webster's unique 
contribution is that he provides us with the stimulating challenge to attend to the puzzle of \:Vealth. 
At this point, it is useful to take a closer look at how Aegean models of inequality deal with the 
problem of wealth's acquisition by elite minorities in the first instance. 
Material advance in general and wealth in the form of agricultural surplus in particular, as 
motors behind the emergence of relations of dominance and subjugation, occupy a modest place 
in the SubsistencelRedistribution model (Hamilakis 1995: 5). At first sight, Webster's criticism 
does not seem to apply to the subsistence/redistribution model. For as the model holds Cretan 
chieftains came about through a need for redistribution not through the appropriation of 
strategically or competitively acquired wealth in the form of ;agricultural surplus. Renfrew 
therefore offers a scenario where the struggle for power was not grounded in the struggle for 
wealth. Wealth is attracted to managerial elites as a reward of their office. Some groups establish 
themselves as managerial elites and as a result they become able to control surplus staple produce 
and convert it into other types of wealth which elites use in order to fmance their governmental 
institution. It might be said that Renfrew provides a partial account of two different types of 
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economic phenomena namely economic processes and economic relations. It has been argued 
(Cohen 1974: 22) that economic processes refer to interactions between individuals and available 
resources whereas economic relationships refer "to person to person interactions in the course of 
economic processes. Conversely, in the subsistence/redistribution model, the introduction of 
grapes and vines, agricultural specialisation, the cultivation of formerly marginal land all these 
can be seen as particular economic processes as dermed by Cohen. What is less obvious however, 
is the nexus of the economic relationships these enable or constrain between different individuals 
or groups as well as the bearing of these economic relationships in the formation of power 
relations. 
Obviously, according to Renfrew, people (though not the Neolithic ones) do not seem to lack 
economic interests and motives; that is why they decide to specialise in different foodstuffs. Their 
motive is a higher productivity, a surplus of produce, 'a willingness to invest income and hence to 
accumulate what might be regarded as capital'- (Renfrew 1972: 34). Moreover, although Renfrew 
at some points seems to remember that this is dictated by social factors, the general impression 
stemming from the model is that increased production is better than zero growth. In such models 
economic intensification is treated as an independent operation (from the political domain) 
dictated by the pursuit of individual economic advantage and economic efficiency (Brumfiel and 
Earle 1987: 1). Ostensibly, commoners are not concerned with aspirations of authority but simply 
wish to gather material assets. A phantasmatic obsession for wealth (its motive is never clearly 
specified by Renfrew) influences Bronze Age farmers to accept a managerial le~dership. For 
managers could provide farming populations with an organisational structure under which they 
could (without the distraction of having to provide for their families), specialise in particular 
foodstuffs and increase wealth in the form of agricultural surplus. But one may wonder what 
different actors wish or actually do with their increased agricultural produce? What kind of 
relationships do they establish by drawing on them? Why do uneven grades of economic success 
.. 
in the carrying out of agricultural activities not constitute an issue of examination at this level of 
human conduct? Most importantly still, why does wealth not matter in the formation of relational -
inequalities? 
The model turns a blind eye at this routine scale of economic conduct as well as the 
relationships that this involves, and looks directly to a Deus ex machina7 imposed ·elite. It is at 
this level of analysis that political economy appears on the stage and questions relevant to it are 
asked. Hence, according to the SubsistencelRedistribution model, wealth acquires instrumental 
7 Deus ex machina: In Greek and Roma~ drama, a god brought on to resolve a seemingly irresolvable plot. 
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significance only in the hands of already established elites. It serves the political ends of elites, 
legitimising their authority by funding their political apparatus. On the other han<L in the period 
before the establishment of elites, wealth (in the form of agricultural produce) is perceived as an 
end in itself 
Renfrew seems to ignore an old commonplace tenet of economic anthropology~ there are no 
economic motives, but only motives appropriate to the economic sphere (Nash 1967: 9). This also 
means that neither competition over physical resources (Clark and Blake 1994: 18) nor the 
production, acquisition and accumulation of wealth are ends in themselves (cf. Baines and Y oiTee 
2000:16~ Spielmann 2002). To be fair to Renfrew, he suggested in a later paper, that the incentive 
towards increased production need not necessarily be a purely economic one but may have social 
underpinnings (1982a). This is the only time he discusses this at any length. He suggests that the 
desire to undertake tasks that will improve productivity are governed by the individual perception 
of what is required to fulfil social, and exchange obligations as well as the maintenance of an 
acceptable standard of living. But if social and exchange obligations stimulate, as Renfrew 
suggests, the incentive for increased productivity and wealth accumulation, the issue of power 
arises within them not after them. Apparently, political economy operates ·already in these routine 
transactions. More specifically, all of this leads tis to understand wealth not as an end in itself but 
rather as an instrumental resource. I am hardly the first to make this point. Baines and Y offee 
have also suggested that wealth might be more profitably seen 'as an essentially enabling factor 
whose potential is released, but also harnessed and containe<L by societies' (2000:. 16). In other 
words, wealth is an instrumental resource which mediates relations between people. It is a form 
of political resource which dialectically forms a structure of relations while at the same time is 
drawn upon to create new ones. Wealth is an active instrument which must be understood in 
context~ it has no beginning or end; but rather it is manifested in different ways in diiTerent places 
and times. 
Yet, the challenge of accounting for the precise form of such 'social' incentives - that aimed 
to increase production and material advances and dictated particular agricultural strategies (such '. 
as Mediterranean Polyculture) - once again is not taken up into detailed consideration, nor the 
possibility that the struggle for power or status elevation might itself be the crux of the matter 
behind choices of economic conduct that increase material outputs. Consequently, 'in Renfrew's 
functionalist account power comes as an epiphenomenon to serve abstract - socially disembedded 
- economic interests. More paradoxically still, although Bronze Age people in general are 
depicted as economically greedy personalities, those who establish themselves as elites are held 
to have done so ~ithout any reference to their economic action. Accordingly, chiefs acquired 
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their position in the fIrst place not because they assumed any special successful role as economic 
actors (cf. Brumfiel and Earle 1987: I). In other words, economic differentiation is not seen to 
play any significant part in the formation of relational social inequalities. Hence, the economic 
and the political are presented as two unrelated fIelds of action. There is some question, however, 
about the validity of this separation. Following Marx, Cohen (1974: 22-23) reminds us that 
relationships between people in the processes of production, exchange and distribution, namely 
economic relationships, are relations of power and therefore essentially political, and economic 
interests and political interests interpenetrate, act and react with each other: 
In both institutions [economic and political] relationships are manipulative, technical, contractual and 
instrumental, as men in different situations use one another as means to ends and not as ends in 
themselves (Cohen 1974: 23). 
SignifIcantly, Renfrew's peripheral treatment of the unequal generation of wealth by 
prehistoric actors in the subsistence/redistribution account is at odds with other statements about 
wealth's instrumental signifIcance found scattered in his germinal book, The Emergence of 
Civilisation. For instance, Renfrew writes: 
The possession of wealth confers honour; it is an invidious distinction. Nothing equally cogent can be 
said for the consumption of goods, nor for any other conceivable incentive to acquisition, and 
especially not for any incentive to the accumulation of wealth (1972: 497). 
One may wonder whether Renfrew's limited investigation of the instrumentality of wealth's 
generation is due to pure and simple omission or whether it is deliberate and having mainly to do 
with his perception of elites as public servants. For if one is to portray prehistoric chiefs as 
altruistic agents, then they are at pains to fmd an explanation not only for the uneven distributions 
of wealth witnessed in the Minoan archaeological record but also for the generation .of wealth. 
Obviously, one way out of this problem is to overlook deliberately the matter. In other words, if 
Renfrew had directly stressed the signifIcance of wealth inequalities in the emergence of 
powerful groups, he would contradict his functionalist argument according to which elites came 
into being not as exploiters of economic opportunities aiming primarily in their self-interest, but 
rather as benevolent public servants. 
Gilman's (1981) view is somewhat different. To be fair, we cannot apply Webs~r's criticism 
to Gilman. For at least he does not see material wealth as the basis of relational social disparities. 
Material wealth for Gilman is just the trappings of established elites - the symptom of power not 
its cause. In the model of the emergence of social stratification proposed by Gilman wealth 
appears as a passive carrier of information regarding the distributive aspect of social inequalities 
in Early Bronze Age Europe. Of course capital-intensive techniques (such as Mediterranean 
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Polyculture) can increase agricultural productivity. However, it is not the increased agricultural 
produce that brings power, according to Gilman, but rather the opportunity these subsistence 
technologies offer to some aspirants to high status for bullying the mass of the population. By 
being a bully one becomes fIrst a leader and then a wealthy person. Gilman, like Renfrew, does 
not take into account the instrumental role of economic differentiation and wealth disparities in 
the development of social stratification. However, unlike Renfrew, Gilman's marginal 
consideration of wealth is not a matter of mere omission - deliberate or otherwise. It rather stems 
from his clearly expressed belief that the significance of wealth in prehistoric Europe is limited in 
its display potential by already established elites. Once again, political economy is seen to evolve. 
For if wealth is held to possess any instrumentality at all, this is only at the chiefs' hands, 
legitimising elite institutions through conspicuous display. 
The Social Storage model proposed by Halstead and O'Shea is a very appropriate case study 
with which to take the enquiry further since it describes in a more sophisticated way the 
mechanisms that led to an uneven distribution o~ wealth on prehistoric Crete through a process of 
economic interdependence (1982; see also O'Shea 1981; Halstead 1981a, 1988, 1992a). 
Moreover, Halstead (1987) has directly confronted the problem of how the rich first got rich in 
antiquity, since farming, according to past historians, seems to offer limited potential for 
accumulating wealth. A brief summary of the model is necessary at this point. 
Set in the context of the heterogeneous environment of southern Greece, the hypothesis is that 
cycles of agricultural production and consumption involved risk and uncertainty as they were 
carried forward from one year to the next. However, primitive technology makes direct storage an 
ineffective safeguard against a run of lean years. Consequently, the effective strategy might have 
involved indirect storage, where surplus production is used as animal feed, and social storage 
where surplus is given to needy neighbors in the expectation that help will be reciprocated when 
circumstances are reve~sed. The development of the system then arises from variable productivity 
(dictated by temporal climatic fluctuations) in different localities and from a 'normal surplus' in 
successful localities granting the repeated success of particular households and the repeated ' 
failure of others. The latter are driven deep into debt obligations, the repayment of which shifted 
from food reciprocity to labour obligations and material tokens. Accordingly 'the stability of 
. . 
tokens then permits the sustained, unequal accumulation of wealth and its transmission across 
generations within a corporate group' (Halstead 1988: 525). In such a way then, an elite could 
have developed which expanded its wealth and power within the community. Here we come upon 
a difficulty regarding the sustained uneven accumulation of wealth. 
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Long-term uneven distribution of wealth, based on success in subsistence matters seems 
difficult to achieve in such an unstable environment as that assumed by Halstead and O'Shea for 
Crete. I have suggested in chapter two that the likelihood of maintaining scattered plots could be 
a practice that would have countered the erosion of household autonomy in subsistence matters, 
thus making Ulmecessary any option for social storage. However, even if we leave aside this 
possibility, and we treat climatic heterogeneity in the model's terms, there is again a 'difficulty. 
Whereas we can admit that households may differ in wealth matters at any specific moment, the 
heterogeneous environment (periodic climatic fluctuations in rainfall) assumed by the model 
forces us to recognise that each family or corporate unit might expect to experience great 
fluctuations in harvest yields through time. One cannot completely disagree with Halstead (1987) 
that occasional windfall profits could have made a contribution to the income of some households 
resulting in economic differentiation in wealth matters. In this sense, the Social Storage model 
gives a satisfactory answer to the question raised by Webster, namely how wealth is acquired in 
the first instance. No doubt, climatic variability _by resulting in uneven crop yields can be seen as 
one determining factor in the creation, at any moment, of a society of 'haves' and 'have nots'. At 
the same time, the model emphasises the issue of the long-term and permanent/amplified 
accumulation of wealth by some corporate units as basic to the mechanism by which well to do 
farmers transform themselves into leaders. Hence, O'Shea, the co-author of the Social Storage 
account, has rectified Webster's question by stating that 
The issue, therefore, is not the existence of asymmetries in the prcxiuctive potential of wealth of kin 
groups but the conditions under which these asymmetries are amplified and made permanent (1990: 
353). 
It is the long-term uneven accumulation of wealth, according to Halstead and O'Shea, that makes 
economic differentiation permanent and enables net lenders of subsistence relief to stabilise their 
position against net b~rrowers by creating continuous obligations of repayment. Simply put, one 
can be a chief only if they are able to achieve a constant agricultural surplus in order to keep on 
accumulating obligations of debt by needy receivers. The system, therefore, depends on 
amplification of wealth inequalities in agricultural produce. 
Yet, while periodic climatic variability creates temporary wealth inequalities, it negates the 
: .. 
consolidation of permanent groups of givers against receivers of agricultural surplus, that is stable 
groups of 'haves' and 'have nots'. I fmd it difficult to assume, as the model does, that occasional 
windfall profits (based on periodic variability in rainfall) could have resulted in a sustained long-
term wealth accumulation by some farmers. As Van Andel and Runnels have noted 'because each 
unit must anticipate, that it might need the surpluses accumulated by others at' some time, none is 
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able to accumulate at the expense of others' (1988: 241). Everybody has to tighten their belts at 
some point. Likely, differences in wealth, if the~e are assumed to be primarily and simply a result 
of the impact of the alteration of good and bad years in people's fortunes, would probably tend to 
be short-lived. It would be difficult for economic disparities in agricultural produce to attain a 
constant amplification and permanent consolidation. In short, one might argue that the 'well to 
do' farmers would change not only from generation to generation but also within a single 
generation. The successful farmer of a single year or even of a longer run can easily be 
transformed into a needy neighbour in another year, or longer run, and reconvert the tokens 
acquired via past good yields for food. This leads me to ask: how then does long-term 
amplification and accumulation of wealth happen? 
There could be a way out of this problem if the model did not propose a single causal factor 
as a motor toward economic differentiation. Broadly speaking, uneven distributions of wealth in 
the form of agricultural produce - at any moment and in any society - might be the result of 
several factors both social and environmentaL Following O'Shea (1990) and Gilman (1990), 
among others, I suggest that opportunities for economic differentiation arise in every society. It 
might be the case that you and your family are skilful and hardworking farmers whereas I and my 
kin are people of leisure rather than of labour. Crop pests or drought might ignore your plot and 
choose mine. An accident of fire, theft, raiding, or a crisis of death or illness might strike at 
. someone else's household depriving labour hands at a critical stage of the agricultural cycle. And 
it might be a rumour that my neighbour's exceptionally good harvest is caused by a secret 
technique that she is reluctant to share. The possibilities and their combinations are endless. One 
may also note differential success (among corporate units) regarding calculations in options over 
the use of resources and time, as well as an uneven devolution of inheritance among siblings 
depending on seniority and/or sex. It follows from this that we do not need to assume a single 
cause to account for the generation of wealth inequalities and economic differentiation. Harold 
Schneider (1974: 211-213) long ago asserted in his ground-breaking study of economic 
anthropology that even the most so called primitive societies display economic variability as a ' 
result of a wide range of parameters - with variability in rainfall being only one of them. At the 
same time, there is no reason to suppose that agriculture constitutes the primary sphere of 
, . 
economy where wealth disparities can be built and observed. Without going into detail, it might 
be argued that it is our tendency to perceive wealth mainly as a quantity of goods that privileges 
the significance of agriculture in the production of wealth. This is because agriculture appears to 
be the type of production par excellence involving material movement from a lesser to a greater 
quantity. The inception of this idea goes back to Ricardo (Gudeman 1986): 
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Corn feeds into itself and into all other economic processes which, being dependent upon agriculture 
are not themselves productive. Agriculture occupies a core position in [Ricardo's] model precisely 
because the input arrow runs in one direction only, from it to manufacture (1986: 56). 
One may also note that nature (land and sea) might be seen as the source of all material 
wealth since it provides the raw material, that is the resources, that human effort transforms into 
wealth. This transformation, however, is not realised only through farming as the Physiocrats8 of 
Enlightenment France had mistakenly believed (Gudeman 1986: 71-89). One can add hunting, 
gathering, fishing, pastoralism, and craft production. Nature is the source of wealth not 
agriculture. Agriculture is only a technology to extract resources that might, but are not always 
transformed into wealth. More significantly, although nature is a repository of various resources 
that have the potential of being perceived as wealth, there is nothing more misleading than 
directly calling amounts of resources wealth. Wealth is a social construct. Ten sacks of grain can 
only be wealth if they are socially desirable. 
At the same time, in some contexts the crafting of a modest material like wood could produce 
a carving of such exceptional beauty that it is desired by all. This is again a kind of wealth - a 
socially desirable object. Yet, here we are still speaking of wealth disassociated from social 
relations where the material object does not entangle webs of social obligations. For wealth to be 
transformed into a vessel of power, it needs to possess a further quality, namely to establish 
relations among people. Thus, we have to tackle two questions: (1) how do some resources and 
not others acquire a social desirability that transforms them into wealth? (2) And how do some 
kinds of wealth establish relations between people? 
In the beginning of this section I introduced the question raised by Webster, where he 
observes that current discussions of the emergence do not specify the precise processes which 
may throw light on the ways in which human actors transform themselves materially into agents 
of power in the first place. This question is an important one, because it makes us attend to the 
problematic treatment'"' of wealth, but it needs rectification because there is no single factor 
responsible for economic differentiation. Social Storage attempts to find an answer, but it is only -
partial because we should not fmd a single cause. The importance of Social Storage is that it 
attempts to see how wealth fits into the dynamic of the formation of political relations. 
However, we should not ask how wealth is produced in the first place in order to·[md a single 
answer because there are endless possibilities, and economic differentiation is universaL O'Shea 
and Gilman shift the focus of the investigation on how wealth differentiations that can be 
8 A school of economists in eighteenth-century France whose central tenet was that agriculture constitutes 
the unique productive source within the economy. For a detailed account and critique ofPhysiocracy see 
Gudeman (1986). . 
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observed at any time and in any society become permanent. I would go one step further and 
suggest that this shift in emphasis might. acc,ount for the ways that economic disparities are 
reproduced and amplified. That is how the rich become richer. Yet, if our main question is how 
wealth transforms into power, long or short-term wealth disparities equally. The question 
therefore is not how wealth is amplified, but what people do with both their short-term or 
sustained wealth that enables them to establish relations of power with other people. 
How wealth transforms into power and 
the materially productive dimension of wealth 
Wealth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for power relations. In this section I will try to 
show how interdependence in the subsistence regime is traditionally thought to be transformed 
into value that promotes asymmetries of power and prestige. One therefore might ask how rich 
farmers or managers of agricultural produce use their wealth (surplus in agricultural production) 
in order not only to attract other types of wealth but most significantly to impose their power over 
the mass of the population. Unfortunately, the destination of this particular kind of wealth, 
namely the way it was used to create relational social inequalities, rarely constitutes an issue of 
theoretical expansion in Aegean archaeological literature. Hamilakis has suggested that 
the accumulation and unequal distribution of wealth is one thing and the acquisition of power is 
another. In other words, most of the models above do not explain how surplus in agricultural 
production or possession of valuable items are transformed into power over other people. The link is 
not automatic or obvious, and needs explanation (1995: 68). 
Likewise for Trigger: 
In more complex societies, the relative wealth of clan groups or of age and sex divisions within such 
groups may be apparent from differential distributions of material possessions, but this does not reveal 
how such differentials were socially regulated and supernaturally justified (1974: 100). 
Paralleling these scholars, Brumfiel and Earle make the point more succinctly: 
... no single [archaeological] model adequately explains how wealth operates as a political resource 
(1987: 7, emphasis added). 
To the reservations of the above scholars I am adding a further one. If one is disposed to accept 
the simple correlation where a particular type of wealth is produced or accumulated and results in 
inequalities materially reflected in other types of wealth, one should go further and ask: how does 
the transformation of particular material items (and not others) into socially desirable objects, that 
is wealth, happen? And how do some forms of wealth become vessels of power or representations 
of high status? In other worlds, how do people assign value to objects? 
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Returning to the question raised by Hamilakis, Trigger and Brumfiel and Earle, Max Weber 
describes a way in which wealth might be appropriated by intelligent people in order to expand its 
economic potential: 
Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring 
can beget more, and so on. Five shillings turned is six, turned again it is seven and threepence, and so 
on, till it becomes a hundred pounds. The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that 
the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding-sow, destroys all her offspring to the 
thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, destroys all that it might have produced, even scores 
of pounds (Advice to a young tradesman 1748: 87 cited in Weber 1992 [1930]: 15). 
He that spends a groat a day idly, spends idly above six pounds a year, which is the price for the use of 
one hundred pounds ... he that loses five shillings, not only loses that sum, but all the advantage that 
might be made by turning it in dealing, which by the time that a young man becomes old, will amount 
to a considerable sum of money (Hints to those that would be rich: 80 cited in Weber 1992 [1930]: 16). 
Marcel Mauss offers an alternative way regarding wealth's appropriation: 
... they hoard but in order to spend, to place under obligation ... on the other hand, they carry on 
exchange, but it is above all in luxury articles .. : or things 'that are consumed immediately as at feasts 
(1990 [1925]: 96) . 
... thus one section of humanity, comparatively rich, hardworking, and creating considerable surpluses, 
has known how to, and still does know how to, exchange things of great value, under different forms 
and for reasons different from those with which we are familiar (1990 [1925]: 42). 
The passages cited in Weber describe a situation where the primary property of wealth (which 
a clever person should keep in mind and take advantage of), is its potential for growth through 
constantly renewed productive investment. At first sight, the passages do not seem to connect 
wealth with status, but rather ~o offer a way of wealth amplification as an end in itself. This yet is 
not the case if one considers the social context of the eighteenth century when these words were 
stated. Concealed behind the economic conduct of ceaseless investment and reinvestment of 
wealth is as Weber claimed, a peculiar moral code that he called the Protestant ethic. The 
"' 
Protestant ethic aimed to provide guidelines for a socially appropriate design for living. 
Examining the tenets of this ethical code reveals that the earning of more and more money - ~ 
worldly economic success - is only superficially an end in itself. According to the Protestant 
ethic's doctrine of predestination, economic success through ceaseless investment and 
reinvestment and combined with frugality in this life and avoidance 'of using wealth as a means to 
buy material luxury and pleasure, was taken as a sign indicating those who would be assured 
salvation in the next life, the elect of God's choice (Giddens 1992; Weber 1992 [1930]). To 
phrase it slightly differently, in this historical context, ceaseless wealth accumulation was above 
all a measure and medium of social standing, constructed in this world and cashed out in the 
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Kingdom of God. The ceaseless wealth accumulators were not assessed simply as successful 
economic actors but they were ranked on the top of a pyramid of moral status as honest, persons 
of credit, and morally superior. 
But this way of understanding the relation of wealth and moral status, which according to 
Weber seemed not only to characterise but also to have shaped the spirit of modem capitalism, is 
far from being the whole story, as the passages by Mauss reveal. What Mauss maintains is that 
the relation between wealth and prestige can also be seen in a different light, that from an 
ethnocentric 'rational' point of view might seem irrational. Whereas in the passages provided by 
Weber, what seems to empower the wealth bearers consists of actions whereby surplus value is 
appropriated in productive ways combined with worldly asceticism, in Mauss's ethnography it is 
the unproductive appropriation of accumulated wealth or its immediate and spontaneous 
consumption that might confer prestige or authority or both. We can, therefore, observe two 
distinctive ways whereby the possession of wealth may bestow status elevation and power: the 
one involves appropriation of the materially productive potential of wealth, the other draws on its 
materially unproductive dimension. 
Both perceptions regarding the transformation of wealth into prestige (although not clearly 
into power) are present throughout the Aegean literature. Yet, it is only the materially productive 
dimension of wealth that has, more often, been associated with the emergence of relational power 
inequalities and has been more elaborately presented9• A significant milestone in the study of the. 
political potential of the unproductive dimension of wealth has been offered by Voutsaki (1995, 
1997) for the Mycenaean southern Greek mainland. Likewise, Day and Wilson (2002) have 
recently proposed that elite power at prepalatial Knossos was largely based on large-sca~e ritual 
consumption of food and drink and fme pottery rather than on craft production. Renfrew has 
considered the potential of the materially unproductive dimension of wealth to cQnfer status 
through acts of conspicuous display and consumption but he has not incorporated this line of 
investigation in his. elucidation of the original emergence of elites in the Subsistence/ 
Redistribution model (1972: 497-498, 1986a: 162, 1994: 160). As noted earlier, according to, 
Renfrew, wealth in the form of agricultural produce enables already established chiefs to 
consolidate their power and prestige. Early Bronze Age local chiefs and later palace households 
used part of agricultural produce to provide sustenance for. craft specialists. who in turn 
constructed valuable artefacts and symbolically charged paraphernalia manipulated by elites in 
ceremonial and public contexts, in order to display and embellish their power (Renfrew 1982a: 
9 See among others, Bintliffs Landholding model (1982)~ Halstead and O'Shea's Social Storage model 
(1982)~ Pullen's (1992) SubsistencelWealth model (1992). 
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286). In this way, elites converted wealth in the form of foodstuffs into more durable forms that 
through ostentatious displays served the justification and perpetuation of their sovereignty. 
Moreover, external trade or exchange of valuable and prestigious craft-goods between elites of 
individual polities, could further enhance elite power both at home and beyond by offering 
leaders the opportunity to strive for higher inter-polity status in the spirit of competitive 
emulation (Renfrew 1982a: 286; Renfrew 1986b: 8; Cherry 1986: 41). 
For Gilman, as we saw, the issue is not how wealth might have been transformed into power 
but rather how it was not. Wealth in the European Early Bronze Age, as Gilman (1981) argues, 
consists mainly· of valuable tomb gifts and votive hoards. This I believe is a statement of 
paramount importance. For Gilman, while he talks about the presence of a particular type of 
wealth, he also implies the significant absence of another, namely utilitarian tools, traded bulky 
agricultural produce and large-scale public facilities implying central management of food 
production and distribution. If these could be traced to a great extent in the archaeological record 
of prehistoric Europe (and they have not been according to Gilman) they would suggest a 
completely different scenario where wealth could acquire an instrumental significance in the 
formation of relational social inequalities. Large public works associated with redistribution 
systems and elaborate utilitarian tools, would· indicate that wealth in the form of agricultural 
surplus could have tied commoners into webs of social relations, mobilising labour forces and 
enhancing productivity. Simply put, rich producers could have used their surplus food to engage 
the rest of the population in activities that would enhance the material assets 9f the wealthy 
farmers at the expense of the needy. Non-cooperation by commoners to undertake these tasks 
would mean denial of necessary goods for the securing of livelihood (mainly food and tools 
facilitating agricultural production). Gilman mentions the absence of evidence for the exchange 
of foodstuffs and tools which could have helped substantially increase production to ·support the 
idea that wealth in~qualities in the form of agricultural produce do not stand behind the 
emergence of European Bronze Age elites. Still, the materially productive dimension of wealth is 
not absent in Gilman's model. For he clearly suggests that capital investments (Mediterranean 
poly culture, plough, irrigation systems, etc) operated in order to increase wealth in agricultural 
produce. Yet, according to Gilman, the exchange value of this type of wealth is not supported 
empirically and consequently the circulation of wealth in the form of agricultural produce cannot 
be taken as the basis of social integration in prehistoric Europe. People invested in production in 
order to be self-sufficient, not in order to exchange with their neighbours. Exchange he suggests 
is mainly in luxuries. This wealth is rather a vessel for expressing an elite's lifestyle. It does not 
establish relations. of authority. It is only wealth in items necessary for living (foodstuffs and 
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means of production such as utilitarian tools) that has this instrumental potential because it 
establishes relations of exchange that people cannot afford to escape. However, since Gilman 
thinks that the European material record suggests self-sufficient households and a . lack of tools of 
a practical value, he sees the instrumentality of this type of wealth to evaporate at least in this 
particular context. He then correctly shows that wealth was mainly manifested by luxury metal 
items deposited in tombs, which is a kind of materially unproductive wealth. However, he refuses 
to consider this type of wealth as instrumental in creating relations of dominance and subjugation. 
The ghost of Marx still haunts us. For it was Marx who first claimed that, in economic terms,10 it 
is primarily wealth in the form of the ownership of the means of production by some segments of 
society that enables some people to exploit their fellow human beings. 
Wealth in the Social Storage model does not figure as an expendable and redundant concept. 
This account of power relations is unique in offering a mechanism by which wealth is 
transformed into power by enabling the establishment of networks of social relationships. As 
Leach (1982: 149-175) reminds us, in the abse.nce of a social relationship there can be no power 
operation. All enduring social relations Leach argues, at the same time are structures of 
indebtedness since they involve an exchange of interactions which bear the potential to establish 
• debt between the parties concerned. This is like gift-giving transactions which from the point of 
the participants are felt as debt rights and obligations. However, if a debt is fully repaid, the social 
relationship between the parties concerned ceases to exist and consequently the conditions for 
power operation disappear (Leach 1982: 152). In other words, power emanates from regular 
flows of debt (cf. Blau 1971; Gosden 1989a: 47; 1989b: 361). 
Let us not forget that the creation of debt obligations occupies a central position within the 
social storage mechanism of exchange. But how is it then that obligations owed to the lenders of 
food are believed to be transformed into power? As we saw, the model asserts that successful 
farmers cash in obligations of debt in exchange for valuable craft goods (tokens) and/or the 
labour of unsuccessful farmers. In the first case, wealth in the fonn of agricultural produce is 
converted into a more durable storable fonn. Yet, one might ask what is the destination of the 
tokens and extra labour accrued at the hands of the lenders of subsistence relief? What do people 
10 It should be recalled that Marx was trying to account for ways through which mobilisation of social 
labour is achieved and the emergence of capitalism, and not about the original emergence of social 
inequalities. As far as simple societies are concerned Marx (1967 [1894] cited in Wolf 1981: 50) felt that 
labour mobilisation through the control of the means of production is difficult to achieve, because in these 
societies the means of production are simple and so accessible to all. An alternative way of labour 
mobilisation suggested by Marx was through the exercise of domination and power (political force). By 
following this alternative (in the absence of control of the means of production) to explain the emergence of 
elites (and not the mobilisation of labour as Marx did), Gilman is very close to formulating a circular 
argument. He overcOmes this somewhat by considering power as a naked force. 
62 
The materiality of inequalities and the problematic of wealth 
make of these types of wealth subsequently? Presumably, valuable tokens and labour may be 
accumulated as hoarded wealth including display items and built structures respectively (the 
classic archaeological representations of inequality). What can this accumulated wealth promote, 
and how does this play out in daily life? How do the systems expand in greater economic 
inequalities and the perpetuation of relations of indebtedness signifying greater social disparities 
of prestige and/or power? 
At this point the Social Storage hypothesis does not go into much detail, but some hints are 
present. As Halstead (1981 a: 192) points out, the possession of valuable tokens may confer 
prestige. Furthermore: 
[The] sustained, unequal accumulation of wealth and its transmission across generations ... makes 
possible the symbolic and active manipulation of wealth ... and so provides the critical preconditions 
for the emergence of institutionalised social differentiation (Halstead and O'Shea 1982: 93). 
In the first case, the ways in which these tokens can confer prestige are not specified at all. By 
accepting that material possessions directly correlate with prestige or power only half the story is 
told. It leaves open the question of what causes the transformation of trinkets into recognised 
symbols of status or vessels for the means of domination. In the second, although Halstead and 
O'Shea suggest the symbolic and active manipulation of tokens as a mechanism whereby social 
differentiation may be established, they do not directly specify what this symbolic manipulation 
involves. Here, one might suppose practices of conspicuous ceremonial consumption of wealth, 
such as active destruction (as in the spectacular rivalry potlatches), mortuary or ritual deposition. 
We now have sufficient anthropological and archaeological perspectives)) to remark that these 
practices, although they are mentioned by Halstead and O'Shea (1982: 94; see also O'Shea 1981: 
178-179) as potential solutions aimed at overcoming inflationary threats to the value of tokens, 
can be thought of as strategies pertinent to the games of status elevation. To complicate the issue 
more, a further question may be asked. Can we assume a prestige or status elevation based on the 
display of tokens acquired through blatant exploitation? (Your tokens, or you'll die from 
starvation!). It is certainly true that those facing famine would pay whatever price for a sack of' 
grain, but who really loves or honestly respects the black-marketeer or the loan shark? 
You have given gifts, but you have not given gifts of love, you have not given with a kindly heart. You 
would already have been robbed of your life, if I had known earlier of the danger (from the Edda saga 
cited in Mauss 1990 [1925]: 81). 
11 See for example, Bataille (1998); Bradley (1982, 1990); GOOe1ier (1999); Gosden (1989a, 1989b); 
Kristiansen (1989); Manning (1994: 227 and n.7); Mauss (1990 [1925]); Morris (1986); Nakou (1995); 
Voutsaki (1997); Werner (1992). 
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While we can see that wealth could be manipulated symbolically to bring prestige, it seems 
difficult to conceive of in this context since. it was arrived at under the conditions of duress that 
saw families being forced to hand over precious objects to their more fortunate neighbours. At 
this point, it should be recalled that we are dealing with small village populations where the 
actions of individuals or whole families cannot easily be hidden from public view. The ways you 
make your riches (either honest, or not), your cooking expertise as much as the way you clean 
your house, and attend to your farm and livestock constitute favourite subjects of village gossip. 
Economic success may, quite often, lead to resentful gossip, scornful nicknames, envy, ostracism, 
and even vengeful sorcery. At the Duau village of Papua New Guinea, for instance, members of 
the community who are affluent beyond the average person are not only the targets of malicious 
gossip but also the victims of envious sorcerers (Thune 1983: 361). Similarly, the Amatenango 
Indians of Mexico take this tension between ungenerous well to do people and the rest of the 
community to extremes. There, as Nash (1966: 79) informs us, men are known to have been 
jailed or even killed for being not just stingy b~t blatantly prosperous. That mere possession of 
wealth is not enough to guarantee respect has also been documented by Drucker (1937: 252 cited 
in Gould 1966: 86) for the Tolowa Indians of northwestern California. Equally, as Sahlins notes 
for the Kapauku of upland New Guinea, 'a selfish individual who hoarded his money and does 
not lend it, never sees the time when his words will be taken seriously and his advice and 
decisions followed, no matter how rich he may become' (1972: 215). Examples from world 
ethnography can be endlessly multiplied, yet one does not need to go beyond present day Greek 
villages to realise that mere possession of wealth does not automatically elevate status. Greek 
metaphorical expressions used to characterise people who make their wealth by exploiting· others 
such as karcharies 'sharks' or 'blood suckers' are illuminating in indicating the fact that wealth 
can buy you resentment rather than prestige. Unlike the Social Storage model, the 
phenomenological ~ensions of political behaviour cannot be ignored in accounts of prestige 
creation given the emic realities of political processes. Striving for prestige is not simply based in 
the possession of resources, but is underpinned by the way that people manipulate the meaning of-· 
these resources and the transactions in which resources are involved strategically in order to 
appeal to the public mind (Cohen and Comaroff 1976). 
Furthermore, valuable craft goods exchanged for food by ~eedy households 'figure in the 
Social Storage model as a rough equivalent to money12, as a neutral medium of exchange, as 
12 There is now an extensive anthropological literature on money that cannot be presented in detail in the 
limited space of this chapter. For a detailed account of different anthropological perceptions on money see 
various contributions in the volume edited by Bloch and Parry (1989), Money and the morality of 
exchange. -
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anonymous objects devoid of history. Yet, there is, a fundamental difference between money and 
valuable items; what sets valuable objects apart is that they are unique (cf Graeber 1996). On the 
contrary, money is characterised by impersonality and anonymity (Nash 1966; Simmel 1990). It 
is a unitary media of exchange which demotes a wide range of activity to a single ladder of 
measurement (Nash 1966). As Graeber (1996: 6) has aptly put it, every dollar bill is exactly the 
same as any other, that is to say that money does not involve unique articles at all: 
As a result money presents a frictionless surface to history. There is no way to know where a given 
dollar bill has been. Nor is there any reason one should care, because neither the identity of its former 
owners nor the nature of transactions in which it has previously been involved in any way affects its 
value. This is why transactions involving money can be said to be 'anonymous': the social identities of 
those transacting need not become part of the stakes of any transaction. (Graeber 1996: "6). 
It is worth stressing that the symbolic possibilities of money to express the quality of a 
relationship are fInite; one can pay more or can pay less, one does not ask what and how, but how 
much (Leach 1982: 174; Simmel 1990). Consequently, 'its quantity is its only important 
determination' (SimmeI1990: 259, emphasis added). 
The authors of the Social Storage model by being silent on the nature of valuables (that is 
they rarely mention what type of objects their category of valuable craft goods consists of) 
dismiss the distinction between money and valuable tokens. Consequently, they turn the latter 
into an anonymous medium of exchange and standards of value (units of account) similar to 
money by stressing primarily its capacity to signal and defme differentiation through its 
quantitative dimension. This can be illustrated by Halstead and O'Shea's assertion that 'if too 
many valuables exist relative to the potential of the system their value declines ... indirect storage 
networks may be faced with an inflationary problem,13 (1982: 94; O'Shea 1981: 178). In other 
words, like money the value of tokens is held to rest on quantity and their exchang~ value for 
goods (food in this case), as well as on the ways that this value based on quantity can be affected 
by the relationship between the demand and supply of goods. Valuable articles, however, do not 
follow the same principle as money mainly because they are unique. Take for example, Picasso's 
Guernica or a Trobriand /ada armshell. These are unique objects in the sense that only one 
Guernica exists, and although there are other Picasso paintings, each is special in its own way. 
Similarly, a kula armshell differs from any other. Although so~e might have si~lar shape or 
colour or be similar in appearance, they are unlike any others: they have individual names, 
because they are associated with different and ranked histories of fame and reputation constructed 
13 Inflation as Schneider points out refers to a situation where 'the demand of goods is increasing at a rate 
faster than the rate of increase in supply' (1974: 238). 
65 
The materiality of inequalities and the problematic of wealth 
through their circulation in time, as they absorb the life stories of their successive owners (Weiner 
1992). More significantly, a Picasso or a precious kula shell are not media for economic 
(commercial) exchange but media for building prestige and fame. The destination of money on 
the other hand, is reduced solely to the media of economic transactions. 
Unlike money, whose quality is its quantity, the worth of valuable objects does not rest 
primarily on amount but on their individual biographies making them distinct from one another. 
According to some anthropologists (Mauss 1990 [1925]; Nash 1966: 26), in so called simple 
societies, livestock, salt, cocoa beans and durable objects, such as brass ingots, shells, 
woodpecker scalps, and many others may constitute media of exchange and units of account. 
Thus, they are taken to be a kind of primitive money or simulate aspects of monetary exchange. 
However, they are not an indifferent medium of exchange exactly like money since they are 
exchanged only for similarly valuable goods in a system consisting of separate and ranked 
circuits or spheres of exchange (Bohannan 1955; Nash 1966). Additionally, while we could see 
salt, cocoa beans, or pigs as money since they _ appear to be categories composed of indifferent 
things, the same cannot be safely asserted for more durable goods. In much of the literature it is 
not clear whether, for example, a shell or a brass ingot is like any other shell or brass ingot or if 
they have a personality like the Trobriand kula shells. As Dalton (1965, 1967) points out, in some 
cases these so called primitive monies have names and history, so they are not like our money. 
Different anthropologists seem to agree that neutral media of exchange like money have a feature 
that makes them unsuitable for use in the construction of obligations (Douglas 1967: 120; Mauss 
[1925] 1990: ch.2 n.29; Leach 1982: 166; Schneider: 1974: 176-177). That is the mobility which 
makes likely the discharging of a debt without any continuing social relationship. This point 
occupies a central position in Simmel's philosophy where money is seen as responsible for non-
commital relations between people due to its power to discharge debts (Becker 1959: 221). 
Conversely, where co~plete obligation is pursued as a form of repayment there is no medium of 
exchange involved (Schneider 1974: 176-177). If there is one, the relation between the parties 
disintegrates, the obligation is repaid and the flow of power stops. 
Returning to the Social Storage hypothesis, the reader should note that there is only one case 
where they are informed about the kind of things the category of valuable tokens may have 
consisted of. For the context of prehistoric Thessaly, these might' have been polyclirome pottery 
with paints from rarer minerals, a few metal articles, furs and skins, and spondylus shell bracelets 
(Halstead 1981a: 198). Now, there are two implications surrounding the game of power and 
prestige, depending on whether one sees the above tokens as unique or as indifferent media of 
exchange. As for the prestige game, if we accept that these objects derive their value from their 
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unique social biographies, and not from exchange potential to buy food it seems difficult to see 
them conferring prestige to those who subsequently acquired them through exploitation. 
Obviously, Halstead and O'Shea's wealthy elites are not the successful kula players but black-
marketeers who try to expand their wealth by exploiting the needy. At least within the local 
community, valuable tokens acquired through exploitation would more likely bestow upon their 
receivers notoriety rather than prestige. 
On the other hand, if the Social Storage account had not treated tokens to a large extent like 
money, but had seriously considered their value to be grounded in their unique personalities, it 
would offer an important way whereby material wealth is transformed into power. I propose that 
if we choose to perceive the tokens as indifferent media of exchange like money, which as 
remarked earlier has the feature of discharging debts, we face a difficulty regarding the 
establishment of obligations which is essential to the formation of power relations. Who can 
assure us that a needy person, given that she maintained this status year after year, would choose 
to continue exchanges with the same successful_ farmer? Once the needy paid for food through a 
money-like medium, their debt would be repaid. They would not need to come back to the same 
lender and may well choose to transact with a different one. Yet, if this faimer had taken from the 
needy not a neutral medium of exchange, like money, but rather an object with a social history 
reluctantly exchanged the previous year for food, the farmer is in a situation to attract the same 
client for further transactions. The value surrounding this item may have attracted the needy who 
once possessed it to continue transacting with the new possessor in the hope that in.the future the 
lost precious item would be regained. Here I am reworking from a different perspective Weiner's 
(1985, 1992) germinal thesis that some valuable things are to be kept by their possessors because 
they are inalienable possessions crucial for the construction of social identities. Although these 
possessions might be lost through the vagaries of life, they bestow power to those who can keep 
them. Furthermore, some inalienable objects may be highly desirable or socially valued goods 
which everybody wished to possess. In this sense, an inalienable possession may have a radiant 
presence that pervades all exchange events for giving and the status that ensues is measured by-
what has been kept (Weiner 1992: 65). Simply put, it is an avenue for both prestige and power. 
As for the capacity of debt obligations to act not simply as prestige magnets but as vehicles of 
domination by channelling resources into materially productive investments, the Social Storage 
premise asserts that 
... regular donors [of normal surplus] perhaps gain[ed] rights to the labour of recipient farmers and 
act[ed] as 'agents' for more distant exchanges with other communities (Halstead 1992a: 112). 
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... by acquiring rights to additional labour, the most successful households could further enhance their 
productivity and would be better able to maintain exchange partnerships in other villages (Halstead 
1989: 76) . 
... durable craft goods made possible the uneven accumulation of wealth, enabling successful fanners 
to reinforce their position by making favorable marriage settlements, acquiring rights to labor and so on 
(Halstead 1988: 525). 
The lenders of subsistence relief, therefore, can use the labour of borrowers for their own needs 
and the tokens ostensibly constitute part of a bridewealth exchange for the acquisition of a bride, 
or they could be reconverted for labour. Valuable tokens are perceived mainly as vehicles which 
produce more intense economic disparities by enabling the successful to reinvest in production by 
acquiring labour either directly or indirectly through marriage which in the long term provides 
children and thus a labour force for the extraction of larger food surplus. Once again a new 
vicious circle of debt obligations begins. The interesting question is whether the successive 
circles of indebtedness involve the same actors. I propose that this is highly doubtful for 
transactions involving money-like payments where the debt is fully repaid do not extend the 
relationship between creditor and debtor in time. 
The idea that wealth transforms into status and power through its materially productive 
reinvestment has been also put forward by Pullen (1992) in a more recent study where he 
constructs a so called SubsistencelWealth model to account for the development of elites in 
southern prehistoric Greek mainland. According to him, the discovery at the Early Bronze Age 
Tsoungiza hill in Ancient Nemea of fragments of terracotta oxen figurines preservin.g a system of 
yokes, implies the adoption of high-cost plough technology14. As Pullen asserts, only prosperous 
farmers could be able to afford cattle and ploughs and adopt plough agriculture which permits 
exploitation of new microenvironments. Their wealth (in the form of agricultural produce), 
therefore, could be productively invested as capital in cattle. The ownership of a plough and a 
pair of oxen in turn would be a strategy for individual households to amplify their wealth. 
Essentially you become wealthier through harnessing the energy of the oxen thereby increasing 
your productivity and secondly by creating obligations to your neighbors when they wish to lease " 
the oxen and plough for their own productive increase. So far, the model lacks the sophistication 
of social storage where a complex mechanism generating debt obligations is suggested. Pullen 
fills the lacuna of his argument by introducing a Marxist element: ' 
The high cost of the new capital technology would lead to differential access to the means of 
production. and hence a hierarchy of wealth, status, and power, headed by an elite, would emerge. One 
14 According to Pullen (1992: 53), plough agriculture constitutes a costly investment since it involves the 
procurement and maintenance of ploughs as well as caring and provision of food for the oxen. 
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could imagine the oxen- and plow-owning farmer becoming the 'big man' in this community (1992: 
53. emphasis added). 
The spirit of a peculiar type of capitalism, the one that Weber quite hastily felt to ~haracterise all 
modern capitalism15 is present in both Social Storage and SubsistencelWealth premises: 
... the desire to make money with money. which implies transforming wealth into capital. which is in 
turn invested in the process o/production and circulation 0/ commodities (Gode1ier 1999: 63. emphasis 
added). 
The particular view which connects wealth with a growth of the productive forces was 
advocated in the early 70s by the economic anthropologist Pierre Rey who proposed that the role 
of circulation (of women, men and goods) in society is to reproduce the means of production 
(Berthoud and Sabelli 1979: 745). However, does this peculiar type of economic rationalisation 
or 'obsolete production mentality', to use Berthoud's and Sabelli's words, hold for the creation of 
authority, status and prestige in the past? Finally is economic achievement the fundamental force 
and arena behind the inequalities of the Early Minoan II? And if it is in what sense? 
For some economic anthropologists (Godelier 1972, 1978; Wolf 1981: 49; 1982: 77-78) this 
kind of wealth is not anymore just wealth but economic capital16• In Wolfs ·words, 
Wealth in the hands of holders of wealth is not capital until it controls means of production. buys 
labour power, and puts it to work, continuously expanding surpluses by intensifying productivity 
through an ever-rising curve of technological inputs (1982: 78). 
The point here is not just whether one can assume the existence of capital in pre-monetary 
societies or not. For example, Godelier, Wolf as well as Marx himself (de Ste. Croix 1981: 504) 
would doubt that there is anything like capital in so called archaic societies given their belief that 
this emerges only when (monetary) wealth can mobilise labour power and control the means of 
production. I do not completely share this view. What is more interesting, however, at"this point, 
is how deeply engrained Aegean accounts of inequality are with respect to the productive 
dimension of wealth. 
Ethnographies are rich in cases of so called primitive societies where the desire of or struggle 
for wealth in the above sense (wealth accumulated as capital invested in production -
intensification of agriculture, construction of facilities for productive projects) did not have a 
place since individual accumulation of wealth was not possible or an accepted' principle of 
economic and social life (Mauss 1990 [1925]; Godelier 1999). We are also informed of past 
15 But see Baudrillard (1988). for example, who has remarked that today capitalism is a consumer 
capitalism. 
16 There has been a long debate among economic anthropologists over the definition of capital. see Firth 
(1964); Forde and Douglas (1967). 
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communities that possessed levelling mechanisms militating against the accumulation of wealth 
in the hands of particular segments of society and thus preventing likely further investments in 
production or undermining the significance of economic achievement as a parameter of social 
distinction. Manning Nash (1966: 35, 78-79; 1967: 8-9) has mentioned some of these 
mechanisms: symbolic destruction of wealth, potlatch, forced sharing or loans to relatives and 
neighbours, provision of services and resources in communal office, generous give aways of 
various goods, feasting and drinking following economic success, fracture of property through 
bilateral systems of inheritance. We can also add here offerings to the gods, the dead andlor the 
ancestors. 
Such mechanisms ensure that wealth is consumed so that the property of the various 
households within the community will be equivalent. To avoid any misconceptions, an important 
point should be stressed. In these societies it is not that wealth is not produced at all but rather 
that it is mainly consumed in ways that do not make it an economic capital for accumulation and 
reinvestment in production. For example, the Kachins of highland Burma see movable property as 
an adornment to the person and not as capital to be invested (Leach 1954: 42). The Kwakiutl of 
the Northwest Coast of North America, on the other hand, engage in frenetic disbursements of 
wealth (Mauss 1990 [1925]). Similarly, well to do Tolowa Indians seek prestige by throwing 
themselves into lavish expenditure of food for their fellow villagers at various festivities (Gould 
1966: 86). Simple disinterest can hardly ever be suggested as a reason for lack in a situation of 
potential capital accumulation (Firth 1964: 22). Let it be made clear that so called a~chaic people 
neither lack economic sense nor despise economic profit (Forde and Douglas 1967: 27; 
Malinowski 1961 [1926]: 27; Shennan 1999; Panoff 1970). The materially unproductive 
manipulation of wealth has nothing to do with altruistic instincts and a stress on social solidarity 
or a lack of economic rationality. Most importantly, it can be also observed in modern societies. 
In present day Crete, for instance, at the annual feast celebrating the dormition of the Virgin 
Mary, villagers gather to drink, eat and dance in the village square. As part of the festivities, a 
lottery organized by the village development society takes place in order to raise funds for '. 
community infrastructure such as the renovation of churches. The festival in general is taken as a 
good opportunity to show off one's wealth by wearing elegant clothing and jewellery or arriving 
in an expensive car. While many people exploit this opportunity to show their' wealth, the 
ostentatious display of material goods does not on its own confer prestige. During the festival, 
participants are approached to buy lottery tickets, and most agree to buy some. It is only after the 
festival lottery comes to a close that the real game of prestige begins. When the musicians put 
dovm their instrum~nts and the festival organiser has everyone's attention the final lottery tickets 
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are put up for sale. Over the microphone, after thanking the crowd for joining the celebrations, 
the organiser invites people to make offers for the remaining tickets. This is when aspirants for 
local status begin a competitive game of bidding for the most tickets. Those who wish for the 
most prestige wait until the end and will often buy all the remaining tickets with the entire village 
looking on. Once again, prestige accrues to those who conspicuously spend their wealth in 
materially unproductive ways. Keeping this in mind, let us challenge 'our obsolete production 
mentality' and acknowledge, as Berthoud and Sabelli long ago suggested, that 
... the emergence of social structures the entire function of which is material accumulation and the 
development of productivity is not the only phenomenon worthy of attention (Berthoud and Sabelli 
1979: 749). 
I propose that a similar picture is revealed through the archaeological record for Early Bronze 
Age Crete. This will be examined in detail in the next chapter. At the moment, I want just to 
stress that economic enterprise in the form of accumulation of resources or capital for 
reinvestment in further production does not see~ to have been the predominant strategy for status 
elevation or the establishment of relational inequalities at least during the Early Bronze Age. To 
avoid any misconception, I do not mean to suggest that reinvestment in production was absent in 
these times. After all, even the more frenetic acts of material destruction or generous giving-
aways of various kinds of wealth depend on having valuable things to destroy or give, and these 
somehow have to be produced or acquired. To argue merely that control of and reinvestment in 
production are strategies pertinent to the construction of status and relational social .inequalities is 
a truism. To go beyond truisms we need thorough context specific investigations of the ways the 
above strategies promote and are being promoted by structures of indebtedness. Here I am 
thinking along the lines of the programme of work that Chris Gosden (l989b) has undertaken in a 
study about Late prehistoric southern Britain. Moreover, I do not wish to chart different ways of 
wealth's appropriation along an evolutionary scale. My main point is that wealth is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the creation of status or relational inequalities. It becomes 
sufficient only when it establishes relations between people. However, these relations vary from-
time to time and from place to place and they depend on the understanding a particular society 
has of its wealth. 
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Chapter 4 
The 'when' question of wea'ith and inequality 
Introduction 
The debate over the emergence of social complexity, characterised by the advent of palatial 
structures and forms of social inequality has not only been concerned with understanding why 
and how social differentiation came into being, but has also been obsessed with hunting down its 
temporal origins. This is consistent with a theoretical standpoint which understands inequality as 
a phenomenon limited in history. Broadly speaking, if one assumes that inequality is a condition 
that can be traced to a specific time and is not omnipresent, they are obliged to reconstruct its 
genesis. In the Aegean in particular, from the eighties until today generations of prehistorians 
have faced a further riddle. This concerns the question of whether palatial social inequalities were 
the outcome of a cumulative process already present in the workings of the Prepalatial (EMI-
MMIA) era, or a series of sudden quantum leaps (cf. Cullen 2001; Haggis 1999: 56; Hamilakis 
2002: 14; Manning 1994: 230; Warren 1985: 83). 
It might be argued that the historical question of inequality in general and its at~ndant issues 
of tempo are parts of an epistemological tradition which has provided us with a false evolutionary 
conundrum to begin with (cf. Hamilakis 2002). For to stress a point made in chapter one, 
societies that precede so called civilisations are reduced to evolutionary stepping-stones worthy of 
study not for their own sake, but rather because we assurrie that they have something to say about 
their presumably more complex antecedents. Hence Soles's assertion that the tracing of social 
inequalities in prepalatial Crete 'will determine the way the appearance of palatial civilisation 
itself is explained' (1988: 49). 
Meanwhile, closer observation reveals that current perceptions regarding the historical 
question of inequality in Europe have been shaped not so much by the material record but by our 
ideological conditioning (McKay 1988: 6). This is based on strong Western biases and 
mythologies about key concepts such as wealth and value (among others) which distort our view 
of past societies. For instance, wealth as the archaeological manifestation par excellence of 
inequalities is usually defmed according to Western biases about aesthetics, scarcity, quantity and 
quality. More significantly, these occidental biases, being the product of archaic ethnographic 
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myths rather than representations of reality, convolute and exaggerate our view of contemporary 
Western societies. In other words, what is commonly believed to represent our Western way of 
conduct has been constructed as an exacerbating antithesis of an often ethnographically conceived 
imaginary perception of the Other, i.e. so called contemporary 'primitive' societies (cf. Moreland 
2000). Hence, we submit to unrealistic views of both so called simple and complex societies. The 
former are seen as fairly irrational in economic terms and lacking any impulse to acquisition 
whereas the latter, represented as their very opposite, are seen as the epitome of economic 
rationality and calculating ability. 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the debate regarding the historical question of 
inequality in the Aegean and reveal its genealogy. The controversy, as I shall try to show, is 
grounded on different poorly conceived perceptions regarding the ways in which wealth 
transforms into power and the material visibility of this transformation. In chapter three I made a 
distinction between the ways in which wealth is transformed into an instrument of domination. 
The first involves practices that draw on the materially productive dimension of wealth, whereas 
the second relies on routines which capitalise on its materially unproductive dimension. A further 
challenge I confront in this chapter is to test these different practices against the archaeological 
record of Early Bronze Age Crete. It is in this period that Aegean scholarship traditionally seeks 
the social foundations for the emergence of the so called Middle and Late Bronze Age Minoan 
palaces. The chapter will conclude with some ideas on the materiality of inequalities which may 
serve as starting points for rethinking the misleading polarity between 'simple' and 'complex' 
societies. 
Gradualists, Revolutionists and Intermediaries: The hunting down of 
origins 
In its pursuit of the historical origins of social inequalities in the Aegean, current research falls 
into three rough categories. The first is commonly called the gradualist approach and tracks a' 
steady growth in social complexity and ranking, from the beginning of the Early Bronze Age, 
namely EMIl through to the Palatial times. The genealogy of this perspective goes back to Arthur 
Evans who enthusiastically asserted that the doctrine of evolution constitutes the central truth of 
archaeological science (1884: 28). His sequential division of Minoan civilisation into three stages 
- Early, Middle, and Late - was akin to stages of organic growth or personality developmene 
1 The stages of the development of living organisms are hirth/growth, florescence and maturity (Cherry 
1983: 36). . 
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(Cherry 1983: 36; Hamilakis 2002: 6). One can certainly trace here the nineteenth-century 
evolutionary idea that there is a close analogy between organic evolution and stages of social 
evolution2• For Evans, the analogy between organic evolution and cultural progress was best 
exemplified by the gradual evolution of material culture. This perception has been shared to one 
degree or another by more recent followers of the gradualist theory. Branigan (1970) and Warren 
(1987), for instance, have interpreted Early Minoan settlement plans, building complexes, storage 
facilities, bench fittings, wall plaster and various other architectural appearances as embryonic 
forerunners of the Middle and Late Minoan palaces. 
Meanwhile, the gradualist approach has reached new levels of sophistication through the 
work of scholars who cast their theory of evolving social inequalities in the form of explanatory 
models. Thus, Renfrew (1972) proposed that the 'emergence of civilisation' is the end result of a 
sustained cumulative growth triggered by the multiplier effect - a mechanism of positive 
feedback loops between different fields of activity (subsystems). Halstead and O'Shea's Social 
Storage premise (1982), mentioned above, rep~esents a continuation of this tradition in that it 
aims to model how relational social inequalities grew up gradually and steadily through the 
building of economic obligations. The same is true for Pullen's SubsistencelWealth model (1992) 
which, as we saw earlier, surmises an incremental evolution of social inequalities accelerated by 
prolonged strategies of capital investment in agriculture. An additional example is Gilman's non-
functionalist model (1981) which assumes that Minoan ruling classes developed through the 
employment of capital subsistence techniques that gradually retarded the process of segmentation 
characteristic of tribal societies. Likewise, Webster (1990) sees palatial social inequalities as the 
outcome of a prolonged incremental process where familial labour pools expanded to include the 
binding of a non-kin clientele. Supporters of the gradualist thesis, therefore, visualise Early 
Bronze Age non-palatial societies as evolutionary stepping-stones containing the' early but 
steadily blossoming seeds for the social asymmetries observed during the Palatial era. As Soles 
(1988: 49) has put it, the appearance of social ranking in the Prepalatial period can imply an 
intermediary stage in the development of Minoan civilisation, corresponding to what Service has --
called a chiefdom. Equally, for Webster (1990), stratification increases as societies evolve 
incrementally from band to tribe to chiefdom to state. 
The second category is what has been called the revolutionary approach (Branigan 1995), 
after the work of its main exegetist John Cherry. Cherry (1983, 1984) castigated the gradualist 
2 The proclivity of evolutionary thinkers to suppose that there is a homology between the level of social 
complexity and personality development is known in sociology as 'homological compression' (Giddens 
1984a: 23 9~ see also note 4 below). 
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perspective for its weak empirical foundations, its lack of explanatory power - for it assumed that 
time itself constituted the main mechanism of social change3 - and its embracing of fallacious 
nineteenth-centUty orthogenetic concepts and organic metaphors. According. to Cherry's 
(1978:429, 1983, 1984) view, it was a sudden and discontinuous speeding up of social processes 
beyond anything that had gone before, rather than a slow and cumulative development during the 
EM period that led to the formation of Minoan palaces and the social inequalities that they reflect. 
With regard to the content of social transformation, Cherty made a point of paramount 
significance. He maintained that one should not lose sight of the fact that the organisational 
changes observed during the Palatial times were not just of degree, as the gradualists assumed, 
but largely of kind. Hence, for Cherty, social change is not just a quantified . change but also a 
qualitative one. According to the principles of general evolution, higher and more complex forms 
of social life surpass lower and less complex ones (Giddens 1984a). While Cherry's revolutionary 
paradigm does not leave this completely behind, the emphasis on the qualitative aspect of social 
change is a refreshing approach. A summary of the qualitative content of changes has been 
provided by Cherty himself: 
... at the outset of the EM period ... there is yet no evidence, at any rate, for the actions of central 
persons ... nor obvious indications of social ranking or stratification; there are no unambiguous signs 
of craft specialisation or of the institutionalised division of labour; economic links beyond the local 
residential unit are so few that subsistence self-sufficiency must have been the norm ... a millennium 
or so later - certainly by the nineteenth century B.C. - everything is different. The archaeological 
record of the Old Palace period provides reasonably satisfactory evidence of small-scale states in 
operation (1983: 33-34, emphasis added) [and] ... we see [now] the Aegean palace system at its height, 
representing a degree of economic specialisation and political centralisation comparable ... to the 
contemporary states and hierarchical imperial organisations further to east (1984: 20). 
In my view, the revolutionary approach's potential for understanding the quality of social change 
in Minoan Crete has not yet been fully realised among Aegeanists. In charting the qualitative 
difference of the Prepalatial landscape according to a series of absences, one perpetuates the 
mythological and fictitious polarity of 'simple' and 'complex' societies which, as recent 
advancements in social anthropology demonstrate, has no real historical credibility. Most. 
importantly, echoing Meillassoux, Wolf (1982:89) has remarked that describing societies by an 
absence of features tells us hardly anything about what they are. To this we need merely add that 
Cherry's view of prepalatial actors as self-sufficient isolates is refuted empirically by the 
existence of a complex web of socio-economic interactions during the Prepalatial period. This 
3 The tendency of evolutionists to believe that the elapsing of time is the same thing as social change has 
been called by Giddens 'temporal distortion' (l984a: 242). This along with 'unilineal compression', 
'normative illusion' and 'homological compression' are considered to be the four dangers associated with 
evolutionism (for a detailed critique see Giddens 1984a: 239-242). 
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becomes clear when we consider the acquisition and procurement of raw materials such as 
bronze, gold and obsidian (Branigan 1991a; Broodbank 2000: 276-319; Carter 1998; Day and 
Wilson 2002) and also intricate patterns of pottery production and circulation (Day et al. 1997; 
Whitelaw et al. 1997; Wilson and Day 1994). 
At the same time, adherents to the revolutionary approach variously suggest that Early Bronze 
Age Cretan societies were fairly egalitarian and autonomous and that the key to the emergence of 
social inequalities lies in the last phase of the Early Bronze Age, namely, EMIII and/or even later 
in the MMi. Watrous (1994: 713), for example, has denied the existence of wealthy chiefly elites 
before the Middle Bronze Age 4. Manning (1994: 233) unlike Cherry and Watrous has traced the 
emergence of some fragmentary indications of social differentiation in a few large EMIl sites in 
the north or east of the island. Notwithstanding, he postulates a small-scale intensive farming 
regime led by self-sufficient, independent households for the EMI-Il. Additionally, despite his 
view that the process of social change had ~tarted already during the later part of EMIl, Manning 
does not in fact part company from the other revolutionists for he likewise states that a real 
momentum of development occurred at the relatively short EMIII-MMIA period In his words, 
'what had been an emergent elite in later EB2, now [EMIII-MMI] became a real elite ... the key, 
emergence is the ... sudden social transfo~ation that occurred in the EMIII-MMI period' 
(Manning 1994: 237-239, emphasis added). Finally, Sbonias (1999: 46-47) sees no signs of 
political hierarchies in EMIl despite some variations in the distribution of wealth and asserts that 
the significant formative period comes after the EMIl times. 
Meanwhile, a third approach has been put forward by scholars who have tried to bridge the 
gradualist/revolutionary divide by taking a stance in the middle (Damilati and Vav~uranakis 
forthcoming). I will call this the intermediary approach. For example, Wilson (1994: 44) has 
briefly made the point that while a scenario of gradual incremental social change might be 
simplistic, it is equally debated to what extent one can talk about a relatively sudden quantum 
leap in MMI, as proposed by Cherry. Drawing on his thorough review of the ceramic deposits 
from EM Knossos, Wilson came up with an alternative model which depicts the process of social 
change and growth in prehistoric Crete as always cumulative, yet proceeding at an irregular 
tempo. As he sees it, the EMIIA and also the EMIlI represented an accelerated pace of progress 
whereas the intermediate EMIlB demonstrated a slower tempo of change. Ac~ording to this 
narrative, the dawn of social ranking in Crete can be traced to the EMIIA period. It is during this 
period, that there is firm evidence for grand-scale ritual feasting and drinking (Day and Wilson 
4 In his more recent work, Watrous (2001) has moved slightly away from his extreme revolutionary 
orientation withou~ however significantly deviating from his original emphasis on rapid change. 
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2002: 149), consumption of fme pottery (Wilson and Day 1994), regional specialisation in pottery 
production, intricate webs of exchange interactions (Day et. all 1997 and Whitelaw et. all 1997), 
trade in sumptuous items and large-scale projects of a labour intensive nature (Wilson 1994). This 
picture, which suggests the existence of a central authority, is best exemplified at Knossos, 
though it is also evident at some other sites like Malia, Mochlos and Gournia (Wilson 1994). In 
sharp contrast to EMIIA, the subsequent period EMIIB appears to be more conservative. More 
specifically, earlier Knossian trade contacts with both the Mesara and the Cyclades vanish. As 
Wilson points out, this might have been the result of desertion or destruction of many Cycladic 
settlements. Overall, the EMIlB was a period of isolation from the rest of the Aegean for Knossos 
and Crete as a whole. For Wilson, this situation suggests a slowing down of the tempo of change 
during the EMIIB. Yet, as he notes, all this was about to change in EMIlI when one can detect a 
new acceleration of the pace of social change within the Prepalatial sequence. At Knossos for 
example, though the scarcity of imported wares evident in EMIlB continues into the EMIlI, there 
is now evidence for another major rebuilding. programme similar to that argued for EMIIA. 
Wilson's account presents us with a detailed review of the Knossian archaeological evidence 
during the Prepalatial times. However, the approach is still largely descriptive and we are offered 
no more than clues regarding the nature and the sources of elite power at Knossos. 
A significant fund of ideas that can be drawn upon to highlight these issues comes from a 
more recent paper by Day and Wilson (2002). Here they analyse evidence from Prepalatial 
Knossos and the nearby harbour site of Poros-Katsambas suggesting that political power was 
already in operation between EM I-EMIl. They argue that both sites might have acted 'as a 
potential basis of power' since they both reveal various practices that point to a significant 'degree 
of control held by the few (Day and Wilson 2002: 154-155). For example, Knossos, the earliest 
known Cretan settlement, demonstrates considerable communal feasting and drinking practices 
that could be associated with commemorative ceremonies and cosmological perceptions given the 
great antiquity of the site and its dramatic location on route to Mount Jouktas dominating the 
skyline. Poros-Katsambas, on the other hand, seems to have been a cosmopolitan centre and a ' 
repository of knowledge of distant places since it bears evidence of skilful craft production and 
procurement of large amounts of raw materials and processed and unprocessed commodities from 
. . 
the Cycladic islands. Notwithstanding their different content, for Day and Wilson, both categories 
of activities evident at Knossos and Poros-Katsambas respectively, appear to represent 'acts of 
transformation' which could be crucial in the creation, reproduction and sanction of social 
inequalities. At Knossos, acts of transformation pertinent to the creation of a reservoir of power 
were materialised through the production of memory and the manipulation of ceremonies. At 
77 
The 'when' question of wealth and inequality 
Poros, on the other hand, they were materialised through procurement of exotic raw materials and 
skilled craftsmanship. Hence, according. to this narrative, Knossos and Poros played 
complementary roles in the process of the emergence and legitimation of power during the EM 
times. 
Even more thought-provoking, however, is the authors' contention that Poros, which displays 
evidence of considerable involvement with intensive craft production and procurement of exotic 
raw materials, did not see the building of a palace. Most significantly, the palace was founded at 
Knossos where evidence of intensive craft production is modest and acts of consumption of fine 
craft items, food and drink seem to have played a more prevailing role. Finally, as this account 
holds, the building of the palace of Knossos can be seen neither as a sudden innovation within the 
local prehistoric landscape nor as the product of steady incremental growth but rather as a project 
that came about through the historical appropriation and reworking of older traditions. This 
reworking became legitimised through changes in the landscape such as the building of 
architecture and the enacting of ceremonial display, which helped to renegotiate older forms of 
inequality. 
Another example is formulated by Haggis (2002: 137) who has expressed his frustration 
about both the gradualist and revolutionary . approaches to social change. In response to 
gradualists, he has asserted that it is more productive to see palatial Crete simply as an expression 
of the continuum of change instead of as the climax or florescence of social development. On the 
other hand, he proposes that the revolutionary paradigm is inadequate because of its insistence on 
framing prepalatial Crete as a static landscape filled by self-sufficient and isolated communities, 
despite the accumulation of new evidence which reveals a plurality of regional and inter-regional 
systems of contact during the Prepalatial era. According to this view, prepalatial society was not 
actually less complex compared to the palatial but less connected: In Haggis's (2002: '123, 129) 
definition, low connectedness corresponds to a pattern of interaction consisting of multiple and 
distinct but not unidirectional, unilateral or hierarchical linkages between different sites of a 
region. More specifically, Haggis (1999) accepts the existence of EMIl elites and places emphasis ' 
on their purely local, intra-site sphere of influence. He also notes that their village-based power 
was legitimised and expressed ritually in the context of local cemeteries. These local elit~s, 
projected themselves at a regional level at the end of the Prepalatial times (EMIII-MMIA) after a 
period of discontinuity at the close of EMIIB when, according to Haggis (1999: 55), 
environmental and social limitations contained economic expansion or obstructed growth. The 
expansion of the fonnerly local elites' spheres of influence demanded an extension of the 
agricultural resource base - land, and more importantly labour - and hence it created competition 
78 
The 'when' question of wealth and inequality 
and conflict. To the victors went the spoils and the successful elites were able to mobilise enough 
labour to build and maintain the palatial sOCial structures. According to this narrative, peak 
sanctuaries were very significant features of the late Prepalatial periods, because they provided 
elites with large regional labour pools and operated as religious mechanisms of regional control. 
However, Haggis's model of social change appears to be quite close to the gradualist 
approach. Despite his distinction between local elites in EMIl and regionally projected elites from 
EMIII onwards, as well as arguments about a marked discontinuity in economic development 
during the end of EMIl, Haggis clearly sees a gradual tempo of development from village elites to 
regional elites. Most importantly, though he states that palatial society was not more complex than 
prepalatial but more connected, he implicitly reduces the differences between the two societies to 
one of scale. It is a truism that palaces represent a hierarchically connected landscape whereas 
prepalatial communities on the other hand express a lower level social organisation in spatial 
terms. I certainly agree with his point that this difference of scale should not be seen as the 
revolutionists' simplistic polarity between isolated, self-sufficient egalitarian and highly 
interactive ranked societies. Nor should we accept the gradualist argument that sees the 
transformation of lesser forms of power into hi~er ones. Yet, in Haggis's narrative, the basis of 
power at both EMIl and EMIII-MM times has hardly changed. Extraction of agricultural surplus 
acquired through labour mobilisation is the vessel of power of both local and later regional elites. 
Now, if the model is analysed closer we fmd that Haggis's stress on control of surplus production 
as the source of power (Staple Finance) is not based so much on empirical evidence but rather on 
a preconceived belief that food surpluses are the condition sine qua non for the existence of 
elites5• This might well be the case, but as Earle has pointed out, control of subsistence 
production, namely, Staple Finance 'underlies many, but not all, early complex societie~' (l987a: 
64, emphasis added). Additionally, as argued earlier, food surpluses or any kind of wealth turn 
into relations of power only through their conversion into a system of debts. However, the model 
offered by Haggis does not elaborate on the issue of this conversion. The only interesting change 
traced here is the shift of the cui tic mechanism of labour mobilisation from the local cemetery to 
peak sanctuary. 
Whitelaw6 may also be classified among the supporters of the intermediary appro~ch. He has 
5 We find here implicitly once ag~in the Ricardian idea according to which agriculture constitutes the 
determining force of the economy. . 
6 It should be noted here that Whitelaw's earlier work (1983) has seemed to follow the revolutionist 
tradition. More specifically, his architectural analysis of Myrtos (Fournou Korifi) has been taken by 
revolutionists to support the idea of EM egalitarian societies. Nevertheless, although Whitelaw himself 
portrayed Myrtos as an egalitarian community, he recognised that in fact a few EMIl sites deviated from 
this picture. Whitelaw's aim actually was to demonstrate divergent paths to complexity. 
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recently proposed that local elites operated at some sites, like Knossos, Malia and Mochlos during 
the early Prepalatial times (Whitelaw 2002). A significant point made by Whitelaw concerns the 
different pattern of development envisaged at Knossos, Malia and MochIos respectively. Whereas 
the first two sites developed into early palatial centres, the third declined after the later Prepalatial 
times. He proposes that at Knossos and Malia, the basis of elite power corresponded with the 
good agricultural potential of the sites' immediate hinterlands and the control of subsistence 
production and surpluses. To Whitelaw, therefore, local elites are seen to have operated under 
what Earle has called a Staple Finance economy (l987a, 1999; see also Earle and D'Altroy 
1985). On the other hand, the power of EMIl elites at Mochlos, Whitelaw argues, was grounded 
in the control and manipulation of high-value fmished goods and/or exotic raw materials coming 
to Crete through long distance maritime activity. This recalls Earle's Wealth Finance economy. 
The later Prepalatial era (EMIlI), however, saw a major shift from maritime trade activity towards 
the land and an emphasis on agricultural practices. This shift enabled elite groups inhabiting sites 
with great agricultural potential, like Malia and Knossos, to expand their influence and activity. 
Most importantly, agriculturally fashioned elites used a different system of value, i.e. agricultural 
produce, which was much more powerful and dir~t than trinket tokens. Consequently, successful 
elites soon found themselves as regulators of the palatial system of interaction. I fmd Whitelaw's 
scenario an attractive one. More specifically, his point about different parallel sources of power 
during the EMIl period allows us to recognise local diversity and move beyond accounts that 
present sources of power with broad-brush strokes. Yet, on the other hand, the celebrity status 
offered by Whitelaw regarding the control of agricultural production and surpluses at some EMIl 
sites, as well as during the whole course of the Palatial times, raises again the 'how' questions of 
wealth and relational inequalities posited in chapter three. I will return to this issue ~ greater 
detail below. Furthermore, Whitelaw's view of some EMIl communities, like Myrtos, as 
essentially egalitarian does not appear to suggest a radical break with the revolutionary approach, 
for it likewise perpetuates the simplistic dichotomy between simple and complex societies. 
Current readings of the Cretan EBA: A bird's eye-view 
The scarcity of information from the Early Bronze Age (Cherry 1984: 29; Haggis 1999; Manning 
1994: 230) constitutes a regularly quoted hindrance militating against our attempts to reach any 
defmite conclusion about the state and kind of social inequalities during this era. Haggis (1999) 
has pointed out the poor quality and incomplete nature of early publications, the insufficient 
evidence regarding the configuration of entire EM settlements, the poor condition of much of the 
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recovered architecture which presents archaeologists with no more than tantalising fragments of 
walls. One may add here the amateur character ()f many early excavations as well as the selective 
preservation of some types of EBA material excavated at the beginning of the century. This is the 
case with skeletal remains (cf. Soles 1988), for instance, which constitute a category of evidence 
that given the scientific techniques available today could have shed light on various patterns of 
social and economic inequality. More specifically, skeletal remains can offer some interesting 
information regarding the issues of ascribed or inherited status and the degree of correlation 
between nutritional/mortality patterns and wealth differentiation (Mays 1989; Smith 1987). At the 
same time, exemplary modem publications of EBA settlements are scarce, whereas data from 
some EM contexts have not yet been fully published. Finally, one needs to bear in mind that most 
of our knowledge about the period is derived from funerary contexts which are highly prone to 
both ancient and modem plunder. Nevertheless, this fragmentary evidence has been marshalled 
by gradualists, revolutionists and intermediaries alike in hunting down the origins of Minoan 
social inequalities. There are two broad sets of data which current research has drawn upon in 
order to trace the state of social inequalities during the Prepalatial period: (1) profane architecture 
and furnishings and (2) burial evidence. Examination of the former seeks to fmd evidence for 
structures with an assumed public function as well as size and quality differentiation between 
residential buildings. The latter is analysed in order to attempt to fmd potential indications of 
social ranking evidenced in differences in burial form, tomb gifts and tomb architecture. 
Gradualists'reading of the EBA material realities 
In 1970, Branigan brought forward the theory that the EMIl House on the Hill at Vasiliki and the 
contemporary architectural complex at Myrtos (Fournou Korifi), both in eastern Crete, could be 
seen as architectural ancestors of the Middle and Late Bronze Age Minoan palaces (Plate 4). He 
argued that closer observation reveals that both structures feature architectural details that are 
more or less incorporated into the palaces. The architectural checklist that seemed to Branigan 
(1970: 48), to demonstrate that the concept of palace was present already from the EM times ~ 
included features like wall timbers, wall benches, light-wells, painted walls, narrow corridors, 
intermural wells, paved staircases, western and central courts, long magazines and offset 
, . 
doorways. It is particularly worth mentioning the traces of paving in the area between the south-
east and south-west wings of the House on the Hill, which were held to indicate the most 
prominent characteristic of palatial architecture, namely, a central paved court (Branigan 1970: 
44). In a similar vein, Warren (1987) has described Myrtos and Vasiliki as architectural 
predecessors to the palaces. He points out several characteristics at Myrtos, which constitute 
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a) Plan of the EM House on the Hill at Vasiliki (source: Branigan 1970: 45, Fig. 7). 
b) Plan of the architectural complex at Myrtos-Fournou Korifi (source Warren 1992: 
198, Fig. 27.1). 
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elements of the subsequent Palatial architecture. In addition to the cellular settlement plal\ 
benches, storage facilities and red plaster, special emphasis is put once again on the possible 
existence of an open court at the central summit area (unit 45). Warren then turns our attention to 
the EMIII-MMI constructions south of the palace at Malia. The close-lmit structure of possibly 
three architecturally distinct units each consisting of small rooms and passages, was taken by 
Warren to be an intermediate developmental stage continuing the form of Vasiliki and Myrtos 
and heralding the architecture of the first palaces. Accordingly, in Warren's evolutionary scheme 
the fIrst palaces are in tum forerunners of the second palaces. Hence, the MM kouloures at 
Phaistos, having themselves evolved from the EM Myrtos storage magazines, ar~ believed to 
anticipate the circular granaries of the LMI Malia. 
According to Warren (1972: 267 and n.2), the people of Myrtos and possibly Vasiliki led a 
communal way of life and lacked any apparent chief7, To avoid any false impressiol\ Warren's 
perception of Myrtos as an acephalous community (in political tenns) does not imply an 
affiliation to the revolutionary thesis. Rather, to him, the tempo of social evolution was quite 
slow, and accordingly what one observes at Myrtos or at Vasiliki are the very fIrst stages of a 
prolonged incremental growth that fmally culminated with the emergence of palatial societies. 
Unlike Warren, Branigan (1970: 118, 1988: 67) went on to propose that the residents of both the 
House on the Hill at Vasiliki and the architectural complex at Myrtos represented not only a 
central power within their respective local communities but also in embryo form the occupants of 
the future palaces. The elaborate plan and large size of these structures seemed to . suggest their 
interpretation as single mansions indicating the existence of a class able to mobilise wealth and 
labour for the construction of residences superior to those of their fellow beings. Likewise 
Cosmopoulos (1995: 28) sees the buildings at Myrtos and Vasiliki as indicatio~ of the 
emergence of a central authority. Branigan (1970, 1972, 1988, 1995) has also pointed out the 
appearance of monumental domestic architecture at Palaikastro in EMIl and at Knossos in EMIlI. 
He suggested that both the building with the thick walls at Palaikastro and the L-shaped structure 
at Knossos were constructed on a different scale to contemporary houses in the same sites 
pointing to the mobilisation of a substantial human workforce. Hood (1977: 168; see also Hood 
and Smyth 1981: 8) in his turn has submitted that both structures may be qualifie~ given their 
substantial size" as forerunners of the later Bronze Age palaces. In a more recent paper, 
MacGillhTay and Driessen (1990: 399) echo Branigan's suggestion about the building at 
7 In Warren's words, Myrtos alluded to 'a social organisation based on a single large unit, a clan or tribe 
living communally and perhaps not differentiated into individual families, and quite without any apparent 
chief or ruler' (1972: 267). 
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Palaikastro by arguing that though further investigation is necessary, a role akin to that of the 
later Cretan palaces seems likely. Another large prepalatial building, the Pre palatial House 3, has 
been reported by Soles and Davaras (1996: 180) at the site of Mochlos in Area E3. This is a 
rectangular structure whose size, sophistication of construction and large quantity of EMIlI 
pottery, set it apart from the other Prepalatial buildings discovered so far at Mochlos. According 
to the excavators, if the above characteristics are not due to a later construction of the building in 
the Prepalatial times, they may suggest a different function compared to other contemporary 
structures in the site. Two further large possibly EMIII8 structures with an assumed special 
function come from Knossos. These are the so called Hypogeum, a circular underground structure 
(Plate 5a) below the south entrance of the palace (Evans 1921; Branigan 1988; Cadogan 1992; 
Momigliano 1991) and the Keep, a thick-walled structure featuring six vertical cells at the north 
end of the Central Court (Evans 1921; Branigan 1988, 1992; Cadogan 1992). The interpretation 
of these substantial structures as granaries, though not universally accepted9, has been taken by 
Branigan (1988: 67) to suggest large-scale centralised communal storage in EM times therefore 
further reinforcing the gradualist argument for the development of a central organisational power 
before the erection of the first palaces 10. 
Alongside supposed evidence of vernacular monumental architecture or buildings with a 
special function, gradualists turn to the mortuary record in order to support their thesis of 
evolving social ranking. Soles (1988: 50) considers funerary evidence a sensitive indicator of 
social ranking and has encouraged a focus on various criteria of wealth differentiation derived 
from burials such as types of graves, grave goods, insignia of authority and differential treatment 
of the deceased. Hence, both Gilman (1981: 1) and Webster (1990: 343) have variously asserted 
8 The EMIlI date assigned to the structures by their excavator, Arthur Evans (1921) has been the object of 
scepticism. For example, Pendlebury (1939) dated the Hypogeum to the :MMIA period. More recently, 
Momigliano (1991) has argued that though the bulk of pottery from the Hypogeum finds comparisons with 
:MMIA pottery types, the fragmentary state of the evidence and the limited investigation of the deposit do 
not permit any exact dating of the structure. More interestingly, Branigan's (1992) reappraisal of the Keep' 
led him to reject his initial acceptance (Branigan 1988) of Evan's EMIlI date and assign to it a date not 
earlier than MMIB. 
9 The respective functions of both the Hypogeum and the Keep are far from clear. The Keep has been 
variously interpreted as a prison area with its cells acting as dungeons, a guard tower (Evans 1921), a grain 
silo (Evans 1921 ~ Branigan 1988) and a cistern (Graham 1962). The interpretation of the Hypogeum as a 
granary has been favoured by Hutchinson (1962), Halstead (1981b) and Branigan (1988), whereas for 
Evans (1921) the structure more probably acted as a guard entrance. Strasser (1997), on the other hand, has 
expressed his scepticism about the interpretation of the Hypogeum as a granary for its lack of an 
impermeable interior cement which would render impractical such a function~ but see Halstead (1997) for a 
r~ly to this view~ the debate continues. 
10 However, according to Branigan's recent reassessment of the Keep's chronology (see n.8 above) 'the 
Keep cannot be seen as part of a prepalatial monumental complex, along with the Hypogeum, as at one time 
seemed possible' (1992:162). 
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that the rich Bronze Age burials discovered in various parts of Europe leave no question that 
marked social disparities emerged during· the third and second millennia BC. Gilman in 
particular, following Renfrew, suggests that the development of social hierarchies may also be 
inferred due to the transition from collective to individual burial rites observed in the beginning 
of the Bronze Age over much of Europe. In a purely Cretan context, some gradualists have paid 
attention to the cemeteries of MochIos and Gournia in eastern Crete, Malia in central Crete, and 
some Mesara tholos tombs (Platanos, Aghia Triadha, and Koumasa) in order to demonstrate the 
early emergence of social disparities. 
Starting with MochloSll, Soles (1988, 1992a) points out that the mortuary buildings (complex 
I, II, III and complex IV, V, VI) on the West Terrace seem to reveal a social ranking higher than 
that represented by the small built tombs, the rock-shelters and the pit grave located on the South 
Slope. More specifically, the West Terrace funerary assemblage has yielded burials with more 
abundant and/or unusual mortuary furniture. They are further singled out from the South Slope 
burials by the location, elegant decoration, greater size and architectural sophistication of the 
tombs. Significantly, the West Terrace tombs appeared to be foci of elaborate ritual activity since 
they were provided with a paved avenue of approach and a large altar. On the other hand, such 
architectural features are lacking from the tombs located on the South Slope. Finally, Soles notes 
the provision of the West Terrace tombs with several compartments which might have been used 
for some kind of initial laying-out of the deceased. In his view, this find in conjunction with 
evidence of bone manipulation may sufficiently demonstrate that burial in the West Terrace was a 
two-stage undertaking involving much more effort and energy expenditure. 
At Gournia, Soles (1979, 1988, 1992a) stresses the employment of two different cemeteries 
by the population during the Prepalatial times: the North Cemetery placed on the north ~pur of the 
Akropolis (Boyd-Hawes et al. 1908) and Sphoungaras at the west slope of Pera Alatzomouri Hill 
(Hall 1912). According to his point of view, the North cemetery with its built tombs above 
ground (implying a complex secondary treatment of the deceased), altar and prestigious tomb 
gifts was probably the burial ground for an elite minority. On the other hand, as Soles remarks, 
the dead at Sphoungaras were buried in pits and rock ledges and were accompanied by very few 
objects. Moreover, no altar, which could imply ritual ceremonies ,serving to sanctio~ elite power 
(Soles 1992a: 255), has been recovered. Hence, the burial pattern at Sphoungaras seems to 
indicate a much more modest expenditure of energy and resources compared to that of the North 
Cemetery. This along with the fact that Sphoungaras appeared to be a more extensive burial 
11 A more detailed presentation of Soles's account of the cemetery at Machlos will be offered at the last 
part of this study. 
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ground than the North Cemetery led Soles to identify the former as the final resting place for the 
lower echelons of society, which represented the majority of the population within Goumiote 
prepalatial society. 
Turning to the Maliote mortuary assemblage, Soles (1988, 1992a) detects a pattern of social 
inequality which strongly recalls the picture derived from Gournia. More precisely, he observes a 
significant contrast in terms of energy and resource expenditure between the EMIl rock-crevice 
burials found along the coast and the contemporary small rectangular built tomb (known as the 
'Ossuaire Renaudin') in the Necropole des Pierres Meulieres. The latter, displaying far more 
effort and labour investment as well as a potential secondary treatment of the deceased, was 
probably reserved for the richest inhabitants of Malia. To Soles, the contrast between rich/elite 
and poor/commoner elements of the Maliote population became even more striking at the end of 
the Prepalatial period (EMIlI). At this time, along with the introduction of modest pithos burials 
throughout the coast, three more tombs were constructed at the N ecropole des Pierres Meulieres 
and the first burials appeared at the architecturally elaborated earlier structure that lies beneath the 
monumental protopalatial tomb at Chrysolakkos. 
Moving now to Mesara in southern Crete, Branigan (1984, 1991b, 1993: 114) modified his 
initial characterisation of the area as the land of unranked, egalitarian communities. He proposed 
that although the tholos tombs in the Asterousia Mountains still seemed to suggest egalitarian 
communities, the evidence from the Mesara plains and the foothills implied societies in which 
social ranking was emerging. At the cemeteries of Platanos, Aghia Triadha, and Koumasa, each 
exhibiting two or three tombs, it has been suggested that Tholos A at Platanos (plate 5b), Tholos 
A at Aghia Triadha and Tholos B at Koumasa, were in size, architectural sophistication and 
concentration of precious grave goods superior to the other(s) in the same cemetery. In this light, 
the communities represented by these burial grounds were understood by Branigan to stand 
between simple egalitarian farming societies and fully-fledged chiefdoms. 
Meanwhile, according to gradualists, evidence for social ranking comes also in the form of 
small moveable possessions such as seals, daggers, diadems, metal vessels, elaborate forms of 
pottery and stone vases (see Branigan 1983a, 1984, 1991b). It is commonly remarked that finds 
such as copper daggers and gold diadems could be interpreted as ,insignia of author!ty (see Soles 
1988). Finally, the presence in Crete of a stratified society of 'haves' and 'have-nots' already by 
the EMIl has also been inferred from the discovery of seals which are taken to argue for the 
emergence of ownership and private property (see Vitelli 1978: 43; Cosmopoulos 1995: 24). 
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a) Plan of the hypogeum at Knossos (Renfrew 1972: 97, Fig. 6.9). 
b) Tholos A at Platanos (Branigan 1970: 169, Fig. 40). 
Plate 5 
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Revolutionists' reading of the EBA material realities 
Turning now to the opposite camp represented by adherents of the revolutionary scenario, we 
detect quite a different reading of the EM material realities. Cherry (1983; 1984), for instance, 
found the gradualist thesis where EM material forms constitute embryonic versions (in 
architectural and organisational terms) of the Minoan palaces to be thin; a simple empiricism 
lacking explanatory power. He felt (Cherry 1983: 35) that closely bound up with this view is the 
fallacious belief that time itself causes change. For Cherry (1983: 35, 1984: 22), simply citing or 
enumerating superficial similarities in material culture tell us nothing about the emergence of the 
palatial system of organisation. Finally, the evidence from sites like Vasiliki and .Myrtos bears 
very little in common with the later palaces in respect to layout, scale, elaboration, labour 
investment, and differentiation of activities beyond the household level (Cherry 1983: 39). 
Following Cherry, Watrous (1994: 713) has decried the portrayal of Vasiliki and Myrtos as 
architectural forerunners of the later palaces. More specifically, he objects to Branigan's 
argument for the existence of a paved central court at Vasiliki since there is no evidence of EMIl 
buildings on the west part of the hilltop. To this he adds that the storage facilities at Vasiliki have 
in truth, relatively little in common with thos~ of the subsequent palaces since they were not 
centralised, but most likely occurred as annexes to each house. Most importantly, according to 
Watrous, excavations at EMIl levels at sites like Chania, Knossos, and Phaistos, which eventually 
became palatial centres, and where we accordingly should expect embryonic elements of palatial 
architecture, revealed only fragments of modest structures in terms of size and design· complexity. 
It is worth noting at this juncture, that one of Cherry's major contributions to the debate was a 
critique of the much quoted gradualist assumption that large buildings necessarily reflect political 
elites. According to him (Cherry 1983: 39), in the absence of corroborative evidenc~ about the 
function(s) of supposed large buildings, any simple equivalency of 'large building' and powerful 
elite seems dubious. At the same time, the old hypothesis which saw the architectural remains of 
both Myrtos and House on the Hill at Vasiliki as single residences of wealthy men has been 
seriously questioned by several scholars (see Cherry 1983; 1984; Watrous 1994; Whitelaw 1983; 
Zois 1976, 1980, 1992). Drawing this out further, Whitelaw's (1983) architectural reassessment 
of Myrtos revealed the site as a cluster settlement characterised by distinct ~onstructional 
episodes and consisting of five or six household units, whereas a similar picture of small houses 
built side by side has been proposed for Vasiliki by Zois (1976, 1980, 1992). Therefore, the 
consensus is that both the assumed 'single mansion' at Myrtos and the House on the Hill at 
Vasiliki did not constitute large, single houses but several smaller ones built over time. These 
revisions along with the suggestion that the smaller houses in both settlements represent 
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independent, self sufficient families - since they do not seem to display any apparent 
differentiation in size, architectural elaboration and wealth distribution - have been repeatedly 
argued by the revolutionists to indicate further that the EBA landscape was filled by egalitarian 
societies. Thus, Whitelaw (1983: 336) characterised Myrtos as a small egalitarian rural 
community12, a characterisation also adopted by Zois (1992: 276) for Vasiliki. Moreover, Cherry 
(1983: 39) has considered this to be archetypal of other EM settlements. In the same spirit, 
Watrous (1995: 41) has challenged Branigan's interpretation of the structures at Palaikastro and 
Knossos as prominent household buildings within their respective local communities. Instead, he 
went on to assert that it might be misleading to consider these structures as domestic at all since, 
in the former instance, the walls do not look like anything we know from the EM domestic 
architecture and, in the latter, the L-shaped structure is probably a terrace. Furthermore, one may 
note that the fragmentary preservation of the structure at Palaikastro renders any secure 
interpretation of its function impossible (Manning 1994: 238). Likewise, the assignment to the so 
called Keep at Knossos of a centralised storage function may be far from unambiguous. Thus, 
although Manning (1994: 239) does not rule out that both the Hypogeum and the Keep suggest 
forms of storage centralisation indicating a societal transformation in the EMIli, he notes (1994: 
239) quoting Graham that the latter structure' was a cistern, rather than a granary. Finally, 
Manning (1994: 253 n.16) does not dismiss Branigan's chronological reappraisal of the Keep 
according to which the structure probably belonged to the beginning of the Palatial times, namely, 
MMIB and not to the EMIlI as once believed. Similarly, Watrous (1994: 7~1) following 
Momigliano's (1991) MMIA chronology of the Hypogeum shifts the origins of the 
institutionalised centralised food storage from the Early to the Middle Bronze Age, which is 
closer to the erection of the palaces. 
Additionally, the revolutionists argue that the evidence of social ranking in the bUrial record 
of the Prepalatial peri9d is not a straightforward matter either. According to them (Cherry 1983; 
Watrous 1994), the wealth and architectural elaboration of EM so called elite tombs have been 
overemphasised. For example, Cherry (1983: 40) believes that most Mesara tholos tombs lack a-· 
vault and that the labour and skills invested in their construction were not substantial. Likewise, 
Watrous (1994: 713) notes for MochIos that the size differentiation between the West Terrace 
tombs and those at the South Slope is not as striking as has been previously assumed. At Gournia, 
12Jt is worth stressing here that Myrtos' interpretation as an egalitarian community has been paradoxically 
reinforced by its excavator Peter Warren an advocate of the gradualist thesis. Despite his interpretation of 
Myrtos - as a single large architectural complex not differentiated into individual families - Warren (1972) 
was reluctant to identify the site as the home of a chief. According to him, Myrtos implied a clan or tribe 
living communally (see note 8 above). 
87 
The 'when' question of wealth and inequality 
he marshals empirical evidence to question Soles's suggestion that we can infer social ranking 
there from the employment of two cemeteries by the population. As mentioned earlier, Soles 
believed that the poor element of the Gourniote population was buried at Sphoungaras whereas 
the built tombs of the North Cemetery were reserved for the elite. In Watrous view (1994: 713 
and n.130), a more probable scenario is that the Sphoungaras cemetery was in fact used by a . 
separate community. This is suggested by the recent discovery made by the Gournia survey of a 
sizeable EM settlement on the hill above Sphoungaras. 
At the same time, one should not lose sight of the fact that many tombs built originally in EM 
times contain deposits which continue into the Protopalatial times (Watrous 1994: 714). This is 
the case with some tholos tombs at Mesara. For instance, Tholos A at Aghia Triadha spanned the 
EMI-MMII period. More interestingly, as Watrous (1994: 713 and n.128, 129) maintains, most of 
the pottery and metal objects found there, as well as in other Mesara tombs, do not belong to 
purely EMIl levels. In respect to the Maliote mortuary pattern, he (1994: 713 n.131) suggests that 
most of the tombs that Soles believes to be prepalatial belong almost entirely to the Protopalatial 
period. 
At MochIos, Watrous argues that recent discoveries demonstrate that wealth was not 
restricted to the West Terrace tombs (see also Sbonias 1999: 29-31). So called elite materials like 
gold jewellery and ivory have also been found at some South Slope tombs. Most significantly, it 
can also be debated to what extent architectural sophistication of tombs corresponds to their 
wealth. For example, the fact that despite its modest construction, Tomb XIX at the South Slope 
was among the wealthiest burials in the cemetery suffices to demonstrate that such correlation 
may be quite misleading (Watrous 1994: 713 and n.128). Eventually moreover, according to 
Cherry (1983: 40), the evident unequal distribution of wealth at cemeteries like Mochlos simply 
points to the fact that some burials were wealthier than others, rather than beirig positive 
reflections of social hi~rarchy. A similar view has been espoused by Sbonias (1999) who has also 
suggested in contrast to gradualists, that EMIl seals do not support the existence of a hierarchical 
society since they cannot be taken to stand either as symbols of authority or as indexes of" 
complex economic transactions. According to him, EMIl seals most probably had a special 
amuletic character since they appear to display a stylistic homogeneity that makes them 
unsuitable for personal display or identification of different levels of centralis'ed economic 
administration (Sbonias 1999: 35-36). 
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Intermediaries'reading of the EBA material realities 
As we saw earlier, Wilson has maintained that social change in Bronze Age Crete was a 
cumulative process moving at an uneven pace. According to this theory, EMIIA reveals the flrst 
clear evidence of social ranking and represents an accelerated tempo of social change. At 
Knossos he argues (1994: 36) that the beginning of social ranking may be demonstrated by a " 
large EMIIA building known as the West Court House, which was uncovered beneath the West 
Court of the later palace. Perhaps even more important in this context is the evidence from 
beneath the West Court and the northern half of the palace where large-scale levelling activities 
cut down into the late Neolithic levels. This seems to indicate a project of substantial rebuilding 
and reorganisation of the settlement during the EMIl A period. In the stretch beneath the northern 
half of the later palace, this included levelling up the sheer slopes of the hill and the extension of 
the area for building on the ridge to the north and northeast. Similarly, tests beneath the West 
Court have revealed large-scale terracing of buildings and the construction of a terrace wall. Of 
particular interest here appears to be an early. phase of levelling in EMIIA of the upper floor 
rooms of the West Court House in order to make space for an open public area. 
According to Wilson (1994: 42), this demanding building programme "undoubtedly points to a 
central agent of power able to commence such a task and coordinate a substantial workforce for 
its completion. Equally signiflcant in this context is the dramatic rise of ceramic imports in 
EMlIA Knossos from other Cretan regions, most notably Mesara. In Wilson's view, these imports 
provide signs of craft specialisation and trade in luxury wares. Moreover, the operation of a vivid 
and expanded network of exchange contacts during the EMIIA can be further demonstrated by 
the flrst ceramic imports that reached Knossos from outside the island. These were mostly of 
Cycladic provenance, though a very limited amount of Near Eastern 'exotica' has also been 
reported. Wilson (1994: 44) then goes on to assert that the picture revealed from Knossos for the 
beginning of social complexity and ranking in EMIIA can also be independently conflrmed by 
Soles's (1988) study of the mortuary assemblages from the cemeteries of MochIos, Gournia and 
Malia. Furthermore, recent work at the harbour site of Poros-Katsambas has brought into light' 
substantial EMI-EMII evidence of imported raw materials from the Cyclades as well as intense 
craft activity, the products of which were then exchanged beyond the settlement. The latter 
included pottery production and widespread obsidian and copper working for the manufacture of 
prestige items like blades and daggers. It perhaps goes without saying that the evidence from 
Poros not only indicates a central organisational power but also questions the validity of some 
older accounts that tended to depict prepalatial societies as self-sufficient isolates (Day and 
Wilson 2002: 153~154). It is also worth mentioning here that the case for the emergence of 
89 
The 'when' question of wealth and inequality 
ranked society in EMIl or even earlier in EMI has been strengthened by further analysis of the 
ceramic assemblages from Knossos. More specifically, Day and Wilson (2002: 149-152) have 
recently suggested that some EMI and EMIIA ceramic deposits from Knossos were not the 
product of gradual accumulation of rubbish, but rather represent the debris from a single event. 
Accordingly, they might demonstrate the remains of large-scale communal consumption of food . 
and drink organised by elites seeking prestige and a means to legitimate their authority from as 
early as EM!. 
On the other hand, the EMIIB period, as Wilson maintains, seems to represent a slower pace 
of progress; 'a somewhat stark picture' (1994: 41). By these times the exchange contacts between 
Knossos and its neighbours from both within Crete and further afield in the Cyclades fade; 
Mesara imports virtually disappear, while no single import of a Cycladic origin is known from 
EMIlB. Likewise, foreign contacts cannot be documented with any certainty. During the EMIlI, 
in turn, though no evidence for an expansion of contacts has been obtained, there is a number of 
features that may point towards a new acceleration of social change (Wilson 1994: 38-44). At 
Knossos, in particular, two substantial buildings can be reported: the so called South Front House 
recovered at the southern edge of the settlement and the Hypogeum. Additionally, one can now 
document the early limited use of the potter's wheel. The most conspicuous feature of the period 
at Knossos is the expansion of the settlement to the north and to the west of the later palace that 
involved the commencement of a substantial rebuilding scheme comparable to that postulated for 
EMIIA. This included the construction of a paved road at the southern side of the Royal Road and 
the erection of the extensive Northwest terrace wall. The latter as Wilson submits might have 
constituted the foundations for a central building or buildings on the hilltop. 
To document the existence of social ranking in the EM period, Haggis (1999: 60-61) marshals 
evidence of architectural, wealth, and functional differentiation at Vasiliki and Myrtos and of a 
special function building at MochIos. Although he does not see the House on the Hill at Vasiliki 
and the architectural complex at Myrtos respectively as single residences (mansions) but as 
structures consisting of different individual households, he has remarked that both communities' 
do not actually lack evidence of socio-economic differentiation. For example, he notes that one 
can discover real differences in size, architectural details, sophistication, technique and possibly 
in function both among the houses at the hilltop and between these and the houses in the 
southeast slope at Vasiliki. At Myrtos, Haggis turns our attention to the south central cluster with 
its large storage capacity, Room 82 with its exceptionally rich pottery, spacious Room 80 
featuring a large central support and the exclusive concentration of the whole assemblage of vases 
of the local South~Coast fabric with white-painted chevrons in Rooms 72-73 and 79. However, 
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before we make negative assertions about the existence of social inequalities at Vasiliki and 
Myrtos, Haggis suggests there is a further point to keep in mind. This concerns the incomplete 
excavation of Vasiliki as well as the serious erosion at both sites. The supposed picture of EMIl 
egalitarian communities argued by the revolutionists might therefore be a distortion due to these 
factors. At MochIos, Haggis notes the large prepalatial building (Pre palatial House 3) with 
massive foundations in Area E3 excavated by Soles and Davaras (1996). The meaning of this 
building's architectural differentiation which might point to a special function becomes even 
more significant, he remarks, bearing in mind the overall size of EMIl MochIos and its wealthy 
burials. In addition, Haggis points out that the scale and complexity of EMIl as shown by ceramic 
exchange would have demanded central authority (1999: 59). Finally, he supports (1999: 60) the 
existence of social ranking in EMIl on the grounds of the funerary record following older 
accounts like that of Branigan for Mesara and that of Soles about MochIos, Gournia and Malia. 
Whitelaw (2002), on the other hand, has retained his original interpretation (Whitelaw 1983) 
of Myrtos as an egalitarian hamlet. As he argues, despite the accumulated new evidence that 
demonstrates specialised ceramic production, and a complex and extensive pattern of exchange 
relations at EMIl Myrtos (Day et al. 1997; Whitelaw et al. 1997), there is still no evidence to 
point out central organisation of these activities or redistribution at the village level. Nevertheless, 
when one turns to prepalatial MochIos, Malia and Knossos quite a different picture emerges. At 
EMIl MochIos, Whitelaw recognises the traces of social stratification in the unequal consumption 
of wealth as shown by differences in tomb size, sophistication and grave goods. Furthermore, he 
intimates the high concentration of valuable finished goods and exotic raw materials at MochIos 
in comparison to other EM sites. Thus, whereas Myrtos, for example, has revealed a modest 
amount of obsidian, MochIos has produced several deposits of hundreds of blades and cores. 
This, in Whitelaw's view, might be taken to indicate that the power of the Mochliari elite was 
based on the control ~,f trade and craft production. At Malia, apart from the evidence of social 
inequalities based on Soles's account (1988) of the funerary record, Whitelaw further documents 
the carefully laid-out EMIl building which has been partially recovered under the subsequent ' 
palace. Likewise, Knossos reveals significant middle and late prepalatial structures which, 
according to Whitelaw, point to major terracing projects for their construction and rebuilding, 
consequently demanding a central power able to organise, pla~ coordinate and finance their 
execution. 
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Putting the debate into perspective 
At this point I want to pause in order to summarise the disjunctures as well as common ground 
between the above approaches. This will afford a moment of critical evaluation and help to situate 
the view of gradualists, revolutionists and intermediaries within the framework of my own 
argument about the universality of social inequalities. To encapsulate the approaches so far: 
Firstly, the gradualist approach tracks a steady and irreversible growth in social complexity and 
ranking, from the beginning of the Early Bronze Age, namely, EMIl through to the Palatial times. 
Secondly, the revolutionary thesis, in sharp contrast to gradualists, portrays social inequalities as 
the outcome of a sudden and revolutionary development whose origins are traced to the last 
phases of the Prepalatial period or to the beginning of Protopalatial times. Finally, the 
intermediary approach agrees with the gradualists that social ranking begins early in the 
Prepalatial sequence, but emphasises local trajectories or follows the revolutionists in that it sees 
social change more or less as a discontinuous process rather than as a matter of an uninterrupted 
incremental growth. 
At fIrst sight the greatest rupture seems to concern the gradualist and the revolutionary 
paradigms of social change. Yet, despite appearances, is it not true to say that both these accounts 
are in fact evolutionary ones? By now it should be clear that gradualists and revolutionists alike 
see inequalities as something which was absent in some part of Cretan history and present in 
some other. Put another way, these seemingly different views suppose an original state of being 
where people were equal; and then what happens? Through either a process of slow and 
incremental development or a revolutionary and rapid transition people are forced to leave what 
Rousseau (1999 [1754]) calls the natural state of being, i.e. equality, and enter inequality. 
Besides, both gradualist and revolutionist views of social change have been shaped by the 
principle of cultural evolution which, as McGuire remarks, 'implies not just any change, but 
developmental change' (1983: 91, emphasis added). That is, irrespective of the proposed pace of 
change, continuous and gradual or discontinuous and rapid, the trajectory of change envisaged by 
both traditions for Aegean prehistory is one leading to the eventual development of social 
complexity. No doubt, this is more apparent in the gradualists' Russian doll-like perception where 
more complex MM and LM societies evolved out of the less complex EM ones which themselves 
surpassed the eyen less complex social formations of the Neolithic. However, it is' useful to note 
here that the concept of developmental change is not alien to models that advocate a 
revolutionary transition (cf. Giddens 1984a: 229). For example, while Cherry (1983, 1984) 
argued that the momentum of change was a sudden quantum leap beyond anything that had gone 
before, he also pointed out that the trajectory of this process represented a qualitative 
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development in tenns of social complexity13. Given this conviction, there is no surprise m 
Cherry's more recent designation of the emergence of Minoan palatial states as the 'Big Story of 
the Bronze Age in Crete' (1999: 18). It is equally significant to recognise that. gradualists and 
revolutionists alike use the tenn 'complexity' as a synonym for social differentiation. Hence 
complex societies are taken to manifest social differentiation and simple societies the opposite. 
One should note that this particular use of the term 'complexity' as a metaphor for social 
inequality is problematic, for rather than being based on empirical fmdings it is the product of 
modernist intellectual constructions (Rowlands 1989). 
Meanwhile, although there is much that is attractive about certain aspects of intennediary 
accounts, most intermediaries seem eventually to enter the evolutionary tradition 'established by 
their predecessors. In particular, the tendency to frame inequality around a hypothetical starting 
point, that is the hunting down of origins of inequality, stands more or less inviolate. Day and 
Wilson (2002; see also Wilson 1994), for instance, trace the emergence of social inequalities to 
EMI or EMIl times. The theme of emergence reappears in the work of Whitelaw (2002). It seems 
to me that what all these accounts argue for, more or less explicitly, is the absence of social 
inequalities before the EM period. Hence, the Neolithic landscape is still conceived to have been 
inhabited by egalitarian societies. But it is also apparent from Whitelaw's (2002) account that a 
similar state of egalitarianism is assumed for some EM sites like Myrtos. One thing is 
immediately clear; it has been proved extremely difficult so far among Aegeanists to avoid the 
fallacious pigeonholing of societies as egalitarian/simple and hierarchical/complex. . 
Nevertheless, one should acknowledge that some narratives associated with the intermediary 
school are in various ways sensitive to the drawbacks of such simplistic, sharp and quick 
distinctions about the nature of prehistoric societies. Thus, although Day and Wilson (2002) do 
not appear to dismiss the polarity between egalitarianiNeolithic and hierarchicallBronze Age, 
they try to drop the", distinction between simple and complex societies within the Bronze Age 
sequence. More specifically, they undermine the pernicious notion that depicts the difference 
between prepalatial and protopalatial 'complexity' as a qualitative and/or quantitative divide. As 
this account suggests, the prepalatial Knossian social landscape was neither simple nor less 
complex compared to its protopalatial successor. The sceptical reader may then wonder whether 
anything did change from Prepalatial to Protopalatial times; or how change can oe measured at 
all. Yet, according to Day and Wilson (2002: 161), whose view I share, their argument is not - let 
it be emphasised - a thesis against social change. Their analysis of Knossos and Poros tries to 
13 It is perhaps useful to note here that 'momentum' concerns the rapidity with which change occurs, while 
'trajectory' refers to the direction of change (Giddens 1984a: 246) 
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detect a variety of changes in architecture and material culture, in the scale of ceremonial 
practices and in the levels of extra-communal contacts, without resorting to the obsolete idea that 
conflates change with the escalation or sudden emergence of 'complexity' and inequality. More 
significantly, as this account holds, social transformation is a complex historical process, the 
result of constant reworking and renegotiation of various practices, traditions and material 
conditions by successive generations. There is a point though about which Day and Wilson are 
mute. This concerns the state of relational social inequalities in other early prepalatial sites, 
especially those commonly portrayed as egalitarian hamlets and those which never became 
palatial centres, not to mention Palatial period sites away from the major hubs of social 
interaction. This is not surprising, given the authors' selected case studies of Knossos and Poros 
Katsambas, both in the vicinity of the Kairatos River Valley. The choice of this particular 
landscape as a case study is due perhaps to its long history of investigation by several scholars as 
well as the authors' systematic examination' of the area's ceramic assemblages (Bennet 2002: 
219). No doubt, Day and Wilson's analys~s offers interesting insights about practices of 
domination as well as a thorough description of their material correlates. Yet, I feel it would be 
strange not to trace power relations' at Knossos given its unique character, history, blatant 
monumentality and conspicuous practices that 'distinguish it from the more ordinary sites in the 
Cretan prehistoric landscape. Knossos resonates with power relations. This is certainly true for 
the Palatial times when Knossos eventually became the setting of a so called palace and a 
significant regional centre of power. To aclmowledge it is merely to restate the obvious. 
However, the unique status of Knossos relative to other Cretan sites has been variously argued 
even for earlier times (see Broodbank 1992; Evans, 1994; Soles 1995; Whitelaw 1992). For 
example, its special character as the homeland of the first settlers (Evans 1994; Soles 1995), its 
substantial size (Evans 1994), indications of ceramic imports coming from distant sources 
(Tomkins and Day 2.001), as well as increase in the manipulation and use of symbols and social 
ritual (Broodbank 1992), from the Neolithic onwards have given rise to tentative suggestions 
about Knossos' exceptional position as a front-runner opening the path towards complexity (see 
for example Evans 1994; Broodbank 1992). In John Evans's words, 
Neolithic Knossos is important in its own right as a Neolithic 'super-site', unique in Crete, but it is 
surely not coincidence that Knossos also became the most important centre. No doubt many other 
factors played a part in bringing this about, but it is at least possible that building on an unusually large 
and firmly established Late Neolithic community, with perhaps surviving traditions of its great 
antiquity and special position in the island's history, gave Knossos an initial advantage which 
contributed in some measure to its success in Minoan times (1994: 19, emphasis added). 
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One may subsequently ask, whether Day and Wilson (unlike revolutionists and Whitelaw) 
perceive small EM hamlets like Myrtos or Vasiliki as arenas of power like that of the Kairatos 
landscape. I believe that this can be inferred from the authors' earlier studies· of various EM 
ceramic assemblages throughout Crete (see Day et a1.1997; Whitelaw et al. 1997). Here, although 
they do not directly address the issue of power relations and the specific ways these are played 
out, they positively suggest that the pattern of ceramic production, circulation and consumption 
evidenced at Myrtos and other EM sites points to a considerable social complexity during the 
Prepalatial period. In this light, it seems quite likely that Day14 and Wilson do not preclude the 
existence of relational social inequalities at EM so called· egalitarian communities. Had they opted 
for case studies which are commonly (but fallaciously) assumed to lack power relations - since 
links between everyday practices, material conditions and power inequalities are often not 
conspicuous - their discarding of the binary division between simple/egalitarian and 
complexlhierarchical societies within the BA 'sequence would have been much more effective and 
instructive (cf. Barrett et al. 200 I). 
Another contributor to this debate is Haggis (1999, 2002) who, quite cogently and perhaps 
more clearly, has overturned the distinction between simple and complex societies within the 
course of the BA. Overall, as noted earlier, Haggis sees the prepalatial landscape not as less 
complex but as less connected compared to the palatial one. Most importantly, he discards the 
egalitarian ID tag attached by prior accounts to small EM communities like Myrtos and Vasiliki. 
According to him, both sites bear evidence of socio-economic stratification. Furthermore, one of 
Haggis's main contentions is that political elites were active during the whole course of the BA, 
yet their sphere of influence spanned a different spatial radius: a purely local one' in the 
Prepalatial period, and a more extensive regional one in the subsequent period. Therefore, for 
Haggis, what sets palatial societies apart from prepalatial ones, is not the sudden emergence or 
acceleration of 'complexity' and inequality but a shift in scale regarding the spatial operation of 
power. I believe that the jettisoning of the misleading view of change as a trajectory towards 
'complexity' and its stripping of notions of progress from lower to higher social forms constitutes" 
one of the most productive contributions made so far to the Aegean literature. Yet, if we displace 
such ethnocentric evaluations of social change don't we need something else to fill the void? In 
simple words, how are we to understand change? Let us recall, 'that in Haggis's account of the 
transition from the prepalatial to palatial form of political power, apart from the outward radiation 
of the system of authority proposed for Palatial times, it seems that very little has actually 
14 Day (pers. comm., January 2003) submits that the material evidence for social inequalities and a central 
authority at Myrtos is scarce but he does not rule out that Myrtos in fact did not lack social inequalities. 
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changed. As we gather from this model, elites strove for agricultural surplus VIa labour 
mobilisation throughout the whole course. of the BA. The shift from the local cemetery to the 
peak sanctuary is seen merely as a shift towards a larger-scale labour pool. More significantly, the 
various resources, fonns of knowledge, practices and experiences that would have facilitated the 
construction of distinct power relations and social identities in these contexts commensurate with 
spatio-political extension are not examined in detail by Haggis. Thus it might be claimed that 
reducing the question of change to the issue of scale and then treating scale as an innocuous 
category does not appear satisfactory, for it seems to demote change into a redundant concept. 
Crucially as John Barrett has observed, 'history becomes limited to questions of change, although 
an understanding of exactly what has changed is ... less than clear' (1994: 33; see also Damilati 
and Vavouranakis forthcoming; McGuire 1983). To sum up, Haggis's account successfully closes 
off one increasingly unproductive line of debate on the content of social change but at the same 
time offers us new problems to explore. The new challenge that confronts Aegean archaeology, if 
its practitioners are to overturn ethnocentric p~rceptions of change, is a thorough context-specific 
description and understanding of the content of social change. I will reserve discussion of this 
issue until a later section15 in which empirical data can be employed to support a specific line of 
argument. 
A further aspect of the above approaches that deserves scrutiny is their treatment of wealth. 
The reader may well have detected by now that most contributors to the debate on the emergence 
of social inequalities in the Aegean take material wealth to be central in the chronological 
identification and/or creation of power inequalities. In other words, leaving aside subtler points 
and distinctions, what the foregoing accounts seem to hold in common is the idea that inequalities 
were constituted at that point of history 'when some people discovered how to get rich at the 
expense of their fellows' (McKay 1988: 8). Surprisingly, however, there is no consensus about 
exactly when this happened. Once again, the major rift is observed between the gradualists and 
revolutionists. Gradualists, as I remarked earlier, have aimed to model the way that relational 
social inequalities matured slowly through the progressive construction of economic obligations 
and wealth accumulation from the EBlI onwards. Their thesis can be summarised by Pullen's 
contention that 'it is certainly during the Early Bronze Age that we see the emergence of elites 
based, most likely, on wealth' (1992: 53). Cosmopoulos (1995: 31), another gradualist adherent, 
strikes a similar note when he asserts that in Crete during the EBII the social status of individuals 
was probably defmed by wealth rather than by any other parameter. Advocates of the 
revolutionary perspective, on the other hand, have chosen the opposite strand by adopting a 
15 See afterword in my conclusions. 
96 
The 'when' question of wealth and inequality 
critical standpoint to the EBII material evidence cited by gradualists. They underplay wealth 
inequalities in the early phases of the EBA and advance the view that the EBA landscape was 
filled by egalitarian societies, that is, societies lacking a differential distribution of wealth among 
individual households. Nevertheless, it is vital to recall that paradoxically it is the parsing of the 
same material realities by both traditions that has given rise to conflicting conclusions concerning 
the state of social inequalities during EBII times. 
The most intriguing question in all of this is why such difference in opinion exists given the 
marshalling of the same material evidence and the fact that both approaches agree on the central 
role of wealth in triggering inequalities. I suggest that the rupture between gradualists and 
revolutionists is not empirical but conceptual, since it is not based so much on different empirical 
observations but rather on different perceptual schemes of wealth that are employed to view the 
EBII evidence. Hence, what is revealed as wealth through the EBII material record to ·gradualists 
is not instrumental wealth or it is only minimal wealth, unable to trigger relational inequalities 
according to revolutionists. Be that as it may, it is of considerable importance to acknowledge 
that the drift in perception concerning the nature of wealth is not easily discernible at first sight 
given the tendency of both traditions to talk about wealth as an obvious category. But what is the 
obvious? Grange dermes it like this: 
It is that which is taken for granted and never spoken of as such; yet, the obvious everywhere and 
always guides and supports our culture. The obvious is that which we already agree - the base from 
which all action, individual and social proceeds. Since it is never explicitly discussed or articulated, the 
obvious is the most difficult to identify, even though in a disguised manner it lies all around us. To 
uncover the obvious we must take a step back from the assumptions and attitudes that entwine us 
(Grange 1977: 136, emphasis added). 
It is my contention that there are significant and so far unconsidered linkages between power 
relations and wealth. These linkages cry out for the analytical and theoretical attention of Aegean 
archaeologists. As a preliminary move to a fresh consideration of the problem one must therefore 
ask how the relationship between wealth and power is articulated in the EBII material record by 
the two different traditions respectively? 
As usually conceived by gradualists, the existence of power inequalities during the EBII is 
demonstrated by large buildings and even most conspicuously by wealthy burials (the materially 
unproductive dimension of wealth). As Renfrew allows: 
It seems reasonable to see in this disparity in grave goods the development of some degree of 
stratification, contrasting markedly with the egalitarian tribal society which we imagine for the Greek 
Neolithic (1973: 225). 
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What is muted in the work of gradualists, however, is the ways in which these types of wealth 
establish relations of debt and dependency. Instead, material wealth is seen to reflect and/or 
enhance relational inequalities directly. This is a significant shortcoming of the gradualist 
treatment of the relation between power and wealth. For to repeat one of the central points of this 
study, wealth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the creation of relational inequalities. 
As Dennis Wrong has rightly noted16: 
Possession of means or resources that may be employed to wield power over others is not, however, 
any guarantee that they will in fact be so employed. A wealthy miser who chooses to live in poverty 
and conceal his fortune from the world is obviously not using his economic resources even minimally 
to control the activities of a few suppliers of goods and services (1979: 125). 
There is also a blatant lack of integration between gradualists' reading of the EBII material 
realities of inequality and their theoretical models that seek to explain the rise of inequality 
through the gradual growth of the means of subsistence production and productivity rates. 
Several gradualists emphasise the importance of surplus production, the enlargement of the forces 
of production and the materially productive investment of agricultural surplus as being central to 
the creation of power relations. At the same time, they simplistically assume agricultural surplus 
wealth to be directly reflected in the material- record in the form of valuable objects and large 
buildings. Simply put, valuable objects and large buildings are seen as the material 
transformations of surplus. In so doing, not only do gradualists reduce the above categories of 
data to passive17 indices of power but also cut themselves short from any opportunity to consider 
the creation of relations of debt beyond the orbit of agricultural surplus production and the 
expansion of the forces of production. Let us recall Pullen's (1992) model where he clearly puts 
forth the thesis that power relations in the EBA emerged through the materially productive 
dimension of wealth. According to him, power lay in the ownership of such means of production 
as the ox and plough as well as in the potential these resources carry for productive reinvestment 
.. 
in agriculture. At the same time, there is no place in this model for the theoretical consideration of 
the relation between valuables and power. Likewise, Webster (1990) sees material wealth in the 
form of precious items playing an insubstantial role in clearing the way towards EBA social 
stratification. To him, relational inequalities stemmed from unequal access to a different kind of 
wealth, namely labour force. The same theme regarding the relationship between power and 
wealth comes up again when we examine Gamble's (1979, 1981, 1982) and BintIiff's (1982) 
16 See also Godelier (1999), Hamilakis (1995), McKay (1988). 
17 An exception is Halstead and O'Shea's Social Storage model where valuable objects (tokens) are seen as 
central to the creation of power asymmetries. However, as I noted earlier, the value of these objects is 
assumed to rest on "their exchange value for food. 
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models. In different ways, both these authors clearly favour the notion that the origins of 
relational inequalities lay in the control. of the materially productive dimension of wealth. 
Interestingly, for Gamble, the appearance of power is not to be found in the automatic generation 
of food surplus wealth and its exchange between EBA farmers. In the first place, relations of 
dependency could not be formed through the exchange of a potential surplus of agricultural goods 
like wheat, wool, olives, oil and wine, which everybody possessed. Rather the process that 
cleared the way for power inequalities depended on the ability of leaders18 to prevent household 
self-sufficiency and so to enforce dependence on themselves for the provision of needs. This 
could have been achieved by forcing or persuading prehistoric farmers to live in nucleated 
settlements, to give up the practice of agricultural diversification, and instead, specialise upon and 
produce a surplus of particular subsistence goods. Local surpluses in specialised food 
commodities would then constitute a powerful capital, a significant instrument of power, in the 
hands of elites. Denial of obedience among specialised villages to the central power would mean 
denial of access to a range of subsistence goods they did not themselves produce. Hence the 
establishment of a relationship of dependency was perpetuated by the elite manipulation of local 
surpluses of food. On the other hand, Gamble is quite laconic regarding the significance of 
valuable objects in the EBA. These are simplistically said (and without any justification) to be 
devoid of any instrumental value in the emergence of political institutions. The reference below, I 
think, is quite illustrative: 
It is on this basis [through the control and organisation of subsistence production] that formal 
institutions with effective power emerge. By contrast the control and exchange of 'primitive valuables • 
is of limited importance in accounting for the effective power of such developing institutions (Gamble 
1982: 104, emphasis added). 
Equally, Bintliff (1982) stresses the primacy of the materially productive dimension of wealth as 
an instrument for power. Central to Bintliffs (1982) account is the importance he attaches to the 
private ownership of productive land in subverting egalitarian relations and converting them into 
relations of dependency. It was the 'major landholders' who became the BA political elites .. 
Besides, food surplus feeds landed elites and their subordinate tenants as well as fmancing the 
production of valuable craft goods whose importance is only minimal in comparison to this 
crucial association between power, class and the land. In his words, 
An argument might now be put forward to the effect that an elite thus established utilises its regional 
power for obtaining prestige objects and raw materials, but that such goods are not vital to the power 
18 According to Halstead (1988: 523), Gamble's model entails a circular argument which does not explain 
the emergence of social inequalities, since the basis of elite power - forced economic specialisation - only 
occurs after nucleation, which in turn is brought about by elite power. 
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of the elite, its grip on the peasantry or the support oflesser nobles~ indeed, much is merely a symbol of 
conspicuous consumption (Bintliff 1982: 109, emphasis added). 
Meanwhile, revolutionists broadly see unequal distributions of wealth in mortuary contexts as 
negligible and typically maintain that unequal representations of tomb gifts may be taken as an 
index of some economic differentiation but not as a straightforward reflection of social hierarchy 
(see Cherry 1983; Sbonias 1999). They also correctly state that large residences may reflect 
unequal access to wealth but not necessarily authority. On this point I agree with them that we 
should be wary of blindly assuming that economic disparities inevitably create relational 
inequalities. The person who has amassed a lot of property but has no influence in guiding other 
people is merely a rich person (McKay 1988: 24). 
Relational inequalities, as revolutionary accounts seem to imply, are formed only through the 
materially productive dimension of wealth. Marx's legacy is all too apparent here; debts and thus 
power relations are created through relations of production. More precisely, the revolutionary 
thesis seems to assume that wealth, in order to establish relational inequalities, has to consist of 
the means of production (land, technology and labour). Possession and control of the means of 
production by a minority not only undermines commoners' means of livelihood, making them 
dependent upon the possessors and the supervisors of the means of production, but also offers 
surpluses for financing of the elite apparatus. The spirit of historical materialism, characteristic in 
this approach where 'the forces of production are somehow the most influential factors leading to 
social change' (Giddens 1984b: 127, see also Giddens 1981: 1), can als,? be traced in 
revolutionaries' marginal treatment of valuable objects. According to Cherry (1984), for instance, 
since valuable objects from EBII do not suggest a large-scale centralised organisation of 
production and do not conspicuously demonstrate how relations of debt are created, they are 
conceived as mere baubles. He has made the point that most of these valuables, and even those 
made of exotic raw _~aterials were locally produced. Yet for Cherry, if I interpret him correctly, 
apart from these powerless and occasional trinkets, there is nothing in the EMIl Cretan landscape 
to signify relations of debt and thus the emergence of political hierarchy. In his view, there is no 
evidence, during the EBA that points to 'monopolies over the means of wealth production' 
(Cherry 1984: 35, emphasis added). Neither are there 'procedures by which people and their 
agricultural products might be mobilised on a large scale': Neither is there' 'standardised 
production in quantity of products for consumption beyond the local unit, nor 'a coherent pattern 
of long-distance exchange in sumptuary items and raw materials' (1983: 38, emphasis added). 
Thus Cherry designates Cretan prepalatial societies as egalitarian. While Cherry and the 
revolutionists might be right in that the EBIl landscape does not exhibit many of the above 
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productive practices, it is my contention that to suggest an absence of power inequalities by these 
times simply on these grounds is to throw the baby out with the bath water. 
It is useful to note here that even major adherents to the gradualist tradition have found 
difficulty in tracing the materially productive dimension of wealth in the EBII landscape. Gilman 
(1981), influenced by the Marxist standpoint, holds that wealth, in order to establish dependencies 
and to be an instrument of power, has to consist of the means of production. However, in the 
absence of evidence of substantial exchange of foodstuffs and tools of practical value he 
concluded that the EBA societies were self-sufficient in subsistence matters. For him, this in tum, 
meant that the possession of the means of production was not in the hands of the few. In other 
words, EBA farmers were not cut off from their means of production, since these probably 
involved simple technologies available to everybody and land was not yet a scarce resource. In 
these rather democratic circumstances, according to Marxist theory, debts and power would be 
difficult to achieve. Still, whereas Cherry perceived this as a clue pointing to the egalitarian 
nature of EBA societies, Gilman postulated ~at power during this period was based on military 
means (naked force). The emergence of power was enabled through the adoption of 
Mediterranean Polyculture, which constitutes a materially productive technology. However, we 
should recall that for Gilman the significance of the new technology in the creation of relations of 
dependency rested not so much on the rise in productivity that it promoted but on the social 
tethering it encouraged. That is, it tied people to the land making them unable to escape the force 
of aspirant leaders. Once again, in Gilman's model material wealth in the form of valuables was 
seen as marginal to the creation of power. 
Within the series of intermediary approaches there is much more variation regarding the 
articulation of the relationship between wealth and power. On the whole, these accounts display a 
more sensitive approach to the EBA material realities. Day and Wilson, as we saw, describe 
practices at EBII Knossos that did not draw on the materially productive dimension of wealth, but 
rather capitalised on its consumption (of pottery and food and drink) in ceremonial contexts. 
Furthermore, at Poros they pay some attention to the instrumental significance of different 
categories of valuable objects in creating power. Equally, Whitelaw (2002) has developed a line 
of argument according to which the power of some EBII elites lay in the control and exchange of 
valuable prestige items. The materially productive dimension of wealth as a motor 'towards power 
inequalities is envisaged for those EBII sites that eventually became palatial loci of power in the 
following MBA period. On this basis, Whitelaw suggests that, compared to valuables, wealth in 
the form of agricultural surplus is somehow more effective in games of power. That is why, in 
Whitelaw's (2002) view, it was only the EBII sites which operated under a Staple Finance 
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economy that became palatial centres. Finally, Haggis (1999) considers a priori that power 
relations emerge through the growth and. expansion of the resource base as well as emerging 
elites' ability to manage land and resources and especially labour in order to amass agricultural 
surpluses. Thus, what runs throughout this model is, once again, the simplistic assumption that 
the forces of production have the most determinant impact on society. Moreover, Haggis sees 
valuable objects as prestige goods without, however, ever addressing in any detail the ways in 
which these would have acquired meaning or acted as instruments of power by creating relations 
of debt. Furthermore, he simplistically seems to assume that prestige goods are the by-product of 
a Staple Finance economy. That is, access to surpluses and labour means that elites can afford to 
order the production of flashy objects to display their power. Note here, that power in the first 
place is based on access to labour and surplus not on the valuable objects themselves. This fact 
points to our tendency to see the value of objects to be constituted only at the time of their 
physical production - when some other type of resource (food, labour matter, and raw material) 
is productively consumed (invested). 
To sum up, I take it to be clear from the foregoing discussion that most accounts on the 
historical question of power inequalities in the Aegean insist on the primacy of the materially 
productive dimension of wealth to build relations of authority and subjugation. Revolutionists 
marshal empirical evidence to propose that this way of handling wealth cannot be observed in the 
EBA, and consequently that power relations were absent at this time. Gradualists, on the other 
hand, though they have built theoretical models that similarly give preponderance to the forces of 
production and increased productivity rates as the most influential factors in games of power, 
infer the existence of relational inequalities mainly through types of material evidence (valuables, 
large buildings and tombs) that are only superficially acconunodated within their theory of the 
emergence of power. In other words, the relationship between valuable objects, the materially 
productive dimensio!?- of wealth, and power is seldom sketched out. The gap between gradualist 
theories of the relationship between wealth and power and the EBA material realities has been 
recognised only by Gilman. Gilman substitutes coercion in place of the materially productive 
dimension of wealth as the source of elite power. Finally, in intermediary accounts, the 
importance of the materially productive dimension of wealth over other types of wealth is less 
absolute, yet it has not been left completely behind. Neither have intermediaries developed a 
theoretical framework to fill the lacuna in the treatment of the relationship between valuables (as 
well as other types of wealth not directly related to the materially productive dimension of 
wealth) and power in the Aegean literature. However, since insisting on the primacy of the 
materially produ~tive dimension of wealth has been a favoured trigger behind the production of 
102 
The 'when' question of wealth and inequality 
relational inequalities for most of the above accounts, it will be interesting to find out whether the -
EBII archaeological record indeed bears this out. I turn to this question in the next section. 
Testing the materially productive dimension of wealth, or does the 
EMIl talk about productive processes? 
By now it should be clear that most archaeological accounts that promote the emergence of social 
inequalities in Crete from the EMIl period have accorded a pride of place to the materially 
productive dimension of wealth as laying the foundations for such development. In my opinion 
the validity of this position is highly questionable. In this section, I want to review the evidence in 
order to explore questions relating to the presence of the materially productive dimension of 
wealth in EM period. To put it simply, does the Cretan prepalatiallandscape speak of productive 
processes and techniques? Furthermore, given my conviction that power relations derive from 
debt, the strategy used here is to fmd out whether the materially productive dimension of wealth 
would have been critical to the creation of debt obligations. 
As we saw, according to the Social Storage model (Halstead and O'Shea 1982), EM power 
relations were based on the success of some' fanners in creating a pool of people indebted to 
them, by producing and exchanging agricultural surplus as food relief for valuables and labour 
obligations. The key element for the creation of debt relations is taken to be surplus food 
production. The more food one had, the more debt obligations would have been inflicted upon 
one's needy neighbours. At the same time, successful fanners would have been able to reinvest in 
further production and achieve greater food surpluses by using the labour obligations of needy 
households or by exchanging durable valuable tokens for labour. This being said, we would 
anticipate the EM landscape to bear traces of a striking emphasis on productive teChniques and 
strategies aimed to~ards significant subsistence overproduction. 
The Cretan landscape shows a remarkable degree of soil erosion. This may be attributed to 
agricultural intensification through productive fanning activities such as plough agriculture, 
which is known to foster erosion. Nonetheless, any quick conclusion regarding the matter would 
be simplistic, since in Greece in general, it is almost impossible to relate specific episodes of past 
erosion to certain types of human activity (Rackham and Moody 1996: 23). Erosion can be the 
outcome of geological, climatic or weather factors rather than of human action (Rackman and 
Moody 1996: 18-24). In the case of Crete, it has been suggested that the observed prehistoric 
episodes of erosion, rather than representing a peak of human activity, have more likely been the 
outcome of 'single unrepeatable freak storms' (Rackham and Moody 1996: 24). Particularly 
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telling is Rackham and Moody's (1996: 24) observation that prehistoric erosion, which could not 
have been assisted by the mechanical destabilisation available to modem people, is far greater 
than that displayed by twentieth-century erosional deposits which represent a· known peak of 
human activity. Hence geological and weather conditions rather than anthropogenic ones seem to 
be a more adequate explanation behind the extremely eroded landscape of prehistoric Crete. 
Leaving aside the issue of erosion, another theme that deserves scrutiny is whether there is 
plausible evidence to demonstrate the existence of agricultural practices that imply substantial 
labour investment. If overproduction of food was the fundamental vehicle towards the 
establishment of debt relations, we would expect to fmd ample evidence of materially productive 
technologies such as plough agriculture, terracing, drainage systems, intensive use of land, 
intensive cultivation of larger areas of land, and agricultural extensification (Halstead 1992a; 
Renfrew 1982a). Plough agriculture by providing a source of mechanical energy larger than 
human muscle power or simple implements like the hoe, permits a considerable rise in 
productivity by increasing the area that an in~ividual can cultivate and by turning the soil more 
effectively (Gilman 1981: 6; Goody 1974: 25). Similarly, terraces, being appropriate for both 
labour-intensive crops and grain, allow greater productivity by assisting farming in several ways 
(Rackham and Moody 1992: 129). They increase root penetration and absorption of water by the 
soil, control sheet and gully erosion, extend cultivable land (for example, by making a less sheer 
slope on which to till), and enable the redistribution of sediment (Rackham and Moody 1992, 
1996: 142). Projects, like the construction of dams and ditches that may suggest efforts to manage 
water supplies (surface or rainwater) for irrigation, flood control or erosion and silt control 
(Balcer 1974: 143), constitute a further productive improvement in the infrastructure of 
subsistence production. Extensification is simply a kind of intensification that involves bringing 
marginal areas into cultivation, thus increasing the overall use of land (Halstead 1992a: 109). All 
these techniques of agricultural intensification, once in operation, can result in the formation of 
what may be described as an accumulative landscape. This is an area with evidence of large-scale 
means of subsistence production and creation of substantial food surpluses19 extracted through 
considerable labour investments (Gosden 1989a: 48). The construction of terraces for instance, 
involves a massive burden of labour and can be considered a time-consuming task. In some cases 
terracing has been shown to take up to a month (Watrous et at. 2000: 473-474): Moreover, the 
maintenance of terraces is a task neither easy nor free of considerable costs (Runnels and Hansen 
19 We need to keep in mind however, that intensification results in increased surplus only if there is not a 
balanced expansion of the agricultural workforce and so of the number of consumers (Halstead 1992a: 
110). . 
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1987; Van Andel and Runnels 1987: 145-148). This also holds true for the maintenance of dams 
(Van Andel and Runnels 1987: 148). Equally, plough agriculture exacts a significant price in 
terms of labour investment and can be considered 'labour stored in the ground, in animals and 
equipment' (Gudeman 1977: 580 cited in Gilman 1981: 6). Fields have to be cleared (Gilman 
1981: 6), ploughs have to be constructed and maintained, plough oxen must be attended to 
(Pullen 1992: 53), and fodder for draught animals has to be provided by the ton (Halstead 1981b: 
323). By the same token, more intensive land-use represents major labour inputs, since it involves 
a shortening of fallow and therefore demands increased frequency of manuring and tillage 
(Halstead 1992a: 109; Renfrew 1982a: 273). Subsequently, the labour burden will dramatically 
increase, if farmers cultivate larger areas of land by taking up marginal or more distant land20 and 
adopting intensive land-use and investment in capital intensive techniques such as terracing and 
drainage projects. Finally, extensification despite the fact that it involves less frequent cropping 
(Halstead 1992a: 109), is accompanied by an increase in travel time to go to outlying fields. In 
short, all the technologies of agricultural intensification mentioned above present significant 
labour investments by expansion of the labour force or by increased per capita input of labour, or 
both (Halstead 1992a: 110). 
Identification of practices of agricultural intensification in the EM era could imply not only a 
preoccupation with considerable overproduction, but also projects towards which the labour of 
needy households could have been channeled for the benefit of their thriving neighbours. It is 
hard to imagine prosperous farmers seeking to exchange food for labour when there are no labour 
demanding agricultural projects and need for surplus labour. This is not to say that surplus labour 
could not have been directed towards other occasions outside agriculture. Significantly, in 
economic terms, free time and an increase in valuable craft goods do not necessarily promote new 
productive projects, but rather may lead to expansion and intensification of non (directly 
materially) productive activities (Nash 1966: 55). Nonetheless, although Halstead (l992a: 110) 
intimates that surplus production does not necessarily presuppose intensification, there is more 
than a hint in the Social Storage scenario that the strategy followed by flourishing farmers wa·s 
aimed predominantly at capturing the labour of their needy counterparts in order to capitalise on 
constant substantial food overproduction for exchange. An important component of this account 
is emphasis on the significance of continuous reinvestments in agriculture realised through the 
extraction of labour obligations . 
. Not wanting to forget that not all forms of agricultural intensification are equally susceptible 
to archaeological identification (Halstead 1992a: 109) let us explore whether the EM landscape 
20 Cultivation of ~ore distant land increases the travel time to the fields. 
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bears them out. To begin with, we will start with the plough. It has been suggested that plough 
agriculture is not particularly suited to the arid environment of south Greece which, moreover, is 
not especially favourable for raising cattle (Halstead 1981 b: 330). Furthermore, the lack of 
arteJactual evidence, such as ploughs themselves or artistic representations of ploughs, combined 
with the absence of archaeobotanical studies that might reveal the presence of weed species 
associated with the practice of ploughing, does not allow us to reach a positive conclusion 
regarding the operation of plough agriculture during the EM period. The earliest evidence for the 
use of the plough in Crete dates to the MM period and consists of a Minoan hieroglyph (27) 
which seems to resemble an ard (Hansen 1988: 51; Renfrew 1982a: 273). It is a remarkable fact 
that even in the Late Bronze Age, extensive plough agriculture seems to have been rather limited 
(Halstead 1981b: 331). Significantly, as the oxen tablets from Late Bronze Age reveal, even the 
palaces themselves only had a few plough oxen (Halstead 1981 b: 332). 
. A well-dated prehistoric terrace system consisting of huge terraces of the check-dam type has 
been discovered on the islet of Pseira in the. bay of Mirabello (Hope-Simpson and Betancourt 
1994). Examination of the relation of terraces to habitation sites, soil development, masonry style 
and stratification of Minoan sherds within the terraces has assigned it a MM date (Hope-Simpson 
and Betancourt 1994: 322; Rackham and Moody 1992: 129, 1996: 143). Apart from this we know 
of no earlier example in Crete so far. 
Bronze Age water management on the Greek mainland is known from the plain of Argos (the 
Mycenaean dam near Tiryns) and the Kopais basin of Boiotia (Halstead 1992a: .110). The only 
Cretan examples come again from the islet of Pseira. These are two massive stone structures 
located across the lower parts of the two main stream beds (Hope-Simpson and Betancourt 1994: 
322). Yet, according to the excavators, the dams from Pseira (which seem to have been used for 
the provision of silt for replenishing the terraces and water for irrigation). appear to date to the 
MM period. Alternatively, irrigation can be detected through the presence of non-indigenous 
crops that could not otherwise have been grown in a given site, as well as by new weed species, 
yet no analysis of botanical data has been so far undertaken with this objective in mind (Hansen 
1988: 51). 
As far as the issue of intensive land-use is concerned, it has been argued that farmers living in 
. . 
the dispersed . settlement patterns of EMI and EMIl, practised labour-demanding intensive 
gardening (Manning 1994: 233). That is, they worked intensively a small area around their 
farmstead. Apart from this however, the practice does not appear to have been followed regarding 
the cultivation of larger areas and thus one may claim that overall, intensive land-use was quite 
modest during these times (Halstead 1992a: 110). It is noteworthy that the practice in question is 
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difficult to identify archaeologically (Halstead 1992a: 110). One has to turn to archaeobotanical 
data to examine the non-crop seeds represented and determine their soil requirements, habitat, 
and growing season (Halstead 1992a; Hansen 1988: 50). Unfortunately, such research (which can 
also shed some light on the question of the cultivation of more marginal fields21 ) remains yet to 
be seen for Crete (Hansen 1988: 50). Finally, agricultural extensification has been proposed by 
Manning (1994: 234) for the late Prepalatial period (EMIII-MMIA) on the basis of evidence for 
settlement nuc1eation22• Even during these times however, the picture seems to be more complex. 
Settlement nucleation which correlates with the extension of the agricultural resource base 
appears to have occurred only in some areas like Knossos, Mesara and Malia while evidence for 
settlement dispersal which may coincide with intensive land-use of discrete areas can be detected 
in Vrokastro, Lasithi and Chania (Haggis 1999: 63-65). To date, therefore, there is very little 
evidence for the presence of agricultural intensification or the existence of a substantially 
accumulative landscape during the EMI and most notably the EMIL This is important because 
EMIl is exactly the period when, according_to some, one can trace the emergence of social 
inequalities on Crete. 
On the other hand, even if we could trace the existence of agricultural practices that imply 
significant labour investments in land, it would not tell us whether the providers of labour worked 
in a permanent basis for the successful farmers. This, according to the Social Storage model, 
probably happened at some point because needy households would have otherwise starved. Thus, 
maintaining a hand on valuable craft goods and labour by the needy, the successful farmers could 
accumulate even more food to build even more obligations and reinvest further in production. 
Yet, as I suggested earlier on in this chapter, the Social Storage premise is problematic in 
accounting for the creation of permanent debts, because permanent debts do not involve sale type 
transactions. Simply put, the scheme envisaged by Social Storage might tell us how the rich 
became richer, but n9t how they became powerful. 
Haggis (1999) has maintained that permanent mobilisation of the labour force could have 
been achieved through the 'opium of the people', namely religion. This seems to me an attractive 
scenario, yet it can only be tentatively suggested given the lack of evidence which might affirm 
the presence of considerable labour inputs and materially productive reinvestments in agriculture. 
I do not want to imply that labour obligations were not called upon. However, it c'ould be argued 
that labour obligations may have not necessarily or predominantly been triggered by an obsolete 
21 According to Hansen (1988: 50), if cultivation of marginal areas took place, we should expect a change 
in the assemblage of weeds species as the soil being cultivated changes. 
22 Settlement nucleation leads to taking up more distant fields for cultivation which involves an increase in 
labour costs. . 
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production mentality and instead of being channeled predominantly towards materially 
productive investments in land, they may" have been directed towards various other practices. 
Renfrew (1994: 163), for example, refers to sacral investment, that is investment of resources and 
labour into ritual activities of a sacred character. These can be monumental or oblational. The 
former refer to the construction of monuments which serve as foci of ritual observances, whereas 
the latter refer to the provision (deposition in archaeological terms) of offerings or oblations in 
the form of valuable artefacts. To take inspiration from Bourdieu (1991: 234-243), there is not 
only materially productive labour, what today we narrowly perceive to be economic labour, but 
also the labour of representation. That is to say, labour channeled into practices that aim to 
produce and impose a legitimate vision of the world. 
Furthermore, the idea that regular exchanges of food relief constitute the engine behind the 
emergence of social inequalities in EMIl and the eventual construction of the MMI palatial 
edifices has been questioned on the grounds" of the absence of significant storage facilities until 
the EMIlI and MMI periods (Manning 1994; S~asser 1997). As Strasser holds: 
There are no signs of bothroi on Crete during this period, in striking contrast to their Ubiquity on 
Mainland Greece and in western Anatolia ... precisely the regions where complex societies did not 
emerge during the subsequent Middle Bronze Age (1997: 92). 
Equally important, according to many scholars, the primitive inland transport capacities of the 
EM make any suggestion for movement of heavy staple commodities highly doubtful (see 
Gilman 1981; Manning 1994; Van Andel and Runnels 1988). Food and water requirements for 
animals, limited carrying capacities, low speed and also the absence in this period of a network of 
roads would have made overland transport extremely difficult (Manning 1994: 241)." In this 
respect, it is further interesting to note that if 'social storage' really had operated we would expect 
most EM sites to be concentrated close to the sea in order to take advantage of sea 
communications in the transport of bulky foodstuffs. Interestingly, in contrast to Mainland 
Greece, Crete's thin and long configuration offers a great advantage to nearby-ports to access 
island's arable regions (Manning 1994: 241). However, several EM sites were not located by the 
sea and still others despite their proximity to the sea, were built on hills and had poor access to 
the coast (Hood, Warren and Cadogan 1962i3• Importantly, neither the palatial site of Knossos 
nor that of Phaistos occupied a coastal location (Manning 1994: 242). The point in citing these 
examples is to indicate that we should expect a more careful consideration of the maritime 
transport capacities of a site if indeed transport of bulky foodstuffs was one of the main 
23 For example, several sites in the Rethymnon area and in the Amari valley were distant from the sea while 
sites on the south coast were built on hilltops (see Hood, Warren and Cadogan 1962). 
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preconditions for survival in bad years. To this, one may also add that substantial evidence of 
Minoan sailing vessels postdates the EMIl period (Manning 1994: 241). 
In Strasser's view (1997: 92), the notion that food relief was exchanged for valuable craft 
goods during the EM does not seem to hold true. For, as he notes, the evidence for valuable craft 
goods postdates the Prepalatial times (Early Minoan and the early Middle Minoan periods). 
Strasser's remark is significant, yet it has been awkwardly stated. As I shall argue in more detail 
later on in this study24, rather than suggest that the EM period is relatively devoid of valuable 
craft goods, it is more accurate to say that the evidence of durable tokens in circulation postdates 
the EM. Crucially it is during the EM period that material wealth is conspicuously and 
predominantly deposited in tombs (Cadogan 1986; Damilati 2002). Removed deliberately from 
circulation it consequently acquired a value above exchange. In addition, if food was indeed 
exchanged for valuables between different communities, as the Social Storage model would have 
us believe, then we would expect all the communities within this network of distribution to 
display similar durable tokens. Interestingly, this is not the case. The distribution pattern of these 
tokens is so localised that we have to accept that their value lay in local contexts of meaning and 
value (Damilati 2002; Damilati and Vavouranakis 2002). Without going into much detail, it 
suffices to say that different cemeteries in eastern Crete (e.g. Mochlos, Gournia, Palaikastro) have 
yielded distinct assemblages of valuables25• Not only are there substantial differences in style and 
in the types of objects between the burial assemblages of these neighbouring communities, but 
also between these and burial assemblages from Mesara further afield in central Crete. 
Within central Crete, EM tombs and cemeteries belonging to different communities appear to 
display differential emphasis on certain categories of valuables. For instance, the cemetery of 
Phourni at Archanes, has produced assemblages that show a remarkable emphasis on Cycladic 
and to a lesser extent on Egyptian and Greek Mainland influences. Apart from daggers and 
amulets (both of which show typological similarities with Cyclades), and obsidian blades, the 
Cycladic presence at Archanes is clearly represented by 25 Cycladic figurines, as well as by ivory 
and bronze pins discovered in Tholos C, the 'Area of the Rocks' to the south-west, and to the 
south (Sakellarakis and Sakellarakis 1986: 116-118, 134). Remarkably, bronze and ivory pins are 
very rare in Crete (Branigan 1983b; Sakellarakis and Sakellarakis 1986: 118) and though 
Cycladic figurines have occasionally been retrieved from other Cretan burial contexts, their total 
number cannot rival that from Archanes (Sakellarakis and Sakellarakis 1986: 118). It is also 
worth mentioning the gold beads found in Tholos C and the south part of the 'Area of the Rocks'. 
24 S h . ee c apter mne. 
25 The unique character of the valuables of Mochlos will be discussed in detail in part three. 
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These, as the excavators remark, are unique examples for Crete at this period and show a striking 
resemblance with similar examples from the Treasure of Priam at Troy (Sakellarakis and 
Sakellarakis 1986: 116). Egyptian and Greek Mainland influences on the other hand can be 
detected in certain artefacts retrieved from Tholos E which also displayed a Cycladic presence. 
One may note for instance, a miniature steatite jar inspired by Old Kingdom prototypes and a seal 
whose design is unique among stratified EMIl pieces and seems to have drawn extensively on 
Greek Mainland prototypes (Panagiotopoulos 2002). 
In a nutshell, the EM landscape does not seem to reveal a clear preoccupation with or an 
emphasis on significant productive investment and reinvestment in farming. I do not want to 
overstate the case until the EM botanical evidence is examined specifically with a view to 
identifying strategies of agricultural intensification such as those mentioned above. I would like 
to stress that no doubt the materially productive dimension of wealth can strongly act as a 'fly-
wheel' for the creation of relational inequalities. Still, recalling once again Marx's fundamental 
remark, this can happen only when the materi~lly productive dimension of wealth assists a system 
of permanent dependencies, a situation that is achieved once access to the means of production is 
drastically limited to certain segments of the population. In this respect, pennanent debts can be 
formed once some groups are able to dominate all the land available and concentrate tools and 
equipment crucial to production. In these circumstances, there is a compelling reason for those 
severed from the means of their livelihood to 'sell' permanently their labour and produce 
surpluses that by keeping the mechanism going, ensure the perpetuation of their dependence to 
the possessors of the means of production. 
This does not seem a very probable scenario for the EM times when productive equipment 
would have been fairly simple and so easily accessible. It may be worth noting that metal tools 
were rare during this period (cf. Gilman 1981: 5). Still, taking into account their low quality it is 
hard to see how c0:t1trol of their possession by some individuals or groups would have become 
essential to the production enterprise (cf. Branigan 1974: 133). At the same time, EM times do 
not appear to suggest significant land disputes. Arguably, competition for land would have been 
minimal given the small population figures of most EM communities. For Gilman (1981: 4), the 
presence in Europe and the Mediterranean of large areas of unpopulated but habitable land during 
the Middle Ages and the early modem period suggests that land was not a scarce resource until 
very recently. In his view, the same could be said for the Aegean Bronze Age when one can 
assume far lower population densities. Additionally, according to Manning (1994), the pattern of 
dispersed settlements in EMI and EMIl could probably imply that land was not at a premium 
during these tin?-es. On the other hand, the destruction by fire of EMIIB Vasiliki could indicate 
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armed hostility triggered by land shortage. However, as Watrous points out, the similarity of 
events like the abandonment of some areas and the shrinkage in size of some sites that seem to 
betray a 'time of retrenchment' and 'population decline' in EMIlI Crete and contemporary· Greek 
Mainland and Cyclades argues for a wider cause (2001: 223). 
There is no justification for assuming that power relations lay uniquely with subsistence 
production, investment and reinvestment in the means of production and ownership of land. For it 
is an oversimplification to see control over and investment in land as 'somehow the more real and 
material basis of society' or to assume that all other strategies of status activity depend on this 
and then to reduce their significance to simple acts of conspicuous consumption (Rowlands 1998: 
179). To repeat an essential point of this study, a dynamic growth of the production apparatus is 
not the only way to create power relations (cf Bataille 1998; Berthoud and Sabelli 1979). 
I would suggest that one of the most critical features of the Cretan Early Bronze Age is an 
emphasis on practices that bring to the fore the materially unproductive dimension of wealth as an 
instrument of paramount significance in games of status acquisition and power. In this respect, 
Renfrew's (1994) sacral investment as well as the presence of rich burials (necrotaphic 
prominence) appear to be significantly relevant phenomena. Notably, the tombs contain almost all 
the prepalatial stoneware seals and metal objects we know (Cadogan 1986: 154; see also Nakou 
1995 on metal artefacts). To the deliberate deposition of material wealth in tombs, we can also 
add the substantial occurrence of contexts that argue for conspicuous consumption of food and 
drink. Drinking in particular should have acquired a special significance in the Ea~ly Bronze Age, 
as the expansion and elaboration of forms of drinking vessels such as jugs and cups clearly 
indicate (Manning 1994; Renfrew 1972). Particularly telling is Tenwolde's (1992) observation 
that a great amount of pithoi at the EM settlement of Myrtos were liquid rather than food 
containers. 
What we should always keep in mind is that all these practices as well as the various artefacts 
and resources that enable their execution are not mere indices of wealthy or prominent 
individuals. For example, as the Trobriand harvest contest (Kayasa) teaches us, people may 'fight 
with food' (Wiessner 1996: 9) in order to acquire power and high status (Schiefenhovel and 
Brell-Krannhals 1996). In Tawema, power and high status depend on generous yam giving. The 
most considerable effort here is channeled towards the kemata, that is, a yam garden for harvest 
gift-giving, which not only surpasses in size other types of garden but also receives considerable 
and conspicuous labour (Schiefenhovel and Brell-Krannhals 1996). It is worth mentioning that 
the surplus of yams is not invested in the production of more yams. Rather, it is ceremonially 
displayed in sophisticated yam houses as a symbol of chiefly power and eventually redistributed 
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to the people (Gregory 1982: 55). Thus, as the Trobrianders' case makes clear, emphasis is not 
always or inevitably placed upon the materially productive dimension of food; com (or yam in 
the case of our Trobrianders) does not always feed back into itself. Food clearly. matters, but not 
simply as a source of calories in order for people to maintain their bodies, acquire energy and 
then go on to work more and reproduce the means and the relations of production. People may 
produce significant food supplies without having in view a ceaseless growth of the means of 
production. Materially unproductive practices like the depletion of all food in a festival, ritual 
event or other occasions may act as a critical vessel towards the establishment and perpetuation of 
debts, power and positions of high regard. To strike an optimistic note, Minoan scholarship has 
started recognising feasting and drinking as meaningful practices of major importance in the 
creation of power and high status (see Day and Wilson 2002; Hamilakis 1995, 1998, 1999). Some 
further improvement can be made towards the study of these practices and their association with 
power by investigating the ways they could have acted as vehicles for the generation and 
maintenance of debts. On the other hand, one. can only concur with Pader (1982) when arguing 
that current archaeological studies of material culture accord a pride of place to description, rather 
than explanation: on 'what', rather than on 'why' and 'how'. In this respect, valuable objects 
retrieved from tombs are taken to be simple markers of wealth, power and status without ever 
considering the act of intentional and voluntary placing of material wealth into the ground and its 
removal from circulation as meaningful practices that deserve our attention26• An object's 
significance cannot be exhausted by its superficial treatment as a passive token of the identity of 
its possessor. Exploration of objects' role in actively creating identities, social positions and 
relations of debt should be seen as a research objective that Aegean archaeology cannot any 
longer afford to postpone. 
On the visibility of wealth and its implications in the archaeological 
study of inequality 
In discussing the materiality of inequality in Cretan prehistory we cannot avoid considering the 
role of metallurgy. In fact, the inception of effective bronze metallurgy has been recognised as a 
significant contributor to the 'emergence of civilsation' in the Aegean (see Renfrew 1972). 
Noting the contrast between the relatively modest representation of metal artefacts in the 
Neolithic material record and their exceptionally increased presence in the Early Bronze Age, 
26 Here we can mention Voutsaki's (1995, 1997) groundbreaking work on Mycenaean contexts in 
Peloponnese. Unfortunately, no such work exists to date on Cretan material. 
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Colin Renfrew (1972: 338) argued that a Metallsch0 CJ?7 took place during the early phases of the 
Bronze Age, most notably in EBII. His Craft SpecialisationlWealth model which aimed to 
supplement the SubsistencelRedistribution hypothesis, gave rise to the widely espoused idea that 
the widespread production and consumption of metal artefacts during the EBA was critical in the 
emergence of social inequalities (Renfrew 1972: 483-485). Renfrew argued that metals not only 
offered a highly effective medium for reflecting wealth and high status, but were also crucial 
through their associations with warfare, militaI)' prowess and technological advance in the 
original production of social asymmetries. In his view, the EBA was the historical setting of a 
highly acquisitive society where social status was closely linked to the control of production, 
display and consumption of material wealth and especially of metal objects. A side effect was the 
rise of competition and military hostility that further assisted the development of the metallurgy 
subsystem by stimulating a need for weapons. By facilitating war, weapons in turn would have 
given rise to a warrior class where high status would have been closely linked to military 
prowess. In addition, the demand for material wealth was seen as favouring craft specialisation 
and an increase in subsistence production. 
It is worth mentioning that as a scenario for the emergence of inequalities in the Aegean the 
Craft Specialisation/Wealth model is quite problematic. A closer look suffices to demonstrate 
unanswered questions which at ftrst sight might elude us due to the circularity of the general 
argument. Above all, the model fails to explain why metals - the assumed catalyst for the 
emergence of social inequalities - became desirable in the fIrst place in what Renfrew believed 
were egalitarian societies. Renfrew attributes the demand for metal objects and other prestigious 
items to a phantasmatic acquisitive Bronze Age society, which suddenly emerges from a non-
acquisitive Neolithic one purely due to the inception of effective bronze metallurgy. If one 
follows the dichotomy between unranked Neolithic and ranked EBA communities, the model 
leads to conceptual ~ead ends or at best to a circular argument. On the one hand, Renfrew clearly 
tells us that there is a desire for metals because Aegean society has become acquisitive. This 
argument is brought forth in order to provide explanation for the emergence of inequalities. On 
the other hand, Renfrew suggests that, given the inception of metallurgy, society has become 
acquisitive due to its newly acquired incentive for pursuing and expressing ranking through 
material wealth. Paradoxically, the object of inquiry, namely the rise of inequalities, becomes 
now the explanation for the appearance of an acquisitive society which is what Renfrew 
considered in the fIrst place to be an explanation for the original rise of inequalities. 
27 By Metal/schock Renfrew meant 'a sudden reaction produced by the first impact of metallurgy f!.nd metal 
products upon the populace' (1972: 338). 
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The main point of concern here is that by underestimating the importance of metallurgy 
during the Neolithic and overestimating it during the Early Bronze Age Renfrew proposed both a 
further stimulus to the emergence of social inequalities as well as a striking material indication of 
these inequalities. I suggest that this fact is relevant to the way wealth has been so far envisioned 
in the Cretan Bronze Age. For it bears significantly on archaeologists' current tendency to insert 
wealth into evolutionary interpretative schemes. Poignantly, Renfrew's perception of metals as 
'the first clear expression of wealth' (1972: 492) in the Aegean prehistoric record has led to the 
arbitrary assumption of a non-acquisitive egalitarian Neolithic society where there is little point to 
overproduction since people have limited needs. In Renfrew's words, 
The farmer in an ideally simplified society produces enough for the needs of himself and his family. 
There is little point in producing much more food than they can eat, since there would be nothing for 
him to do with it. His needs are satisfied (1972: 41). 
ArgUably, the question of origins with" its attendant ethnocentric evaluations still reigns 
supreme leading once more to the fallacious distinction between simple egalitarian and complex 
ranked societies. However, one cannot avoid the impression that what is inherent in this 
distinction is our obsolete assumption that a hierarchical society is one that expresses social 
inequalities in material wealth. The content of material wealth is defined according to Western 
biases about aesthetics, scarcity, quantity and quality. In this respect, Marx's theory of labour 
value in capitalist societies is frequently foisted uncritically upon pre-capitalist societies to chart 
categories of valuables. The important thing to keep in mind therefore, is that, according to 
current consensus, ranked societies are not just those that express inequalities by material means, 
but to a large extent those which display the forms of material culture that best fit our" modern 
conceptions of what is valuable. Conversely, societies such as the Greek Neolithic that fail to fit 
these preconceptions appear in our archaeological narratives as egalitarian. While I have no 
problem with a view that takes metals to have been important in power struggles in a given 
community in a given historical age, I fmd it hard to accept that inequalities were absent in earlier 
times simply because metals were not important or present. After all, 'an artefact cannot be used 
as the benchmark for a social phenomenon in a period before its invention' (McKay 1988: 12). 
Equally, one should not see the prominent presence of rich burials (Necrotaphic Prominence) in 
the Aegean EBA as an index for the emergence of previously absent inequalities. it perhaps goes 
without saying that a European Bronze Age warrior is a person of high status, 'but what of his 
counterpart amongst the Plains Indians of America where the body was not interred but exposed 
for decomposition?' (McKay 1988: 8). It should be stressed that so far archaeologists have 
grounded the e~stence of so called egalitarian societies primarily on negative evidence, most 
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specifically the lack of rich burials or the lack of particular types of objects. One may note 
however, that negative evidence does not generate understanding or offer answers to our 
questions, but rather creates problems by directing our attention to what is missing: 
Thus a cemetery in which there is no appreciable differences in the grave contents becomes the remains 
of an egalitarian society, not because it is, but because our accepted symbols of rank are missing 
(Mckay 1988: 8, emphasis in the original). 
To get back to the Aegean case, more recently N akou (1995) has offered a new look at 
Aegean prehistoric metallurgy. She points out that the importance of metal during the Neolithic 
should not be overlooked. The distinction between a lack of metals in the Neolithic and an 
explosion in their production and consumption in the EBA - what Renfrew called Metallschock'-
might be the outcome of biased chronological visibility of metals in the archaeological record due 
to the specific depositional strategies of each period. The prominent position of metal artefacts in 
the EBA is due to their deposition in formal-burials, a practice that makes them more visible in 
the archaeological record. On the other hand, as Nakou demonstrates, in the Neolithic metal 
artefacts occur in settlements and caves. Bearing in mind that settlement traces leave much less 
visible marks compared to mortuary contexts the notion of a metal-free Neolithic may largely be 
the outcome of a visibility bias. Significantly, -even within the EBA, the striking association of 
metals with burial deposits - a practice itself worthy of attention - should not lead us to conclude 
necessarily that metal artefacts did not occur at all in settlements. 
However, I would like to suggest that even if Nakou was not able to demonstrate the 
existence of metal artefacts in the Neolithic we should not go on to believe that the period lacked 
relational inequalities. The existence of power and status inequalities cannot simply be inferred 
from the presence of a particular type of wealth, be that a golden cup or a bronze dagger. Nakou's 
restoration of the presence of metals in the Neolithic might be enough for scholars like Renfrew 
to confirm the existence of power structures in this period. However, what is of paramount 
importance for both the Neolithic and the EBA is to explore the ways that metals or other kinds of 
objects were implicated in the creation of power and status, rather than presuppose their 
significance simply based on their tracing in the archaeological record. This draws us once again 
to the issue of debt, the very essence of power relations. The possibility that inequalities in so 
called egalitarian societies might have been constructed through practices which prioritised 
different kinds of resources and displayed different kinds of rationalities quite at odds with 
current technocrat perceptions of what is rational, efficient and valuable in power, status and 
wealth struggles needs to be taken seriously into account. The value of an object may not 
necessarily depe~d on its physical scarcity or the labour time invested to it, but rather it may be 
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grounded in the cosmological representations and moral investments it contains28• Last but not 
least, attention should be paid to the significance of intangible resources such as knowledge, 
memory and skills in shaping debts and therefore power relations. In this respect, Vitelli~s (1995; 
sec also Perles and Vitelli 1999) work on the Greek Neolithic is unique in offering us exceptional 
inspiration in thinking about how inequalities could have been based on pyrotechnological skills 
and knowledge that carried ritual connotations. 
To sum up, low visibility of particular types of objects in the archaeological record cannot be 
taken as a justification to perpetuate the myth of egalitarian societies, the question of the 
historical emergence of inequalities and the futile project of hunting down their temporal origins. 
There is no bctter way to demonstrate thc danger of grounding an argument for the existence of 
egalitarian societies purely in negative evidence than by borrowing some words from McKay: 
If, for some reason, the pyramid of Cheops had vanished we could argue that a classless society existed 
on its site by citing the remains of the workers' huts which lie near it. These were uniform and lacked 
hierarchical distinction (1988: 8). 
28 Note for example, human bones, sacred places or landmarks in the landscape that possess a profound 
value in various societies. 
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A brief history of the concept of inequality: 
The ancients and moderns 
Introduction 
It has been repeatedly pointed out by sociologists, political activists and politicians alike that 
contemporary society is characterised by profound social inequalities. By this they mean that 
people are unequally placed and rewarded and they are offered unequal opportunities 
(Beteille 1981: 59). Perhaps it goes without saying that this does not merely constitute a 
sociological observation, a political standpoint or a philosophical assertion but, extrapolating 
from its consequences, a social fact experienced in real life. Judging from personal 
experiences, one would guess that no single social being would deny having experienced her 
or his social position - in various stages of their life and in contexts as different as the 
workplace, school, the academy, the neighbourhood etc. - as being unequal compared to 
those of others. Among the inequalities that loom large in our society, the most easily 
observable are those of income, wealth, status, opportunities of life and access to power to 
achieve desired ends. 
At this juncture, I remind the reader of Beteille's (l969a: 13, 1977, 1981: 65) observation 
that the phenomenon of social inequality has two expressions, a distributive ~d a relational 
one. The former refers to the unequal distribution among people of different qualities and 
resources like wealth, power, prestige and skill, which is independent of any social relations. 
The latter refers to the ways in which individuals with unequal shares of resources and 
qualities are socially related to each other in terms of superordination/subordmation and 
deference. At the sat.?e time, one especially prevailing strand in the contemporary world is the 
condemnation of inequality, which is accompanied by the plea for the much more comforting 
ideal of equality. Let us keep in mind in the current discussion that the notion of equality is ~ 
not a monolithic term (Beteille 1986: 121). When we talk about the importance of equality we 
may not all mean the same thing. More precisely, one may value 'competitive equality' or 
, . 
'equality of opportunity' while others may rate highly 'distributive equality' or 'equality of 
results' and we should not fail to recognise the significant differences of political orientation 
and perception between these different points of view (Beteille 1994: 1010). 
I would like to stress here that the ideal of equality - namely, the faith in the feasibility of 
the creation of. a society where nobody would outrank anyone else - has a long intellectual 
history that can be traced back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Interestingly, it 
.. 
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was developed in opposition to the intellectual teachings of classical political philosophy. It is 
my contention that the assumptions and prejudices surrounding the ideal of equality, have 
been taken for granted in many current archaeological accounts. In this chapter, I want to 
reflect on the modernist philosophical discourse on inequality and the ideal of equality. In 
doing so, I wish to reveal why and how archaeologists have failed to recognise that inequality 
is a universal} social phenomenon and instead remain engaged with the futile task of hunting 
down its temporal and spatial origins. 
The rise of the discourse on inequality in classical philosophy: 
Plato, Aristotle and the search for the state of nature 
It might well be argued that the views of modernist thinkers on equality and inequality 
presented a radical intellectual break with the classical tradition of political philosophy. This 
becomes obvious if one locates for a moment their discourse on inequality and particularly 
their faith in the natural equality of human beings next to the intellectual journeys that were 
taken before, especially Plato's and Aristotle's discourses on inequality. Plato's distaste for 
the Athenian democracy and his claim that it constituted a morally corrupted form of 
government have been repeatedly pointed out in many commentaries on his work2• One 
should note here that most of Plato's contemporary Athenians regarded democracy as the 
most positive form of governing for it incorporated in the task of governing a wide range of 
experiences from other social activities, by allowing people of different p~ofessions to 
participate in political affairs. Plato, on the other hand, claimed this was one of the most 
serious defects of democracy, since he believed that special knowledge, rather than' equal 
participation, was the most important requirement of governing (Day 1988: 8). 
At the same time, his ideal just society, as it is developed from his best-known" work the 
Repub/ic3 was an e~~remely inegalitarian and authoritarian society Plato's ideal society was 
divided into three groups of citizens; the philosopher Guardians, the soldier Auxiliaries and 
the Producers, or money-makers, the last of which included traders, merchants, farmers, ~ 
craftsmen and labourers. It should be noted immediately that the groups in question, as 
presented by Plato, differ not only in lifestyle and status but also in power (Annas 1981: 172). 
, . 
The Guardians constituted the smallest group whose rule is not constrained by any 
constitution or body of laws but rather by the wise character that prevents them from misusing 
} On the universality of social inequality see Adams (1977: 395)~ Berreman (1981: 8)~ Beteille (1969a: 
14, 1969b: 362)~ Cancian (1976)~ Dahrendorf(1969b: 40)~ Fallers (1973: 6)~ Hamilakis (1995: 30)~ 
Hendricks (1988: 217)~ McGuire (1983: 100)~ Wason (1994: 1). 
2 As John Day (1988: 9) remarks, in Plato's view, the death of his teacher Socrates was a firm proof of 
the corruption of the Athenian democracy. . 
3 In Greek, Poiiteia. 
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their power. As Plato sees it, the Guardians are the rulers because they are ideally wise, in the 
sense that they have a natural competence to rule and have been educated and trained in order 
to develop further this natural skill for the common good (Annas 1981: 175; Day 1988: 25-
32). On the other hand, the soldier Auxiliaries who form a larger group and the Producers 
who include the majority of the population are excluded from any claim to political power. 
This is fair, Plato maintains, because unlike the Guardians, the Auxiliaries and the Producers 
are weak in reason. Furthermore, they lack the freedom to live their life as they wish and are 
essentially enslaved to the power of the Guardians. 
Most significantly, Plato openly suggests that it is in the interest of the citizens belonging 
to the classes with the weaker reason to accept their subordination to the rule of the 
Guardians: 
Therefore, in order that such a man [whose own reason is weak] be ruled by a principle similar to 
that which rules the best man, we say he must be enslaved to the best man, who has a divine ruler 
within himself. It is not to harm the slave that we believe he must be ruled ... but because it is 
better for everyone to be ruled by divine intelligence. It is best that he should have this within 
himself, but if he has not, then it must be imposed from outside ... (Republic 590 c-d cited in Annas 
1981: 173). 
In other words, in Plato's ideal society, social inequalities and the unequal division of power 
are beneficial and justified. They are exactly what an ideal society demands. In fact, 
inequalities are presented in the Republic as the perfect panacea against disorder and injustice. 
The point is clearly revealed in Plato's assertion that justice and order prevail only when each 
individual tries to do just what she or he is naturally better skilled at and not becoming 
involved in areas of competence that others are naturally better fit to perform. Thus, 
according to Plato, the worst disorder and injustice that could ruin the ideal city (polis) would 
come if the Producers or the Auxiliaries interfered with what the Guardians are naturally 
competent to do - namely, to rule. Having said that, it is now easy to see why Plato thinks 
that democracy is unjust (Day 1988: 21). Bearing this in mind, it comes as no surprise that 
'Plato's society has offended and continues to offend many, because he is frankly and 
unapologetically inegalitarian' (Annas 1981: 172). 
Subsequently, Aristotle, Plato's greatest pupil, maintained that a natural rank order among 
people is inevitable because men are by nature unequal (Dahrendorf 1969b: 21). He proposed 
in the Politics, an assessment of hierarchical order, that is the' existence of ruled and ruling 
elements as a common and universal feature of nature and all living organisms. From this 
point he proceeded to justify as a natural outcome of human relationships not only social 
inequalities but also slavery (Lockyer 1988: 53~56; Taylor 1995: 254-257). In Aristotle's 
view, no better demonstration of the natural existence of a hierarchical order can be found 
than in the relationships between the soul and the body and between reason and desires, 
.. 
respectively (Plattner 1979: 97). These two relationships stand in Aristotle's view not only as 
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two conspicuous cases of a natural hierarchy, but also as examples that teach us that 
hierarchical order is actually beneficial and just. 
The train of the Aristotelian argument runs as follows: the soul has a natural rule over the 
body because the former provides the latter with rational direction in the absence of which the 
body would not be able to deal with the environment. At the same tinle, it is more 
advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul, not simply because it is better that the body 
should be under rational direction, but most importantly because it benefits the body to be so 
directed (Taylor 1995: 254). Similarly, the desires or passions are naturally under the 
direction of reason, for without reason to control our strong passions or desires, they may 
disconnect our thinking and awareness of our conditions leading to moral weakness 
(Hutchinson 1995: 215-217) . Accordingly, those men who differ from their fellow human 
beings as much as the soul and reason differ from the body and desires are by their very 
nature superior. These are people in whom reason rules over desires and the soul over the 
body according to the natural order. At the. same time, just as it is beneficial and natural for 
the body and desires to be under the rule of the soul and reason respectively, so too it is just 
for people to rule over animals, and for the- naturally superior human beings to govern the 
inferior ones in whom the desires and the body are not directed by reason and the soul, as 
nature dictates (Lockyer 1988: 53). As Aristotle sees it, the inferiors are natural slaves, or in a 
sense resemble draught animals, for they do not display any aptitude of rational self-direction. 
Conversely, it is more advantageous for them to be under the direction of those endowed with 
deliberation (Taylor 1995: 254-255; see also Lockyer 1988). In Aristotle's words., 
It is thus clear that there are by nature free men and slaves, and that servitude is agreeable and just 
for the latter ... Equally, the relation of the male to female is by nature such that one is superior and 
the other inferior, one dominates and the other is dominated ... With the barbarians of course, the 
female and the dominated have the same rank. This is because they do not possess a naturally 
dominating element. .. This is why the poets say, 'It is just that Greeks rule over barbarians', 
because the barbarian and the slave are by nature the same (Politics 1254b, 1252a cited in 
Dahrendorf 1969b: 18, emphasis in the original). 
As much as I may be running the risk of caricaturing Plato's and Aristotle's complex, 
arguments of political philosophy, there are nevertheless two noticeable features underpinning 
the classical discourse on inequality; firstly, the belief that a hierarchical order is the natural 
condition of human beings and secondly, the conviction that when the subordination of some 
people under others follows the rules of nature, it is beneficial and just. To smooth the 
reader's path, the last point is more clearly unraveled in the Aristotelian analogy of the just 
hierarchical order with the relationship between soul and body or reason and desires. 
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The modernist synthesis: Fetishising culture, pacifying nature 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau 
To tum from the teachings of the classical political philosophy to the modernist discourse on 
inequality is to enter a completely different world. With the latter emerged the belief that the 
command of some human beings over others (relational inequalities) has no foundation in 
nature and that equality rather than inequality is the natural condition of people. The idea that 
the state of nature is a state of equality is found for first time in seventeenth century in the 
political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
One of Hobbes's main themes in Leviathan is to show that although people are by nature 
equal, the state of nature as a state of equality is also a condition of misery and of war, of all 
against all. For as he maintains humans' distinctive nature is characterised by passions and 
desires that drive them towards things that give them pleasure, disabling them from 
distinguishing good from evil, and that given the desires or passions of different human 
beings are rarely the same, the whole state of nature as a state of equality turns one person 
against the other (Forsyth 1988: 130). In other words, according to Hobbes, although equality 
is the original state of being, it bears 'antisocial potentialities' (Hughes 1988: 154). Therefore 
the division of people into the rulers and the ruled is rational and necessary to put an end to 
the intolerable war of all against all (Hall 1973: 34). Moreover, in Hobbes's account the state 
of nature is not presented as a historical fact, but rather as something that people are always at 
risk of falling into (Forsyth 1988: 135; Hall 1973: 29). 
On ,the other hand, in the Second Treatise of Goyernment Locke's evaluation of the state 
of nature as a state of equality is more positive than that advocated by Hobbes.' More 
precisely, Locke is not concerned so much with the antisocial potentialities of equality, but 
rather with the rights people enjoyed in the state of nature as a state of equality. Ii might be 
said that Locke's conviction that the state of nature is a state of equality forms the backbone 
of a political ideology that celebrates every human being having the right to equality and to be 
free from being subjugated by the arbitrary will of others (Beteille 1981; Hughes 1988). Quite -, 
ironically, however, Locke's doctrine on the natural equality of humankind is far from 
unshakable. For instance, we are told in the First Treatise, a book that - according to some, 
, . 
contradicts the arguments of the Second Treatise in many ways (Hughes 1988) - that there is 
some foundation in nature for the subordination of the wife to the husband or of the slave to 
her or his master (Beteille 1981: 64). In addition, it is worth 'mentioning that Locke leaves 
room for inequalities among human beings in tenns of age, virtue and merit, yet he does not 
elaborate on h~w distinctions of merit or virtue emerge in the state of nature (Beteille 198 I: 
64). 
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Perhaps the most famous modernist proponent of the idea of equality as the natural 
condition of mankind is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the ideological founders of the French 
Revolution. Although Rousseau was a prolific writer, his political philosophy is mainly set 
out in two books: Discourse on the Origin of Inequality among Men and whether it is 
Legitimised by Natural Law [Discours sur l'origine et les Jondements de l'iliegalite parmi 
les hommes (1753)], and the Social Contract [Du Contrat social (1762)]. In these writings, 
Rousseau not only directly questioned both the classical discourse on inequality and the 
doctrine of the divine right of the absolute monarchy in France at the time, but he also 
passionately argued that modem humanity should and can resurrect the lost ideal of equality. 
It should be noted at the outset that Rousseau does not deny the existence of physical or 
natural inequalities stemming from differences in bodily strength, age, health or mental make-
up among women and men, yet he believes that these are insignificant (Beteille 1981: 63; 
1994: 1011). What matters to him are social inequalities, like the subordination of one 
individual to the authority of another (Beteille 1981: 63; Mann 1986: 51; Plattner 1979: 96). 
Such inequalities, he holds, have no foundation in nature; rather, they are artificial and thus 
subject to abolition. To attack the Aristotelian premise that human beings are unequal by 
nature, Rousseau came up with the argument that in the state of nature people are not 
endowed with reason as Aristotle maintained (Plattner 1979: 97). As we have already seen, 
for Aristotle, some people are entitled to rule over others because the former innately possess 
reason whereas the latter do not and therefore cannot direct themselves. According to 
Rousseau, no natural human being has reason. Instead, all human beings in the s~te of nature 
are only interested with the fulfilment of their desires and passions and the maintenance of 
their bodies. Consequently, since no one possesses reason, no one is naturally above her or his 
fellow beings and accordingly holds no natural right to rule over others. Simply stated, to 
Rousseau's way of thinking, inequality - rather than equality - is unnatural and unjust. 
This thesis was., a revolution in political thought in itself. For unlike Hobbes, In 
Rousseau's philosophy, the idea of equality as the original state of being, does not lead to 
negative evaluations of the state of nature but rather serves as the reveille for the abolition of ' 
social inequalities 4• The train of Rousseau's argument as commonly understood has' been 
aptly summarised by Dahrendorf(1969b: 21): 
If men are equal by nature, then social inequalities cannot be established by nature or God; and if 
they are not so established, then they are subject to change, and the privileged of today may be the 
outcasts of tomorrow; it may then even be possible to abolish inequalities. 
4 Although Rousseau himself does not conclude that all existing social institutions should be abolished, 
the reader can easily reach this conclusion for herself or himself (Hall 1973: 41). 
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The implication of Rousseau's argument was critical in political terms since it suggested that 
given their extranatural foundation all social hierarchies could lose their taken for granted 
claim to respect (Dahrendorf 1969b: 21). It is no wonder that the belief or disbelief in natural 
equality, i.e. the way people think about natural equality, has been invented as a barometer 
that measures individual or group politico-ideological stances to society as c'onservative or 
revolutionary. In simple terms, we have come to believe that one who accepts equality as a 
natural state of being or one who denies it, automatically becomes 'a member of the radical 
left or the radical right [respectively]' (Flanagan 1989: 260). 
To be sure, the ideological, political and intellectual implications of Rousseau's 
postulation of a natural state of equality are too far-reaching and complex to be given 
adequate treatment here. Yet, there are aspects of Rousseau's argument that we. should bring 
into the open, for they have a significant bearing on the way archaeologists today have come 
to deal with the concept of inequality. I am talking about the projection by Rousseau himself 
of the idea of natural equality, and concomitantly of an original apolitical state of being, into 
history. To phrase it slightly differently, unlike Hobbes, Rousseau presents the natural 
equality of mankind as something that really -existed in the remote past and then goes on to 
depict the different succeeding stages in time through which humanity evolved (Dahrendorf 
1969b: 22; Hall 1973: 29). Particularly telling is the opening sentence of the Social Contract 
where we are told that 'Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains' (cited in Keens-
Soper 1988: 173). Thus, with Rousseau, the history of humanity acquired an evolutionary 
image. Yet, Rousseau also seeks to demonstrate that social inequalities, given their extra-
natural foundation, do not constitute an inevitable fate of humanity (Hall 1973: 41). As he 
maintains, inequalities and the establishment of political authority came into' being 
historically, with the introduction of property, in particular landed property (Rousseau 1999 
[1754]). In his own words, 
. .. as soon as [people] observed that it was useful for a single person to have provisions for two, 
equality disappeared, property was introduced, labour became necessary; and vast forests were 
changed into smiling Fields which had to be watered with the sweat of men, and in which slavery , 
and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow with the crops (1999 [1754]: 25) ... The first 
man who fenced in an area and said 'This is mine' and who found people simple enough to believe 
him, was the real founder of civil society (1754: 66 cited in Dahrendorf 1969b: 22). 
One may say then that according to Rousseau all pre-agricultural societies lacked any 
form of political authority. It is also worth mentioning that Rousseau does not touch upon the 
question of how property came into being. That said, if Rousseau's discourse is analysed 
closely we find that for him the establishment of political society, though not inevitable, is 
irreversible; that is, once it is established, people cannot and perhaps should not go back to 
their original apolitical condition. We are now approaching one of the most perplexing 
arguments of Rous'seau's political philosophy, for this quite clearly seems to contradict his 
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assertion that 'no man has a natural authority over his fellowmen' (1762: I cited in Plattner 
1979: 96). Quite paradoxically, Rousseau, without explaining why, declares that at some 
point people start to recognise 'the imperative of belonging to a social order5, (Keens-Soper 
1988: 175). Having said that, the question that now concerns Rousseau is not anymore 'how 
once free men can regain their ... independence, but rather how men ... voluntarily agree to 
the creation of a social order, which though not natural, is or has become indispensable' 
(Keens-Soper 1988: 175). In Rousseau's view, therefore, although the political society is an 
extra-natural artefact, people living within it can still resurrect their natural freedom as long as 
the political authority is founded upon the agreement of those subject to it. 
It might be suggested that the above argument constitutes a rather unhappy compromise 
for Rousseau's political philosophy and, more specifically, for his belief in . humankind's 
natural equality. However, at this juncture, it is more adequate for our purposes to summarise 
the themes of Rousseau's discourses that have had a great impact on the archaeological study 
of inequality. His views have come to be understood as unquestionable doctrines by 
successive generations of people in the contemporary world, and I suggest that they have been 
unconsciously implanted into the archaeological study of inequality to a significant degree. 
These are: 
1) the belief in the non-inevitability of social inequality and, as a corollary, the non-universal 
existence of social inequality; 
2) the idea that true equality existed in the remote past, as well as the concomitant perception 
of inequality as a phenomenon that has emerged historically; 
3) the presentation of the emergence of political authority and of the process by which people 
became 'civilised' as ajoumey through evolutionary irreversible stages; and 
4) the notion that the question of the invention of property is the key which can unlock the 
riddle of the emergence of social inequality. 
Morgan, Marx, Engels 
Critically, the ideas of early modernist thinkers on inequality were to re-appear in various· 
forms in the writings of several prominent scholars of the nineteenth century, most notably in 
those of Lewis Henry Morgan, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Beteille 1994). 
Morgan in particular has been seen as one of the most infl~ential inventors of the myth of 
the primitive apolitical society (Kuper 1988: 42). For example, in Ancient SOCiety, Morgan's 
best-known work, first published in 1877, we are offered a history of a series of 
developmental stages of social organisation. According to Morgan (1907 [1877]), the history 
5 Rousseau's laconic statement about the imperative of social order runs as follows, ' ... the social order 
is a sacred right which serves as the basis for all others. And yet this right does not come from nature~ 
thus it is founded on conventions' (Rousseau 1762 cited in Watkins 1953: 4). 
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of civilised humankind commenced with a state of Savagery (divided into three stages) that 
progressively gave way to a state of Barbarism (again divided into three stages) and from 
there to Civilisation. It should be noted that Morgan devised this classificatory scheme of 
human evolution by drawing on ethnographic information and historical sources. 
Contemporary aboriginal Australians, Polynesians, the Athapascan tribes of Hudson's Bay 
and various coastal tribes of North and South America were taken to represent examples of 
the savage way of life. The Iroquois of New York State, the Aztecs, the Homeric Greeks as 
well as the Latin tribes before the foundation of Rome were offered as representative 
examples of various stages of the state of barbarism. A basic tenet of Morgan's theory was 
that the stages of savagery and barbarism were characterised by an absence of social 
inequalities and political organisation and that the foundation of political society 'did not 
occur until after civilisation had commenced' (1907 [1877]: 63). In Morgan's view, 
civilisation commenced with the composition of the Homeric poems about 850 BC, whereas 
the first political society appeared about 509 BC when Cleisthenes divided Attica into demes. 
Furthermore, he distinguished between two types of human organisation, namely, social 
and political. He maintained that the former,' which in his view constituted the older form of 
organisation and marked the 'primitive' stages of evolution, was founded upon gentes, 
phratries and tribes, that is upon kinship bonds and personal relations. On the other hand, 
political organisation, the type of organisation that characterises the stage of civilisation, was 
seen to have been founded upon territory, property and the dissolution of kinship ties. More 
important still, one of Morgan's (1907 [1877]: 7) major points was that the emergence of 
social inequalities and the foundation of political organisation were 'the result' of the 
development of private property. A further premise was that the growth of property was 
contingent upon progress in technological inventions and discoveries, most particularly 'those 
arts upon which the means of subsistence depended' (Morgan 1907 [1877]: 525). We are also 
told that the property of 'savages' was inconsiderable and that their concept of it 
undeveloped. At this stage, people's passion for the possession of property was almost absent 
and any ideas regarding its inheritance and value were quite feeble. In barbarism, the amount . 
and forms of property increased, yet land was still owned in common by the tribe, and a 
strong sense of inheritance had not been sufficiently developed. On the other hand, with 
civilisation, the 'greed of gain' was perfectly realised (Morgan 1907 [1877]: 527): 
Commencing at zero in savagery, the passion for the possession of property, as the representative 
of accumulated subsistence, has now become dominant over the human mind in civilised races 
(Morgan 1907 [1877]: vii). . 
In civilisation, as Morgan held, we can trace the full development of the idea of property. Not 
only does property increase in amount and form at this stage, but also a significant change 
.. 
occurs in the tenure of land, namely, the bulk of land falls under individual o\vnership and 
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rules emerge with respect to its inheritance and proprietorship. Crucially, the increase of 
wealth and the individual amassing of property led to the foundation of personal influence 
and unequal rights, the establishment of privileged classes and the gradual development of the 
sentiment of aristocracy. According to Morgan, these conditions, which were unknown to the 
previous stages of social evolution, where society was based upon democratically organised 
gentes, 'disturbed the balance of society by introducing unequal privileges, and degrees of 
respect for individuals among people of the same nationality' (1907 [1877: 551]). 
It is worth stressing that for Morgan institutionalised social inequalities were neither 
natural nor inevitable (Kuper 1988: 71), nor were property careers the ultimate fate of 
humanity. The historical seniority of the democratic and egalitarian order of the ancient 
gentes was taken to prove that equality or communal life, rather than inequality and 
individualism, was the natural and original condition of humankind. One may wonder 
whether Morgan's belief in the actual historical existence of an original state of equality was 
forced on him by the evidence available, or rather, whether his political ideology forced his 
data to fit into the intellectual scheme; in the last chapter of Ancient Society he strikes the 
optimistic note that a revival of the egalitarian and democratic principles of the ancient gentes 
is in store for the future of the human race: 
Although several thousand years have passed away without the overthrow of privileged classes, 
excepting in the United States6, their burdensome character upon society has been demonstrated ... 
The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property, 
and define the relations of the state to the property it protects, as well as the obligations and the 
limits of the rights of its owners ... Democracy in government, brotherhood in society, equality in 
rights and privileges, and universal education foreshadow the next higher plain of society to which 
experience, intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending. It will be a reVival, in a higher form, 
of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes (Morgan 1907 [1877]: 552, emphasis 
added). 
In light of this, it comes as no surprise that Morgan's ideas were to impress .Marx and 
especially Engels, the great theorists of the communist ideology. Nearing the end of his life, 
Marx who has been described by Diamond (1974: 105) as the Rousseau of the nineteenth 
century, became interested in the new anthropology and began to take extensive notes on the_. 
work of Phear, Lubbock, Maine and Morgan. Following Marx's death, Engels employed his 
notes on Morgan's Ancient Society as a point of departure for his own book The Origin o/the 
Family, Private Property and the State (1985 [1884]), which was basically a dissemination 
and development of Morgan's own theories (Barrett 1986; Gosden 1999: 106; Krader 1972; 
Kuper 1988: 73). 
As Engels tell us in The Origin, the gentile constitution of savagery and barbarism with its 
communistic household, its communal ownership of land, absence of nobles and kings and 
6 As Kuper notes, in ,Morgan's view, the constitution of the United States imitated the democratic order 
of the ancient gen tes. 
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equality and freedom for individuals - women included - is 'a wonderful constitution' (1985 
[1884]: 129). On the other hand, based on Morgan's demonstration of the historical seniority 
of the gentile constitution, Engels (1985 [1884]: 141) was able to support more convincingly 
his belief that the state and its concomitant inequalities were a recent invention in human 
history. Put another way, in Engels's view, the communist and egalitarian constitutions of the 
past represent the original conditions of humanity whereas the non-egalitarian state societies 
constitute artificial introductions that resulted from the development of property. 
The legacy of Morgan is all too apparent here, yet with Engels and Marx, the discoveries 
of the American anthropologist would take a more political form (Barrett 1986: 9); while 
Morgan's critique of the stage of civilisation was quite ambiguous and concluded with the 
optimistic note that somehow the intelligence of humankind will manage . to overcome 
inequalities, Marx and Engels thought the critique of civilisation to be inseparably linked to 
revolutionary praxis (Krader 1972: 3). The latter, for them, would be the first step in 
overcoming the deformations associated with civilisation and in particular with the capitalist 
epoch (Krader 1972: 4). It is well known that Marx and Engels believed that an ideal 
trajectory for human development ran from primitive egalitarian societies, through class-
based societies and towards the technologically advanced egalitarian societies of the future 
(Beteille 1994: 1011; Trigger 1989: 222). Importantly, Morgan's study seemed to give weight 
to Marx and Engels's ideas about the revival of a communistic society without social 
inequalities and private property. This was not simply a utopian vision, as Morgan showed 
that egalitarian societies with communal property had empirical foundations in history and 
therefore could exist once again in the future7• 
Engels (1985 [1884]) after reading Ancient Society, devised his own evolutionary scheme 
of social organisation. This ran from pre-class societies, divided into pre-clan, matriarchal 
clan, patriarchal clan and terminal clan stages, to three forms of class society - slave, feudal 
and capitalist - and from there to the socialist and communist societies of the future. It was in 
this spirit that he added a footnote to Marx's famous saying in The Communist Manifesto; 
'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles'. Essentially, what' 
Engels tells us is that Marx, in his use of the term 'history', actually meant 'all written 
history' (1998 [1848]: 8), and that before the periods of written history, there were no social 
inequalities, no, oppressors and oppressed and accordingly no class struggles: 
7 According to Marx and Engels, the technologically advanced egalitarian societies of the future would 
come into being not through a social contract a la Rousseau - which in fact, as they claimed, had 
brought into being a 'democratic bourgeois republic' and the 'Reign of Terror' - but rather through the 
abolition of private property (Marx and Engels 1998 [1890], see also Engels 1998 [1892]: 40-41]. 
Morgan's primitive communistic societies seemed to support Marx and Engel's view that a return to 
egalitarian social formations can be achieved only in the absence of private property. 
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That is all written history. In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organisation existing 
previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then ... village communities were found 
to be, or to have been the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner 
organisation of this primitive Communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by 
Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe. With the 
dissolution of these primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and 
firmly antagonistic classes (Engels 1998 [1890 edition of The Communist Manifesto]: 8 n.l, 
emphasis in italics in the original~ emphasis in bold added). 
An inherited tradition: The modernist paradigm in archaeology and 
anthropology 
The intellectual history above, though by no means exhaustive tried to open a perspective in 
which to situate the current praxis of archaeology with respect to the study of inequality. 
Worth noting first is that, as might have been expected, the modernist discourse on inequality 
was subsequently espoused by archaeological research in the Soviet Union. In the Stalinist era 
in particular, Soviet archaeologists were compelled to interpret their fmdings solidly in 
accordance with Engels's evolutionary scheme of social organisation and were discouraged. 
from subjecting this interpretation to any kind of scientific criticism (Trigger 1989: 225). 
Outside the Soviet Union, but still in the orbit of Marxism, Gordon Childe, one of the 
most influential archaeologists of the twent~eth century would introduce Marxist inspired 
methodological guidelines for the study of inequality in Western archaeological contexts. 
Although Childe was highly critical of the dogmatism under which his Soviet colleagues were 
compelled to submit to a priori assumptions, rather than testing them archaeologically 
(Trigger 1989: 255), he also viewed social organisation as evolving from egalitarian to 
hierarchical forms. In Scotland before the Scots, he described the evolution of. social 
organisation in that country as a transformation of an egalitarian social formation into a 
hierarchical one. Childe focused on the excavated finds of communal tombs, -which he 
suggested correlated with a communal ownership of the means of production. He found this 
pattern to be significantly different from the fmds of individual tombs, which expressed 
differences in status (see Trigger 1989: 234, 259). 
In anthropology, the myth of simple egalitarian societies was variously perpetuated by 
Morton Fried (1967) and Elman Service (1962, 1978) among others. Subsequently, it would 
become commonplace in feminist anthropological discourse as well (Flanagan- 1989: 250). 
Similarly, the notion of primitive communism was to be further popularised over the years by 
several eminent anthropologists like Stanley Diamond (1974), Eleanor Leacock (1972) and 
Richard Lee (1979; 1990) just to lnention a few8• Thus, we are still apt to believe that in 
8 For example~ primitive communism 'refers to the collective right to basic resources, the absence of 
hereditary status or 2.uthoritarian rule, and the egalitarian relationships that preceded exploitation and 
economic stratification in human history' (Leacock 1983: 394 cited in Lee 1990: 231). 
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contexts where property seems to be absent or communally held there is little room for 
relational social inequalities. According to this argument, hunter-gatherer societies have come 
to be portrayed more often than not as our apolitical ancestors (see for example, Lee and 
DeVore 1968; Meillassoux 1972; Tilley 1981). 'What do you value when you cannot easily 
hoard or keep the things which are scarce?' And 'how do you express value when you cannot 
own or keep to yourself the things you might want to?' (Sinclair 1998: 10). Thus goes the 
simplistic assumptions of the deep-rooted notion of hunter-gatherer societies as inevitably 
simple and egalitarian (Bender 1989: 84; McKay 1988: 24; O'Shea and Zvelebil 1984: 1). Of 
course there is a further ramification of the modernist discourse on inequality. I am talking 
here about the still widely held inclination to view the economic world of those communities 
we used to call egalitarian as being impotent. When we see economic activity, that does not 
resemble the rationality of modem economics, we tend to disregard it as nothing more than 
altruistic, peaceful, reciprocal giving or sharing or as an impersonal levelling mechanism 
dictated by society in order to iron out or, resist real inequalities (see Halstead 1995; Kent 
1993; Lee 1990: 244; Trigger 1990). In short, we view these incongruities as representing the 
attractive antithesis of the modem economic man. 
These products of the modem intellectual construction have shown remarkable durability 
in both archaeology and anthropology. They are still with us in our obsession to continue 
talking about egalitarian societies of the past, and in our futile endeavours of hunting down 
the temporal origins of inequality . Yet, if the modernist belief in equality as a natural state of 
being, and its associations with arguments about its actual historical existence are correct, we 
can only comply with McKay's (1988: 6) sarcastic comment that humankind's abandonment 
of the primeval condition of equality might be explained only in terms of our self-destructive 
natures. 
Before reaching any conclusion, I think it is instructive to look at the evidence that 
informed the modernist assumption about the historical existence of the state of equality. 
Although in Rousseau's account the existence of a state of equality was portrayed as a 
historical fact, it was largely the product of armchair conjecture (Hall 1973). Archaeology in" 
his time was in its infancy, and Rousseau's only evidence was based on the hearsay of 
explorers' rather exaggerated and, at best, selective accounts of so called primitive 
communities. Therefore his writings on the historical existence 'of equality hardly warrant any 
serious attention, even in comparison with the often highly imaginative accounts of 
eighteenth-century explorers and travellers (Levine 1993). 
As Rousseau felt unencumbered by the need for direct evidence, I would like to offer a 
counter argument on the universality of inequality from literary fiction by offering a summary 
of George O'rwell's Animal Farm. No longer able to tolerate farmer Jones's intolerance and 
.. 
abuse, the Animals of Manor Farm revolt and take over the farm. Led by Snowball and 
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Napoleon, the two most intelligent of the pigs, they decide to create a life of equality, 
harmony and prosperity. Life goes smoothly at first, but then Napoleon sees a chance for 
power and position. He orchestrates the removal of the altruistic Snowball and assumes 
control of the farm and together with the other pigs rules over the rest of the other animals. 
Orwell, like Rousseau, theorised about social relations through his observation of social 
classes, however, also like Rousseau, his story on the inevitability of inequality is not based 
on an empirical study, but rather on the musing of anecdote. 
With Morgan the assertion of an original state of equality appears, at first sight at least, to 
move from the realm of mere philosophical speculation to that of a scientifically based 
observation. However, further reflection on Morgan's ethnographic method leads us to 
skepticism concerning the accuracy of his conclusions on the egalitarian communities of the 
stages of savagery and barbarism. As Michele Barrett (1986: 17) has pointed out, Morgan's 
ethnographic accounts display the methodological innocence of the nineteenth century. For 
even if we acknowledge that he spent time. with the Iroquois, a great many of his ideas were 
not based on first-hand information9• That is, Morgan relied heavily and uncritically on the 
sketchy and rather unreliable accounts of missionaries, travelers, traders and explorers. What 
is also relevant here is that nineteenth-century ethnographies about the state of social 
differentiation in 'primitive' societies were largely a caricature shaped through the 
comparison between us, the so called 'civilised' and them, the so called 'primitives'. This 
comparison was in tum used to demonstrate the great differences between the 'civilised' and 
the 'primitives'. Yet arguably, the failure of nineteenth-century ethnographic accounts to 
recognise social differentiation, not to mention individual physical variation in 'primitive' 
societies, can be seen as a symptom and intellectual by-product of this epic bias regarding the 
differences between us and them. It is interesting to point out that social differentiation among 
individuals of one's own kind consistently seem greater than among individuals of-a different 
kind (BeteiIIe 1994: 1016). Put in another way, under the regime of the civilised I primitive 
dichotomy, so called primitives were perceived as constituting a homogenous world 
consisting of socially undifferentiated others. 
Finally, Marx and Engels took Morgan's ideas about the historical existence of equality 
for granted without conducting any ethnographic fieldwork (Barrett 1986; Krader 1972). This 
is because they were not interested in 'primitive' societies for their own sake, but rather they 
were interested in employing the models of primitive society as examples in order to show 
9 Morgan had some direct contact with the Iroquois, whom he successfully represented in Washington 
in his capacity as a lawyer. He was also made a honorary Iroquois by certain Seneca, being given the 
name TA-YA-DA-O-WUHKUGH 'he who lies across' - though this led to an episode of him trying 
to organise white people as if they were Indians, rather embarrassing from a contemporary point of 
view. Leslie White published Morgan's 'Indian notebooks' some time in the 1940s. lowe this point to 
Michael Lane. 
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that equality could be achieved once again in the future. As I have argued above, and as 
Diamond has perceptively noted, primitive societies were for them the groundwork of all 
future historical movement. 'Marxism did not generate an ethnology but a critical and 
revolutionary analysis of civilization, particularly of modern capitalism' (Diamond 1974: 
107). 
To cut this long story short, the naturalisation of equality by the modernist intellectual 
tradition has left us with the misleading question of when social inequality came about (cf. 
Flanagan 1989). Yet, I take it to be clear from the foregoing discussion that the notion of 
equality as the original and natural condition of humankind is not originally based on 
archaeological evidence or serious and extensive ethnographic information. Rather, it tells us 
more about the ideological motivations of the great modernist thinkers than it describes real 
societies. The legacy of its rhetoric had been so firmly established through time that 
anthropology and archaeology alike have shaped questions and research agendas according to 
its philosophical speculations. 
A future for inequality's pasts 
The problematic assumptions and preconceptions of the modernist discourse on inequality 
have begun to come under scrutiny. I now offer a few observations that may help clarify why 
my own position in this discussion is towards the universality and diversity of inequality. To 
begin with, there is no justification in ethnography for assuming that inequality and 
complexity are inescapably or universally the outcomes of farming economies (cf. Arnold 
2000). Anthropological and archaeological literature on this issue has accumulated rapidly in 
recent years and strongly supports the view that the direct association of agriculture with 
inequality is largely misleading (see Gailey and Patterson ·1987; Hayden 1990, 1993; Matson 
and Coupland 1995). It is of greatest importance to note that social inequalities can be traced 
even in societies that do not rely for the satisfaction of their subsistence needs on agriculture 
but on foraging. It is worth mentioning that, according to some scholars, the archaeology and' 
ethnography of the Northwest Coast in particular seem to teach a new lesson: chieftainship 
and complexity might be the preconditions for, rather than the outcomes of the development 
of farming (Hayden 1990; Matson and Coupland 1995). 
Thus even hunter-gatherers who are traditionally assumed to represent the egalitarian 
ideal by their 'collective ownership of the means of production, reciprocal rights of access to 
resources, lack of emphasis on accumulation, generalised reciprocity within the camp, access 
to all of the forces of production and their restriction of ownership to possession of tools' 
(Flanagan 1989: 249) do not perform their lives 'in a time before differential value' (Sinclair 
1998: 15). 
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Valuation systems do exist, as Sinclair (1998) has shown even in the absence of property 
or the accumulation of material resources. Value can be based on an individual's skills, . 
physical abilities, age, sex, position to the ritual life of the community, knowledge - technical, 
social or ritual - or even in the ethic of sharing that is traditionally associated with the denial 
of inequality (Bender 1985, 1989, 1990; Hendricks 1988; Hoebel 1958; O'Shea and Zvelebil 
1984; Sinclair 1998). This idea is a little misleading, however, since sharing and generosity, 
though undennining economic differentiation, may constitute at the same time strategies to 
exert influence and differentiate statuses. Those who share can also appear as the leading 
agents of a valuation system that appreciates and values an egalitarian ethos, and in this sense, 
they are ranked and esteemed highly. Thus, although hunters may not have the right to keep 
the kill, they have the right to give it away and to create a debt that creates. prestige and 
authority (Sinclair 1998). Furthermore, hunters have to work hard and be skilful and brave to 
face the dangers involved in hunting, in order to provide resources for sharing. It is not only 
keeping and hoarding or the productive reiJ?vestment of material resources - so embedded in 
the Western experience of the creation of value - that can confer value and create relations of 
debt. 
At the same time however, there is no reason to suppose that all hunter-gatherer societies 
lack evidence of private property or the accumulation of material wealth. The aboriginal 
communities of the Northwest Coast of British Columbia provide a striking example. These 
people were dependent upon fishing, hunting and gathering as a way of life, lived in large 
extended-family houses and moved around part of the year. Yet they deviated from the 
standard expectations regarding the social organisation of hunter-gatherer groups. That is, 
instead of being egalitarian and loosely organised, they displayed a concern for wealth 
accumulation, ownership and status and a complex social organisation with part-time craft 
specialisation and defined social inequalitieslO (Matson and Coupland 1995). 
Equally, the late Mesolithic cemetery of Oleneostrovski mogilnik in the Boreal zone of 
eastern Europe which has produced the amazing amount of 7000 artefacts (O'Shea and 
Z velebil 1984: 4) constitutes one among several examples of Mesolithic cemeteries that· 
prompt us to be wary of blindly attributing a non-materialistic character to hunter-gatherer 
communities. Notably, the existence of social inequalities in hunter-gatherer societies has 
been demonstrated by several meticulous archaeological studies. One may note' accounts on 
the later Upper Palaeolithic populations of southwest Europe (Bender 1989; Sinclair 1998), 
the European Mesolithic (Clark and Neeley 1987; Constandse-Westermann and Newell 1989; 
10 More specifically, according to Matson and Coupland (1995) social inequalities were hereditary and 
permanent and social mobility between groups was limited. There existed three groups of people that 
some scholars have seen to represent social 'classes': nobles (those who were close to the chief and 
enjoyed rights to resources and ceremonies), commoners (freeborn individuals lacking nobles' 
privileges) and slaves (owned by nobles). 
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McKay 1988; Meiklejohn and Zvelebil 1991: 134; O'Shea and Zvelebil 1984), late Archaic 
societies of the American Midcontinent (Bender 1985) and prehistoric hunter-gatherers of 
California's Sierra Nevada (King 1976). 
What I have in mind may be also illustrated by the case of many so called band societies 
where status is associated with contribution to the general well-being of the community. In 
these societies, as Trigger (1974) has pointed out, any individual attempts to achieve an 
unequal distribution of material possessions undermines rather than promotes status . Yet, I 
would part company with Trigger (1990) and Kent (1993) among others who support the 
thesis that when sharing, reciprocity and generosity are core values in a given society, they 
operate as levelling devices aiming to solidify social bonds and maintain egalitarianism or to 
oppose considerable power inequalities. 
Meanwhile, Bronislaw Malinowski (1961 [1926]: 18-21) and Robert Lowie (1953 [1921]: 
196-200) challenged the idea of primitive communism, which was thought to be reflected in 
so called contemporary 'primitive societies'. (and projected backward onto certain societies of 
the past). These anthropologists examined various societies that were believed to lack the idea 
of private ownership. They found out that while some forms of collective ownership might be 
traced, in fact, fully-fledged communal ownership did not exist. The evidence points more 
frequently towards joint-ownership by some groups within a given community rather than by 
the entire community. In other words, collective ownership does not necessarily mean 
communal ownership. Neither are privileges, benefits, self-interest or individualistic motives 
lacking among so called 'communistic' societies. 
Take, for instance the Trobrianders' canoe, which has been cited as an object of 
communal ownership par excellence in Melanesian society. This is often taken for granted, 
since access to canoes seems to have been open to any member of the community who wished 
to use them for fishing. Simply stated, the canoe appeared to have been used frequently by the 
whole community. But upon closer inquiry, one quickly discovers that every canoe in the 
Trobriand Archipelago had its rightful owner, who acted as the fishing magician and the head 
of the fishing team (Malinowski 1961 [1926]: 20). Those who normally accompanied him in 
the fishing enterprise consisted of members of the same sub-clan and acted as a crew. Not 
only was the crew under an obligation to the rightful owner, but there were strict rules that 
dictated how each man was to 'fill his place'. Moreover, when the owners and'the members 
of the crew surrendered their privileges of use to other people, this was always done 'for a 
consideration, for a repayment' (Malinowski 1961 [1926]: 18) .. 
Likewise, a closer look at the Chukchi of Asia who are usually cited to justify the idea of 
primitive communism reveals that individualistic motives or unequal access to resources are 
far from unknown. Thus we find that while the meat of a whale stranded on the coast is 
shared among all "present, the whalebone belongs only to the person who first spotted the 
134 
A brief history of the concept of inequality: The ancients and moderns 
whale (Lowie 1953 [1921]: 200)11. A further point needs also to be made, quite simply that 
collective ownership by a given group should not be taken to suggest that everything (i.e. any 
form of property) is ovmed in common. 
Significantly, this fact has been recogni.sed even by firm supporters of the notion of 
primitive communism like Diamond (1974: 131-134). According to him, however, ownership 
of private property in so called primitive communistic societies mostly includes non-material 
resources such as esoteric knowledge, which as he holds are unable to create structures of 
power inequality and the economic exploitation of one person by another. For Diamond, it is 
only the means of subsistence production, 'those material means essential to the survival of 
the individual or the group', which if privately held, can enter into structures of domination 
(1974: 131). Now, as Diamond puts it, since these resources are largely held in common or 
are readily accessible in 'primitive' societies, the road to social inequalities is blocked. 
However, there is no justification for the primacy of place accorded by Diamond to the means 
of production as the instruments - par excellence - of power (cf. Rowlands 1998). Relational 
inequalities can be created through personal or group ownership of the material and non-
material means of destruction (Goody 1974) or the material and non-material means of social, 
biological and ritual reproduction, or some combination of these things (Barrett and Damilati 
2002, forthcoming; Bender 1985; Friedman and Rowlands 1977; Meillassoux 1972, 1978a, 
1978b; Spielmann 2002; Weiner 1980, 1985, 1992). At the same time, contrary to Diamond's 
--- argument, collective ownership of the means of production or collective relations of ------------------------------~--------------~-----------------------------------
production are not incommensurate with relational inequalities or unequal allocation of 
. . 
resources. Saitta and Keene (1990) have meticulously demonstrated this point with reference 
to the modern Israeli kibbutz and the ancient Pueblos of the American South-West. By.now it 
should be clear that the assumptions upon which the validity of the historical existence of 
egalitarian societies has been based do not seem to hold true. 
To complicate the issue further, it is often the case that even major adherents to the idea of 
egalitarian communities fmd difficulty in admitting the existence of a perfect state of equality 
and social cohesion. In Fried's words, 'equality is a social impossibility ... the term-
egalitarian society may be understood as an ellipsis, the missing word being relatively' (1967: 
27-28, emphasis added). A similar standpoint has been expressed by Lee: ' ... the fact is that 
perfect equality doesn't exist anywhere. It is a fact of life that human beings differ in their 
abilities ... if one takes a definition of perfect equality as a standard, it will never be found' 
(1990: 236, emphasis in the original). The same anthropologist has come to recognise that 
tensions and warfare are not incompatible with what he calls primitive communistic or pre-
11 For further examples that demonstrate that so called communistic societies are not actually devoid of 
individualistic moti,,~s, unequal access to resources and the notion of private ownership see Lowie 
(1953 [1921]: 198-200). 
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class society (Lee 1990: 232). Others like Sahlins (1958), allow that inequalities based on age, 
sex, and personal characteristics are to be found in every society, yet in the absence of 'truly 
egalitarian societies', he reserves the tenn 'social stratification' for societies that employ 
criteria beyond the three mentioned above. As Flanagan remarks, 'the term egalitarian is 
again reduced to a residual - the absence of stratification' (1989: 246, emphasis in the 
original). Yet strikingly, the concept of egalitarian society has been retained even for societies 
which display not only positions of high status and prestige but also offices of leadership (see, 
for example, Lee 1990; Trigger 1990). The justification made is that in some societies like the 
!Kung or the Iroquois, leaders or chiefs lack real power and material privileges and largely 
function as puppets in the service of the tribe12• 
Arguably, a true egalitarian society would lack positions of unequal prestige and influence 
not to mention chiefs or leaders, however onerous their responsibilities or limited their 
privileges might be (cf. McKay 1988: 19). In this light, one can only concur with Flanagan 
(1989: 247) that in the absence of ethnographic examples, the egalitarian identity tag assigned 
to certain societies has been saved purely by easing the criteria. It would suggest that the 
rescue of the tenn is a matter of morality or an ideological standpoint among the practitioners 
of anthropology who are reluctant to abandon it. This is clear in essays by scholars like Lee, 
among others, which indicate a strong moral. tone in that they present what they describe as 
communistic pre-class or egalitarian societies to be more ethical, just and humane, than 
conspicuously non-egalitarian ones (cf. McGuire 1992: 181). In a similar vein, Trigger has 
criticised Marxist anthropologists who recognise that power relationships are present in so 
called 'primitive' societies, that they do so at the cost of abandoning the important Marxist 
premise that human behaviour is significantly different in small-scale societies as compared 
with class societies. For Trigger this is tantamount to drawing upon the favourite doctrine of 
right-wing social analysts (1990: 120). 
Be that as it may, it is interesting to note that most anthropologists who still retain the 
tenn 'egalitarian society' do so by acknowledging its relative meaning. Archaeologists on the 
other hand, more often than not take it at face value and treat it in terms conditioned by·· 
theoretical myopia. That is, it is usually assumed that societies described as such display a 
perfect state of equality and that the concept is in no need of further explanation. Again, the 
prevailing assumption when we trace contexts characterised b'y egalitarian principles is that 
'equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so' (Berlin 1978: 84 cited in Beteille 1994: 
1010). For we have come to believe that equality, unlike inequality, is a natural condition and 
12 Clastres's (1989 [1977]) work published in Society Against the State has been crucial to the 
popularisation of this idea. Yet interestingly, Clastres did not mean for his argument about the weaker 
power of leaders in pre-state societies to be taken as a statement which upheld the idea that pre-state 
societies lacked power relationships. 
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therefore unproblematic. Consequently, discussions of what the equality of so called 
'egalitarian' societies might have actually been are virtually absent in the archaeological 
literature. This whole process of dealing with 'egalitarian' contexts - namely, by idealising, 
naturalising and finally ignoring them - points to the Western ideological tendency to mask 
social phenomena (Flanagan 1989: 261). As Flanagan remarks, if we are to arrive in a better 
understanding of inequality and equality we need to recognise that both phenomena are 
'products of sociocultural mechanisms' and therefore both demand explanation. Equality is 
no less a social artefact than inequality. 
Furthermore, we should be compelled to recognise the plain fact that the idea of equality 
as a pervasive state of being with an actual historical existence has emerged and re-emerged 
variously in times of profound social inequalities (cf. Beteille 1994: 1032). and injustice 
and/or when the arrogance of political authority has reached its peak. Rousseau, for example, 
lived in an epoch of great social upheaval where Marie Antoinette is popularly known to have 
responded to her starving people that if they did not have bread to eat, they might well eat 
cake. Likewise, Morgan's adherence to the historical existence of a universal state of equality 
blossomed after his brief visit to Europe in the nineteenth century, where he came face to face 
with the injustices of the Old World's aristocratic and monarchical institutions (Kuper 1988). 
As Kuper (1988: 69) points out, Morgan was reluctant to espouse Spanish chroniclers' 
interpretation of Aztec political organisation as a monarchy analogous to existing European 
monarchies. For this would imply that monarchies were indeed primitive and original 
institutions and therefore justified. For Marx and Engels, the case is even more 
straightforward, since unlike Morgan, they were not mere visitors but permanent citizens of 
the very Europe whose political institutions Morgan found to be so distasteful and unpleasant. 
That is, they had first-hand experience of the inequalities associated with the 'bourgeois 
supremacy' and the 'antagonism of capital and wage labour' (Marx and Engels 1998 [1890]: 
28-29). 
It is of no small significance that proposed solutions aimed to resurrect what modernist 
thinkers believed to be the original and natural state of human existence, namely equality,' 
were to fail in whatever context they were adopted. Napoleon's solution summarised in the 
slogan 'careers open to talent' advised the creation of a world with equal opportunities 
(Beteille 1994: 1032). Yet, it is clearly naive to regard western European coUntries or the 
United States of America, where policies that attempt to ensure equality of opportunity 
abound, as egalitarian societies. Simply put, equality of opportunity has not given rise to 
equality of condition or to equality in the distribution of resources. For equality of opportunity 
goes hand in hand with competition: 'this means that there can be equality only before the 
competition~ and not after it' (Beteille 1994: 1032, emphasis in the original). Let it be 
.. 
emphasised also that there is a close link between equality of opportunity and individualism. 
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Crucially, although individualism advocates the autonomy and freedom of the individual and 
militates against ascribed inequalities on the one hand, on the other it emphasises competition 
and achievement and as such legitimates and triggers inequalities in other forms (Beteille 
1994: 1016). Similarly, Marx and Engels's.solution that advocated the abolition of private 
property and the creation of a society of equal rewards was proven to have' given rise to a 
utopian or, in the best case, to an imperfect state of equality. In fact, communist regimes 
eventually evolved into an intolerable combination of planned economy and dictatorship 
disguised as popular democracy (Godelier 1999: 4). In Beteille's words, 'the bourgeois state 
has collapsed many times over, but the end of the inequality of power is nowhere in sight' 
(1994: 1020). That is unless one is ready to pretend that communist Romania, for example, 
was an egalitarian society rather than the personal domain of one man,. the infamous 
Ceausescu and his party. And even if the example of Romania appears extreme to some, 
Beteille (1994: 1034) has made a similar comment about the Soviet Union before its collapse. 
The essential point is that although the ~oviet Union witnessed the introduction of state 
policies that aimed to produce equality of the socio-economic conditions of the population by 
reducing, for example, income differentials between 'manual' and 'intellectual' workers, the 
objective of regulating and reducing inequalities was not achieved. For, as Beteille observes, 
the very policies of direct intervention in. economic and social processes that aimed to 
suppress inequalities led to an immense concentration of power within the party and the state 
mechanism. It is therefore important to realise that there is no such thing as a neutral or 
uncommitted device for the reduction or elimination of inequalities. On the contrary, such 
instruments give rise to their own inequalities. In this light, we should concur with Beteille 
that 
One could then ask whether, in moving from the inequalities of estate prevalent until the eighteenth 
century to the inequalities of class about which Marx wrote, and from those again to the 
inequalities of power of the twentieth century, any real or demonstrable gain was made in the 
achievement of equality (1994: 1034). 
History therefore seems to confirm that the notion of perfect equality is the result of 
philosophical speculation and the strict imposition of a moral value, rather than it being a 
condition actually achieved at some point in human history. Indeed, a nominal equality can be 
used to disguise dangerous practices - to paraphrase George Orwell, 'all men are equal, but 
some men are more equal than others'. As Louis Dumont (1977, see also 1969) has famously 
put it, modem, Western man can be described as Homo aequalis in the realm of values, but 
not in the realm of facts. That is, modem Western societies are egalitarian only in the sense 
that they value equality, but not in the sense that they have achieved equality or may ever 
achieve it. Thus, the conclusion to be reached is that we should not be too quick to describe 
certain societies of the present or the past as egalitarian by looking merely at the ideals they 
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set or had set for themselves, while failing to recognise what they actually practise or 
practised (Beteille 1994: 1015; Dumont 1969, 1977; Flanagan 1989: 248). 
At this point, it will be enough to say that while there is no such thing as egalitarian 
society there are however egalitarian situations, principles, values, contexts or scenes in every 
society (Flanagan 1989: 261). All that we need to acknowledge is that equality and hierarchy 
co-exist, and that so called 'egalitarian' societies may carry 'insidious hierarchies', just as so 
called 'hierarchical' ones may accommodate egalitarian contexts and principles 13 (Flanagan 
1989: 262). In this light, speaking of whole societies as either egalitarian or hierarchical 
seems deceptive (Beteille 1986: 122, 1994: 1014; Flanagan 1989: 262). 
Up until this point, I have tried to show that there is now enough archaeological, historical 
and ethnographic grounding to demonstrate that the historical existence of a peryasive state of 
equality is highly dubious. Accordingly, we are encouraged to cast radical doubt on accounts 
that structure the study of inequality around determining its temporal origins. My own view is 
that structures of inequality are omnipres~nt in time and space operating and manifesting 
themselves in different societies and even in different sectors of the same society in various 
ways. But in case my account has not been entirely convincing, let me tum finally to a mode 
of thought developed by scholars like Berreman (1981), Dahrendorf (I 969b), Fallers (1973) 
and most notably Beteille (1981, 1994). Beteille's contributions in particular represent one of 
the most systematic and devoted bodies of work on the sociology of equality and inequality. 
All of these authors have variously suggested that social inequalities are closely related to the 
existence of a truly universal feature of human society. This is plainly the tendency of human 
beings to classify, order and evaluate things, situations, ideas, performances and each other as 
better or worse, as superior or inferior along culturally prescribed criteria and standards of 
value. Drawing upon the germinal work of Durkheim and Mauss on systems of classification, 
Beteille directs our attention to the fact that such systems, which reflect preferences in various 
culturally recognised items, exist in every society (1994: 1018; see also Levi-Strauss 1996 
[1962]: 40-42). Consequently, one might agree that 
. .. it would be strange in a culture to have standards of evaluation that apply to food, dress, 
adornment, plants and animals, but none that applies to human beings and their activities. In other 
words, where people are able to discriminate between good and bad food, they will also 
discriminate between good and bad cooks~ where they judge some gardens to be superior to others, 
they will also judge some gardeners to be superior to others; where there are ·preferences as 
between artefacts, there are likely to be preferences also as between artisans. I am of course talking 
now of culturally prescribed, or at least culturally recognised, preferences, and not the personal 
preferences of particular individuals. Every culture, no matter how rudimentary, has its own bias, 
not only for certain types of human performance but also for certain types of human quality 
(Beteille 1994: 1018, emphasis added). 
13 One might note h~re the principle of equality before the law (Beteille 1994: 1028). 
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Such a view poses a serious challenge to the idea of a perfect egalitarian society and therefore 
to the origin myth of inequality. The approach put forward here is that a world of equals is 
impossible. For inequalities stem above all, not so much from the emergence of private 
property but 'from the very concept of societies as moral communities' (Dahrendorf 1969b: 
40). The reader should bear in mind that the idea of the truly universal nature of inequality 
argued here is different from that advanced by Davis and Moore (1945) in that it does not aim 
to reify inequality as something natural or necessary14. Unlike Davis and Moore's functional 
explanation of inequality, it is not an argument that justifies inequalities or serves to 
legitimise existing structures of power as a functional necessity in society. Neither does it rule 
out the possibility that inequalities can be abolished. According to Beteille (1981, 1994), the 
idea of natural inequality is a contradiction in terms. Nature presents us only with differences 
and the inclination to order some of these differences and put them into scales of value. Yet it 
is important to keep in mind that not all the differences count as inequalities. The very process 
of isolating qualities or performances to mark for favoured attention, as opposed to those we 
ignore, is not dictated by natural laws. It is rather a social artefact, something that particular 
people make and remake differently in certain historical contexts. That is, nature does not 
decide about our evaluations. As Beteille has cogently and perceptively put it, 
With human beings differences do not become inequalities unless and until they are selected, 
marked out, and evaluated by processes that are cultural and not natural .... differences become 
inequalities only with the application of scales; and the scales with which we are concerned in 
talking about inequalities in a social context are not given to us by nature but are culturally 
constructed by particular human beings under particular historical conditions (1981: 60). 
In other words, to claim that inequality is indispensable is not to suggest that particular forms 
of inequality are natural and consequently fundamental. An archaeology that recogni"ses the 
universality of inequality is neither adverse nor incompatible with the performance of what 
Shanks and Tilley call a critical archaeology, namely 'an invitation to engage in a 
transformative practice' (l987a: 198). In their words, 'a critical archaeology involves us in a 
reading of the past which at the same time invites us to shape a different future. The study of 
the past ... becomes an operation to change the world as we know and experience it' (Shanks 
and Tilley 1987a: 196). 
14 Davis and Moore (1945) similarly suggested that no human society is conceivable without the 
existence of social inequality or social stratification. However, for them, social inequality or social 
stratification are indispensable because they serve the smooth functioning of societies in the sense that 
they fill the different occupational positions of every society. In their view, not all occupations are 
equally important or demanding and therefore the rewards associated with them should be analogous to 
their importance and difficulty in order to ensure the smooth allocation of all occupational positions. 
For critical reviews of Davis and Moore's functional explanation of inequality see Beteille (1981: 71) 
and (Dahrendorf 1969b: 29). 
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I would remind the reader that the researcher who suggests that inequalities are absent in 
'primitive' societies appears to offer an alternative type of social organisation (one that is 
more moral and just) to the reformer or the political activist who sees class in contemporary 
society and wishes to alter it. Conversely, the researcher that sees the universality of social 
inequality seems to rule out this comforting alternative (Cancian 1976: 235). Needless to say 
that in an age that - in word, at least - appears to value the ideal of equality so highly, those 
who offer the comforting alternative of equality are considered to be the 'politically correct'. 
On the other hand, those who adhere to the truly universal nature of inequality and maintain 
that inequality is indispensable, appear to run the risk of being accused as conservative and 
'politically incorrect'. Simply put, for some contributors to the debate, claiming that the 
restoration of a world of equality is unrealistic, because such a world never exis,ted in the first 
place, is not only unfashionable but also an unethical or immoral choice inconsistent with 
their ideological conditioning valUing equality. 
We are once more drawn back to the theme of the universal characteristic of human 
beings to evaluate and act on their evaluations. Social scientists, no less than other human 
beings, construct their own scales of evaluation. Not only do they order and evaluate societies 
and their structures as simple or complex, but they also classify and evaluate their own 
arguments and ideological standpoints based on what is currently understood as being socially 
and politically acceptable. As Flanagan (1989: 260) notes, social scientists still face 
remarkable challenges in studying value systems without becoming inextricably bound up in 
and tied to their own values which ultimately influence the way they construct interpretations. 
It seems to me that accepting the truly universal nature of inequality, in the way Beteille 
explains it, need not be perceived or understood as injuring the culturally prescribed value of 
'politically correct' academic practice. For particular scales of value, upon which social 
inequalities are fabricated, are not given by nature but constitute social artefacts' specific to 
the communal representations of certain times and places, and therefore, they can be 
eliminated or abolished together with their attendant cultures of inequality. However, the 
central 'role of evaluation in the production of inequality should alert us to the fact that while 
particular scales of inequalities can be abolished, every abolition of this type is always at the 
same time followed by the emergence of different scales of value and therefore differently 
manifested inequalities. In my view, inequality is an indispensable and inevitable 'fact'. Yet it 
does not constitute a functional necessity, nor do its particular manifestations follow any 
natural law or evolutionary trajectory. Different forms of inequality cannot be predicted a 
priori, for the scales of value that produce them are themselves the products of historical 
contingencies written in various ways by social actors in different societies. In Shanks and 
Tilley's words, 
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The future is always open to construction and reconstruction ... there is no iron cage of historical 
inevitability ... [because] humanity creates its own history and so can change, or alter the 
consequences of [the] historical development through specific forms of social action and 
intervention (1987a: 196). 
I have spent considerable effort outlining the vanous assumptions that underpin the 
practice of dealing with the concepts of equality and inequality in academic discourse. What 
has been presented here is the barest sample of arguments and counter-arguments regarding 
the origin myth of inequality. I hope I have convinced the more sceptical readers that the 
tendency of people to evaluate and then act on their evaluations in the context of interpersonal 
relations (Berreman 1981) constitutes a powerful argument for the truly universal nature of 
inequality, an argument that is not easily dismissed. More follows if we are willing to engage 
with the research implications of the above argument and go beyond the simple recognition of 
the universality of inequality. It is my contention that to explain inequality adequately, we 
have to consider the construction, reconstruction and deconstruction of culturally prescribed 
criteria and standards of value in any society in question. Equally, we must recognize the 
possibility that there may be co-existing, competing or alternative scales of value that may 
conflict or subvert so called 'dominant' value-systems. 
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Chapter 6 
The language of inequality 
Introduction 
Social ranking, stratification, prestige, status, ascribed and achieved inequalities: these are 
some of the popular terms which current archaeological accounts of inequality use. Arguably, 
however, though the language of inequality has a remarkable pedigree in the social sciences, 
the exact meaning of these terms is rarely made explicit (cf. Renfrew 1982b: 2). Hence we 
frequently find accounts that propose to explain the emergence of hierarchical societies, or 
aim to fmd evidence of social ranking or stratification without spending any effort to clarify 
what exactly they mean by these terms (see Gamble 1981; Gilman 1981; Soles 1988). If one 
takes account of the huge amount of literature that has been written on the subject, what 
stands out is a terminological fetishism that has somehow consumed the debate. The cavalier 
usage of these terms obscures, rather than reveals, anything useful about the nature of social 
inequalities. At the same time, a casual glimpse into those rare accounts that take time to 
defme the language of inequality suffices to demonstrate the absence of a common ground. 
The end result of all of this has been the conflation of terms, making comparative research 
confusing at best and at worse impossible. 
To be sure, this is not the whole story. As I will try to show below, the current language 
of inequality is loaded with several unwarranted assumptions that direct the study of social 
inequalities towards questions which are red herrings, while ignoring the most essential ones. 
In particular, it entails an emphasis on static description of structures and relations of power 
that cuts us off from considering their production in action. Perhaps more importantly, it is 
loaded . with neo-evolutionist misconceptions that perpetuate the fiction of the historical 
emergence of inequalities and its attendant distinctions between simple and complex 
societies. For example, ranking and achieved inequalities are commonly used to describe 
societies with less rigid power structures compared to those·' for which current scholarship 
reserves the terms stratification and ascribed inequalities. My readings of Beteille's (l969a, 
1969b, 1981, 1986, 1994) exemplary essays on various aspects of the phenomenon of 
inequality have inspired me to see in a new light the archaeological narratives on ascribed and 
achieved inequalities, as well as their tendency to assign greater significance to the former. 
Again the. framing of current archaeological accounts has been conditioned by the 
assumptions of the modernist discourse on equality and inequality. However, as I hope to 
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show in this chapter, once one removes these assumptions, our view of societies with ascribed 
inequalities as the more real arenas of power relations is revealed as a distortion. 
Status and Prestige 
The word status is of Indo-European origin. Its stem can be found in Sanskrit sistami, Greek 
histemi, Latin stare, English stand and German stehen. Nouns derived from these verbs 
revolve around the notion of verticality (Wiessner 1996: 2). The first anthropological 
definition of status goes back to Ralph Linton. For Linton (1936: 113-114), status is thought 
to refer to a socially recognised position that an individual occupies (see also Hoebel 1958: 
384-5). According to this defmition, every person may have many different types of status, 
which exist in relation to others. For example, a young boy may be a son to his parents, a 
brother to his siblings and a friend to his playmates. This definition of status overlaps 
significantly with the notion of social identity (Goodenough 1965: 2; Jenkins 1996: 134-6). 
Subsequently, Ward Goodenough (1965) suggested a different definition of status, one 
that brings into play its political dimension. In his view, status can be seen as a series of rights 
and duties vis-a-vis others and in this sense, it is closely associated with vertical distinctions 
or relational inequalities produced between p~ople in certain contexts. This approach is close 
to Weber's notion of status as an aspect of social stratification that is synonymous with 
ranked social standing or honour (Wiessner 1996: 4). In this respect, status is no longer a 
neutral concept referring to the position or identity of an individual. Rather, it refers to what 
Hoebel (1958: 385) calls rank, namely the hierarchical position of an individual, higher or 
lower with reference to the social position of others. We may note at once that this approach 
to status is more similar to a great deal of archaeological research than that proposed by 
Lintonl. Arguably, when archaeologists talk about status inequalities they mean inequalities 
in social standing between different human actors. Following ethological studies of the 
concept, we may remark that status points not only to 'a notion of verticality, the physical act 
of being in a certain place' but also to 'the impact or the impression that one makes on others. 
from that position' (Wiessner 1996: 2, emphasis added). Accordingly, one may argue that 
status gradation refers to the gradation of impact or the ability to attract attention or exert 
influence upon others. 
More than this, high status operates as a resource of influence that may command forms 
of subordination and submission among those with lower status. Furthermore, high status can 
also carry prestige, the latter being associated with esteem, admiration, respect, reverence and 
deference (Fried 1967: 32; Silverman 1966: 899). There is a clear gradation between high 
1 A number of archaeologists (see for example, Pader 1982 and O'Shea 1984) however, has directed its 
attention towards understanding the archaeology of horizontal distinctions. 
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status and high prestige: one evokes notions of influence and potential domination, while the 
other has associations of esteem. Notwithstanding, prestige as esteem may win high status, 
and bearers of high status may also attain high prestige; and both may be wells of power to be 
drawn upon so as to sway outcomes. 
Thus, when I occasionally use the term status in this study, it is not necessarily one's 
occupation or role I am interested in but specific contexts where individuals can exert 
influence upon others and have the potential to manipulate a favourable outcome. However, I 
would like to point out that in my case study in chapter ten, I will try as much as possible to 
avoid using the terms 'high status' and 'prestige' and try instead to use the term 'symbolic 
capital' (Bourdieu 1977a, 1977b, 1986, 1991). This is mainly for two reasons. 
1. Symbolic capital can be used to refer to either prestige or high status or both. It seems 
to me, that we cannot easily distinguish prestige in archaeology as I have defined it above. 
Making or achieving high status does not necessarily result in others' positive approbation. 
Furthermore, in revealing contexts where .material evidence suggests forms of influence, it 
cannot be logically inferred that they have been constructed on the basis of esteem or respect. 
Likewise, practices of influence mayor may not have engendered a sense of esteem or respect 
in retum2• The place which individuals hold in the esteem of their fellow human beings is 
difficult to identify (Aron 1969: 71). For esteem and respect are based more or less on 
subjective moral criteria and may vary according to the social milieu. Although the researcher 
can make judgements about the moral efficacy of particular features or artefacts, it is not 
certain that the past society studied employed the same system of valuation in the same 
uniform manner. 
2. Although one can justifiably use the term 'high status' as an abbreviation for the 
distinctive social standing of an individual or group of individuals, I would like to point out 
that we do not usually excavate individual persons who can be ordered in a hierarchy (except 
in certain cases of burial archaeology). Rather, we excavate practices (c£ Shennan 1993). For 
example, the building of a spectacular monument in one context of practice, the provision of a 
generous feast in another, or the keeping and regulation of socially valued knowledge or 
objects in still another - all point to practices that aim to make an impact and to exert 
influence. Now, if these different contexts happen to occur in the same community, how can 
we say with c~rtainty that the keepers of socially valued goods were ranked higher, lower, or 
equally with the providers of feasts or the inhabitants of a spectacular monument? What we 
can more safely suggest is that the provision of feasting, for example, was a practice aimed to 
elevate the social standing of the providers with reference to the receivers. In this sense, one 
2 Similarly, although a given society may bestow significant power on certain prestigious statuses, 
there is no necessary association between power and prestige (Fried 1967: 33). 
145 
The language of inequality 
may indeed have a valid point in saying that the providers attain a higher standing compared 
with the receivers, but no more. 
That is, quite often there is no way to know for certain whether the strategies of influence 
described above were associated with the same social actors in all contexts. Without other 
forms of evidence, such as texts, it is nearly impossible to suggest whether we have a single 
group of persons of high social standing or many. It is therefore all the more difficult to find 
evidence for theories of multiple hierarchies. This is the problem with archaeological 
accounts that try to trace factions or 'heterarchies' (see Hamilakis 1999; Keswani 1996; 
Schoep 2002), as I will argue in detail later on. They try to demonstrate the existence of 
groups, whereas what we can only uncover, compare and evaluate is practices. Rather than 
attempting to find individuals or groups in a hierarchy of social standing and power, a more 
rewarding way to study inequality is to try to uncover people performing social standing and 
power (cf. Strum and Latour 1987). We may not be able to people the ranks of status or 
power in prehistory, but we can certainly people the practices of influence and power that we 
excavate. 
Ascribed and Achieved Status 
Social theorists usually classify status according to the means through which people obtain it. 
Ascribed status is that obtained involuntarily through the right of birth and is a matter about 
which people have little or no choice. It is assigned upon the individual by virtue of his or her 
pre-existing social affinities such as the status of parents (Fried 1967: 30; Hoebel 1958: 386; 
Linton 1936). For example, the aristocracy of Europe has acquired its status for hundreds of 
years through its genealogical links with past generations. On the other hand, achieved status 
is one that is acquired through personal skill or knowledge. This is a social position of 
influence that is vol~ntary, in that it comes about through schooling, practice and effort. 
Traditionally, anthropologists and archaeologists have assigned greater significance to the 
former (see Bintliff 1982; Brown 1981; Clark and Neeley 1987; Gilman 1981; Halstead 1995;-· 
Sahlins 1963). More particularly, archaeologists have tended to see achieved· status 
temporally preceding ascribed status. Societies in which status, power and wealth inequalities 
hinge on personal capabilities and achievements are commonly perceived to precede 
chronologically those societies where inequalities hinge on ascription by birth (see Bintliff 
1982; Constandse-Westermann and Newell 1989; Gilman ·1981). Moreover, there is a 
commonplace tendency to perceive anything that we consider to come first as inevitably 
uncomplicated and indeed more primitive (Perles 200 I: 3). Accordingly, societies with power 
and status -inequalities based on achievement are thought to be less complex or stable arenas 
,., 
of power relations. Conversely, societies which appear to display hereditary inequalities are 
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thought to reveal a more elaborate form of social ranking (see Bintliff 1982; Brown 1981; 
Gilman 1981) and they are subsequently seen to fall on the upper steps of an assumed social 
evolutionary ladder. A comparative example can be found in Sahlins's (1963) anthropological 
study of Melanesian and Polynesian political systems. What we gather from this account is 
the impression that the Polynesian leader whose authority was hereditary was 'every inch a 
chief compared to his Melanesian counterpart whose authority was based on personal 
accomplishments (Sahlins 1963: 289). Some push the distinction between achieved and 
ascribed inequalities even farther and maintain that the former correspond to egalitarian 
societies while the latter correspond to rank societies, the latter term to which I will come to 
shortly. On this basis, hereditary inequalities are taken to 'provide the basis for all subsequent 
social differentiation' and arguments have been made for the paramount significance of their 
archaeological study (see Clark and Neeley 1987: 121). 
On closer examination however, the validity of the above assumptions comes into 
question. The first point to emphasise is that the big-men societies of Melanesia - which are 
commonly associated with achieved social standing and power and are taken in neo-
evolutionist accounts to represent a stage- before the 'more complex' Polynesian chief 
societies - are in fact the creation of colonialism. As Golson (1982) and Feil (1987: 259) have 
independently demonstrated, in Melanesian societies, status and power were ascribed at birth 
before being based on personal accomplishments. One may note a line of reasoning that has 
carried neo-evolutionist archaeological and anthropological research through the twentieth 
century and into the present. This is the tendency to see state societies as forms of social 
organisation that have reached the endpoint of the growth of social inequalities, power and 
complexity. Paradoxically, in modern so called highly stratified capitalist societies, 
achievement constitutes a more common means to attain a high social standing or access to 
power. In other words, there is a logical problem faced by neo-evolutionist typologies that 
maintain that achieved status precedes ascribed and that the former characterises simpler 
societies. Y offee has argued that 
In the neo-evolutionist movement from big-man societies to chiefdoms and then to states, there is 
something illogical: big-man societies are classically those in which rank, wealth, and status hinge 
on achievement, but in which such rank cannot be inherited; in chiefdoms, classically, rank and 
status are ascribed (through the kinship system) and passed along intergenerationally'; in states, it is 
achievement - through control of resources, for example - that is again the hallmark of social 
organisation, while kin groups and ascription play less important roles in social life. It would make 
much more sense, perhaps, to derive states from achievement-oriented big-man societies than it 
. would from ascriptively-determined chiefdoms (1993: 65). 
The point here concerns the inconsistency between neo-evolutionist accounts' notion of states 
- as the containers par excellence of power and profound inequalities - and their deeply 
entrenched· yet unjustified belief that ascribed inequalities constitute a more elaborate 
147 
The language of inequality 
evolution of social inequalities, one which is closely associated with more rigid structures of 
power. 
It should suffice to say that this belief about the relation of ascribed status with more 
profound inequalities is an intellectual construct of modernity. As I already wrote, modernity 
preached a world of equality and social justice. However, it did not take long for the modern 
world to realise that a society of absolute equals constitutes a social impossibility, or in 
Dahrendorf's words, an idea that 'has a place only in the sphere of poetic imagination' 
(l969b: 40). It is my contention that it might be our way to deal with this unpleasant and 
uncomfortable conclusion that bears significantly on the dichotomy between ascribed and 
achieved inequalities, and our inclination to see the former as more power-laden. What 
several modernist thinkers and contemporary reformers appear to advocate (once they realise 
that a perfect state of equality is impossible) is that as long as social inequalities correspond to 
natural or physical inequalities among individuals, they are more palatable (Beteille 1981, 
1994). 
Natural or physical inequalities are seen to refer to unequal abilities, talents or 
endowments among the members of a given society. The assumption is that these inequalities 
are given by nature or God and can be cultivated during individual's lifetime through training 
and effort so there is little to be explained or to be done about their existence. Some actors are 
braver and stronger warriors; others are more skilful hunters or more intelligent actors. When 
these so called natural gifts allow them in a context of fair competition to attain a higher 
social standing or access to power there is nothing perceived as being unnatural . or 
problematic. People freely compete and those best endowed by nature are better rewarded. On 
this score we assume, as Beteille remarks, that 'the orders of rank ... revealed by fair and free 
competition must correspond to the natural scheme of things' (1981: 60). Conversely, social 
inequality, according to current consensus, becomes problematic when it does not hinge on 
natural gifts. Orders of rank based on ascription by birth for example are thought to be 
cultural or human-made artefacts and thus artificial and arbitrary. They block fair competition 
and mobility of rank and subsequently militate against the fair correspondence between social, 
inequalities and what we take to be physical or natural inequalities. In other words, it is the 
naturalisation of inequalities based on achievement that prompts us to believe that inequalities 
that are thoug~t to hinge on extra-natural foundations are the only ones that merit explanation. 
However, there are two snags about this assumption. Firstly, to recall a point made by 
Beteille (1981, 1994), there are no such things as natural inequalities. People may differ in 
various ways from each other, but the selection of the differences that become inequalities is a 
culturally specific social process. Not all societies mark out and select the· same differences in 
individual talents, achievements or endowments for favoured attention. For example, in one 
context, people may rate highly brave performance in war or bodily strength, while in 
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another, they may value entrepreneurial skills or the mastery of words. Crucially, we should 
not fail to recognise that both the evaluation of differences and their very recognition 
constitute social processes in that they are decided by particular human groups under 
particular historical conditions (Beteille .199.4: 1022). In this respect, inequalities based on 
personal skills and accomplishments are no less problematic or human-made than ascribed 
inequalities. They equally merit explanation and prompt us to seek why a given society 
selects, encourages and assigns a distinctive significance to particular individual skills or 
endowments while ignoring others. Secondly, we need to bear in mind, that the process of 
naturalisation of inequalities has found different expressions throughout human history. 
Interestingly, while today we find social inequalities based on capabilities and achievements 
as natural and fair, in the past it was hereditary inequalities that were though~ to be natural 
and legitimated. More specifically, for several centuries, the hereditary ruling families of 
Europe presented their rule as a divine right offered to them in birth. The theoretical 
justification and naturalisation of their po~er was anchored in the idea that the rule they had 
inherited was the gift of God, a matter beyond human choice, and therefore inevitable and 
sanctified. On the other hand, inequalities based on achievement were presented as a human-
made artefact that could be unmade and challenged. 
In a nutshell, there is a tendency throughout human history to believe that some forms of 
social inequality are natural, in the sense that they are dictated by divine will or nature and 
biology, whereas some others constitute human-made artificial impositions into society that 
can be unmade and opposed (Berreman 1981: 14). Be this as it may, what sort of inequalities 
we decide to see as the gifts of God or nature and what as of human-made design are the 
product of historical contingencies. The view taken here is that both ascribed and achieved 
inequalities have been seen in both ways. 
There is nothing wrong in tracing and distinguishing between the different ways by which 
people in different societies obtain social standing and power. However, problems arise if it is 
assumed or openly suggested that what we find is an evolutionary pattern of social 
inequalities, and then chart societies accordingly as more or less power-laden. The prevailing 
assumption which runs through much of the literature on ascribed and achieved inequalities is 
that the former reflect more rigid or closed systems of social inequalities because (unlike the 
latter) they restrict mobility of rank and prevent people from escaping hereditary inferiority. 
Yet, without going into detail, it is not out of place to remark that achievement-oriented 
systems do not necessarily imply high rates of social mobility and therefore a more open or 
reflexive system of inequalities. We may pomt out that, as contemporary comparative 
sociological research has shown, modem achievement-oriented societies appear to reveal 
lower rates of mobility than traditional ascription-oriented ones (Cancian 1976: 237; Fallers 
·1973; Plotnicov and Tuden 1970: 22). At this juncture, we should take into account an 
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important consideration noted by Fallers (1973: 252-3) that illuminates why - however 
achievement -oriented a system of recruitment to high social standing and power positions 
appears to be and however much it values highly personal talents and accomplishments -
social mobility can be seriously undermined: It is plainly the fact that even when access to 
high positions is open to personal ability and achievement, in real life situations, those people 
of power, high social standing, or wealth are usually able to bestow competitive advantages 
upon their children in the race to the top. To give a concrete example from contemporary 
political experience, the current president of the USA, as well as the prime minister and leader 
of the opposition in Greece, all come from families that have produced previous prime 
ministers or presidents. Now, in both countries, the particular positions are open to those with 
the skills, and election is considered to be a matter of achievement. It seems v~ry likely that 
the individuals in question were better endowed to succeed in an otherwise free competition 
due to the competitive advantages bestowed by their families compared to other individuals 
who lacked such advantages. The conclus~on to be reached, therefore, is that achievement-
oriented systems of inequality do not present more flexible and open structures of power. 
It needs also to be stressed' that classifying societies as either ascription-oriented or 
achievement-oriented may be an oversimplification that obscures the fact that in most 
societies, recruitment to high social standing. or power hinges on elements of both ascription 
and achievement. In short, I am arguing that the distinction should not be overdrawn (cf. 
Beteille 1981: 62 n. 2) for it is of considerable importance to acknowledge that people may be 
in fact 'more flexible in compartmentalising their lives and adjusting to complex conditions 
than we would believe' (Plotnicov and Tuden 1970: 23). For example, one may fmd that even 
in a single society, recruitment to one highly valued position is based on ascription while to 
another one on achievement. For example, on closer examination, in both Melanesia and 
Polynesia, achieved and ascribed statuses are never alternatives (Earle 1987b: 282). Notably, 
rules of succession are not unknown in the so called big-man Melanesian societies, and 
equally, in Polynesia, competition and achievement have been shown to characterise many 
cases of ascension to power and high status. Perhaps more remarkably, so called hereditary~ 
positions leave space for achievement, just as non-hereditary positions may not be entirely 
open to personal skills. As Fallers tells us of the nineteenth-century kingdom of the Baganda 
in Mrica: 
[by] the idiom of 'inheritance' [Baganda people] mean something broader than English-speaking 
. people do. For Baganda, nsikirano applies simply to any position which is filled from among, and 
on behalf of, the members of a descent-group - a kind of 'inheritance' in which there is clearly 
room for a good deal of achievement. But if traditional ascribed positions were not hereditary in 
any strict sense, neither, of course, were those positions described by Baganda as 'not hereditary' 
completely open to talent (1973: 260). 
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Finally, it may not be easy to sort out confidently the actual existence of inequalities of 
power or social standing based on ascription by birth in prehistory (cf. Pader 1982). 
Traditionally, archaeologists have indulged in tracing hereditary inequalities through the 
study of mortuary remains. More specifically, they are prone to believe that the presence of 
child burials that display great energy expenditure or were accompanied by lavish depositions 
of precious tomb gifts that the children could not have obtained themselves, constitutes a firm 
indication of hereditary high status or power (see Binford 1971; Clark and Neeley 1987: 125; 
Gilman 1981; Soles 1988: 61 n. 4). Notwithstanding, as we are now beginning to realise, this 
might not be a sound conclusion. According to Pader (1982) and Shennan (1982: 30), rich 
child burials may in fact reflect the achieved status of the parents rather than that inherited by 
the children3• A further complicating factor regarding the direct correlation of rich sub-adult 
burials with high status is that extravagant displays of bereavement and parental affection 
may sometimes result in biases in artefact distributions in burials (McKay 1988: 9, 59). 
In addition, to repeat an essential point. of this study, wealth does not necessarily indicate 
social standing or power. Bearing this in mind, although rich burials of children or infants 
may suggest that parental wealth was transmitted to the offspring, it does not follow that high 
social standing or authority were also passed through hereditary lines. That is, 'the questions 
of how wealth is inherited and of how prestige or leadership is obtained do not always have 
the same answer' (Wason 1994: 98). Eventually, moreover, while rich sub-adult burials might 
indicate hereditary inequalities in wealth, they do not constitute a safe index of hereditary or 
even achieved inequalities of status or power, for the parents themselves may have been 
simply affluent rather than leaders or individuals of high social standing. According to some 
(see Brown 1981; Peebles and Kus 1977), the presence in sub-adult burials of insignia of 
authority or high status may be a good indication of hereditary inequalities of power, prestige 
and status. However, there are problems with this assumption as well. 
First, keeping in mind Brown's (1981) point that both status (or prestige) and authority 
may be symbolised by the same means, namely wealthy burials, it is not always easy to 
distinguish whether the furnishings of rich sub-adult burials point to hereditary high status or·, 
authority. Hence a further problem concerns the distinction between symbols or artefacts of 
authority and symbols or artefacts of high status. For Brown, rich child burials that lack 
insignia of authority, such as crowns or head-dress ornaments' may point simply to inherited 
prestige or status. I take it to be clear from the discussion above that wealth does not 
inevitably correspond to esteem or high social standing. Yet Brown is correct only regarding 
the point that wealth does not necessarily equal authority. It is furthennore vital to recognise 
3 The point"has been. also made by Renfrew (l986a: 146) who nonetheless chooses to interpret the rich 
child and infant burials of the prehistoric cemetery of Varna in Bulgaria as evidence of inherited status. 
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that wealth may not equal social standing or that social standing may not equal authority. 
Thus, any analyses of hereditary or achieved inequalities of status or power should try also to 
distinguish between types of artefacts that indicate status or authority respectively in the 
context of specific practices. We need to approach objects not merely as 'parts of symbolic 
systems, interrelated by metaphorical association and metonymical connotations' (Thomas 
1996: 71). Our task is not simply to identify and describe conspicuous symbols of status or 
authority in the material assemblage of a given community. We should further disclose the 
ways in which different artefacts might have actively operated as instruments of influence or 
created relations of debt and therefore of power. 
Second, even if we manage to distinguish between symbols or artefacts of authority and 
status in sub-adult burials, there is no reason why these objects would not again point to the 
achieved authority or high status of the parents rather than the hereditary position of the 
children. What is more, even when skeletal remains allow us to make the point that some 
prominent adult individuals in a given society were related by blood, again the inference of 
ascribed inequality may be tentative. For even if we are able to discover that the dead 
individual found in a so called royal or high' status tomb was genetically related with another 
dead individual buried in another prominent tomb, the possibility that the system of 
succession hinged on achievement rather on .ascription cannot be eliminated. As I've already 
remarked, individuals coming from prominent families are offered competitive advantages 
and therefore may compete more successfully in the race to the top m a seemingly 
achievement -oriented society. 
To summarise, despite received wisdom, the distinction between ascribed and achieved 
inequalities should not be thought of as a distinction between more and less rigid inequalities 
or structures of power. Notably, the dichotomy should not be overdrawn even in a single 
society whether it appears to value higher achievement-oriented or ascription-oriented 
systems of recruitment to positions of influence and power. The vital point to recognise is that 
the choice of some societies to rate highly in their value system achievement and others 
ascription tells us about two sides of the same coin. This is the fact that 'to some extent, every 
system of social inequalities must be sold and accepted ideologically' (Plotnikov and Tuden 
1970: 23). Both ascription and achievement have been currencies upon which people have 
variously dra'Yll upon in different times and places to naturalis'e, justify, sell or legitimise how 
particular individuals are placed where they are in society and not elsewhere. 
Ranking and Stratification I 
Ranking and stratification seem to constitute the most popular yet largely taken for granted 
" terms of the language of inequality. Renfrew has commented upon the ambiguity that 
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accompanies the use of the term 'ranking', despite its continuous scholarly currency, as well 
as upon the lack of attempts towards its precise definition in his opening chapter to an edited 
volume entitled Ranking, resources and exchange (l982b: 2). It is a remarkable fact, though, 
that none of the contributors to this volume returns explicitly to the issue of the definition of 
'ranking'. 
Broadly speaking, 'ranking' can be defined as 'a class in a scale of comparison; hence 
relative position' (Renfrew 1982b: 3). In this sense, it stands generally for the existence of 
scales of vertical differentiation among human actors or groups in a given society according 
to specific criteria or variables. But here I must add a further point in order to be clear. This 
concerns the distinction between hierarchy (or 'social ranking' in common archaeological 
parlance) and social stratification. The former refers to ranked inequalities between 
individuals and belongs in the domain of social organisation and interpersonal relations, while 
the latter implies ranking between categories of individuals such as classes, groups or castes 
and belongs in the domain of social structure (Flanagan 1989: 248). Stratification is also taken 
to imply something more, to which I will return shortly. Crucially, as Renfrew points out 
(1982b), the researcher needs to make clear the nature of the variable according to which 
social actors are being ranked. One may note here that from an external observer's point of 
view, individuals or groups may be ranked in terms of variables as different as wealth, power, 
social standing or education just to mention a few. In archaeology, the task of revealing 
patterns of vertical differentiation concerns specifically the variables of social standing, 
prestige and power. Simply put, when archaeologists talk about the social rank of. an 
individual or a group of individuals, they refer to their relative position in a scale of status, 
prestige or power. Randall McGuire sums up the situation well when he remarks that 
In the classic archaeological model of social structure, societies consist of discrete, hierarchically 
ordered layers arranged like those of a wedding cake, with a king or chief in place of the bride and 
groom and successively broader layers of courtiers, priests, scribes, craftsmen, and finally, 
peasants on the bottom (1983: 99). 
In this respect, social relations are conceived as a kind of layer-cake which is held to represent 
the visual structure of social standing or power or both in society. Each layer is piled on top of 
the next, being organised 'in a single hierarchy in which each group [or individual] is defined 
as being above, below or in between. Or alternatively, as a jam sandwich, with most of the 
jam at the top' (Goody 1976: 100). Needless to say, what is signified by the particular 
culinary metaphor of jam is the notion of power or status as properties unevenly distributed. 
In addition, current archaeological approaches to ranking, as we saw, begin with the 
simplistic assumption that material wealth faithfully reflects power, prestige and status. 
Conseque~tly, they imply unequal distribution of status, prestige or power directly from the 
presence of unequal wealth distribution. Yet the point here is that the variable material wealth 
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- according to which we tend to rank social actors as being of higher or lower status or less or 
more powerful and prestigious - is rarely made explicit. In particular, there is a tendency to 
impose a homogenous method to all types of material resources (cf. Hamilakis 1995: 29). 
Moreover, although the jam sandwich image is assumed to lay bare unequal distributions of 
power and status or prestige between individuals or groups (Le. distributional· inequalities), it 
does nothing to encourage serious inquiry into the relational aspect of these inequalities. 
Be that as it may, there is a further question in my mind. This revolves around the utility 
of archaeological approaches that attempt to disclose the social structure of a given society as 
an overarching layer cake in the terms described by both McGuire and Goody, as well as the 
validity of their results. According to Fallers (1974), for example, to impose a reified layer-
cake model on society is perforce reductionistic or oversimplifying, in the sense. that it ignores 
the very complex interactions that play out in normal societies. Dennis Wrong has made a 
similar point arguing that 
if we treat power relations as exclusively hierarchical and unilateral, we overlook an entire class of 
relations between persons or groups in which the control of one person or group over the other 
with reference to a particular scope is balanced by the control of the other in a different scope 
(1979: 11). 
This view, which bears out the point that power and social standing can be counterbalanced 
rather than ranked, occurs again in several archaeological accounts that criticise the 
hierarchical or stratified model of society in favour of a 'heterarchical' (see Crumley 1987, 
1995; Keswani 1996; Levy 1999; Potter and King 1995; Rogers 1995; Schoep 2002)4. 
The concept of heterarchy is borrowed from McCulloch's work on the neural organisation 
of the human brain, and it has been introduced into archaeology by Carol Crumley. (1987, 
1995). As defined by Crumley, a heterarchical relation or structure is one in which 'each 
element is either unranked relative to other elements, or possesses the potential for being 
ranked in a number of different ways' (1987: 158, see also 1995: 3). It is worth pointing out, 
that some self-styled exponents of a heterarchical approach use the term synonymously with 
'egalitarianism' (see Rogers 1995). However, the notion of heterarchy, as introduced by 
Crumley, does not seem to support this interpretation. That is, it does not negate categorically 
the co-existence ofheterarchical and hierarchical orders in a given society5. Rather, it alerts us 
4 The references cited are but a small fraction of a now voluminous literature on heterarchy. For further 
examples, see the various contributions in Ehrenreich, Crumley and Levy (eds.) Heterarchy and the 
Analysis o/Complex Societies (1995). 
5 I cannot refrain from noting here that Crumley herself appears somehow ambivalent on the matter. 
Nevertheless, I believe that it does not clash with Crumley's perception ofheterarchy, that in terms of 
power or status, we cannot deny a hierarchical element. More specifically, it is one thing to say 
following p~oponents of the heterarchical approach that in a certain community, one may find a 
spiritual leader and. a war leader who do not outrank each other in social standing or power 
(heterarchical relation). However it is quite another thing to say that the whole community is 
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to the fact that describing social landscapes and relations exclusively as hierarchical cuts us 
off from recognising also the existence of horizontal dimensions of differentiation. According 
to Potter and King (1995: 17) horizontal differentiation implies distinct societal elements 
which may be either unranked or of equivalent rank within a hierarchical structure. To phrase 
it in a different way, in their view, heterarchy does not rule out hierarchical or stratificatory 
orders, it subsumes them (Potter and King 1995: 29; see also Brumfiel 1995; Keswani 1996; 
Schoep 2002). 
With respect to the study of power and status inequalities within hierarchical models of 
society, heterarchical approaches present a way forward. For they encourage us to recognise 
three significant ideas. Firstly, there may be different sources of power and status in a given 
society (Crumley 1995; Levy 1999). Secondly, status and power can be count~rpoised rather 
than ranked. Thirdly, the interactive elements in a society need not be permanently ranked 
relative to one another (Crumley 1995). Crumley offers some examples that help to clarify 
these points: 
Thus, three cities might be the same size but draw their importance from different realms: one 
hosts a military base, one is a manufacturing centre, and the third is home to a great university. 
Similarly a spiritual leader might have an international reputation but be without influence in the 
local business community. The relative importance of these community and individual power bases 
changes in response to the context of inquiry and to changing (and frequently conflicting) values 
that result in the continual reranking of priorities (1995: 3). 
In short, Crumley and most of those who have followed her outline a scenario wherein 
discrete institutions, individuals or groups may be catapulted into positions of power or high 
social standing according to different contexts. They furthermore maintain that social 
landscapes need not be the seats of overarching power hierarchies but rather the battlegrounds 
of competing individuals, elites, factions, coalitions, and confederacies (see Brumfiel 1989, 
1992, 1994; Crumley 1995; Hamilakis 1995, 1999; Keswani 1996; Schoep 2002) .. 
I do not doubt the theoretical and empirical validity of this point. For example, among 
.. 
the Baruya of New Guinea, high social standing goes to the talented warriors, as well as to the 
best shamans. Both these positions constitute the most highly prized statuses (Godelier 1977:-. 
201). Leadership among the Stalo of British Columbia was not necessarily ascribed by birth. 
Leaders or Sie'm could be anyone whose personal abilities were most highly regarded. 
Attributes such as wisdom, ability, industry, generosity,' humility and pacifism were 
considered hallmarks of good character, and individual effort and ability could overcome the 
disadvantage of low birth. So, for example, Sie'm could have high status by being good 
hunters, high-born people or those with knowledge of the supernatural (Duff 1952: 80), In 
medieval Ireland, textual evidence allows us to conclude that not only were there multiple 
heterarchical. The v.ery existence of leaders points to a vertical differentiation (hierarchical order) in 
155 
The language of inequality 
parallel hierarchies of social standing but also that the political hierarchies contained 
heterarchical elements (Wailes 1995). There was the hierarchy of the Church, the lay 
hierarchy, that of poets, of lawyers and of various categories of craft specialists. Interestingly, 
a 'high king' and an archbishop held equal.status in honour price. Below them, a bishop, a 
king and the highest grade of poet shared an equal status too; the same held for the 
subordinate levels of all of these hierarchies. Moreover, as regal inventories reveal, kingship 
alternated between competing segments (Wailes 1995: 64). Aztec society constitutes a further 
example pointing to the existence of a heterarchical order. Ethnohistorical evidence leaves no 
doubt that the society in question was permeated by factional competition, that is competition 
between structurally and functionally similar groups6 striving for resources and positions of 
prestige, power and high status (Brumfiel 1989). The conclusion drawn here is that 
heterarchical elements and relations have been safely inferred for various societies on the 
basis of textual or ethnographic information. 
Unfortunately, in my view, the potential of identifying competing individuals or groups of 
equal power and social standing in preliterate societies through archaeology, is usually rather 
limited and at the best tentative. Keswani (1996) for example, has suggested that Late Bronze 
Age Cypriote society can be more appropriately described as heterarchical than hierarchical 
with respect to the local, regional and island-wide scales. In her scenario, not only did the 
island comprise several autonomous regional polities but also several individual polities 
contained multiple elite groups and institutions, none of which was obviously paramount. In 
the case of Enkomi, for instance, the dispersion of metallurgical workshops and imposing 
ashlar mansions in several different areas of the town is taken to attest to the absence of a 
central administration authority. Equally, the existence of three different temples, Keswani 
argues, can be seen as indicative of the absence of a single, centralised religious authority. 
More recently, following Keswani's methodological guidelines, Schoep (2002) has made a 
similar point for the protopalatial town of Malia on Crete. According to her, the existence of 
evidence for ceremonial and religious activity, craft specialisation, monumental architecture 
and administration in different parts of the protopalatial town argues for a heterarchical social 
landscape populated by distinct competing factions and their followers, rather than for a 
single central power. 
An important snag in Schoep' s and Keswani' s arguments for the absence of a single 
central hierarchy of power in Late Bronze Age Cypriot towns and protopalatial Malia 
respectively, concerns the distinction between decentralisation and non-centralisation, a 
power and influence between them and those who are subordinated to their authority. 
6 Factions should be contrasted with classes (BrumfieI1989: 128, 1994: 8). The former divide society 
in vertical cleavages that unite individuals of distinct strata and promote conflict between members of 
the same strata. On the other hand, classes divide society in cleavages that cut horizontally separating 
externally competing and internally solidary strata. 
156 
The language of inequality 
problem which Keswani herself recognIses (1996: 217). The identification of various 
religious, ceremonial, craft and administrative activities in different parts of a community can 
be taken as an indication of the absence of a central power (non-centralisation). However, this 
same pattern can also be interpreted as a· manifestation of a central authority that has chosen, 
according to various strategic considerations, to decentralise or disperse its activities spatially 
( decentralisation). 
More than this, without implying that the above accounts are necessarily in error (more 
precisely, they are methodologically ill-founded), it seems to be the case that heterarchical 
approaches that attempt to disclose discrete elite individuals or groups and factions in 
prehistory usually start from an a priori assumption. This concerns the idea that different 
archaeological contexts that exhibit similar or alternative material resources and which 
equally point to instruments and practices of power or status, correspond to discrete social 
units. The answer to this issue is too large to embark upon here in detail, but I will offer some 
grounding that may help to clarify my. scepticism about the identification of physical 
individual actors or groups in prehistory. 
One area of study in which the problems relating to the straightforward association of 
architectural units with discrete social units have been clearly felt is the archaeological study 
of households and families. Anthropologists and archeologists alike have now become aware 
of the fact that architectural residential units may represent various categories of social groups 
(Bender 1967; Whitelaw 2001; Yanagisako 1979). Particularly, a single residential unit might 
not necessarily correspond to a single family (nuclear or extended). Moreove~, it might not 
correspond to a family at all, but rather to a different category of group, namely the household 
(Bender 1967f. The Iroquoian longhouse represents an example of a residential unit 
inhabited by several families (Hayden and Cannon 1982: 142). Still, sometimes members of 
the same family can be dispersed in different residential units, and therefore a single family 
can comprise a nu~ber of different households. Ethnographic analysis of Swahili houses and 
settlements on the East African coast bears out the fact clearly. On the island of Lamu, for 
instance, an elite class of Swahili people and some of their female slaves inhabited coral 
houses. Once a female slave became the concubine of her master, she could be given a house 
for her own use and for that of her children. Her house, which was located at the edge of the 
ward in which her master lived, was usually not a coral hous~ but a less elaborate structure 
(Donley 1982). The crucial point here is that in the absence of the above information, the 
researcher could easily oversimplify the economic and social relationships between the 
residents of the coral house and those of the modest structure. It is not difficult to see how the 
7 Arguably,' the refe;ent of 'household' is common residence, while the referent of 'family' is kinship 
(Bender 1967; Yanagisako 1979). 
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two buildings could be interpreted as representing two independent groups; a wealthy elite 
group and a less economically endowed group of commoners. Yet as we saw, the matter is 
much more complex, and we basically deal with two residential units that do not correspond 
to two independent groups. Notably, the concubine living in the more modest house would 
retain her slave status if she had not begotten children by her master. 
Without going into detail, one final example may be given from Eskimo ethnography to 
illustrate that there can be no simple correlation between different resources of power or 
contexts of practice and individuals or social units. Leadership in Eskimo society is expressed 
in two ways; in shamanism and in hunting. Quite commonly, there are two leaders: the 
shaman leader who is the custodian of religion and the 'economic' leader who is the best 
hunter (McKay 1988: 22-23). Yet although we may logically infer that Eskimo society 
provides us with a clear example of counterpoised, heterarchical power, there is an important 
complication to such a conclusion. Although power is usually shared between two different 
individuals, this does not need always to be the case. For as McKay notes, there are times 
when a single individual is able to combine both offices. Thus, whereas it is clearly the case 
that Eskimo society values two different resources of power (hunting talent and shamanistic 
skills), it would be misleading to relate them inevitably with two different competing 
individual actors. 
Quite simply, as the hierarchical-stratificatory model tries ambitiously to fit individuals or 
groups into a vertical scale, likewise the heterarchical model is concerned with the charting of 
discrete physical entities in a horizontal dimension. The concern once again is more with the 
distribution or what one may call the quantification of power or influence, rather than with 
their relational and perfonnative aspects. 
Remarkably, although Renfrew (1982b) encourages the archeological study of 
hierarchical and stratified organisation in past societies, he argues that looking for "individuals 
might not be the m?st productive avenue of research. He suggests this even though his work 
is underpinned by the assumption that stratified or ranked societies are based on the 
differential status of individuals. According to him, ranking should be explored in tenns of 
the degree to which a society, its institutions, and the processes at work within them were 
centrally organised. For the individual, as he rightly states, is 'difficult to catch in 
archaeological terms' (Renfrew 1982b: 4). In Renfrew's vie~, the next logical step in the 
study of ranking is to shift emphasis from attempts towards the tracing of personal ranking to 
categories of data that enable the investigation of the degree of centralisation of authority. The 
latter, he argues, can be revealed through the examination of road and fortification patterns, 
settlement patterns, central places and monument hierarchies in tenns of scale (measured in 
human-hours of construction labour). 
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One can only agree with the idea that the exciting moments of identifying a 
Tutankhamun, a Pompeii, an Ice Man or a Shang tomb are really rare in prehistoric 
archaeology (Hodder 2000: 31). Nevertheless, can this be taken as a justification for writing 
histories of generalised institutions and hidden impersonal patterns, which moreover, leave 
out social actors' actions, motivations, intentions, sources of strength and interpersonal 
relations by being usually conceived in systemic8 terms? 
Recently, archaeologists belonging to the same intellectual tradition as Renfrew ('New 
Archaeology') have begun to speak about 'agency' following contemporary trends in social 
theory (see for example, Ames and Maschner 1999). They have declared that humans were 
motivated by their own interests, and that they made crucial choices which guided the 
development of past society. Perhaps this is an attempt to put a humanistic spin on an older, 
more detached argument. Paradoxically however, social change is still framed within the 
language of biological evolution, so that choice itself reflects cultural fitness and the selective 
traits of environmental adaptation. In the end the people are still 'faceless blobs' to use Ruth 
Tringham's phrase (1991). In a similar fashion, proponents of the heterarchical or factional 
approach aptly remark that a line of research such as that advocated by Renfrew, imposes a 
kind of bird's-eye view or an outside-in perspective on society, which marginalises human 
agency (Brumfiel 1992; Hamilakis 1995: 60;. Schoep 2002). According to Schoep's account 
of protopalatial Malia, for instance, 
it is important to stress, when making generalisations about different forms of power, that the 
problematic of agency cannot and should not be ignored. For example, did all three forms of power 
[political, economic, ideological] emanate from one source, as the conventional palatial model 
proposes, or could power relations within the main centres have been more subtle and complex? 
(2002: 105) 
Poignantly, in Schoep's study, the concern with the current 'buzzword of agency' (Dobres 
and Robb 2000) appears to be closely linked to the identification of discrete social units. Yet 
we should highlight the confusion in equating the search for human agency with the 
archaeological spotting of specific individuals and groups (Dobres 2000: 142; Johnson 2000: 
212). More precisely, 
The former is a theoretical concern, to fill a gap in our understanding of the cause of material 
culture variability: it is the proposition that we cannot understand such variability without 
reference to active agency. The latter, on the other hand, is a practical concern with those 
superficially exciting moments, present particularly in historical archaeology where one can 
identify 'real people' and relate them to traces in the archaeological record (Johnson 2000: 212). 
8 That is, through their contribution to a systemic objective (i.e. integration or adaptation) rather than 
through their connection to human subjects (Mouzelis 1995: 47). 
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The now bulky literature on the concept of agency need not be paraded here9• It will 
suffice to say, that agency can be defmed as the means by which things are achieved, as 
embodied practice situated in particular times and spaces through which historically situated 
human actors fmd their place in and act effectively upon their world (Barrett 2000, 2001). In 
bare essentials, therefore, agency is about doing or action (Giddens 1984a: 10); actions, 
however, cannot be abstracted or demarcated from the historical and material conditions 
which they occupy (Barrett 2000). Having said this, it is vital to recognise that an 
archeological search of agency 'does not necessarily require knowledge of the names and 
addresses of those involved' (Dobres 2000: 142). Most significantly, neither can the search 
for agency be reduced to a treatment of past material conditions as mere reflections of past 
practices. Notice here, that this is exactly what both hierarchical and. heterarchical 
epistemologies and languages actually do. For example, a temple is seen as the trace of a 
religious practice and a workshop as the trace of craft activity related to specific human 
actors. These practices may be considered subsequently to reflect forms of control. From 
here, both hierarchical and heterarchical models go on to infer that some individuals or groups 
have more or less or equal power comparedto others. Yet the hard question must be asked 
whether this really illuminates the way power and influence were constituted. As John Barrett 
aptly puts it, 'What point is there after all in the archeological depiction of a building plan if 
one never understands what is involved in pushing open a door to enter a room?' (2001: 153). 
To sum up, the failure of both heterarchical and hierarchical approaches to the study of power 
inequalities is not so much that they do not introduce the human actors into the centre. of 
attention, but rather that they do it in a simplistic way. However, if our interest is the search 
for agency, it is the exploration of the ways in which human agents actively operated and 
performed through the materials which have survived for our study that has to be the central 
concern of the practice of archaeology (cf. Barrett 2001). 
Ranking and stratification II 
I would now like to address another problem concerning the utility of the tenns ranking and 
stratification. It is often the case that ranking is used to denote an evolutionary stage of power 
and social inequality, namely one that stands between so called 'egalitarian' social 
organisation and 'stratified' society. The pedigree of this perception goes back to the work of 
Morton Fried. A rank society, as defined by Fried 'is one in which positions of valued status 
are somehow limited so that not all those of sufficient talent to occupy such statuses actually 
achieve them' (1967: 109). On the other hand, 'a stratified society is one in which members 
9 The reader can refer to various contributions in Dobres and Robb (2000). 
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of the same sex and equivalent age status do not have equal access to the basic resources that 
sustain life' (Fried 1967: 186). Likewise, to give an example from the Aegean, Halstead, 
following Fried, argues that ranking refers to institutionalised inequality of status while 
stratification indicates unequal access to staple resources, like food and labour (1992c: 56, 
1995: 21). In his words, stratification is 'something over and above ranking'. This in turn 
means that so called 'stratified' societies constitute grounds for more profound power 
inequalities compared to rank ones. 
The intellectual lineage of this view stems from a certain theoretical myopia regarding the 
notion of basic resources. To be more specific, there is a blind faith surrounding the idea that 
the creation of debt - and thus dependency and power - can firmly be achieved only through 
resources associated with the materially productive sector of economy, such as labour, raw 
materials, land, water for irrigation and food (see Fried 1967: 52, 186-187). The exclusion of 
some segments of society from these types of resources, which are considered to comprise the 
basic means of livelihood, ensures the dependence of these segments on those who have 
managed to monopolise the resources in question. In comparison, rank societies are thought 
of as weaker political arenas. According to ·current consensus, in these societies, high social 
standing and power do not derive from economic control, nor do they produce unequal access 
or a privileged claim to the means of subsistence. Social standing in rank societies, as Fried 
maintains, usually exists 'totally independent of the economic order' (1967: 52). 
Consequently, since both individuals of power or high status and commoners enjoy similar 
access to what traditional accounts narrowly perceive to be the strategic resources on which a 
society is based, the former cannot effectively put the latter under their control. This means 
that in rank societies, 'leaders can lead, but followers may not follow; that commands are 
given, but sometimes they may not be obeyed' (Fried 1967: 133). On the other hand, stratified 
societies are believed to be characterised by a more fundamental kind of inequality. However, 
as Fried himself hastens to add, 'there is no society in which all commands are obeyed' 
(1967: 133). 
Subsequently, Plotnikov and Tuden (1970: 4-5), noting that social stratification is not to 
be found in every society and that it should be distinguished from other forms of social 
inequality, set out to outline a more precise definition of stratified societies. According to 
them, ideally, stratified societies have hierarchically ranked groups that hold relatively 
permanent positions in the hierarchy and have unequal access to economic and political 
sources of power, relative to their rankings. Moreover, the groups are separated by invidious 
rivalries and cultural differences and are articulated by an overarching ideology that 
rationalises the established hierarchical arrangements. These authors then go on to assert that 
it is hard to come by an ideal model of a stratified society, for, as they state, the characteristics 
" described above vary from society to society. They remark that although ranking - which is 
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defined by them as the evaluation of individuals and roles on bases like sex, age or kinship 
statuses, is universal - societies composed of ranked social groups that are organised on other 
bases are not to be found everywhere. 
To summarise, the term 'social stratification', as commonly used in anthropological 
parlance, is closely related to unequal access to so called 'basic' resources and the presence of 
hierarchically ranked groups. This seems to be the direction taken also by theoretically 
informed accounts on the investigation of social stratification in the Aegean (see Gilman 
1981; Halstead and O'Shea 1982; Halstead 1992c, 1995; Webster 1990), yet it should be 
stressed that quite often the terms 'ranking' and 'stratification' are used interchangeably (see 
Renfrew 1972). 
It is important to add, however, that the utility of the term 'social stratification' thus 
defined has not gone unchallenged in social theory. According to Fallers (1974: 16, 29), for 
example, social stratification is a poor tenn that fails to describe adequately social inequality 
in both western and non-western societies, because it refers to a single culture of inequality -
namely, economic differentiation. In his words, 
Not only is [social stratification] quite misleading when applied to the many non-western societies 
in which thought and action about inequality centre much more upon interpersonal relations of 
superiority and inferiority; it also oversimplifies by attempting to capture with a single graphic 
image the multiple bases of differentiation and inequality which exist within western societies. 
Race, ethnicity, occupation, and regionalism are not reducible to 'class' or 'stratum', and all these 
terms, to the extent to which they have meaning in non-western societies, very often have a very 
different meaning there (Fallers 1974: 29). 
More recently, Earle (1987b: 290) has challenged the view that depicts rank societies as 
societies where power has no real economic privilege or grounding. As he suggests, it is 
difficult to imagine a society where political differentiation is entirely symbolic and does not 
emanate from economic control or does not bestow real economic advantages: For him, 
descriptions of rank societies that project a picture of economic egalitarianism are 
anthropologically unfounded. To smooth the reader's path, Earle argues against Fried's 
popular view that distinguishes between what current accounts call 'structural differentiation' 
(ranking) and 'economic differentiation' (social stratification), from a different perspective 
from Fallers, who challenges the stratigraphic image of society because it reduces power 
inequalities to economic inequalities. However, although the. above accounts .appear to be 
incompatible at first sight, both Fallers and Earle are right in different ways. It seems to me 
that the incompatibility of their accounts stems from a narrow perception of economy and that 
if we correct this, they can be made to fit. But let me elaborate first. 
A few pages back, I referred to the fact that economic differentiation can be traced even in 
those societies we tend to defme as simple with little second thought. I also argued that 
sharing wealth does not mean absence of economic disparities or sharing of power. That is, 
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we should not fail to lose sight of the fact that those who share with their fellows have 
amassed something to share and that at the end of the day they may not share equally. Now, 
although most researchers have come to accept that wealth differentiation exists in what Fried 
calls rank societies, they take this to be insignificant or not instrumental when it cannot be 
found to involve goods essential to physical survival. However, to recall a point already made 
in this study, it seems to me that the restriction of the definition of 'basic resources' to capital 
goods essential to physical survival is misleading. People do not live by bread alone (Pearson 
1957: 324). To think otherwise is to treat societies as mere aggregates of physical bodies. 
Relations of dependency can be created through various material and non-material means that 
are deemed to be essential to the social reproduction of a given society and its members. 
Human beings need to feed themselves, but they also need to become fully fledged social 
beings. 
Eventually, moreover, the distinction between rank and stratified societies 
compartmentalises different parallel aspects of the phenomenon of social inequality. Social 
inequality is simultaneously a moral, structural, behavioural, interactional, existential and 
material phenomenon (Berreman 1981)10. Note here a material, not materialistic, 
phenomenon. Accounts a la Fried that distinguish between rank and stratified societies seem, 
in the case of the former, to strip the material aspect of social inequality from the rest of its 
dimensions, while reintroducing it in the case of the latter. On the other hand, Earle's point 
that political differentiation cannot be separated from economic differentiation and that chiefs 
in rank societies constitute 'an incipient aristocracy with advantages in wealth and lifestyle' 
attempts to offer a correction to old wisdom by introducing the material aspect of inequality 
in so called rank societies (l987b: 290). It would be more precise to say, however, that 
certainly those who follow Fried faithfully and to some extent those, like Earle, who criticise 
Fried treat the material aspect of inequality superficially.· To put the things straight, 
inequalities of power and status are material phenomena in that they are based on or bring as 
reward (or both) differential access to goods, services and opportunities. To confme the 
resources and rewards of social inequalities not simply to material goods but also more-· 
particularly and narrowly to resources related to the productive system is to reduce the 
material aspect of inequalities to classical materialism. Nonetheless, I am not sure whether 
Earle would be keen to recognise economic privileges outside the conventional view of 
wealth. 
10 'A moral phenomenon in the sense that people evaluate each other, a behavioural one in the sense 
that people act on their eva1uations~ a structural phenomenon in that social differentiation exists in 
society~ an interactional one in that these actions occur largely in the context of interpersonal relations; 
a material phenomenon in that their actions entail differential access to goods, services and 
opportunities; and an, existential phenomenon in that people experience their statuses and respond to 
them cognitively and affectively' (Berreman 1981: 4). 
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It is important to realise that the structures of inequality observed in different societies do 
not fit into sterile typologies that attempt to depict an ascending evolutionary plotline of the 
growth of power. The difference between so called rank and stratified societies or more 
correctly put, between societies, is the way they manage or relate the total of socially valued 
and desirable goods, both tangible and intangible - in one word, wealthll - to desired ends. 
But again we should not take this to extremes by following arguments that reproduce the 
substantivist-fonnalist debate in economic anthropology12. We may note here the enduring 
significance in the capitalist world of charity and gifts, that is, of things given not in exchange 
for other things or money. This, combined with the plethora of private valuations and 
classifications (Kopytoff 1986: 88) serves to illustrate that there is more to contemporary 
Western societies than the Dow Jones Index, supennarkets and bank transact~ons (Thomas 
1991: 27). Additionally, as anthropologists have begun to argue, in so called simple or 
traditional societies the idea of altruistic and economically disinterested or profit unmotivated 
actors is purely a caricature (Appadurai 19~6: 11). Significantly, the drive to commoditisation 
is not unknown in pre-monetary societies (Appadurai 1986; Kopytoff 1986; Thomas 1991). 
My dissatisfaction with the tenn 'social stratification' stems from the fact that it projects a 
narrow perception of economy, one that reduces economy to what is obviously economic, in 
that it accords a pride of place and instrumentality to materially productive resources. 
Consequently, and perhaps more importantly, it perpetuates the simplistic distinction between 
more and less power-laden societies. Faller's (1974) argument can now be modified; 'social 
stratification' is a poor tenn not because it reduces inequality to economic principles ,of 
differentiation but because it abuses the very meaning and content of the tenn economy itself. 
I close this chapter noting that the current language of inequality and its attendant 
typologies have influenced unproductively the way we study inequality by loading it with 
several unwarranted assumptions. More than this, it is a language that deals with relational 
inequalities in a quite static and descriptive way by spiriting away the most essential question 
of how power and status are actively constituted. To strike an optimistic note, there is another 
language that I feel can encourage us to study inequality in a more prolific way. This is one 
that brings to the 'stage' its perfonnative dimension and does not resort to simplistic 
assumptions and superficial typologies that keep alive the distinction between simple and 
complex societies. 
11 My definition ofw.ealth is after Schneider (1974: 256). 
12 For good summaries of the Substantivist-Formalist debate see Hodder (1982) and Schneider (1974). 
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Chapter 7 
Dealing with inequality: 
Symbolic capital and performance 
It is not enough to know the ensemble of relations as they exist at any given time as a given 
system. They must be known genetically, in the movement of their formation (Gramsci cited 
in Barrett 2001: 141). 
Introduction 
In reviewing both the hierarchical and heterarchical languages of inequality as . well as their 
implications for archaeological research, I tried to lay bare what they allow and do not allow 
us to say about inequalities in past societies. Notably, it may be legitimate to say that these 
approaches appear to contain within them what Strum and Latour (1987) have referred to as 
the ostensive definition of social link or what Farnell (1999: 352) calls an observationist rather 
than an agentic stance on action and societY. That is, such approaches treat society, social 
relations and integration as something that can be the object of an ostensive definition since 
they seem to assume that social scientists alone, standing outside society have the potential to 
grasp the nature of society in its entirety. In this theoretical framework, which can be traced in 
a great deal of contemporary social analysis, human agents are seen in relations or inside 
society - they are stuck in neat little boxes - yet the way in which they achieve t?ese relations 
is rarely explored (cf. Strum and Latour 1987). The grave consequence of these approaches is 
that they invariably fail to take into serious account the manners according to which influence 
and power are actively constituted. In other words, we commonly look for or acquiesce to the 
idea of people in hierarchies or heterarchies but we fail to reveal how these same people 
construct and achiev~ moments of hierarchy or heterarchy in practice. 
What strikes me most about the traditional conception of power relations is that it is static, 
general and mute. It is a frozen single snapshot, where more or less we see the king in his " 
castle, the poor in their huts, the grain surpluses and the material riches neatly stored and 
ever-expanding. It is supposed to be a grand narrative of power, more or less everywhere and 
always the same. However, to borrow a few words from Nicholas Thomas, 'we have no sense 
of what is said or thought, and the image fades before we discover' what people are actually 
doing 'what becomes of the things' (1991: 11). Mark Edmonds expresses a similar point 
when he notes that 'what is lost is any sense of the mess of people dealing with others, the 
complex moral economies and the blurring of regimes of value ... people, ideas and artefacts 
... - a tangle of relations' (1999: 127). Thomas and Edmonds refer to the ostensive images of 
.. 
barter and trade respectively, yet the same can be said about a range of social realities like 
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power, landscape, social identity, the body or the 'state' where the approach in question has 
been adopted. The solution lies only in our willingness to abandon the ostensive modeling of 
society and its attendant faceless, general, non-context specific social typologies that grasp 
reality as a fmished product, and to move towards an approach that values the 
multidimensional rhythms of social life as they are enacted in context. 
Typologies are empty of the real embodied presence, the shifting and context specific 
character of human existence, and therefore in view of this absence I want to move towards a 
way of thinking that puts the changing and multi-vocal character of the human condition back 
into focus. In this chapter I want to show how a performative approach that respects the 
contingency of human history can help elucidate how social inequalities were produced in 
different contexts. Fortunately, a growing number of scholars from various d~sciplines have 
recognised the need to take adequate appreciation of human agents practising or performing 
society rather than merely being in society!. Nonetheless, a theoretically and 
methodologically informed performative. analysis pertinent specifically to relational 
inequalities in concrete archaeological contexts is still pending. It is to this task that I now 
turn. 
Turning names into verbs, turning objects into processes: 
Rethinking power and status 
Power is relational (cf. Foucault 1980). Equally, what current accounts call sta~s, and what I 
have defined as influence is again relational. One can conceive neither power, nor status 
outside of relationships. I see power as the ability of an individual to impose their will upon 
another in social action (Wolf 1990: 586). A crucial aspect of power is the creation of debt 
obligations (cf. Blau 1971; Bourdieu 1977a: 195; Gosden 1989a; Leach 1982; Schneider 
1974), their accum.~.Ilation and maintenance. As Blau (1971: 232) writes, an individual may 
instill a sense of superiority over others through bombarding them with benefits they cannot 
possibly repay and therefore subduing them under the weight of obligations. On the face of it,' 
power can be defmed as 'a relationship between two or more actors in which one (the 
powerful person) is owed obligations or dependence by another' (Schneider 1974: 247, 
emphasis in the original). Resources and services that ar~ seen as essent·ial to human 
existence, that are possessed or controlled by some but not by all, act as magnets critical to 
the generation of debts. Debt draws upon resources whose significance and value are socially 
constituted, reinvented and agreed upon in social interaction and practice. In Munn's words, 
1 See for example, Barrett (1994, 2000, 2001)~ Damilati (2002)~ Edmonds (1999)~ Farnell (1999)~ 
Goffman (1990 [1959])~ Gosden (1989b)~ Harrison (2000)~ Keating (2000)~ Munn (l986)~ Pearson 
(1998)~ Shennan (1993); Smith (1993); Strum and Latour (1987); Sweely (1999); Thomas (1996). 
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Value creation ... is a complex symbolic process, both a dialectical formation of the symbolic 
system of meanings constituted in sociocultural practices and an ongoing dialectic of possibilities 
and counter-possibilities - explicit assertions of positive and negative value potentials - through 
which the members of the society are engaged in an effort to construct and control themselves and 
their own social world (1986: 3). 
This helps make a further point, which, in contrast to a fairly widespread view, holds that 
social values are existential rather than intrinsic (Weiner 1992: 15). It is in this sense, namely 
by being transformed into socially desired and valued goods able to bestow debt that 
'resources enter into structures of domination' (Giddens 1981: 4). As Graeber has aptly put it, 
Value is something that mobilises the desires of those who recognise it, and moves them to action. 
Just as royal splendor calls on its audience to do as others have done, so does the perception of 
value in objects of exchange. Others have sought to acquire these things, runs the implicit message; 
therefore, so, too, should you (1996: 12, emphasis added). 
Arguably, the above remarks should lead us to the notion that a power relationship cannot 
be adequately studied or inferred merely as a process of accumulating resources between 
individuals or groups (cf. Miller and Tilley 1984: 7). Instead we need to be attendant of the 
complex and contingent ways in which value and debt are implicated in relations of 
inequality. The relations of things, people and values are a single reality. It might be said that 
the making of power or domination, the very ability of dominant individuals or groups to 
perpetuate and legitimate their position, rests on their competence to establish what a society 
values or holds in distinction (cf. Bourdieu 1984). Meanwhile, it has been claimed that power 
is not yielded or taken once and for all (Nelson 1999; Miller and Tilley 1984). All that we 
need to acknowledge at this point is that the enactment of power can be met with resistance, 
intermittent rebellions, escapism, sabotage or protest (Paynter 1989: 386; Wolf 1990:590). I 
suggest that this is the case. Debts might slip into oblivion or lose something of their original 
meaning and efficacy. Cultural norms2 that dictate socially decided currencies of value 
according to which _,debts are played out - what is to be owed, what is worthy of being sought 
after in specific cultural and historical contexts and what not - may come to be challenged. 
Accordingly, for any power relation to persist in time, considerable effort needs to be directed 
towards the creation, projection and refinement of certain values as well as the recognition, 
maintenance, securing and remembrance of debts. 
To tum to. status seeking, this has been shown to be a behavioural predisposition universal 
In human societies which, despite its biological underpinnings, is shaped, directed and 
negotiated by culture (Weissner 1996). For example, strategies and skills used to acquire 
status, the resources that facilitate such strategies to take place, as well as the achievements 
2 Indeed the concept cultural norm itself is problematic in that it suggests that value judgements are 
static or obsolete. Pr.rhaps Bourdieu's (1977a) habitus, a set of gradually inculcated dispositions that 
make individuals to act and react in specific ways, is a better term. 
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that are esteemed highly in the status quest, may be quite different from one social milieu to 
another depending on respective cultural values. Significantly, status refers to a structure of 
attention and influence, namely the ability of an individual to attract attention and exert 
influence on others in order to satisfy favourable ends in various areas of life. As such, high 
status or prestige (respect or honour i.e. the positively esteemed influence) :.... and the same 
applies to power3 - can be seen themselves as significant resources or as a kind of capital, 
more specifically what Bourdieu (l977a, 1977b, 1986, 1991) calls symbolic capital. 
Importantly, the idea that status is about the attraction of attention and the exertion of 
influence helps clearly make the point that like power, status making is a relational or 
transactional affair. Above all, structures of influence and attention are grounded for their 
ongoing security in impression management and public validation regarding both their initial 
generation and their maintenance. Without affirmation by others, any claim to power or 
influence becomes the illusionary obsession of an egotistic dreamer. It may be worth noting 
that while face-to-face interactions are germane or indeed prototypical to status making, 
structures of attention and influence can be closely associated with the creation of fame or re-
known. Fame can be seen as an enhancement that transcends and extends beyond our physical 
bodies, yet still refers back to them. It is the mobile dimension of our existence that 
transcends space and time travelling with our names through the thoughts and words of others 
(Munn 1986). 
No doubt, the above brief notes cannot do justice to the richness of the discussion or the 
complexity of facts surrounding the exploration of the sociology of relational inequalities. 
Nevertheless, my main concern here is to make clear that both power and status are better to 
be studied as processes rather than as fixed entities or obsolete objectified categories .. To put 
it straight, both power and influence are enacted. Debts and structures of attention and 
influence are practical accomplishments. They have to be produced, sustained and reinvented 
in contexts of social interaction; that is to say they are about work and action (cf. Levy 1999: 
72; Wolf 1990: 593). People do not simply fmd themselves in relations of power; they 
achieve, perpetuate, reinvent or resist debts and structures of influence. The value of different 
resources, the efficacy of debt obligations and structures of influence are realised in usage4• In 
the case of resources this is achieved in the manner of their employment; in that of debts and 
influence this is attained as lived commitments among agents. This is not it functionalist 
perspective where we ask what do things do or what objective functions they accomplish. To 
3 We should not forget that in one important respect power is an enabling resource in that it provides 
power brokers 'the means of getting things done' (Giddens 1984a: 283). . 
4 Here I follow Michel de Certeau's (1984: 30-33) notion of usage. This may refer to ways of 
employment, to what individuals make of things and images, the specific ways in which they use, 
refashion and transform objects, as well as to custom (stereotyped and traditional procedures or 
patterns of use recognised and reproduced by a group). 
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do so, it would be to perceive a schoolbook for example, as being everywhere and always a 
medium for education, as something to be read. However, it might be, as de Certeau tells us, 
that 'the child still scrawls and daubs on his schoolbooks; even if he is punished for this 
crime, he has made a space for himself and signs his existence as an author of it' (1984: 31). 
On this occasion, the book was not to fulfill its objective function; it was· not to be read. 
Instead, as de Certeau might argue, the child made the book operate in another register. The 
book was diverted from one use and re-deployed for another, from a text to be read to surface 
to make his or her own mark. What concerns us is how resources or capital are lived through, 
the different manners of their employment in everyday life, the values they evoke, the ways 
their forms and points of reference gain validity. 
In pursuing the case for an archaeology not simply content to tackle relational inequalities 
as fmished products, and one that tries to make sense of the movement and style of social 
realities, we require an important shift in our understanding of power and status that seeks 
their transformation from nouns to verbs. To a degree there is nothing novel or radical in this 
remark. Several authors have voiced similar ideas in seeing social realities as processes. For 
example, Mitchell (1994) has pursued this direction regarding the study of landscape when he 
invites us to think of it, not simply as an object to be seen but as a process by which social 
relations and identities are formed. In Landscape and power, he advances a more 
comprehensive model for dealing with landscape, one that asks not just what landscape is or 
means but what landscape does, how it works as a cultural practice. Wolf (1990: 592) strikes 
a similar note, when he asks us to start speaking of the state, less as a thing - a fixed type of 
social constellation - than as a process5• 
According to Marshal Sahlins (1987), there is always the possibility of a substitution 
between kinds of action and categories of relationships. Verbs signify just as well as nouns 
and can change the structural order of meaning so that the character or the significance of a 
unit of analysis can be understood from different points of view. Now crucially, in turning 
power and status into verbs, we can move beyond accounts that treat individuals as cultural 
dupes towards narratives that are better endowed to restore the significance of human agency 
in history. For action cannot be separated from embodied agents (cf. Giddens 1984a: 3) who 
'are able to see, reflect upon, understand the social reality in which they exist, and actively 
manipulate and reinterpret symbols and ideological understandings for their own purposes' 
(Sweely 1999: 395). The questions now become, I think, much more interesting ones. We are 
no longer content to acknowledge that an action has taken place because we trace the material 
record of that action. Rather we wish to grasp something of the performance of that action, its 
5 The reader may a!so refer to the work of Jenkins (1996) on social identity and Frank (1991) on the 
body which join Mitchell's and Wolf's call to view social realities as processes. 
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specific style, material conditions and spatio-historical contingencies (cf. Barrett 2001: 152). 
We are now invited to open the door to the king's chambers, to see his majesty possessed 
with purpose, processing through his gilded hallways, displaying his position to his vassals, 
his presence tangible in his dictates, and his voice resonating through the audience chambers. 
On performance 
Why performance 
The place to start exploring the constitution of relational inequalities, or to use Bourdieu's 
language the production of symbolic capital by embodied human actors, is by taking up the 
notion of perfonnance. Contrary to older accounts' commitment to evolutionary conceptions 
of power, I wish to shift the emphasis regarding the study of relational inequalities from 
investigations dealing with the hunting .down of their temporal origins to attempts to 
understand how inequalities of power and status are contextually performed in society. 
Arguably, performance evokes connotations of theatricality and theatre; producers, actors, 
audience, stage, props, costumes, stYles of acting and movement, ostentation, fame and above 
all presentation of 'things that are make-believe' (Goffinan 1990 [1959]: 9). As such, it 
emerges as a course of action strongly associated with the management of impressions before 
an audience. For Goffinan, who introduced the concept into sociology, in order to examine 
the presentation of self in everyday life, perfonnance can be defmed 'as all ~e activity of a 
given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other 
participants' (1990 [1959]: 26). 
Recently, the metaphor of theatricality has been introduced into various disciplines giving 
rise to four different apprehensions of perfonnance, or ways in which perfonnance can be 
theorised. These, .. despite focusing on different aspects and potentialities of everyday 
performances, share a common interest in grasping social realities as continually unfolding 
and becoming in order to put an end to the arbitrarily imposed silence of the lived experience 
(Harrison 2000; Thrift and Dewsbury 2000). My aim here, however, is not to pursue the 
concept of performance through the diverse literature that is beginning to emerge on 
performance theory. That would demand a greater deal of rehearsing various theoretical 
sources than space permits. On the other hand, such a project is too demanding for the needs 
of this research. One may note here not only the often difficult and abstract language within 
which contemporary social theory has framed the issue of performance but also the great 
variety of specific questions pertinent to different branches of academic specialisation. 
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Following Pearson (1998), I understand perfonnance as a valuation -process revealed 
primarily in the body. It must be underlined however that perfonnance is not an abstract 
process or a humanless mechanism. It is about the ongoing construction of social realities 
mediated through the body's capacity to act and to make distinctions in the world. It binds the 
body to time, places, materials and people. By placing themselves in the fluid movements of 
social life, perfonnances constantly draw on different kinds of resources, producing different 
fonns of identity and demarcation, and attempting to validate these within the context of 
social life. In bare essentials, the perfonnance of everyday life does not so much express or 
represent a role, as an actor might who depicts the character of Hamlet, but rather it is in 
search of a character; to find its value and meaning, to find out who it is. At the same time, I 
choose to define perfonnance in a broader sense, after Goffinan, to include not only Pearson's 
modes of action and communication distinct6 from the 'everyday', but also the routine and 
mundane practices of life. It might be argued that 'the reality of everyday life is shared with 
others' (Berger and Luckmann 1991[1966]: 43). In this sense, it resembles some kind of 
perfonnance. More specifically, it assumes an interactionist logic, a seriality to movement, 
and time and space contingent engagements between watchers and the watched or individuals 
and audiences, who each in their place perfonn and subsequently -interpret the actions of 
others. In brief, a dinner party or even a routine encounter between two neighbours cannot be 
perceived less as perfonnances than a coronation ceremony or a carnival parade that may 
involve large public gatherings. 
Although I do not disagree with Pearson that perfonnance is marked out by special types 
of conduct, I believe that these penneate in various degrees all the aspects of life from the 
banal to the exceptional. Everyday life is not simply a spontaneous sequence of actions 
following an arbitrary code of communication, but is rather conditioned and enabled through 
structures of the past and the expectations that people bring to bear upon them. Whatever 
people do, always ~reates impressions, conveys infonnation to others, and is a dialectic play 
between 'seeing' and 'being seen' which involves a particular setting, props, costumes, 
gestures, manners and rules of conduct; a script that makes sense. Nevertheless, while the 
script of life has or aims towards an idealised perfonnance, the lines can sometimes be 
reversed, distorted or completely omitted. The costumes might not be -appropriate, the 
choreography. amiss and the acting in poor taste .. A church,' a bar, the academia constitute 
different settings each demanding a special type of conduct and script; and although someone 
is not expected to enter a church and dress, move or speak the same way they would in a bar, 
6 According to Pearson (1998: 33), performances involve modifications of participants' behaviour, 
degrees of anticipation and expectation and are usually manifest in ordered and programmed events 
bound in time. Moreover, they take place in specific places and are recognised by the participants as 
heightened occasions distinct from the everyday. 
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the expectations can be mediated and reinterpreted. Social life is often defined by its 
messiness as for its regularity. It follows from this that in the routine enactment of social 
reality there is always room for manoeuvre, 'faux pas', forgotten lines or unintentional 
consequences. These may bring forth new possibilities or conditions of life that in tum may 
initiate new occasions or types of performance, or modify older ones. In one important 
respect, therefore, performance allows us to recognise the everyday experience of the lived, a 
'generative' and 'open-ended process' that ruptures fixed categories of thought through 
'contingencies, excess and indefinite answers'. In other words, it resists social analysis that 
tries to bestow unity and static labels to the multiple (Harrison 2000: 499). Everyday life seen 
either as a good or a bad play, or, as a comedy or a drama is constantly being performed. In 
William Shakespeare's words, written almost 400 years ago, 
All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely players: They have their exits and their 
entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts (As you like it). 
In bare essentials, I see performance as others have interpreted practice (see Barrett 2001; 
Bourdieu I977a; Giddens I984a). Broadly speaking, both concepts bring into scrutiny the 
active character of ongoing becoming existence and thus enable us to move beyond narratives 
that treat the social as the dead, the fixed, the immobile. In addition, to restate the obvious, 
both performance and practice imply the presence of an agent, the performer or the executor 
of practice and in this way they restore a human scale in the study of social facts. Yet, I fmd 
performance to be a more useful and robust term. This is partly because some strong forms of 
postmodemism 7 have paid insufficient attention to the creators of practices (human actors), 
the embodied character of practices and their materiality. Looking critically at Foucault's way 
of dealing with practices, Mouzelis notes that there has been a significant decentring of the 
subject in the sense that practices appear to be without an author or ultimate goal and thus 
disconnected from the people who initiate them (1995: 45-48; see also Miller and Tilley 
1984: 7). More precisely: 
The social [is seen to consist] of systems of differences, and in that sense lacks an overall 
coherence; it lacks a centre or a unifying will that could endow it with guidelines and overall 
objectives. So if modem culture gave us the 'death of God', postmodernism gives us the 'death of 
Man', or rather the 'death of the subject' (Mouzelis 1995: 45). 
To tum to the issue of embodiment, Frank (1991: 36) and Turner (1991: 11, 1992: 87) have 
idependently pointed out that in Giddens's structuration theory the focus of discussion is more 
on the unconsciousness or the non-discursive (practical conscIousness). In contrast, the body, 
most notably the embodied structures of understanding by which people grasp the world 
receives only scant consideration. According to Turner (1992: 87), structuration theory 
, 7 The intellectual ~ovement that pioneered the study of society as social practices. 
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displays a deterministic view of the body in the sense that it treats the body to a large extent 
as a physical constraint which limits the capabilities of movement and perception of human 
agents8• Finally, John Barrett (2001: 152) has intimated the marginal concern with the 
materiality of practices in Bourdieu' s theory of habitus. As he notes, despite Bourdieu's 
recognition that artefacts can be strategically employed into the reproduction of social 
practices, it is also equally significant to be aware of the fact that material culture is an 
integral component in the structuring of referential processes. In simple words, practices may 
refer to absent values and conditions, yet it is through material culture that such references 
take shape. 'The strength of objects lies in their capacity to materialise the invisible, to 
represent the unrepresentable' (Godelier 1999: 109; see also Tuan 1974: 23). For instance, the 
object of the cross, refers to Christianity, the crown refers to kingship while a ~attle flag may 
signify men who are ready to die to save it. Remarkably, these objects do not simply represent 
or refer to absent conditions or values but also enable individuals to marshal those conditions . 
in performance and act with reference to th~m. 
On the other hand, I maintain that the concept of performance carries a semantic charge 
that cannot afford to marginalise human actors, embodiment and materiality. This can be well 
illustrated given its dramaturgical connotations of stage, decor, props and costumes that are 
appropriated and fabricated, purposeful actors, communicative body movements, gestures, 
and postures, omission and things that may evoke conditions, values, times and places outside 
the present stage play, special effects that aim to manipulate time, space and attention. 
Perhaps even more significantly, the concept of performance brings simultaneously and more 
vigorously to the fore the material, behavioural and interactional or interpersonal dimensions 
of inequality since it implies interaction between people and resources of various kinds both 
tangible and intangible. In this respect, it entails a social dynamic to the way everyday 
realities of a relational character like power and status are constituted. Simply put, 
performance facilitates the investigation of a great range of resources, the ways in which these 
are actively deployed by embodied human actors in the creation of debts and influence, as 
well as their behavioural, moral and material effects in specific contexts of practice. 
Having defmed my own view of performance in relation to that of Pearson's and the less 
helpful concept of practice, I want to tum back to status and power. It might be said that 
through the different contexts of performance, the character of interactions produces, 
reproduces, negotiates or even challenges commonsense social realities or socially 
engendered values, such as morals, relationships between people and social discourses. This 
brings us directly to the issue of power and status. Arguably, the perception of everyday life 
8 This, as Shilling (1993: 201) notes, holds for Giddens's major writings (1984a, 1990) on structuration 
theory. On the other hand, Giddens's work on modernity (1991) shows an interest in the body as 
enabling. 
173 
Dealing with inequality: Symbolic capital and performance 
as a seriality of performances calls for a change in the style of practice of the archaeological 
exploration of relational inequalities. More precisely, it enables us to move from narratives 
that present uniform and immobile contexts of interaction with single and impersonal 
mechanisms (like redistribution, craft specialisation or a precarious environment) or 
currencies of value that construct individuals as finished identities, the same at every context 
of their mobile presence. It is towards the specific details of context we focus. 
It should be stressed at this stage that performance is a complex concept that demands the 
researcher to deal with the convoluted nature of history, social interactions, cultural taste, 
material culture and practices. Still, it is the complexity and messiness of social relationships, 
structures of debt and influence, the plurality of resources and values rather than their 
objectification and neat pigeonholing that better grasps social reality. In order t~ put forward a 
performative approach that contributes towards our understanding of this complexity, it may 
be possible and analytically necessary to discern the basic constituent elements of 
performance, namely, the body, space, tim~, and tangible and intangible resources. These not 
only facilitate performances blending together in various combinations and styles but also 
may constitute significant resources or currencies of value through which human actors create 
and maintain debts and structures of attention and influence in the course of everyday life. 
The elements of performance 
A premise of this study is that through performances the human body, space, time, objects as 
well as intangible resources such as memory and knowledge are implicated in various ways in 
the creation and management of meaning. Keeping in mind the plurality of ways in which the 
various elements of performance are entangled, it is not my aim to offer here an all inclusive 
recipe that prescribes the blending of the body, space, time, and other resources in every 
performance. For their entanglement is context specific and perhaps more importantly, one 
can only talk at a very abstract theoretical level about performance and its elements outside of 
specific contexts of practice. The task is rather to bring into attention some interesting 
qualities concerning the elements of performance without implying that these adhere in any 
precise manner and combination across all performances. Everyday life is an arena of style. I 
suggest that difference is to be found in the details in which embodied actions, intentions and 
expectations are networked and interwoven with respect to particular conditioris of existence 
and sets of resources, material and non-material, in order to bring about effects (cf. Miller and 
Tilley 1984). 
Bodies offer people the means of acting: 'acting people are acting bodies' (Shilling 1993: 
9). As such, bodies are the instrumental means par excellence that enable performances to 
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take place9• That said, bodies are also ways of relating to, perceiving and understanding the 
world (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Tilley 1994: 14). Bodies are not the passive shelters of the 
mind but rather significant means of communication and identification that embody the world 
as sensory organs through emotion, perception (hearing, touching, seeing), body movement 
and orientation. It is through our body's engagement with others and our material 
surroundings that we relate to and make distinctions between things, people and places in 
order to create understanding. In other words, embodied perception is not a passive act, or a 
kind of spectator sport, rather bodies are also authors of their own social worlds, 'action-
systems' and 'modes of praxis' (Giddens 1991: 99); they simultaneously consume and 
produce social realities through their routine engagement with the world. 
Moreover, bodies, given their inherent social and biological insufficiency due to their 
unfinished nature at birth, do not act independently but they both influence and are influenced 
by other bodies in seeking to create a meaningful world to act upon. In one important respect, 
bodies are centres of display, that is, they are not only instruments for seeing but also for 
being seen. Our bodies send out messages of intent through modes of dress and adornment, 
demeanor, body movements, postures, orientations and facial expressions 10. They attract 
attention or may seek to elude it. As such, they are at once a means of communication and 
managers of impressions, indexes of differentiation and similarity and canvases upon which 
identification can play (Jenkins 1996: 23). Accepting that identification of ourselves and other 
people is firmly anchored in the body helps to understand why so often bodies become targets 
of disciplinary control themselves, valuable resources around which debts are played out as 
well as projects of enormous symbolic appropriation and sites of representation. These 
practices, which consist of both acts of physical intervention and investments of meaning, are 
more so enabled by the organic and social elasticity of the body due to its unfinished nature at 
birth. Values, lifestyles, experience, social inequalities, relations, shifts in social position, 
identities, morals, gender stereotypes, age and even professions are all embodied in the ways 
we move, sit, look and relate to others and our surroundings. According to Shilling (1993), 
these embodiments are contingent on social practices and can perpetuate or legitimise existing 
social relations and values. Crucially, the body itself may be actively implicated in 
performances that aim to create or perpetuate debts. For instance, the body may constitute an 
important currency of value in rites of passage that aim to' authenticate one"s transition in 
critical social stages, like adulthood without which life appears to be unthinkable. In such 
9 Still, the body due to its indivisible nature may constrain specific performances in the sense that it 
cannot operate simultaneously in different places (Hagerstrand 1973). 
10 Modes of dress and adornment constitute features of the surface of the body that belong to the 
'bodily appearance' aspect of the body and are used as clues to interpret actions. 'Demeanour', on the 
other hand, refers tl) how appearance is used by individuals in relation to constitutive conventions of 
everyday life (Giddens 1991: 99). 
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occasions, bodily transformation constitutes a crucial element of the practical accomplishment 
of becoming a fully-fledged social being. It might be said, that this refers to what Giddens 
calls 'the struggle of being against non being', through the creation of ontological reference 
points that guide how to go on in daily life, (1991: 48). It is a task of attaining a feeling of 
biographical continuity, which is essential to individuals' universal quest for ontological 
security (Giddens 1991: 47-63). 
At the same time, routinised forms of interaction with others, other places and the world 
around create meaning which is inscribed in bodies as memory. As Connerton (1989) tells us, 
the past is sedimented in the body. However, memory is not just inscribed in the body. The 
body itself is the producer of memory. In other words, bodies are able not only to recall 
events and situations but also to act as mnemonic devices themselves. This, as I will try to 
show in my case study, can be an instrumental means for keeping alive the memory of debts 
and therefore their efficacy through time. 
Performances do not occur in a vacuum. An embodied world is made up of different 
textures of humanly created space and time (Tilley 1994: 14). Knowledge of the world, as 
well as the ability to act, stem directly from-the potential conditions and capacities for bodily 
movement and interaction with the landscape. Space is both the 'product and means of 
performances. Certain properties of space bear significantly on the specific ways 
performances are staged and bring different human actors together. For example, the built 
environment can direct the reading of space in specific ways by controlling bodily movement 
and access, evoking meaningful moral and social classifications of actors and reinforcing 
specific ways of acting while impairing others (cf. Parker Pearson and Richards 1994). More 
than a physical substrate, space may be transformed into a vessel for the creation of debt 
relations. The opportunity for domination may be enabled by 'the ability to control access to 
and manipulate particular settings for action' (Tilley 1994: 27). Spaces that accumulate 
human experiences _may become containers of history: transactions between people, networks 
of contact and communication, rituals, journeys and other memories imbue landscape with 
stories. In these contexts emotional attachment and a sense of belonging stemming from a 
place's history and genealogy can become currencies of value able to inflict profound debts. 
For example, landscape can be seen as a repository replete with spiritual powers dwelling in 
geographical formations, flora and fauna, or parts of the buiit environment. Interaction with 
these places may demand ritual stocks of knowledge and the enactment of ceremonial dramas 
which are intended to establish favourable relations between humans and these powers. These 
stocks of knowledge which are unlikely to be shared by all members of a given community 
can be exploited and controlled in systems of debt obligations. In a nutshell, competitions 
over spa~e do not involve only disputes of ownership of materially productive land, as 
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western models of space would have us believe, but also struggles over the meaning of places 
(Gregory 1989: 196) and their history. 
Through the medium of routine embodiment, bodies gain a knowledge of persons, places 
and things, investing them with a particular historical character and social value. In this sense 
bodies appropriate the valueless substrates of the surrounding environment and demarcate 
them into socially meaningful categories. As such, human activity itself becomes inscribed 
within objects, places and people; they become historically constituted and biographical in 
nature. Crucially, objects, places and people themselves become embedded in memory, thus 
neither time nor space can be understood apart from embodied performances. The ability to 
go on in the world, to keep on performing as it were, is intimately bound up with past 
experience and future expectations. For instance, transactions such as gift-giving or marriage 
payments between different actors may construct persisting ties of affiliation, feelings of 
relatedness, obligations and relational webs of meanings between different spatial contexts 
even after the transaction has been completed (Georgousopoulou 2003: 58). 
Like space, objects too may be embodied, and through performances may be embedded 
with meaning (Pearson 1998). Objects not -only enable performances to take place but also 
acquire meaning and value through their enactment. That is to say, ownership of things may 
not in itself be significant, for things have meaning only in the context of their performance 
(Gosden and Marshall 1999: 175). Whatever the immediate instrumental uses made of 
different forms of material, such as buildings and metal objects, all artefacts constitute also 
means through which society creates representations of itself (Miller 1985: 35). Cosmologies 
and values flourish and are embellished through material culture. Take for example, the 
complex cosmologies of the Australian Aborigines known as The Dreaming. As an ideology 
or as a theory of existence, in which everything in the world comes into being, the dreaming 
is an immaterial reality, still it only flourishes because it is constituted by material and verbal 
possessions (Wein~.r 1992: ~01). Equally important, objects - like people - have social lives. 
They come into being, are fabricated, become embellished, age, circulate and are consumed in 
various ways in different contexts (Gosden and Marshall 1999). In this sense, they accumulate 
histories and act both as currencies of value and mnemonic devices that bring the past, other 
places and identities into the present (Pearson 1998: 37) as vital resources for manipulation 
and the creation of debts. For instance, the bones of 'the ancestors venerated in a 
commemorative ceremony may introduce absent times, places as well as material realities and 
values associated with endurance and immortality in contexts of current social practice. 
Performances do not simply occupy time but also produce time as a meaningful 
dimension of social life. People are 'fundamentally temporal beings in that they may 
recognise a past, present and future as categorically separate. It is the ability to recall a 
.. 
personal past, to conceive of oneself as being alongside others in the present and to plan for 
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the future which renders us humans' (Thomas 1996: 236). Moreover, more than one sense of 
time may be found in the same society (Bloch 1977). As a resource time may be both 
consumed and produced in strategic ways. Time, like space, is appropriated through action; 
however, rather than simply consuming time like a commodity, human action itself may 
influence the way people perceive time and in tum time may help to structure human action. 
For example, one's appreciation of a place, practice or object, may be valuable because of 
age, that is the amount of time that has passed, lending it a sense historical legitimacy. 
Recalling traces of the past may solidify historical events and encounters into the material 
world (Tilley 1994: 27: Walsh 1990: 133). Material things then may transcend death, and 
times past, they may stand as reference points for past narratives and help to bring the past 
into the present, creating a sense of continuity or permanence which acts against the fear of 
loss (Thomas 1996: 80; Weiner 1992: 7). The overcoming of fear and loss constitutes one of 
the most important ontological quests of humanity and may be manipulated in order to inflict 
enormous debt obligations. 
'Capital is what makes the games of society something other than 
simple games of chance': A final note on symbolic capital 
It might be said that the making of status or power both depends on, and is a kind of capital 
accumulation process. I defme capital as the capacity to mobilise resources of various kinds in 
order to create debts as vessels for domination, or, to exert influence to raise one's social 
standing (cf. Bourdieu 1977a, 1986; Mouzelis 1995). These resources and thus capital are not 
necessarily confmed to (conventionally considered as) economic ones. They may inClude a 
great range of conventionally unproductive - in economic terms - goods which are used and 
consumed without reproducing the conditions of production. These might be symbols, 
knowledge, skills of various kinds, social proximity, friendship, generosity, access to distant 
and dangerous lifeworlds, rituals, various goods (tangible and intangible), which may be 
temporarily accumulated for unproductive spending/giving away. Here we can also add 
idiosyncratic human qualities such as the ability, talent, skill or open-handedness and 
enthusiasm to mobilise different kinds of resources including wealth for surrender or 
destruction. Access to such kind of resources does not necessarily build an economic capital 
but may enable people to accumulate a symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1977a, 1977b, 1986, 
1991), which can promote their power and widen their influence within society. Thus, there" is 
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not just economic capital but also symbolic or, according to Mouzelis, social capital ll . 
Significantly, symbolic capital like any form of capital not only takes time to accumulate but 
also has the potential to generate profits and reproduce itself in identical or expanded form. 
As such, it can be considered as 'a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that 
everything is not equally possible or impossible' (Bourdieu 1986: 241-242). 
There is still another point of value to consider, namely the relationship of economic and 
symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu, 
Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical 'economic' capital, 
produces its proper effect inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it conceals the fact that it originates in 
'material' forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source ofits effects (1977a: 185). 
Thus, as Bourdieu puts it, symbolic capital is a transformed economic capital that can produce 
effects such as status and prestige only if it involves concealment and misrecognition, that is, 
when people do not recognise the material or economic means behind the source of status and 
prestige. Although I agree with Bourdieu' s idea of concealment of the economic basis of 
symbolic capital's effects (influence and the creation of debts), I believe that we need to stress 
that the source of symbolic capital is not always what today we narrowly perceive to be 
economic capital. To repeat a point already made, symbolic capital can be achieved through 
access to various types of resources and some of them may be intangible or unproductive in 
economic terms. That said, symbolic capital is always economic in a sense, since it involves 
augmentation of resources and the maximization of some kind of profit (Bourdieu 1991: 15), 
though not always directly materially productive profit. 
Another important parameter of symbolic capital is its often oppositional relationship to 
productive -in Marxist terms -economic capital. In many occasions, symbolic capital might 
be accumulated through gift-giving, destruction, or generous expenses of food, labour and the 
means of production. In such cases economic capital as defmed by Marxists, constitutes the 
basis of symbolic capital through a process of negation of its very own existence. Here 
Bourdieu's idea of misrecognition is particularly relevant. Therefore there is a further irony; 
people who have accumulated symbolic capital - debts, high status and prestige - by freely·· 
giving more, and more often than they should, may at times appear less well to do individuals 
in society (Fried 1967: 115). 
The case of the impoverished chief is well known to ethnographers. These chiefs were 
rich, as Fried (1967: 114-118) has told us for what they expensed and not for what they 
11 Mouzelis (1999) prefers to use the term social capital instead ofBourdieu's symbolic capital because 
he believes that the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic capital is problematic, since all 
forms of capital have a symbolic parameter. Social capital, he argues is the ability to mobilise social 
relations to achieve prestige. I agree with his critique on Bourdieu's terminology, but I shall keep using 
the term symbolic since it is better known to the audience due to the wide reputation of Bourdieus' 
work. 
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accumulated. Besides, they worked harder than anybody else, for they were expected to be 
particularly lavish in their distributions. The Zulu chiefs, for instance, could only consume a 
modest amount of porridge, the rest had to be surrendered to their people (Goody 1974: 31-
32). But we should not be misled, this generosity or 'parental' model is not without its hidden 
subtleties. Obviously we do not talk about altruistic instincts but of strategies to exert 
influence or create debts. Moreover, as Mary Douglas has famously asserted, even though we 
celebrate charity as a virtue we know that it wounds. In reality, 'there are no free gifts; gift 
cycles engage persons in permanent commitments that articulate the dominant institutions' 
(Douglas 1990: xii; see also Forde and Douglas 1967: 23). In other words, a free gift is a 
paradox for negating reciprocal exchange creates permanent debts between these involved. 
More importantly, things that are given might not be necessarily material objects. In 
Godelier's words, 
The thing may also be a dance, a spell, a name, a human being, support in a dispute war, and so 
forth ... the category of 'giveables' encompasses much more than material objects, and I will say 
that it takes everything which can possibly be shared. a sharing which makes sense and which can 
put someone else under obligation or create a debt (1999: 102). 
The perpetuation of an unbalanced relationship between donors and recipients cannot be 
easily overcome since the latter are cut of any means to pay back a similar counter-gift in 
order to obliterate their debt towards the former. This debt however becomes a counter-gift 
which might be cashed by the donor, though not usually for similar returns (since the logic of 
free gift negates direct reciprocity) but for other currencies of value such as support, 
submission, influence, gratitude, reputation or prestige. As Firth writes, 'the recipient repays 
by serving as an "instrument of enhancement" for the giver' (1967: 15). 
In the Homeric world competitive gift-giving was a popular avenue to re-known, high 
status, prestige and the establishment of alliances among heroes (Knapp and Cherry 1994: 
147). Although gift-giving is archaeologically invisible because it is 'an ephemeral 
.. 
phenomenon', one may infer its presence through related practices such as deliberate 
destruction or deposition of wealth (Morris 1986: 2). Interestingly, as Bradley (1982, 1990) 
and Kristiansen (1989) have independently remarked, many elaborate artefacts in prehistoric 
times appear to have entered the archaeological record as deliberate deposits in the fonn of 
hoards, grave goods and 'water fmds'. These separate deposits, according to Bradley, might 
be 'variants of one underlying pattern entailing the voluntary discarding of property' that can 
be considered as one way of building prestige (1982: 108). Remarkably, hoards of valuables, 
though rare enough, are not completely unknown in Aegean prehistory (see Branigan 1969). 
Additionally, gifting can be extended to include consumption as in feasting, or the sacrifice of 
wealth items to ancestors and gods. 
180 
Dealing with inequality: Symbolic capital and performance 
At this juncture we should recall that materially rich sites are conventionally equated in 
the archaeological literature with high rank in regard to lavish grave goods and impressive 
structures. These are taken to imply an investment of economic capital in the form of 
mobilisation of raw materials and labour for their construction or production. However, a 
more balanced consideration of the significance of objects can include the grasp not only of 
their production but also of their consumption that might involve practices of destruction or 
waste. No doubt, from the standpoint of materially productive profit, the pyramid is 'a 
monumental mistake; one might just as well dig an enormous hole, then refill it and pack the 
ground' (Bataille 1998: 82). 
On the other hand, one may be sceptical regarding the validity of accounts that emphasise 
gift-giving as a means to power and status, when at the same time they appear to equate 
materially rich sites with high levels of social rank. In the case of palatial Crete for example, 
how would palaces bursting with items of wealth emerge in systems of gifting, debt and 
competitive consumption? (Barrett and Damilati 2002). In such systems sacrifice to gods or 
the dead is certainly possible, but this is not structurally equivalent to accumulation by the 
living. 
Annette Weiner's (1980, 1985, 1992) ideas on the paradox of keeping-while-giving and 
subsequently Maurice Gode1ier's (1999) elaboration of her work offer us some useful insight 
in these matters. In critiquing Mauss's original essay, Godelier demonstrates that along with 
the distinctions Mauss makes between various kinds of gifting, one can fmd recurring but 
undeveloped references to things that cannot be given but must be stored. I ~ant to suggest 
that it is only by understanding the dialectic between gifting and accumulation that it is 
possible to grasp the construction of value. This, in tum, reveals the material construction of 
human identities. 
In ethnographic literature we can distinguish three kinds of gift exchange. The· first, what 
is usually called b~lanced reciprocity, is seen to establish equivalencies between both the 
things exchanged and the participants. Second, are unbalanced exchanges where gifting 
requires reciprocal payments that never cancel out the initial obligation. The latter form of 
exchange structures many of the obligations of kinship and is given a mystical character in the 
debts the living may owe to the spiritual world. Significantly, exchange relations in this case 
are dominated, by the unbalanced relationship between gifts of fertility, life and reproduction 
and the tokens of debt that come with them. Carried forward across generations, they order 
and give identity to participants in terms of these exchange relationships. More specifically, 
they situate the living in relation to the spiritual world. Finally, there is an antagonistic form 
of gift-giving, where Mauss grouped the Kwakiutl Potlatch ceremonies and the Melanesian 
Kula exchange. Potlatch events furnished public stages for the achievement of re-known and 
.. 
honour where competitors sought to silence each other by imposing an enormous challenge to 
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reciprocate. Failure to meet such a challenge, which was accompanied by extravagant 
squandering of wealth, meant that the memory of the original sacrifice of the successful 
participants lived on. Kula exchange provides another context for status and power seeking 
where participants engage in far-flung regional exchanges in an attempt to outrank rivals by 
acquiring the most valued shells. Here gifts, when put into circulation carry the memory and 
re-known of the giver with them as they move from hand to hand to seek out a reciprocating 
partner. The more valuable the gift, the greater the challenge and thus the longer the time it 
remains in circulation and the greater the memory and prestige that the gift accrues to the 
giver. A noticeable feature of all these examples of exchange is that they establish 
equivalences of sorts between things as well as, in relational terms, the identities of the 
participants. 
As we have seen, things are not passive badges of identities but rather enact and validate 
identities, and symbolic capital through their circulation and consumption. Significantly, their 
value is not always decided at the moment of their physical production, as Marxists would 
have us believe, but in usage, as they accumulate history through their movement from place 
to place and from hand to hand, or at the moments of their consumption and materially 
unproductive surrender. But what of those things that must be kept and not given away? Why 
do inalienable possessions exist and what is their role in the production of symbolic capital? 
Both Godelier and Weiner offer straightforward answers: 
. .. no identity can survive over time and provide a foundation for the individuals that make up a 
society if there are no fixed points, realities that are exempted (provisionally but lastingly) from the 
exchange of gifts or from trade (Godelier 1999: 8). 
Persons and groups need to demonstrate continually who they are in relation to others and their 
identities must be attached to those ancestral connections that figure significantly in their statuses, 
ranks or titles. To be able to keep certain objects that document these connections attests to one's 
power to hold oneself or one's group intact. For to give up these objects is to lose one's claim to 
the past as a working part of one's identity in the present (Weiner 1985: 210). 
Arguably, Godelier's and Weiner's remarks prompt us to move beyond the logistics of mere 
physical survival and towards the very definition of the self, community and the never-ending 
search for ontological security and completeness. What we confront in inalienable 
possessions are anchor points or better put, the sacred core that guarantees the definition of a 
particular possibility of humanity, the cosmological certainty' of its existence' (Barrett and 
Damilati 2002, forthcoming) . 
. This may include reproductive fertility, transition to specific stages of social being, 
answers to the worries of birth, aging and death, the landscape and its life forms, the soil into 
which the ancestors are placed and where subsequent generations will follow after death, as 
well as cosmological phenomena such as gods, ancestors, spirits and the secret and sacred 
myths of the world's foundation. While these values may epitomise immaterial theories of 
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existence, they can be manifested materially. For example, they may be present in the way 
that the spiritual world haunts formations in the landscape or specific localities, or as an 
ancestral presence may be embedded in a fragment of a human bone. In addition, they can 
flourish and further be enhanced though the practices of song, dance, story telling and 
prestigious craft work. It should be stressed that all these material manifestations rather than 
being the symbolic representation of some abstract ideal, they constitute the iconic 
appearance of forces and values that give an identity to the human community. As such, they 
would have been media for the revelatory experiences of ritual and initiation and foci of 
enormous emotional commitment to be protected as the cosmological core of the world itself 
(Barrett and Damilati 2002, forthcoming). Such possessions are given in trust to be 
maintained, guarded and venerated. The keepers of the sacred traditions might be skilled 
performers of religious ceremonies; communicators with the gods, spirits or ancestral 
presence; interpreters of signs and myths; experts of sacred body decorations, secrets of 
healing, fertility formulas, dance steps and spells. 
At first sight, it may appear that guardianship of inalienable possessions constitutes a 
responsibility above individual ambition or self-interest and that those entrusted with the care 
of these values act on the behalf of the communal good. In this sense, an aspect of social 
status may act for the community. However, as Wiessner (1996) notes, in fact, this status 
draws attention to itself and acts as a magnet to which others are drawn. The moral core is the 
focus of desire, the desire to be recognised and placed within a particular social community 
(Barrett and Damilati 2002). Additionally, inalienable possessions not only ~ccrue power, 
attention and influence to their owners or guardians but also extend these privileges in other 
transactions, so that the ability to keep becomes a capital that empowers the ability to attract 
(Weiner 1992). This attraction, in which, let it be stressed, no moment is perfectly 
independent of the previous one, is exactly the very essence of capital. Unlike roulette, which 
holds the opportunity of changing one's social standing instantaneously, capital is what makes 
the games of society 'something other than simple games of chance' and ensures that not 
anyone at any moment can become anything (Bourdieu 1986: 241). 
Thus, the sacred moral universe to which all identities are relational does not innocently 
promote social integration by uniting people under a shared cosmology which negates 
differences and establishes solidarity as Durkheim once believed (Weiner 1992: iOl). Instead, 
what is shared talks about the deeper truth of what is not equally shared, about difference that 
establishes debts and domains of authority and reminds us that everything is not equally 
possible or impossible. We may now concur with Bataille (1998) claiming that the sacred 
retains rather than negates difference through destruction, spending of resources, violence, 
sacrifice and above all, as Weiner (1992) so uniquely demonstrated, through the keeping of 
inalienable possessi~ns. 
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A rough guide to the archaeology of Mochlos 
This sleepy seaside village has a few rooms, a hotel or two and a number of tavernas - To 
Bogazi is good - squatting along its tiny harbour~ if you find yourself needing a place to stay, 
you could try the rooms at the clean and simple Pension Hermes behind the waterfront, which 
are the cheapest in the village, or there's Hotel Sofia on the harbour itself for a bit more en-
suit luxury (The Rough Guide To Greece 2002: 706). 
Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce the reader to my chosen case study, the site of Mochlos in eastern 
Crete. Appearances can be deceptive and ~s is more than true in the case of the now modest 
fishing village of Mochlos. In Mochlos, the tourist boom experienced on the rest of Crete is 
still yet only a vague blip on the radar of local tavemas. While the village struggles to attract 
attention from outside today, it was not always this way. MochIos has been the stage for the 
enactment of Cretan history for millennia. Prehistoric populations, Romans, Byzantines, all 
have left their mark here. What follows is a rough guide of Mochlos' location and 
topography, archaeological expeditions, history of habitation and Early Bronze Age 
archaeology, which aims to give a feel for the place and its once glittering presence in Cretan 
history. 
Location and topography 
MochIos lies west of Siteia and east of the Gulf of Mirabello on the coast of northeastern 
Crete (Plate 6). It IS one of the few parts of the coast accessible in this region, but only after 
travelling about 6km down one of two recently paved roads. The easiest entrance is from 
Sfaka 30 km from Siteia and 40 km from Aghios Nikolaos on the main road. Mochlos is 
situated on a low plain that stretches about 4 to 5 km along the coast (Soles 1983). The plain 
is now occupied mostly by olive trees and grape vines (Plate 7a). The modem village belongs 
to the jurisdiction of Siteia and has gained some popularity among holiday makers due to its 
small fish tavernas and picturesque scenery which is further. complemented by many small 
fishing boats anchored in lines on the coast. Geographically MochIos is isolated from the 
interior of Crete by the Omos Mountains that encircle the plain to its west, east and south. To 
the west of the village, carved into the slopes are the nearby villages of Lastros, Sfaka, 
Tourloti and Myrsini. To the north the plain of Mochlos faces the Cretan Sea (Kretiko 
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Pelagos). At some 150 metres off the coast lies a small barren island that rises to a height of 
about 45 meters (Plate7b). It is this islet which comprises the majority of 'ancient' Mochlos 
(Plate 8a). 
The islet covers an area of about 250 by300 metres (Soles 1992b) and is basically 'a mass 
of limestone' of a roughly circular shape (Seager 1909: 274) covered by clumps of bushes 
(Plate 8b). There is some misunderstanding around its actual name (Zois 1973: 98); some call 
it Mochlo or Mouflo, a name that most correctly belongs to the mainland shore opposite the 
islet. However, others call it Psyllo (Flea), a name given as if corresponding to the nearby 
larger island of Pseira (louse). The latter name, which is quite popular among the natives of 
eastern Crete, stems from a confusion regarding the spelling} of the name of the larger island 
(Zois 1973: 98). In fact the official name of the islet of Mochlos is Aghios Nikolaos after the 
name of the small chapel which stands on its south shore. 
Today settlement is restricted to the coastal plain of the Cretan mainland since the islet 
lacks a natural source of water and vegetation but boatmen ferry visitors - mostly during the 
summer season - to its south shore. It is from this side that the island slopes down more gently 
into the sea and becomes accessible. On the west, east and especially the north side, however, 
the island is characterised by abrupt forbidding cliffs (Seager 1909; Soles 1978). 
Archaeological concentrations are extant both on the islet of Aghios Nikolaos as well the 
immediately adjacent shoreline of Crete. It is worth mentioning here that in antiquity the sea 
levels were most likely lower than today so the islet may have been linked to the mainland by 
a narrow strip of land, now submerged some 2 metres below sea level (Leatham and Hood 
1958-1959; Seager 1909; Soles 1978; 1992b). On the mainland shore, two submerged rock-
compartments which may have functioned as fish-tanks in Roman times strongly suggests a 
rise in sea level that subsequently flooded the isthmus creating the island (Leatham and Hood 
1958-1959: 273-275). Hence, before its submergence the isthmus would have made the islet a 
promontory with an excellent harbour on each side (Leatham and Hood 1958-59: 273). 
History of research 
Archaeological inquiry on Mochlos goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
site was brought to the attention of Aegean archaeologists by the American amateur 
archaeologist Richard Berry Seager in the summer of 1907. Seager2 was working in an 
American archaeological expedition at the nearby island of Pseira when a Turkish boatman 
1 According to Zois (1973: 98), the correct spelling of the name of the larger island is not Pseira (louse) 
but Psyra. Psyra is an unspecified fish species. 
2 Seager worked in a series of archaeological excavations in eastern Crete; at Gournia, Sphoungaras, 
Vasiliki, Pseira, M~chlos, Pachyammos, Vrocastro and Pryniatikos Pyrgos (Becker and Betancourt 
1997; Kenna 1970). 
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Plate 7 
a) The area of Mochlos: view from Myrsini - Galana Charakia (source: courtesy of 
Georgios Vavouranakis). 
b) View of the islet of Mochlos as seen from the modern village (source: courtesy of 
Georgios Vavouranakis). 
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a) Map of the islet showing the early cemetery and settlement remains (source: 
Soles 1992b: 186, Fig. 25.1). 
b) Aerial view of the islet (source Soles 1992b:187, Fig. 25.2). 
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infonned him about the existence of ancient walls on the islet of Mochlos (Aghios Nikolaos) 
three miles further east. At the end of the 1907 excavation season at Pseira, Seager crossed to 
Mochlos with around 20 workers for a 3 day exploration. After 2 days of trial excavation 
Seager decided to postpone further investigation until the following year because of the 
intense heat. However, the quality of finds uncovered during this time strongly convinced him 
of the promising archaeology on the island and its worth for a larger scale excavation. 
Systematic excavations started on April 13, 1908 under the aegis of the American School at 
Athens and with fmancial support from the American School, the Boston Museum of Fine 
Arts and Seager himself (Seager 1909: 273; Becker and Betancourt 1997: 86). Directed by 
Seager the excavation season lasted until June 20th after which Seager considered the 
prospect of a second season of excavations unnecessary (Seager 1909: 273). During this 
single excavation campaign Seager's 120 man crew uncovered a prepalatial cemetery on the 
western part of the islet, remains of a prepalatial settlement on its south seashore, parts of a 
neopalatial settlement as well as various remains belonging to Mycenaean, Roman and 
Byzantine times. Seager's excavations on MochIos resulted in two publications. The first was 
a paper that appeared in 1909 in the AJA 3 -and included a brief account of the finds from the 
settlement. The second followed three years later, in 1912, titled Explorations in the island of 
MachIas, a now classic book - for any. scholar interested in prepalatial Mochlos. This 
document contained the excavator's more detailed account of the prepalatial cemetery. 
There can be no doubt of Seager's contribution to Minoan archaeology in general and the 
archaeology of eastern Crete in particular. In an era, when archaeological attention was 
caught by central Crete's impressive palatial discoveries, Richard Seager was among the first 
pioneers in asserting not only the archaeological significance of eastern Crete but also in 
taking an active interest in the period before the palaces, i.e. the Early Bronze Age (cf. Becker 
and Betancourt 1997: 190-191). Yet, as far as Seager's research on MochIos ·is concerned 
there were certain inevitable shortcomings. Firstly, he worked without the benefit of modem 
scientific methods. Moreover, Seager was above all, as Becker and Betancourt (1997: 191: xi) 
remark, a wealthy collector-excavator who was more fascinated with artefacts and pottery. 
While he was quite careful in cataloguing and describing these categories of data, he paid 
very little attention to the collection and publishing of bones and seeds, and his descriptions 
of architecture were not always highly infonnative (cf. Becker and Betancourt 1997; Soles 
1978: 5, 1992a: 41; Zois 1973: 100). 
For several decades, after Seager, Mochlos' archaeology was almost forgotten and its 
architectural remains were left unprotected to wild vegetation and the vagaries of weather 
conditions (Zois 1973: 100). Subsequent research was carried out almost 50 years after 
3 AJA= American Journal of Archaeology. 
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Seager's visit to Mochlos by the Greek archaeologist Nikolaos Platon (see 1954, 1959). 
Platon carried out a series of rescue excavations in the wider area of the MochIos basin. 
Additionally, in 1955, the British scholars John Leatham and Sinclair Hood (1958/1959) 
conducted sub-marine investigation along the coast between the island and the mainland 
shore in order to check whether, as Seager (1909) had proposed, these were actually joined by 
a narrow isthmus during antiquity. The site became the focus of more systematic 
investigations in the 70s through the initiative of a joint Greek-American project under the 
direction of Costis Davaras and Jeffrey Soles. The MachIos Excavation Project has conducted 
numerous cleaning and consolidation operations as well as excavation projects on the islet of 
Mochlos and its adjacent coastal plain. Several specialists in different disciplines have been 
employed to contribute to our knowledge of various aspects of Mochliote prehi.story including 
geology, fauna, vegetation, skeletal remains and stone tools. The project is still in progress 
and has considerably widened our knowledge of the archaeology of MochIos (see Davaras 
1972, 1976; Soles 1978, 1992a; Soles and.Davaras 1992, 1994, 1996). Recently, the first two 
volumes of the fmal report have been made available. Another contributor to the archaeology 
of the wider area is Nikos Papadakis who undertook several rescue operations and 
excavations of tombs at MochIos basin and the nearby villages (see Papadakis 1984, 1986). 
History of ancient habitation at Mochlos 
The site appears to have been first settled in the Final Neolithic. Evidence for such an early 
occupation has been traced to the islet of Aghios Nikolaos and comes from two ceramic 
deposits on the west and south slopes of the islet respectively. Both were uncovered by 
Seager (1909, 1912); the former under the foundation of EM tomb Von the northwest part of 
the cemetery area, the latter under EM settlement remains to the west of the chapel, in what 
Seager calls Block A. The deposits4 produced a small number5 of more or less complete finds, 
chiefly clay ladles, goblets, a couple of vessels of unspecified function, and a clay enigmatic 
object, as well as large amounts of fragmentary pottery remains (parts of clay ladles and large 
plates). Seager characterised the deposit of the west slope as votive. This interpretation was 
4 The deposit beneath tomb V yielded clay ladles, vases, small cups~ two strange objects (clay rings), a 
tiny dish and a: clay enigmatic object. Additionally, a tiny piece of metal (bronze or copper) was found 
inside one of the black ware vases (no. 32). The other deposit produced mainly clay goblets, ladles and 
large shallow plates. (Seager 1909: 279, 1912: 82 and 93). See also note 5. A terracotta clay boat 
discovered at Block D is confusingly dated by Seager as EMI in the fig. 1 (2) of his 1909 (p: 279) 
publication and as EMIl some pages below in the same publication (1909: 290). If the clay boat 
belongs to what Seager believes to be EMI, then it might be actually Final Neolithic, given that 
Seager's EMI objects have been proved to be Final Neolithic. 
5 Unfortunately, I am not able to offer the exact number of these finds, since as Zois (1973: 101) 
remarks, Seager published only 14 vessels (probably those that were more or less complete and the 
ones that were easy to restore) and gave no information about the lack of the pottery fragments. 
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based on the presence of a large pottery deposit on the very edge of the cliffs, a place 
unsuitable for dwelling, as well as on the clay enigmatic object. The latter was assumed to 
have a cultic character since it seemed to be an early example of Horns of consecration. 
Seager also postulated a possible connection with funerary ceremonies, despite the fact that 
no burials of this period were found (Seager 1912: 93). Although Seager originally dated the 
deposits to the EMI phase, more recent scholarship has assigned to them, fairly convincingly, 
a Final Neolithic date (see Vagnetti and Belli 1978: 137; Zois 1973: 104). The first settlers 
were believed to have arrived at Mochlos from larger Cretan settlements like Knossos and 
Phaistos due to the overcrowding of the latter sites or simply in the search of cultivable land 
(Seager 1912: 94). After this occupation, which seems to have been limited in extent, the 
absence at MochIos of EMI wares, like Pyrgos burnished ware and painted wares that succeed 
the Neolithic ceramic sequence, has been taken to suggest a hiatus in the habitation of the site 
(Soles 1978; Soles and Davaras 1992). 
The major occupation of MochIos starts at the beginning of the EMIl, a period that 
according to some scholars coincided with a large wave of migration from central into eastern 
Crete and the subsequent foundation of new settlements (Soles 1988: 60; Soles and Davaras 
1992: 417; Warren 1972: 268). During this phase, a substantial settlement was built along the 
south coast of the islet and an extensive cemetery was founded on its west slopes (Plate 9a). 
Considering its well-watered and fertile plain, nearby marine resources, excellent harbours -
both on the islet and the mainland shore - along with the geology and physical characteristics 
of the islet, it seems that MochIos was wisely chosen by its prehistoric inhabitants (Soles 
1978: 6-7; Soles and Davaras 1992: 417; Zois 1973: 101). More precisely, the islet itself was 
rich in a chlorite schist resource, which would have provided raw material for the production 
of stone vases. Moreover, the islet's summit provided a useful lookout for potential attackers, 
while at the same time obscuring the settlement on the South Slope from passing- ships sailing 
along the coast to the north (Soles 1978: 7). The span of some 600-800 years from EMIl to 
EMIlI has been considered the most significant and prolific period in the history of MochIos 
(Soles and Davaras 1992). During this period, MochIiotes mastered the crafts of jewellery 
(Plate 9b) and stone vase production and obtained exotic raw materials, like gold, silver, tin, 
ivory and obsidian, from afar. The presence of these exotic raw materials have led some 
scholars to ~uggest that MochIiotes were skilful traders and 'seafarers who may have voyaged 
as far as Anatolia (Soles 1978). According to Whitelaw (1983), the period saw the community 
grow large with the population numbering around 330 people.-
The EMIl-EMIlI period of prosperity was followed by an apparent hiatus in settlement 
between the end of the Prepalatial throughout Protopalatial times (MMIA-MMII). According 
to Seager (1909: 275), Mochios appears to have suffered a major destruction in MMIA. Yet, 
.. 
Seager does not offer any detailed information on the issue. The evidence for MMIA-MMII 
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Plate 9 
a) Picture of the islet of Aghios Nikolaos showing the prepalatial cemetery (source: 
courtesy of Georgios Vavouranakis). 
a) Jewellery unearthed from the early cemetery of Mochlos (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 
36). 
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habitation on the islet is sparse. More specifically, apart from tomb A, the rest of the 
prepalatial cemetery goes out of use, while the only evidence of occupation from the 
settlement area, on the south slope of the islet, is confmed to a few ceramic deposits. At the 
same time, this hiatus of occupation appears to coincide with the establishment of tholos 
tombs at Galana Charakia some 3 km to the east of MochIos. Since the shape and the 
constructional details of these tombs point to a southern Cretan tradition, Soles and Davaras 
(1992) have asserted that the tombs were built by newcomers from the Mesara in south Crete 
where tholos tombs were popular. 
The next significant occupation of Mochlos dates to the beginning of the Neopalatial 
period when a settlement was built on the south. side of the islet atop the p rep alatial 
settlement. The Neopalatial (MMIII-LMIB) town consisted of four blocks of houses (A, B, C, 
D) and was provided with streets paved with large stone slabs and cobblestones (Soles 1978: 
11, 1992b: 192). A substantial rectangular two-storey building (House D) was unearthed by 
Seager (1909) at the eastern part of th~ slope in Block D. House D had two wings and 
featured architectural details, like a triple doorway, plastered floors, ashlar facades on its 
street sides and wooden pillars. In Seager's view, these elements appeared to reflect a palatial 
architectural influence and they were employed in this provincial context in order to bestow 
elegance and a veneer of grandeur. The elegance of House D with its palatial Knossian 
fashion were believed to imply that the building was probably the residence of the Mochlos 
governor or of a rich merchant (Seager 1909: 299). A further large LMI house (Building B.2) 
with monumental ashlar facades and pillar crypts standing above Block B was discovered in 
1991 by Soles and Davaras (Plate 10). This building has yielded evidence for administration 
(seals), storage (storage areas) and ceremonial performances (columnar room, pillar crypts) 
that seem to suggest its function as the main administrative and/or religious centre of the 
LMIB town (Soles and Davaras 1994: 396, 1996). Additionally the neopalatial dwellers of 
MochIos reused the burial grounds of the prepalatial cemetery. Apart from reusing some EM 
tombs they also made interments in the ground and introduced a new burial tradition, namely, 
pithos burials. Crucially, the fact that these pithos burials were intended for children6, seems 
to imply that the main neopalatial cemetery of MochIos has not yet been discovered (Soles 
1978: 13). Neopalatial habitation has also been traced on the Cretan coastal plain opposite the 
islet as well as in nearby sites, like Chalinomouri at the eastern end of the plain (Soles and 
Davaras 1992: 418). More specifically, traces of industrial activity, specialising in 
bronzeworking and clay and stone vase production, have been revealed on the Cretan coast 
behind the modern village (Soles 1992b: 192). Furthermore, a sandstone quarry located on the 
6 The interpretation of pithos burials as children burials has been proposed by Seager (1912: 88). 
According to him, the small size of the burial jars, as well as the scarcity of osteological evidence 
implied burials of very young children whose bones are softer and thus more difficult to preserve. 
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Plate 10 
a) Restored view of first and second floors in east wing of Building B.2 (source: Soles 
and Davaras 1996: 188, Fig. 8). 
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b) Building B.2, plan of second floor in east wing (source: Soles and Davaras 
1996: 187, Fig. 7). 
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coastal plain, some 200 metres to the east of the modem village, seems to have been worked 
intensively since the Neopalatial period. The quarried stone was used as building material in 
the walls of the LBA houses of Mochlos but it is quite likely that the quarry did not serve just 
the needs of the local community. It has .been suggested that the opening of the Mochlos 
quarry in the N eopalatial times coincided chronologically with the remodeling of the palace at 
Gournia and that the latter was the main recipient of the stone quarried at Mochlos (Soles 
1983: 43). At some point at the end of the LMIB period, Mochlos suffered a major 
destruction by fire and was abandoned. It appears that many of the inhabitants were unable to 
escape and perished with their houses (Seager 1909; Soles 1999). The original excavator 
reported human bones badly charred in a number of places in House D as well as in other 
neopalatial houses to the west of the chapel of Aghios Nikolaos. Seager (1909: 301) has 
suggested that the destruction was probably the outcome of a violent attack from invaders. 
More recent accounts, however, attribute the LMIB destruction and break in occupation to the 
eruption of the volcano on the Cycladic i~land of Thera that lies some 130 Ian to the north of 
Mochlos (Soles 1978: 14). 
After a major break in habitation, the site was occupied again at some point in the 
Mycenaean period (Postpalatial). That said, as evidence for the postpalatial (LMIII) 
occupation on the islet has come solely from an isolated house, it is difficult to speak about a 
proper resettlement (Seager 1909: 275). On the other hand, a more significant settlement was 
established a safe distance from the coast in the hills at the eastern end of the Mochlos plain 
(Soles 1978: 14). One may also note the discovery of a number of LMIII chamber tombs on 
the Cretan shore opposite the islet and at Aspropilia, Keratidi and Plakalona, about 3 km to 
the east of the plain (Papadakis 1986; Soles and Davaras 1992: 418). One may assume that 
habitation during this period was sought at some distance from the shore for purposes of 
protection. The Mycenaean period was followed by a long period of abandonment which 
eventually saw the establishment of a small settlement late in the Geometric times. Again the 
main concern of the dwellers seems to have been protection from invaders coming from the 
sea, so the Geometric settlement was built on the summit of a mountain at the eastern edge of 
the Mochlos plain at Lenika (Soles and Davaras 1992: 418). 
Traces of Late Hellenistic habitation are represented by a long, one-story building 
consisting of eight rooms (Hellenistic Building I) and a fort, both located on . the south slope 
of the islet of Aghios Nikolaos. The former structure was originally identified as Early 
Byzantine (Soles and Davaras 1994) but further research proved it to be of a Late Hellenistic 
date (Soles and Davaras 1996). Hellenistic Building I produced pottery of the late second and 
early first centuries B.C., stone tools, a spindle whorl and two beam presses. According to the 
excavators, the building appears to have had significant industrial functions, possibly olive 
and textile production (Soles and Davaras 1996: 225-226). At the area above Hellenistic 
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Building I lies the Hellenistic Fort. It consisted of two groups of rooms, a series of bastions 
and a continuous wall. As Soles and Davaras (1996: 227) note, the fort may have been 
established by the Ptolemies for their operations in eastern Crete and the Aegean. 
In Roman times, a substantial settlement occupied the south slope of Aghios Nikolaos. 
The Roman town was probably also extended opposite the islet on the Cretan shore. Roman 
activity on the mainland is further supported by the discovery of fish tanks for the storage of 
live fish found opposite the islet (Leatham and Hood 1958-1959). Moreover, numbers of 
Roman coins have come to light from both the islet and the Cretan shore (Soles and Davaras 
1992: 419). Another Roman settlement has been reported at the eastern end of the plain of 
MochIos (Soles 1978: 15). 
Finally, in the Byzantine period, traces of two small hamlets have been found along the 
south coast of Aghios Nikolaos and opposite the island on the Cretan mainland at Loutres 
(Soles and Davaras 1992: 419). During this time, a large fortress with towers were erected on 
the summit of the islet, apparently for the protection of the population from the raids of 
Saracen pirates (Seager 1909: 275-276). 
Today, archaeological fmds from Mochlos are exhibited in various museums throughout 
Crete (Herakleion Museum, Siteia Museum, Aghios Nikolaos Museum), the United States 
(University Museum, University of Pennsylvania; New York Metropolitan Museum; Boston 
Museum of Fine Arts) as well as in Britain (British Museum) (see Becker and Betancourt 
1997; Kenna 1972; Soles 1992b). 
Visiting the Prepalatial settlement and cemetery 
Our knowledge of the prepalatial settlement of Mochlos is extremely limited. From what is 
now known and published, the settlement probably stretched around 150 metres' from east to 
west along the s<?,uth shore of the islet and over 50 metres to the north up the South Slope 
(Soles 1978). Furthennore, the discovery of EMIl pottery along with traces of walls on the 
submerged isthmus adjacent to the south coast seems to suggest that the early settlement 
stretched in this direction as well (Branigan 1991a; Leatham and Hood 1958-1959; Soles 
1978). According to a tentative estimate, the settlement occupied an area of at least 0.8 
hectares, that is ten times the area of Myrtos, and consisted of around 55 houses (Whitelaw 
1983: 338-339 and fig. 72F). However, for Soles and Davaras (1992: 424-426 and n. 30), a 
more modest estimate of 30 families might be more appropriate given our incomplete 
knowledge of the north-south extent of the settlement and its density of habitation. 
Prepalatial settlement remains from MochIos are quite scant (Plate 11a). Consequently, 
the exact plan and density of the prepalatial settlement may never be reconstructed in any 
.. 
detail. Unfortunately, Seager (1909) produced no plan of the settlement and was extremely 
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brief in his description of the prepalatial settlement remains he uncovered in Blocks A, C and 
D. In Block A, Seager uncovered a number of small rooms that yielded EMIl and III pottery 
deposits. Yet, apart from commenting that the rooms had poorly built walls which probably 
served both the EMIl and III periods - since there was no evidence of apparent rebuilding 
between the periods - he offered no further information about their architectural details. At 
Block C, Seager documented an EMIlI deposit consisting of twenty vases. Finally at Block D, 
EMIl and III pottery fragments were reported under two LMI houses. Again Seager provided 
no information regarding whether any prepalatial architectural remains were traced in this 
area and confined his description of the fmds to the single stone vase of green soapstone 
uncovered from an EMIl layer under one of the later houses. 
More recent investigations conducted by the Mochlos Project have reported three EM 
structures (Soles and Davaras 1992: 426; 1994: 394-396; 1996: 178-180). The first structure 
(Prepalatial House I, Plate lIb) lies at water's edge under two LMI houses (C.l and C.5) in 
the area designated by Soles and Davaras as F3 (Seager's Block C). The building was in a 
poor state of preservation especially along its west and east sides where it was overlain by 
later structures, and along its south side where beach erosion had exacted its toll. Although 
only three rooms of the house have so far been unearthed, the excavators note that its actual 
size might have been much larger. The building produced EMIl and III pottery chiefly of 
dark -brown burnished ware and eighteen stone tools, including fishing weights, hammer 
stones and obsidian blades. The second structure (Prepalatial House 2, Plate Ilc) is located 
beneath Block B in area E3. Unfortunately, only a few walls and parts of three rooms have 
been found. Finds included numerous stone tools and EMIl pottery. Additionally, a deposit 
containing EMI to EMIIB pottery was found outside the west wall of the building. The 
deposit might have originally belonged to another room in the house which did not survive. 
According to the excavators, the building was originally constructed probably late in EMI and 
remained in use t~oughout the EMIIA and lIB periods. The third structure (Prepalatial House 
3) was also uncovered in the Area E3. It is located to the north of the Prepalatial House I 
beneath an alley that runs alongside a LM house (C.3). Prepalatial House 3 seems to have 
been of superior construction compared to the other prepalatial buildings discovered so far at 
Mochlos. It is a large rectangular structure with massive, carefully built walls that could have 
supported a second story. According to Soles and Dava'ras, the large size and the fine 
workmanship of the building along with the large amount of EMIlI pottery it produced might 
imply a distinct function. 
Notwithstanding these new and interesting settlement fmds, the task of reconstructing the 
prepalatial settlement plan is hindered by the fact that many later structures cut into EM levels 
to the bedrock destroying much of its character (Soles and Davaras: 1996: 178). With 
.. 
193 
Plate 11 
... ... -.... 
_ PREfJALATIAl 
a) Plan of the Bronze Age settlement remains (source: Soles and Davaras 1996, Fig. 1). 
I PREPALATIAL MOCHLOS ~ I '10.00.= 1 . J • 1 ~950---- .---- Iif:( })- - ~l~~ - ,~')C-.. - --
I 4-D· .£/~. ;~ - - --- - - - -- --l 
.);./ ,·f. fl' ..... I '1Z-c.I \ . -. I 
I ___ . \ f~ 'l',h \ I f\ lJ .. ,·''-
I I _----- ~~\)I<.:D' "'l~du .. ..,--...r t:~ 
L- -- c!: ~ ' ,7 
_ L 
b) Plan of Prepalatial House 1 (source: Soles and Davaras 1994: 395, Fig. 3). 
7 4 00~ 
. . 
~!~~ .- .- - - __ ______ __ ______ . ___ ..L ______ _____ ______ __ . _____ ~_ .. ~u 
c) Plan of Prepalatial House 2 (source: Soles and Davaras 1996: 179, Fig. 3). 
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publication of the latest settlement evidence still pending, it is towards the early cemetery that 
we must tum therefore, in order to resurrect something of social life at prepalatial Mochlos. 
The prepalatial cemetery of Mochlos occupies the western part of Aghios Nikolaos (Plate 
9a). It has been considered one of the most important cemeteries on Crete, since it contains 
more built tombs than any other single cemetery on the island (Soles 1992a). These were 
roofed rectangular structures featuring architectural elements such as thresholds, doorways, 
internal partitions and plastered wall surfaces (Soles 1978, 1992a). The built tombs of 
Mochlos are widely known in the literature as House Tombi since their fonn and 
architectural details seem to emulate domestic architecture (Plate 12a) (Soles 1992a). Apart 
from the built tombs, three rock-shelters and a pit-grave have also been detected. Although 
most of the built tombs were constructed in the beginning of the EMIl phase and continued in 
use in EMIlI, there are certain examples that survived in the MMIA phase. After a significant 
hiatus in its use, the prepalatial cemetery was employed by the neopalatial dwellers of 
Mochlos as a burial ground for children who were interned in pithos burials. Additionally 
during this period some of the prepalatial tombs were reused. 
To date, around thirty prepalatial tombs have been documented. They occur in two 
different sections on the western side of the islet; the West Terrace and the South Slope8 
(Plate 12b). The West Terrace constitutes a narrow ledge isolated on the westernmost face of 
the island. It is cut off from the rest of the Aghios Nikolaos on the north and east by sheer 
cliffs that rise from about 15 metres all the way to the top of the islet. To the west of the 
terrace cliffs drop away 20 to 25 metres into the sea (Plate 13a). The only access to the terrace 
is along a narrow 3 metre wide ledge on the south side. From this point the terrace slopes 
upward and runs about 45 metres to its north end. Here are located two large tomb complexes; 
Tomb Complex I, II, III (Plate 13b and c) and Tomb Complex IV, V, VI (Plate 14). The 
former stands on the lower, more southern, part of the West Terrace and is built against the 
face of the eastern cliff wall. It is open on the west side where a narrow pathway hanging on 
the terraced edge bypasses the tomb. The latter occupies the upper, north end of the terrace 
which forms a roughly triangular space enclosed on the east and north by the cliffs that defme 
the terrace and on the west by the drop to the sea. 
Anyone who wants to approach the West Terrace must pass first through the South Slope 
that lies to its southeast. The South Slope is defined to the northeast by a low' cliff and on the 
northwest by a drop in the islet's bedrock that goes down to the level of the West Terrace. To 
the southwest it is bounded by the sea. The South Slope contains the vast majority of tombs. 
7 Examples of House Tombs, though more common in eastern Crete, have been also found in central 
and south Crete (Soles 1992a). 
8 Here, following Soles (l992a), I will be using the name South Slope to refer to both the area 
excavated by Seager and called by him Main Slope and to the adjacent area to the east where further 
tombs were uncovered by Soles and Davaras. 
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Plate 12 
a) House tomb V showing threshold, doorway and internal partitions (Seager 1912, Fig 
17). 
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b) Prepalatial cemetery showing West Terrace (shaded grey) and South Slope (source: 
Soles 1992a, Plan 3). 
Plate 13 
a) Cemetery on West Terrace high above the Aegean (source: Soles 1992b: 189, Fig. 
25.5). 
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b) Plan of tomb complex I, II, III located on the West Terrace (source: Seager 1912: 19, 
Fig. 3) 
c) Computer reconstruction of tomb complex I, II, II (source: courtesy of Georgios 
Vavouranakis) 
Plate 14 
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Plan of tomb complex IV, V, VI (Source: Seager 1912: 41, Fig. 15). 
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Seager (1912: 13 and 15) reported seventeen small tombs9 in the western part (Main Slope) of 
this area. However, he postulated that, given the steep declivity of the area, which would have 
made extreme the process of denudation, the original number of tombs must have been 
double. Most recent investigations by Soles and Davaras have brought into light further 
tombs lO to the east of the area (Main Slope) excavated by Seager. Most of the South Slope 
tombs were built on semi-artificial, semi-natural terraces that ran from east to west across the 
slope. Starting close to the water's edge (Plate 15a) the terraces rose one above the other 
towards the top of the South Slope. The uppermost terrace is the only complete remaining 
example, however, partial remains of terraces evident below, as well as natural contours, 
suggest that there may have been as many as seven. Tombs were built backing onto the wall 
of the next terrace behind and were accessed by passage that ran along the outer edge of the 
terrace (Seager 1912; Soles 1978, 1992a). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning two interesting structures, namely Building N and Building 
3 discovered by the Mochlos Project (Soles and Davaras 1992: 424). Both structures are 
located at the southernmost part of the cemetery and bear unusual features which according to 
Soles and Davaras might imply a function other than funerary. Building N is a small 
rectangular structure that produced a large deposit of obsidian· cores and blades. As the 
excavators remark, it is not clear why the obsidian deposit was placed in this building in the 
context of the cemetery. The second structure, Building 3, was provided with a four-step 
staircase leading from the threshold at the south-west corner down into the building (Plate 
ISb). In the excavators' view, the large amount of fragmentary dark-burnished plates 
retrieved from the structure might suggest its use as a storage area for offerings made in the 
cemetery. 
9 Tombs VII-XXIII. 
10 Tombs Z, H, 8, I, K, A and M. Apart from these tombs that lie on the east of the area excavated by 
Seager, the Mochlos Project cleaned and described further tombs (A, B, r, /j. and E) in the area (Main 
Slope) excavated by Seager. These tombs seem to have been uncovered originally by Seager, though 
none had been numbered or described in Seager's publication of the cemetery (Soles 1992a; Soles and 
Davaras 1992). 
195 
Plate 15 
a) South Slope Terrace 7, view from the east (source: Soles 1992a, Plate 24.a). 
b) Building E on the South Slope (source: courtesy of Georgios Vavouranakis). 
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Introduction 
The archaeological site of Mochlos may not attract the enormous crowds of culture vultures 
that visit the palatial sites of Knossos, Malia, Phaistos and Zakros, still it has come to rank 
amongst the most important and controversial Early Bronze Age sites of Crete. For many 
experts, the exceptionally rich fmds retrieved from the cemetery imply the original emergence 
of social inequalities on the island, one that may shed light on the processes that eventually 
brought into being the palatial systems of power in Middle and Late Minoan periods (see for 
example, Branigan 1991a; Soles 1988; Soles and Davaras 1992; Whitelaw 1983). On this 
score, MochIos has come to be portrayed as an evolutionary stepping-stone towards the 
supposedly more advanced and rigid palatial structures of inequality. Be that as it may, there 
is also a counter premise that sees MochIos more along the lines of the revolutionary 
perception regarding the historical emergence of inequalities on Crete. For example, Watrous 
(1994) and Cherry (1983, 1984) have debated Mochlos' interpretation as a 'rank' society and 
stress that the splendour of its finds is not strong enough evidence of the presence of ruling 
elites in the EBA. Stated simply, the existence or absence of inequalities at Mochlos during 
these times, can be seen as an apple of discord between those who accept an early .emergence 
of social ranking and those who assign to it a palatial date. 
In this chapter I want to explore current interpretations of social inequalities during the 
EBA of MochIos, as well as the role and significance of the site as part of the evolutionary 
paradigm of power in the Aegean. As I try to demonstrate, despite its central place in debates 
of the emergence, Mochlos somehow occupies an anomalous position, since it eludes .the 
anticipations of the evolutionary model of social change. That is, despite its characterisation 
as one of the richest EBA sites of Crete, it never became a palatial centre of power, as the 
evolutionary paradigm of the relationship between wealth and inequalities would have us 
expect. Having said this, one should not take MochIos' status as a null case within the 
evolutionary paradigm as an indication of a society where 'normal' development was arrested 
by some strange malady (Clastres 1989 [1977]). Power inequalities in EBA MochIos were 
neither less significant nor less rigid than those assumed for the subsequent palatial societies 
(Damilati and Vavouranakis forthcoming). 
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The significance of prepalatial Mochlos in Cretan prehistory: An 
overview of current insights. 
Towards the end of the season we found the early cemetery which was a very rich one quite the 
best I should say that has been found so far in Crete .... One of the largest tombs was literally filled 
with gold ornaments. Diadems, pins, chains, etc. You will realise the importance of this when I tell 
you that the graves are for the most part Early Minoan II and III (Seager, letter to Bert Hill, 14 
August 1908 cited in Becker and Betancourt 1997: 88). 
When Seager wrote this letter to his colleague Bert Hill, he could hardly contain his 
excitement. Seager realised that he had not just uncovered another Cretan Bronze Age site. It 
was located in the eastern part of the island, far away from the impressive palatial discoveries 
at the island's centre. The splendour of its artefacts, combined with their early dating 
evidence afforded a new significance to the Early Minoan period, that previously had been 
largely ignored. The harvest of valuable objects included stone vases that demonstrated the 
highest level of craftsmanship, and a considerable treasure of gold ornaments indicating an 
unusual level of prosperity (Plate 16). Seager's finds marked an important juncture in Aegean 
archaeology; the Early Minoan Age had ~ast off its associations with primitivism, and eastern 
Crete would no longer be considered a cultural backwater (Seager 1909, 1912). In addition, 
one of Seager's radical breaks with prior research was to suggest the existence of social 
inequalities as early as EMIl. In his view, the large tombs on the West Terrace with their 
valuable objects most likely constituted the final resting place of the princely or ruling elite of 
EMIl MochIos (Seager 1912: 17). Seager then went on to assert that the great prosperity of 
EM Mochlos and its rulers had probably something to do with its excellent harbour. This 
would have triggered the development of Mochlos into 'a great maritime power' seafaring as 
far as Egypt (Seager 1912: 12-13). 
Nowadays, several decades after Seager, current scholarship is of two minds regarding his 
abbreviated interpretation of the EM community as a ranked society. Most specifically, the 
existence or absence of social inequalities at prepalatial Mochlos fuels discussions which 
divide Aegean scholarship between those who accept an early appearance of social ranking 
and those who prefer to assign to it a palatial date. However, according to the more popu"larl 
view, MochIos is depicted as an evolutionary stepping-stone to the palatial societies of MMIB 
(see Branigan 1991a; Soles 1988; Soles and Davaras 1992). For example, in Soles and 
Davaras's (1992: 417) opinion, MochIos can be seen as a model site for the investigation of 
the cultural processes surrounding the emergence of civilisation. Thus, some writers assert 
that if we can demonstrate with some security the existence of social ranking on the island 
already from the EM period, we can gain some information about the rise of the palatial 
1 But see Cherry (1983, 1984) and Watrous (1994), who oppose the early appearance of social ranking 
at Mochlos. 
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a) Stone vases from the prepalatial cemetery (source: Seager 1912, Plate II). 
b) Gold jewellery from the prepalatial cemetery (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 41). 
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institutions. In the case of Mochlos the evolutionary assumption appears to find support in the 
great amount of valuable objects retrieved from the West Terrace tombs of the early 
cemetery. These are seen to reflect unequal access to wealth and translate automatically to 
power and ruling elites. 
Soles (1988: 60) has interpreted the emergence and nature of political power on Mochlos 
as the outcome of social and environmental pressures. According to him, the large-scale 
eastward migration from central Crete that led to the establishment of many new settlements, 
like Mochlos, in EMIl and the inevitable conflict which resulted from the not always 
harmonious co-presence of different cultures may have played a key role in the emergence of 
EM elites. The power of the latter was most likely based on their role as managerial and 
organisational agents in colonising expeditions as well as on their ritual skiIl~ and knowledge 
for the protection of the colony. 
Meanwhile, following in the footsteps of Seager, several scholars have linked the 
prosperity of Mochlos in EMIl and III t~es evidenced in the valuable tomb gifts to maritime 
trade activity. According to Soles, for instance, the tombs of MochIos most likely belonged to 
'a small town that became prosperous by trading in the Aegean' (1992b: 186). Similarly to 
Branigan (1991a), the exceptional wealth of Mochl~s, evidenced. to a large degree by the 
occurrence of products made of exotic raw materials and of a small quantity of imported 
finished objects, indicates that the site acted both as a centre of production and as a 'gateway 
community' . That is, not only did it receive various goods through long distance 
communication and produced objects of fme quality made of either local or exotic materials 
but most likely controlled their movement into the wider region of eastern Crete. As Branigan 
notes, it seems unlikely that Mochlos would have been self-sufficient in subsistence matters; 
in order to acquire sufficient food supplies, the community would have to enter into exchange 
with other communities in the wider region and trade exotic raw materials and locally 
produced valuable objects for food. In Branigan's words, 'acquisition of adequate food 
supplies presumably hinged upon [Mochlos'] success as a gateway community' (1991a: 104). 
From these statements, it has proved only a short step for some Aegeanists to suggest a 
connection between trade and the formation of the EM political elites at Mochlos. Thus, 
expanding on his 'gateway' model, Branigan asserts that elite power at Mochlos rested on 
control of acquisition and exchange of prestige products. More recently, Whitelaw (2002) has 
advanced a similar argument regarding the basis of power of early elites at Mochlos. At the 
same time, those who write in an evolutionary-gradualist· tradition submit that these early 
ruling elites 'played a key role' in the rise of the palaces and 'decided to a large extent the 
political nature' of the Minoan palatial civilisation (Soles 1988: 60). Paradoxically, despite its 
description as one of the richest sites on EM Crete, since it contains a larger concentration of 
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goldwork and other valuables than any other single cemetery on the island (Branigan 1983b, 
1991a), Mochlos never saw the development ofa palace complex. 
More to the point, the Mochlos assemblage of valuables is unique and does not seem to 
fuel regular exchange relationships outside the local community. Note here that this argument 
is in direct opposition to Branigan's view of MochIos as a gateway community 'controlling 
exchange within and into and out of a region, including that to and between elites sites' 
(l991a: 103). However, if I read the evidence correctly, it seems to me that both fInished 
products coming from outside Crete and artefacts locally produced (at Mochlos) but made of 
imported raw materials stay at MochIos. For example, the golden jewellery from Mochlos, 
which provides 40% of the total for the whole of EBA Crete (see Branigan 1991a), is a 
unique assemblage in Crete. The neighbouring cemeteries of Gournia and Pa~aikastro cannot 
match MochIos. The same picture is revealed for the Mesara Tholoi located further afIeld as 
Branigan (l983b, 1991a) himself has shown. Notably, golden diadems are quite rare outside 
MochIos2 and broad golden armlets, which might have been mounted on leather backings, are 
known only from Mochlos (see Branigan 1983b). More importantly, a quick look at the 
golden diadems from MochIos suffices to demonstrate that none bears exactly the same 
decoration as any other3• Likewise, the silver artefacts found at Mochlos not only represent by 
far the largest sample on EBA Crete (see Branigan 1991a) but again bear a unique character. 
We may note here indicatively a ring with bezel and a small silver bowl decorated around its 
lower half with beading found in tombs XIV and VI respectively (see Branigan 1968). The 
ring differs signifIcantly in design from silver rings retrieved from EM contexts in Arnnisos 
and Aghios Antonios and fmds only a single parallel from Krasi. The silver bowl along with a 
further silver vessel (Plate 17) recovered more recently by Soles also from tomb VI at 
MochIos (see Davaras 1975) constitute the only silver vessels known to date from EBA 
Crete4• A similar picture is revealed through the high quality stone vases made of local 
materials. Again the scarcity5 of Mochlian examples outside Mochlos itself indicates their 
participation in an indigenous scheme of consumption. Moreover, is it appropriate to see the 
handful of assumed MochIian stone vases found at other sites as tokens or commodities 
channeled through a regular economic regional network in which MochIos played the leading 
role of administration? Could they not rather be heirlooms that marriage partners from 
2 Of the 40 diadems recorded to date, Mochlos has yielded by far the largest number (20). See Branigan 
(1983b). 
3 I return to this point in chapter ten. 
4 For further examples that reveal the unique character of the silver artefacts ofMochlos see Branigan 
(1968). 
5 Examples of stone vases that are believed to be of Mochlian origin include a goblet from Myrtos, an 
alabaster jug from Vrokastro, a miniature amphora from Pseira and a handled cup from Sphoungaras 
(Branigan 1991a: 100). 
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Mochlos might individually bring with them to their post-nuptial residence or even gifts 
occasionally given outside the local community for hospitality or for friendship? 
In the light of the above remarks, we may start reconsidering Branigan's (199Ia) 
description of Mochlos as a 'gateway' community where valuables find their way into a 
greater region. Equally, Whitelaw's (2002) thesis that the power of the EMIl elite of Mochlos 
was rooted in control of the channeling of finished prestige items and raw materials south into 
Crete appears ill founded. Rather, an opposite tendency seems to be at work; Mochlos appears 
to receive a modest quantity of imported finished artefacts (two or three have been identified) 
and to produce valuable artefacts of a distinct local character, made of either exotic or local 
materials for internal consumption. Significantly, the internal consumption of valuables 
stresses their inalienable nature beyond the boundaries of the local community. Interestingly, 
the same seems to occur for other communities in central Crete, where their cemeteries reveal 
an emphasis upon Cycladic-like figurines, mid-rib daggers and obsidian, which is almost 
absent in the tombs of Mochlos. This fact seems to challenge Halstead and O'Shea's (1982) 
premise that inter-communal integration culminating in the palaces came about through 
regional exchange systems where valuable tokens circulated between different communities 
as currencies of a common valuation deyice. Simply put, exchange of valuable objects or 
'tokens' does not explain the integration of local communities and the creation of the Minoan 
palatial system of power and authority. There seems little doubt that the grand evolutionary 
paradigm that has so far monopolised discussion about inequality in Aegean prehistory is 
currently looking a bit thin. Thus, Mochlos, which is constantly described as a wealthy ranked 
community that can inform us about the evolution of social inequalities that culminated in the 
rise of palaces, escapes the expectations of the evolutionary agenda which considers wealth as 
the cornerstone behind the emergence of the palatial systems of power and social integration. 
It seems to me that the interesting question is not any longer how and why palatial 
systems of authority come about, but how and why they do not. Aegean scholarship has been 
largely mute regarding this issue. It is only very recently that Whitelaw (2002) alone among 
Aegeanists has sought an answer to the paradox that Mochlos presents for the evolutionary 
approach to social change. I have already discussed his model earlier in this study6, so I shall 
not go into detail but I shall repeat briefly some of his points that seem relevant to the issue. 
Central to Whitelaw's account is that EMIl-III Mochlos was indeed a ranked cOmn1unity with 
a ruling elite whose power rested upon control of the exchange and manipulation of prestige 
.. . 
items. Yet this source of power (exchange-based power structure) Whitelaw argues, was 
highly unstable and failed to trigger Mochlos' development into a palatial centre of authority. 
Instead Mochlos declined after the later Prepalatial times. On the other hand, sites like 
6 Chapter four. 
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Knossos and Malia being situated in areas of fine agricultural potential had access to a much 
more effective source of power, namely agricultural surpluses that eventually enabled their 
development into urban-centred palace states. There may be some truth in this account. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that the way Whitelaw frames his scenario constitutes the best 
resolution of the paradox that MochIos appears to present. His model seems to suffer the 
drawbacks of the evolutionary paradigm of social change. That is, although he aims to depict 
alternative pathways to complexity in Crete by presenting two different patterns of 
development, he seems to assume implicitly that Mochlos demonstrates a step backward on 
the evolutionary stepladder of complexity. The upper step is still reserved for the palatial 
state-societies. Yet, it is my contention that if palatial state-societies represent a higher level 
of complexity in terms of being endowed with more pervasive, effective and rigid structures 
and resources of power the case of EM MochIos and its wealth may tell us a different story. 
We will return to this interesting issue in the closing section of this study where I will try to 
offer some preliminary thoughts on the concept of the state. 
Having argued for an internal consumption practice for valuables at Mochlos and keeping 
in mind that consumption is the chapter of the objects' biography in which these cease to be 
neutral goods and become signifiers of ~terpersonal relations (Gell 1986: 113) it might be 
worth trying to consider their significance as active tools for the construction of identities and 
power relations within the native community. In the extant literature the valuables of Mochlos 
are held to be indices of wealth, high stanis and power; yet our understanding of how exactly 
they operated within the local valuation scheme is still patchy. What the EMIl inhabitants of 
Mochlos saw in these artefacts and how these were strategically employed in the creation of 
debt and relational social inequalities, namely, how exactly these participated in local games 
of power constitutes a topic that needs closer scrutiny than it has hitherto been accorded. I 
shall return with some thoughts on this issue in the next chapter where I will present my 
understanding of the prepalatial community ofMochIos. 
Reading inequality at Mochlos 
Over the last decades several scholars have tackled the issue of power inequalities within the . 
EM community at MochIos. Whitelaw, taking his lead from the often-cited view that there is 
a direct correlation between the size of society and social organisation, has submitted that the 
substantial size of the site most likely points to 'some fonn of hierarchical social 
organisation' (1983: 339). Subsequently, Soles (1988) has proposed that we can trace a 
prepalatial elite (already from the EMIl) in the West Terrace of the cemetery with the 
commoners buried in the tombs of South Slope. He notes that a large community might not 
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necessarily equal social ranking as Whitelaw assumes. Social ranking, according to Soles, is 
better demonstrated by the topographical predominance of the West Terrace tombs in the 
landscape but even more crucially by differences in wealth between burials with respect to 
grave furnishings, differences in the architectural elaboration, the size of tombs and 
differential treatment of the dead. Finally, Branigan (1991a) has based his interpretation of 
Mochlos as a ranked community largely 'on the criteria advocated by Soles, but does not 
completely rule out Whitelaw's argument regarding the correlation between population size 
and organisational complexity. On the other hand, Watrous (1994: 713) and Cherry (1983, 
1984) have cast serious doubt on the description of Mochlos as a hierarchical society by 
emphasising that although the unequal distribution of grave goods at the cemetery conjures up 
the image of a community with wealth inequalities, there is no evidence for a political 
hierarchy. I shall merely bring to readers' attention that both scholars' scepticism about the 
existence of a Mochliote political authority appears to stem from a valid point, namely that 
wealth inequalities do not necessarily imply power inequalities. Yet, I believe that Mochlos' 
wealth informed practices that were crucially interwoven with games of political power. I 
return to this point in the next chapter. 
F or the moment I would like to part ~ompany with Watrous and Cherry and agree with 
the first three authors' suggestion concerning the existence of relational social inequalities at 
the EM community. However, I take issue with some of the criteria with which they base 
their premise. Moreover, I will try to show that the pattern of inequality suggested by Soles 
and subsequently by Branigan - as a simple polarity between elites on the West Terrace and 
commoners on the South Slope - is not as straightforward as they assume. Rather the story 
seems to be more complex. It is time to acknowledge that alternative avenues into the 
examination of inequality in the EMIl may be more productive than those advocated by Soles. 
I suggest' that power inequalities at prepalatial Mochlos were based on the appropriation and 
accumulation of symbolic capital rather than on the transformation of wealth into an 
economic capital channeled to reproduce the conditions of production. Although we cannot 
and must not rule out the production of economic capital at Mochlos, we should be more 
attentive to the ways that wealth was consumed and expended in order to be transformed into 
symbolic capital as well as on various others performances which enabled the building' of 
symbolic capital by drawing on a wide variety of resources not always seen as narrowly 
economic or material. Thus, building from the anthropological and sociol?gical insights I 
have earlier discussed, I will frame some questions that seem to me worth considering; was 
wealth the most important parameter of social distinction on Mochlos? What was wealth's 
destiny and in what ways was it brought into playas an instrument of power? Was there a 
single currency of value associated with wealth or different valuation schemes within which 
wealth was consumed through various practices? More significantly, is it useful to continue 
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discussing wealth exclusively through the capitalist lens of the western experience that 
emphasises the production mentality? By looking at the early cemetery of Mochlos I will 
emphasise some points that seem to be relevant to the above questions. Before moving on 
however, it is instructive to return to Soles's criteria of inequality and see whether the 
Mochlos evidence bears them out. 
Firstly, let us consider the issue of the distribution of so called valuables within the 
cemetery, which has led scholars like Soles (1988; 1992a), Branigan (1991a) and Davaras 
(1975: 114) to infer the presence of a limited elite at the West Terrace. This elite, Branigan 
argues 'was able to dominate the distribution and acquisition of gold and silver, high quality 
stone vases and bronzework, and a small quantity of imported artefacts' (l991a: 103). A point 
has to be made here to ensure clarity concerning the nature of valuables. At the moment, I am 
talking, as Soles and Branigan do, about particular categories of objects such as golden and 
silver jewellery and artefacts, bronze objects and stone vases of high quality. Later I will 
widen the term 'valuables' to include other materials and intangible goods not traditionally 
conceived as such. 
A closer look at the distribution pattern of the precious tomb gifts reveals that there are no 
striking disparities in wealth between the tombs on the West Terrace and those on the South 
Slope (Watrous 1994: 713). Despite appearances to the contrary, rich burials or burials 
containing so called elite valuables are not confined to the West Terrace. Thus, tombs such as 
IX, XVI, XX, XVIII, XIX, XXI, XXII, XXIII and A on the South Slope have produced elite 
grave goods and some of them (XIX and XXI) can rival those of the West Terrace in the 
wealth of their furnishings (Plate 18). Ironically, the heaviest and largest gold object, an 
armlet (Plate 19a), found in the entire cemetery comes not from the West Terrace tombs but 
from tomb XVI on the South Slope (Seager 1912: 68). At the same time, we need to bear in 
mind that the South Slope tombs have been eroded and plundered to a greater extent than 
those of the West Terrace. This may distort the clear-cut demarcation claimed between the 
two sides of the cemetery. Arguably, a good number of MochIos tombs contains similar grave 
goods yet the stress varies, and there are some, though not particularly striking, deviations in 
quantity that might be either real or the result of differential degrees of tomb erosion and 
looting. Nevertheless, if we are to assume an uneven access to valuables (not simply as the 
result of variable preservation) this seems to concern a number of tombs located both on the 
West Terrace and South Slope. 
As for the next criterion of social ranking, namely differences m the architectural 
elaboration and size of tombs, Soles asserts that 
Considerably more energy and expense went into the construction of those [tombs] on the West 
Terrace. These tombs [I, II, III and IV, V, VI] are not only two to three times larger than the largest 
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of the South Slope tombs (and six times larger than the smallest)~ they were built more carefully 
(1988: 50). 
Certainly, we cannot refuse to acknowledge that the tombs of the West Terrace (complex I, II, 
III and complex IV, V, VI) are large structures but we must also note that tomb A (Plate 19b) 
on the South Slope rivals them in size. Thus, large size is not a characteristic confined to the 
tombs of the West Terrace. More to the point, Watrous (1994) has asserted that the large West 
Terrace tombs were not constructed at once but that some of their compartments were added 
over time. For instance, rooms III and V constitute later additions to mortuary complexes I, II 
and IV, VI respectively. This might imply that the West Terrace tombs did not demand a 
great immediate mobilisation of work force for their construction. Meanwhile differences in 
the size of tombs might indicate an unequal reproduction of the groups associated with them 
rather than any unequal access to labour and building materials. 
More crucially, it is noteworthy that out of about thirty tombs that have so far been 
identified in the cemetery all but four are built and belong to the same category of rectangular 
tombs commonly known as House Tombs. Of the remaining four graves, three are rock-
shelters (VII, VIII and XVIII Plate 20) while only one inhumation in a simple pit has been 
reported. Hence, the great majority of the MochIiote community was buried in the same type 
of grave. It is remarkable that the dead at MochIos were more often buried in built tombs as 
opposed to rock-shelters or pits. At the same time, the building materials used in the so called 
House Tombs are not scarce; the mud, the stones, the tools used in building all come from 
local resources and would have been available to every member of the MochIiote community 
equally. The same can also be said about the knowledge that the construction of these 
buildings involves, since despite some individual constructional details the. tombs belong to 
the same general category. 
The interesting question is, given that the materials, the labour force and the technology 
associated with the tombs of the West Terrace do not appear to be scarce resources, why in 
fact did only some segments of Mochliote society construct large tombs? As I noted above, 
this might be just the result of unequal reproduction of assumed family groups. However, if 
we suppose a more or less similar size for the groups buried in different House Tombs the 
question posed above needs an answer. I cannot conclude with an impressive alternative other 
than to direct attention to the simple fact that this parameter of inequality, namely the size and . 
elaboration of the tombs, cannot easily be explained through a model that stresses unequal 
access to resources and a wealth assumed to have enabled mobilisation of labour for their 
construction. Kanta's (1983) ethnographic research has demonstrated the oversimplification 
inherent in the assumption that houses or buildings of a substantial size (in our case tombs) 
are necessarily associated with rich households: 
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a) Rock-shelter tomb VII (source: Soles 1992, Plate 34b). 
b) Rock-shelter VIII (source: Soles 1992, Plate 35a). 
c) Rock-shelter XVIII (source: Soles 1992, Plate 35c). 
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The size of a house however, does not always reflect the family wealth in traditional Crete. An 
example of this in Monastiraki is a substantial house belonging to a poorer family. The owner and 
his relatives cleared away the ground, used the local bedrock for stones, and built the large two-
storied house themselves at the beginning of the century, without much expense, apart from their 
personal work and time, of which they had plenty (Kanta 1983: 159). 
Stated simply, the differential size of tombs at MochIos might not necessarily have been the 
result of differential economic achievement and might be seen to exist independent of 
narrowly defmed economic factors. In addition, particularly telling is Watrous's observation 
that tomb XIX, despite its architectural modesty, presents a great wealth of tomb gifts. Thus, 
architectural sophistication/large size and rich furnishings do not present a strict 
correspondence at MochIos (Watrous 1994: 713 and n.l28). Even if we are to consider the 
large tombs as constructions that came about through mobilisation by some segments of the 
population of the labour of some others in debt, another interesting fmding arises. It is clear 
that the tombs cannot be deployed to demonstrate the transformation of wealth into economic 
capital for re-investment in production but rather into a symbolic one. The construction of a 
tomb can hardly be considered as a productive asset in narrowly defined economic terms. 
Instead it stresses social reproduction and games of power performed through materially 
unproductive consumption rather than an economic intensification which aims to increase 
productivity (as assets like the clearance of a field or the building of a terrace for cultivation 
would imply). At the same time, the likely mobilisation of labour for the construction of the 
large tombs at Mochlos does not display any striking repetition. It can instead be seen as a 
temporary and episodic event in time or chain of similar events, keeping in mind Watrous's 
(1994) premise that each large tomb was probably the product of two episodes of building. 
On the other hand, what appears, at first sight to distinguish the West Terrace from the 
South Slope more conspicuously is that the former was enriched with structures external to 
the tombs such as open paved areas, an ascending ramp, a raised terrace and an altar (Plate 
21). These according to Soles (l992a, 1992b), most likely demarcated areas where ritual 
ceremonies of a public character would take place. under the control of the elite: Yet, one may 
note here that the South Slope was provided with two different structures (Buildings N and 3) 
that equally seem to imply ritual performances of some kind .. 
Another issue that deserves expansion concerns the practice of secondary burial rites and 
its common association with rich burials and high status. It is tacitly accepted that secondary . 
burial by extending the duration of funerary rites constitutes a more complex, elaborate and 
economically expensive (in capital, energy and time) treatment of the dead reserved for a 
minority of individuals. According to Soles (l992a: 243), a burial in a House Tomb 
constituted a two-stage undertaking, in the sense that the bones were relocated after the body 
had been completely defleshed. This has been taken to involve more effort than pithos burials 
(Sphoungaras, Pachyammos, Malia) or inhumations in the earth (Sphoungaras) or burials 
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a) Tomb I VI VI VI , base step of approach (source: Soles 1992a, Plate 22b). 
b) Tomb IV/V/VI, altar and raised terrace (source: Soles 1992a, Plate 22c). 
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made in rock crevices (Malia) (Soles 1988). Nonetheless, at Mochlos itself the distinction is 
not that sharp, given the fact that only three rock-shelters and one pit-grave have been 
reported. Thus, although Soles (1992a: 244) is not explicit about whether he believes that 
extended funerals were also held at the House Tombs of the South Slope, he admits that 
secondary burial can be made within one and the same room. Consequently, on the West 
Terrace the existence of tombs with empty rooms probably intended for the initial laying-out 
of the dead seems to suggest an extended funeral rite, yet it does not inevitably mean that 
secondary burials were confined only· to that part of the cemetery. Most significantly, 
anthropological research has shown that secondary burial has no necessary connection with 
high status, wealth or even, in some cases, with ritual efficacy. This style of burial might have 
only had a marginally higher cost compared to a death rite of an abridged kind (Metcalf 
1981). A case in point is provided by the ethnography of the Berawan of central northern 
Borneo. Metcalf documented not only that funerary rites held immediately after death (patai) 
can be expensive enough to rival in splendour extended rites (nulang) of secondary treatment 
of the dead but also that there is no direct relationship between rank and ritual sequence. In 
his words, 
We cannot assume that the 'best' people receive nulang and the rest only a funeral. Events may 
tum out to the contrary. Noble families can afford nulang, but they are also more likely to have on 
hand the necessary surplus of rice, pigs and other necessities to proceed directly with a patai 
funeral on a grand scale (Metcalf 1981: ~72). 
The above remarks force us to reconsider the conventional wisdom which holds that 
secondary treatment of the dead is much more expensive than an immediate funeral or is 
intended exclusively for rich individuals. In many cases the option for an extended rite might 
only be a practical one, associated with the occurrence of death at an awkward moment, for 
example during harvest when people are busy working in the fields or when available 
resources like foodstuffs are low. ·Ironically enough, the option might be promoted because of 
an inability immediately to mobilise resources that a funeral of an abridged kind would 
demand. As Metcalf has further intimated, unlike death itself, secondary burial can be 
scheduled to fit into a time when a stock of resources is available. To return to MochIos, even 
if we assume that secondary burials are confmed to the West Terrace, something that seems 
unlikely, Metcalfs study warns us to be careful regarding any simplistic and quick. 
associations, such as that advocated by Soles, between funeral rites and wealthy or high rank 
individuals. 
Summing up, at first sight the early cemetery of MochIos does seem to bear out an 
unequal distribution of wealth between the West Terrace and the South Slope. Yet, this is not 
as striking as that envisaged by Soles and Branigan. Notably, some categories of data, like the 
large size and architectural sophistication of the West Terrace tombs or secondary treatment 
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of the dead may not necessarily be the result of unequal achievement in (narrowly defined) 
wealth matters like access to labour and building materials. The link between wealth and 
power is still missing. Thus even in the case that wealth disparities were profound between 
the two parts of the cemetery, one should not lose sight of the fact that wealth is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the establishment of relations of debt and consequently power 
inequalities. It is my contention that it is only by looking at the specific contexts of wealth's 
performance by embodied human actors that we may grasp something of its significance and 
meaning as a vessel for the creation of debts and relational inequalities. I tum to this issue 
next. 
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Chapter 10 
Performing inequality six feet under: 
A drama at Early Bronze Age Mochlos 
Introduction 
Having developed a critique of the Aegean paradigm on inequality in general and on Mochlos 
in particular, it is time to close the circle by proceeding to my own reading of Early Bronze 
Age Mochlos. In the first place, my interest in MochIos began some seven years ago during 
my Master's degree. At that time, as part of my assignments I attempted to trace evidence of 
social ranking at the site by looking at the archaeology of 'social power' (Barrett 1997). The 
archaeology of MochIos and - to be honest - the richness of the finds retrieved from the 
prehistoric cemetery, as well as its topographic division fascinated me from the very first. 
However, at that time I was still trying to hunt down origins, as well as substantiate Soles's 
(1988) distinction between the West Terrace and South Slope material as a distinction 
between elite and non-elite groups. More precisely, I was working along the lines of a 
hierarchical model that I was hoping to supplement with some arguments about horizontal 
differentiation inspired by Crumley's (1987, 1995) ideas on heterarchies, without yet 
engaging seriously with the notion of performance. My Master's course convinced me that I 
wanted to pursue questions of power and inequality in Aegean archaeology. With the start of 
my PhD I was confident that Minoan palaces, the assumed manifestation par excellence of 
power relations, were a productive field for study. Moving away from the impressive palatial 
edifices of Knossos, Malia and Phaistos, I chose the more modest and provincial.neopalatial 
complex of Goumia in eastern Crete as my case study. Influenced by then fashionable 
theories of 'power to' (Miller and Tilley 1984; Barrett 1997) I wanted to show that power is 
above all present in society as an enabling capacity. Moreover, I wanted to demonstrate that 
power is not restricted to elite groups, but rather, that where there is power, there is also 
resistance and that all humans in this sense could be seen as empowered. However, I was still 
uncertain whether the existence of truly egalitarian societies was a social impossibility; I still 
had my doubts. Two years into the research I realised that a theory of power must begin with 
the question of the comrrion-sense definition of power, what is referred to as 'power over' -
the ability of an individual to subvert the will of another. The question was now: was this 
aspect of power omnipresent in every society in the same way that 'power to' was thought to 
resonate across the social spectrum. My context had to change, and so I went back to the 
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Early Bronze Age where the issue of the emergence of power reigns supreme in academic 
research. I returned to Mochlos where I had started. 
It should be clear by now that I object to the evolutionary paradigm of relational 
inequalities. I instead believe that relational inequalities are present in every society, through 
the creation of debt obligations. Equally, given the objective limitations imposed by the 
nature of prehistoric evidence with respect to the identification of physical groups - a point 
discussed in chapter six - I feel unease with accounts of factional competition. Thus at 
Mochlos I do not ask whether inequalities exist in the Early Bronze Age, but how they were 
perfonned. Neither do I substitute a simplistic heterarchical portrayal of the division between 
West Terrace and South Slope for an equally problematic hierarchical one. 
It is the central thesis of this study that the construction of symbolic capital through 
materially unproductive practices could be usefully considered as a significant parameter of 
social distinction and the means through which relational inequalities were created in EBA 
Crete. I would further maintain that there is no single currency of value within the Mochliote 
prepalatial community. Rather, symbolic capital was built up through various performances 
that drew upon diverse material and, non-material resources. A closer look at the early 
cemetery indicates various kinds of routine performances that might have created different 
valuation schemes and currencies of value as they were enacted by embodied human actors in 
different contexts. Inequalities were constructed and experienced, through practices where the 
human body in various states of being '. and becoming, such as styles of movement, body 
ornamentation, gestures, rites of passage and passions of consumption (like feasting and 
drinking) participated actively by drawing on a wide repertoire of resources. Since people 
craft their perfonnances by employing a wide range of props in and according to specific 
settings where they assume particular identities, it is useful to consider the Mochliote 
landscape as an active theatrical stage with its various protagonists, sceneries; exits, and 
entrances. This not only accommodated but also created various performarices and 
subsequently different opportunities for the enactment of symbolic capital In order to 
examine these propositions let us revisit Soles's topographical distinction of power between 
the West Terrace and South Slope. Let us also assume, following Soles, that this entails a kind 
of social differentiation but this time based on various valuation schemes stemming from 
different kinds of performance or different ways of crafting perfonnance. 
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Not to say this did happen but perhaps this could have happened (pearson 1998: 37). 
I think it is useful to suggest that the architectural layout of the West Terrace could be likened 
to a theatrical stage (Plate 22a) where various ostensible ritual dramas were enacted. This can 
be inferred from the spatial arrangement of the West Terrace which featured two open-air 
courtyards: one outside compartment III of mortuary complex I, II and III and another outside 
tomb IV, V, and VI. In the latter case, the combination of different types and colours of stone 
flagging created a decorative mosaic, conspicuously marking and differentiating space from 
that of the surrounding area. This distinctive contrast would probably have been employed to 
reinforce a clear and restricted field of social practice (Kirk 1993), visually infonning 
individuals that only specific forms of conduct were suitable. A further interesting 
architectural element of the tomb is a raised terrace (Plate 21 b) which flanks the open 
courtyard to the east. This structure suggests the accommodation of spectators for events 
taking place in the courtyard (cf. Soles 1978: 11). To the above structures we can also add a 
small stepped bastion which stands at the northernmost part of the courtyard, at the outer 
south-east corner of mortuary complex IV, V, and VI. According to Soles (1978: 11, 1992a: 
57), the discovery of fragments of stone vases on the top of the bastion possibly indicates that 
the structure served as an open-air altar (Plate 21b) for the placement of offerings. Moreover, 
the entry to complex IV, V and VI was provided by an ascending ramp that extends east-west 
across the Terrace, about 4 meters south of the tomb (Soles 1978: 11, 1992a: 56). To sum up, 
the elaborate and complex built environment of the West Terrace appears to demonstrate a 
ceremonial function and Soles (1978) has rightly proposed that certain rituals, funerary or 
religious or both took place there. In addition, the West Terrace was provided with" a paved 
avenue of approach (Plate 22b), which seems to have served as a processfon area (Soles 
1992a: 223) . 
. Looking· at the spatial arrangement of the West Terrace appears therefore to suggest two 
orders of participants; the watchers and the watched, or the spectators and the active 
performers of the ritual sequences. More precisely, the West Terrace was able to. 
accommodate public gatherings which apparently revolved to some extent around the display 
and manipulation of the dead body}. Still, it is possible that some Mochliotes were unable to 
cross the procession area that marks the entrance to the West Terrace. The view taken here is 
} I shall suggest below that the West Terrace probably accommodated mortuary rituals. Following 
Barrett (1988: 31) by the term mortuary rituals I mean those rituals that create passages between life 
and death. These include both funerary rites and ancestor rites. 
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Plate 22 
Altar 
Courtyard 
'-.....I ' ... 
a) The West Terrace as a theatrical stage; tomb complex IVNNI with paved 
courtyard and altar (source: adapted from Soles 1992a: 52, Fig. 20). 
b) West Terrace, paved avenue of approach (source: Soles 1992a, Plate 16a). 
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that even those prehistoric actors who were granted access to the West Terrace's architectural 
space most likely experienced the events held there in very diverse ways. The spatial 
arrangement of the terrace suggests three distinct gradations through which ceremonies were 
experienced (Plate 22a). Firstly, many may have observed the ceremonial practices while 
sitting on the raised terrace. Here onlookers probably took on a more passive role in the 
ceremony. A second gradation is evident" in the paved courtyards where it might be assumed 
that people stood taking a more active part in the performances enacted there. Finally, only a 
very few appear to have been granted access to the altar or inside the tombs because of their 
restricted size. More to the point, it seems to me that the very architectural arrangement of the 
West Terrace did not simply invite large gatherings but more importantly it was designed to 
guide the way that actors 'read' this space. The architectural layout suggests that bodily 
movements and postures were oriented in very particular ways so that certain visual fields 
were emphasised while others were restricted. In this sense, one may claim that the 
architectural features of the terrace were intrinsically linked to political strategies that drew 
upon disciplinary technologies which acted upon people through the control of the body in 
order to elicit certain ideas, emotions, values and beliefs (Kirk 1993: 188). 
For example, the inside/outside division of access to the tomb chambers may be taken to 
create, organise, remind and conspicuously display 'a graded field of knowledge' (Thomas 
1993: 34). Keeping in mind that 'the dead may work miracles ... they may be [benevolent or] 
malevolent and dangerous spirits' (Parker Pearson 1993: 203), actively engaging with them, 
placing them in tombs, and entering into their resting places would have been a way to 
establish debts and obligations among those who did not dare, or were ineligible to perform a 
task of such gravity. Ensuring the correct performance, that is dealing effectively with the 
dead would have required knowledge of particular rules of conduct. This 'know-how' was 
performed in secrecy, hidden deep inside the tomb chambers. Those ineligible to enter the 
tomb, to share this body of knowledge directly, served to demonstrate by their very exclusion 
the distinction between themselves and those who possessed the required knowledge to 
engage actively with the dead. Similarly, one may detect a further gradation of knowledge 
outside the chambers of the tomb complex IV, V and VI between those actors performing 
actively on the open-air courtyard and those sitting on the raised terrace. While the former 
group's active participation would have depended upon and demonstrated a stock of 
appropriate knowledge, the latter's experience of the ritual events was mo~t likely shaped by 
observation and listening alone. We may further suggest that in this context, moments of 
hierarchy were built out of the 'disequilibrium of body language' (Keating 2000) through the 
performance of ritual sequences. That is the architectural arrangement of the West Terrace 
produced a particular 'choreography of authority' through the body (Connerton 1989: 74). 
This would have been expressed, experienced and recalled not just through the particular code 
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of movement imposed by the built environment but also through the particular repertoire of 
appropriate postures that the ritual sequences would have dictated. Simply put, where and 
whether one could stand, move or sit and which postures one was expected to adopt relative 
to others would have contributed to the performance and experience of moments of inequality 
by reminding the actors 'of systems of classifications which the group [held] to be significant' 
(Connerton 1989: 88). 
Additionally, it is particularly notable that people standing on the courtyard and most 
evidently the spectators sitting on the raised terrace of mortuary complex IV, V and VI would 
have been afforded a good view of the sea to the west (Plate 23). Parenthetically, it is . 
important to note that given the westward currents in this part of the Aegean, it was from the 
west that most sailing vessels would have approached Mochlos (Plate 24a) (Agouridis 1997: 
5). According to Vavouranakis (2002: 73 and 113), this emphasis in orientation to the sea 
(rather than the land) may indicate the special significance of the 'seascape' and maritime 
activity to the prepalatial community. As he notes, the location of the tomb complexes I, II, III 
and IV, V, VI on the West Terrace probably was not accidental; the West Terrace constituted 
a 'key navigation point' and a 'sea gate' from where sailing boats carrying exotic raw 
materials approached MochIos. It is wo~ mentioning that the West Terrace was not just the 
starting point but also the end point of the lifecycle of the exotic materials coming to 
Mochlos. For it was in the West Terrace where most of' these exotica (after their 
transforlnation into fmished objects) were eventually deposited (Damilati 2002). Hence, one 
might assume that both the location of the West Terrace tombs and the ritual events held there 
became symbolically linked to maritime activity and its exotic cargo which would eventually 
reach the end of its circulation as it was deposited with the dead (Vavouranakis 2002: 189 and 
Fig. 7.3). 
It is significant to recognise that the built environment of the tomb complexes was not 
simply produced as a passive backdrop for mortuary ritual. Neither was its significarice based 
on the act of their building through the investment of labour and expensive materials if any. 
Instead of paying privileged attention to temporal origins, it is more important to understand 
how the built environment was actively consumed, negotiated and made meaningful to 
members of s,9ciety through the different social contexts of its inhabitation (cf. Barrett 1999; 
Thomas 1993). The significance of this space and the knowledge of how to act, was· 
constituted through lived experience of ceremonial practices, and the way they unfolded 
. . 
within the physical nature of the West Terrace. The performance of ceremonies was gathered 
through ambulatory vision and encoded in memory. The choreography of past ceremonial 
performances was carried forward through memory as expectations that could be applied to 
new ceremonial experiences. Through this education of attention and bodily 'enskilment' 
(Ingold 2000), the built environment took on classifications of meaning that helped to 
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Plate 23 
a) West Terrace looking back to modern village; affording panoramic views of the sea 
(source: courtesy of Georgios Vavouranakis). 
b) Computer model looking east towards islet and West Terrace (source: courtesy of 
Georgios Vavouranakis). 
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distinguish the way that individuals related to the tomb environment, and to each other. As 
this process unfolded through time~ relations of inequality become constructed and 
reproduced. Performance acted as a means of inscribing and cognitively mapping upon 
individuals' knowledge about whom to respect and when to respect them. 
Furthermore, the ancestral character of the West Terrace was accentuated by a Neolithic 
ceramic deposit (Plate 24b) located underneath compartment V (of the tomb complex IV, V, 
VI). Notably, as I have already mentioned, this deposit constitutes the earliest trace of 
habitation at MochIos and has been described as having a votive character firstly by Seager 
(1912) and subsequently by Zois (1973). I would suggest that the presence of this assemblage 
was likely to have been acknowledged by the builders of the EM tomb implying the fusion 
between space and what Yi-fu Tuan (1978) calls 'Cosmogonic time', that is the story of 
origins and myths about creation. Here, space becomes a repository of memory as well as 
debt, as the past is actively drawn upon as a means of colonising the present. It might be said 
that the past is an important resource, marshalled as a means of interpreting the present, but 
also for forecasting the future. Individually, the past is manifested as memory, but collectively 
it refers to history, both of which inform a sense of identity (Jenkins 1996: 28). In this setting, 
origin myths would have probably aime~ to show how founding ancestors came to this place, 
the adventures and hardships of their travels, the way they settled and prepared the earth for 
human habitation, as well as the instructions and the commands they left for generations to 
come (cf. Tuan 1978: 8). Drawing upon the works of Godelier (1999: 185), Meillassoux 
(1978a: 137-147, 1981) and Friedman and Rowlands (1977: 207), I would like to suggest that 
these 'civilising acts', could be described as a free gift, one which put the members of the 
whole community under a permanent obligation towards the ancestors. Yet it remains to be 
asked, how could humans ever give back what they received? People attempted to protect the 
ancestral presence by building upon its memory by reinforcing it through material veneration. 
In Lowenthal's words, 'as the past decays both in the ground and in our memories, ·we make 
the most of thos~ relicts that survive' (1992: 109). The material evidence of the cemetery 
suggests that this was what members of the community did. By celebrating the setting of the 
ancestral presence and heralding its existence they sheltered the material remains of the 
ancestors by "~uilding upon it the EM tomb. Other gifts, that might have been offered to the 
ancestral spirits, would have included prayers, offerings, and even sacrifices2 (Godelier 1999:. 
180). Yet according to Godelier (1999: 185-186), no counter-gift can measure up or be the 
, . 
equivalent of the gifts offered by the ancestors. This is the case because the ancestral powers 
originally gave humans that which they deemed appropriate, without humans ever having 
2 Here the term sacrifice does not designate the offering of human or animal victims for which there is 
no evidence available, but rather symbolic acts of killing like the deposition of grave goods in tombs. 
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Plate 24 
a) Sailing vessel approaching from the west (from Psyra) (source: courtesy of Georgios 
Vavouranakis ). 
UUI\."(--C~ Bench/altar 
Neolithic Deposit 
b) West Terrace as a theatrical stage featuring Neolithic Deposit (source: map adapted 
from Soles 1992a: 52, Fig. 20; Neolithic deposit from Seager 1912, Fig 48.). 
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asked. Moreover, just as the ancestral powers are not compelled to give, they are also not 
compelled to accept or reciprocate in tum. Finally and most importantly, even when the 
ancestors accept human gifts - what they have given to people, the world, life and death - is 
such that human gifts cannot repay; in other words, humans have no equivalent to return. 
Stated simply, the debt of the people to the ancestors can not in any way be cancelled out. 
Returning to Mochlos, while knowledge of the Neolithic deposit might have been 
mutually shared, it may not have been shared equally by all members of the community's 
inhabitants. I would suggest that a minority might have controlled knowledge about the past 
having taken charge of dealing with this profound debt towards the ancestors on behalf of the 
whole community. This select group would have faced the inescapable tension between 
aspirations to maintain secrecy, which might confer power and prestige, and sharing 
knowledge which may not only have authenticated their role as keepers of the ancestral 
traditions (Hendon 2000) but also created ostensible debts. As Cohen suggests 'in all political 
systems, the men at the top develop a "mystique" which raises them above the multitude, 
validates their status in the eyes of their public and also convinces the men themselves of their 
own "right" to their superior position in society' (1974: 16). Knowledge of the ancestral 
presence, the hopes and the fears, the ~lessings and the anathema that it may have fostered 
was most likely shared among the wider population. However, the material remains of this 
presence mediated through the architecture of their tomb, may have been the inalienable 
possessions of a particular group, which had to be guarded and venerated properly. These 
would have been important duties the consequences of which would have been shared and felt 
by the whole community. Yet, their success was probably dependent upon ritual expertise and 
a corpus of knowledge that was not open to all members of the community, but perhaps only 
to those who were linked with the tomb complex (IV, V and VI) located at the heart of the 
ancestral land. Here we observe a version of the paradox of keeping-while:..giving that 
surrounds most inalienable possessions and creates conspicuous debts. While the' material 
remains of the an~estors, their guardianship, and the deeper powerful secrets 'they held about 
the past, as well as the right to mediate the ostensible ancestral debt, were perhaps exempt as 
objects of gift-giving, the benefits that these were believed to convey may have been 
presented as gifts to be shared by all. 
Moreover, I think it can be argued that the character of mortuary performances within the 
context of the cemetery may itself have helped to reify the obligations of debt both between 
, . 
members of the community and the ancestors, as well as between individuals within the 
performance itself. As Connerton (1989: 45) has suggested, ritual performances of a 
commemorative character do not simply imply continuity with the past, but actively claim this 
continuity. By doing so they attempt to legitimate a narrative of events that continues 
uninterrupted through time and space without change. Such ceremonial activity, I would 
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suggest not only satisfied the conditions of debt, but also acted as a sensual reminder, a kind 
of mnemonic device that safeguarded debt from slipping into oblivion. 
In contrast, very different stage scenery is revealed at the southernmost part of the 
cemetery at the South Slope. Here, the funerary character of the built environment suggests a 
more ambivalent situation; apart from tombs, two buildings whose function cannot be 
positively identified as mortuary have been uncovered (Soles and Davaras 1992: 424). These 
are Buildings N and 3 (Plate 25a). Here the public notions of the West Terrace are replaced 
by the more private connotations of visits to the so called Lustral Basin or Adyton. I am using 
these terms3, which actually refer to later, namely neopalatial, constructions commonly 
associated with initiation rituals (Plate 25b) (Marinatos 1984, 1993; Driessen and Macdonald 
1997) in order to describe the function of Building 3, which featured a staircase of four steps 
leading down from the entrance to the sunken floor. According to Soles and Davaras (1992: 
424), architecturally speaking the structure resembles Building 21 in the Phourni cemetery at 
Archanes (Plate 25c). Interestingly, the excavators of the latter structure have entertained its 
interpretation as a Lustral Basin (Sakellarakis and Sakellarakis 1991: 85). 
I would suggest that this area of the cemetery prompted the living to engage with ritual 
actively rather than passively watch the fate of the dead body. The absence of performances 
of a public character is indicated by the small size of Building 3 and the lack of architectural 
elements which could accommodate large public gatherings. In this place performances would 
have been imbued with an aura of mystery since they were effectively concealed from public 
view behind the walls of Building 3. We may assume that in this context accumulation of 
debts and symbolic capital included the control of and participation in rites for the few, as 
well as access to secret knowledge and utterances that their enactment involved. A 
noteworthy fact is that the sunken floor of the so called Lustral Basins strongly suggests the 
likelihood that they were areas of separation and seclusion from the surrounding space: 'when 
descending into them, one partly disappeared from view and reached a different level' 
(Marinatos 1993: 79). Moreover, bearing in mind that structures of this type seem to display a 
concern with privacy and secretness (cf. Marinatos 1993: 81), I would contend that the 
association of Building 3 with initiation rites of some kind is highly probable. 
It is not o~t of place to remark here that a detailed ethnographic study of intiation rites has 
positively shown that all initiation rites involve secrets that have to be guarded since they aim-
3 Both terms are used to describe neopalatial structures that feature a sunken floor. The former has been 
originally used by Evans (1899-1900) who believed that the particular structures were either bathrooms 
or units that accommodated purification ceremonies. Graham (1962: 107; see also Hitchcock 2000) 
subsequently asserted that the so called Lustral Basins were the stage of cultic activities that may have 
involved some kind of bathing. Marinatos (1993: 77) prefers to call the structures in question A dyta and 
although she stresses their cultic nature she challenges their association with bathing. For a full 
discussion on various interpretations of these units see Marinatos (1993: 87). 
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Location of 
Buildings N and 
8 on South Slope 
1Q 
Plate 25 
a) Map of the cemetery showing buildings Nand E on the South Slope (source: adapted 
from Soles 1992a, Plan 3). 
b) (Left) Reconstruction of room 3 at Xesti 3 Akrotiri, with Lustral Basin (source: 
Marinatos 1984: 67, Fig. 44). c) (Right) Building 21 at Archanes Phourni (source: 
Sakellarakis and Sakellaraki 1997: 230, Fig. 60). 
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to transmit powers and knowledge that are restricted to the initiated (La Fontaine 1986: 15, 
185-186). The proposed link between building 3 and initiation rites can be supported not only 
by its architectural resemblance to neopalatial Lustral Basins but also, as I hope to make 
clear, by other types of evidence from the South Slope. In short, the view taken here is that 
building 3 may be seen as the stage of initiation performances or other transition rituals (rites 
de passage) that revolved around the living, actively becoming body. Nevertheless, the most 
radical implication is that rites de passage, namely rites that 'ensure a change of condition or 
a passage from one magico-religious or secular group to another' (Van Gennep 1960: 11) are 
practices which involve the creation of debts and power relations. Without undergoing 
initiation a person born and living in a particular society is denied admission to states of being 
and social groupings that constitute 'a common frame for much of life' in society (Edmonds 
1999: 31). For example, the uninitiated man is not a man but a boy; the uninitiated woman is 
not a woman but a girl. Crucially, in many societies entrance to various social groupings or 
transition to different states of being constitute events that rather than being biologically 
defined are closely associated with the reaching of particular grades of knowledge transmitted 
through initiation by qualified ritual specialists (La Fontaine 1986). Needless to say, the 
knowledge of the latter being instrumental in the construction of the self as a full social being 
may be seen as an effective vessel for the establishment of relations of debt and the 
accumulation of symbolic capital. This concerns those who aspire to construct themselves as 
full social beings and those whose knowledge and wisdom are the only effective means for 
entertaining this end. The fundamental significance of this debt becomes even more apparent 
bearing in mind that the newly initiated actors can now participate in performances, enter 
social contexts and become entangled in relationships, obligations and rights from which they 
were previously excluded. Indeed, as La Fontaine (1986: 185) remarks, after initiation many 
existing relations will be transformed and even those who have not yet undergone initiation 
will be affected by the change in those who have. Equally important given th~t every social 
relationship bears. the yeast for shaping states of indebtedness (cf. Leach 1982), the 
entanglement into new or remodeled social relationships that initiation offers provides new 
arenas and occasions for the initiation of debts between different members of the society. 
Simply put, the initiated can be a debtor herself or be under the debt of her fellow human 
beings, according to the occasion, in social contexts from which she was previously excluded. 
Furthermore, the South Slope yielded two stone tables marked on the upper surface with 
small circular depressions that have been interpreted by Soles and Davaras (1992: 424; see 
also Soles 1992a: 221-223) as Kernoi. According to the existing literature Kernoi (Plate 26a) 
are often described as offering receptacles4 used in cultic activities (Marinatos 1993: 7; Soles 
4 But see van Effenterre (1955) and Zois (1976) who interpret the stones in question as gaming tables. 
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1979: 154 and n.30, 1992a: 222; Warren 1972: 231). Thus, the stone tables from the South 
Slope, which notably are the only examples of Kernoi found so far on Mochlos, may suggest 
that we cannot rule out the presence of some kind of ritual performance of a public character. 
Yet, in the absence of architectural elements that would accommodate a more formalised or 
substantial open-air gathering of spectators or both, it might be reasonable to assume that 
whatever public ceremony that took place on the South Slope, it would have been of a limited 
scale and lacked the ostentatious formality of the West Terrace. Alternatively, the Kernoi 
found on the same area of the cemetery where the Building E stands, that is at the entrance to 
the cemetery, may imply a connection with the performances taking place inside this building. 
At this juncture, it is useful to mention that most Kernoi have been retrieved from non-
funerary contexts (Soles 1992a: 221). This fact might suggest a link between these stones and 
rituals that revolved around the world of the living, such as initiation rites. Additionally, their 
likely interpretation as tables 'for the offering of the first fruits' (Soles 1979: 154) if correct, 
might point to notions of fertility. Be that as it may, I feel that overall the southernmost part of 
the cemetery appears to demonstrate an emphasis on performances that revolved around the 
body of the living. The very position of building E and the Kernoi located at the southernmost 
part of the cemetery which was also its natural entrance (considering the settlement on 
Mochlos was only a short distance further to the southeast) might suggest a transition area, 
one that was intermediate to the routines of the everyday life on the settlement and the world 
of the dead, inhabiting the cemetery. Interestingly enough, according to Van Gennep (1966) 
transitional areas are spaces where transition rites are undertaken as a means of validating the 
passage from one social or magico-religious position to another. I would add here that I do 
not rule out that the transition rites which may have been enacted on the southernmost part of 
the cemetery may also have involved performances intended to prepare visitors ~o enter the 
cemetery (Vavouranakis 2002: 119) and participate in the spectacular mortuary ceremonies 
held on the West Terrace or in the less ostentatious funerals of the South Slope .. 
At the same time, on both sides of the cemetery, performances were shaped by drawing 
upon a range of bodily props and costumes which enabled ~e living to present their dead and 
through them themselves in an effort to create specific impressions in the minds of ot~ers. 
Body adornment is clearly both evident and important for the entire cemetery. On the one 
217 
Performing inequality six feet under: A drama at Early Bronze Age Mochlos 
hand, up on the West Terrace there is a clear presence of jewellery and other objects of 
personal adornment. Body ornaments such as bronze daggers5, seals and jewellery such as 
gold, silver and bronze rings, gold diadems, chains, pendants, pins and armlets, necklaces 
made of gold, semiprecious stones or other scarce raw materials are commonly taken as 
indices of wealth and high status (Plate 26b and c). We could also assume that in this context 
body embellishment was further complemented by clothing. Gold pins in the shape of flowers 
or leaves, as well as strips of thin sheet-gold perhaps were dress ornaments (Plate 27). The 
point that gold strips were 'intended for fastening to gannents' has originally been made by 
Seager (1912: 30). Davaras (1975: 104) has subsequently interpreted them as either clothing 
ornaments or cheap substitutes for diadems and annlets. Yet he has also put forward the idea 
that some of these strips may have been antennae of diadems fallen or deliberately detached 
and removed from their original positions (Davaras 1975: 110). Gold pins imitating flowers 
and foliage have been variously interpreted as hair ornaments (Alexiou 1968; Seager 1912: 
31, 72), diadem attachments (Branigan 1970: 147) and clothing ornaments (Alexiou 1968; 
Pini 1968). Yet, their interpretation as dress ornaments may be the most plausible given the 
sharp end of the pins 'which can pass through some kind of cloth' (Davaras 1975: 106 n.34). 
It seems also likely that the rather sharp end of the pins would have made them rather 
unsuitable as hair ornaments. At the same time, small bronze cutters with remains of ivory 
handle, depilatory pincers made of bronze or silver, stone palettes6 and small stone vases 
appear to be implements of a toilet kit (Plate 28) that may have played some part in body 
embellishment, perhaps through depilation and/or the application of maquillage and other 
cosmetic substances. It is worth pointing out that palettes reported from other EB Aegean 
funerary contexts show signs of colouring matter on their upper surfaces that may suggest that 
they were used for grinding coloured powders (Soles 1992a: 236). As Soles observes, this is 
the case not only with EB Cycladic examples found in graves but also with later. Minoan 
palettes reported from domestic contexts7, It does not therefore seem complete~y unlikely that 
the EM examples from the cemetery of Mochlos were also used in this way (Soles 1992a: 
236), 
5 That a lot of the daggers from MochIos actually had an ornamental rather than functional role can be 
suggested by their hafting system. According to Branigan, many daggers from Mochlos had elaborate 
moulded decoration in the central area of the heel that would have been 'functionally detrimental and 
[could] only have been adopted for reasons of fashion and display' (1999: 89). Equally significant is 
Branigan's conclusion that overall EM daggers appear to have been items of status and display (see 
also Nakou 1995). This can be supported by several male figurines from Petsofa that wore a dagger on 
a prominent position (Branigan 1999: 89). Moreover, the miniature size of some examples from 
MochIos would have made them unsuitable as weapons. 
6 Seager (1912: 36) calls the palettes colour tables. 
7 Interestingly all the Cretan prepalatial examples come from funerary contexts. It is only after the 
prepalatial times that palettes appear only in domestic contexts (Soles 1992a: 236). 
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Plate 26 
a) Example of Kernos from the cemetery of Gournia (source: 1992a, Plate 8c). 
b) Dagger blades from the West Terrace (source: Seager 1912: 35, Fig. 12). 
c) Pendants and cylinder seal (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 25). 
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Plate 27 
a) Gold leaves (source: Davara 1975: 102, Fig. 2). Gold flower pin (source Seager 1912: 
72, Fig. 42). 
b) (Left) Gold strips and ornaments in the shape of flowers and leaves from the West 
Terrace tombs (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 10); (Right) Gold strips and ornaments in the 
shape of flowers and leaves from the South Slope tombs (source: 1912, Fig. 43). 
Plate 28 
a) Stone collared table (source: Seager 1912: 36, Fig. 13). 
b) Saddle quern, probably for grinding coloured powders (source Soles 1992a, Plate 
24b). 
c) Depilatory pincers (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 44); Minature stone vases (source: 
Seager 1912, Plate V). 
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The above categories of objects appear to constitute an important currency of value, for 
some Mochliote actors, where body embellishment refers to the dead. It is the dead body, the 
target of attention, through a kind of beautification that draws on a recognisable repertoire of 
'valuable' body props, costumes and toilet utensils. Most significantly, we need to recognise 
the fact that the precious ornaments seem to have a depositional rather than an exchange 
value. I have already made this point (see also Damilati 2002), but it needs to be repeated here 
that, as the material record shows, these items seem to have been important through their 
withdrawal from circulation, final consumption and deposition through funerary rituals. 
Stated simply, these items are found in tombs and not in settlements (cf. Cadogan 1986; 
Branigan 1993: 73 on gold jewellery). 
Some of the items appear never to have been worn or used during the lifetime of their 
possessors. We can put in this category miniature vases and ornaments inappropriate for 
practical use as well as tiny knife blades and daggers which seem unlikely to have been used 
as proper weapons. Others, like the golden diadems (Plate 29), and the jewellery probably 
circulated in daily life with the biography of their owners in people's encounters as props of 
their identity. In these encounters what circulated was impressions, memories, information 
and meaning and with them the very fame of their possessors. In particular, some of these 
diadems as Seager (1912: 26; see also Davaras 1975) informs us, present traces of hard usage 
and have small pin holes which can lead us to assume that they had been worn for some time 
before their fmal deposition in the tombs. I should also add that a quick look at the spectacular 
gold diadems decorated with repousse8 patterns and motifs (Branigan 1983b) suffices to 
demonstrate that none bears exactly the same decoration as any other (Plate 30). Overall, the 
subjects include geometrical designs of animal figures, a pair of open eyes as well as less 
representational motifs (cf. McCallum 1983: 22). Yet the motif of eyes is confmed,to a single 
example and out of the two diadems where animals clearly appear, the one portrays dogs the 
other some kind of horned animals that according to Davaras (1975: 103), may be agrimia. 
Equally, among the examples which are decorated with more abstract themes, each of them 
bears unique combinations of geometric shapes and consequ~nt1y they do not look identical. It 
seems to me that the uniqueness of each diadem's decoration can be understood as an atte~pt 
intended to reinforce or add a unique personality to each of the items in question., Likewise, 
other types of jewellery from Mochlos seem to bear a unique character. As Branigan has 
pointed out, although some ornaments seem to demonstrate, for example, a· regularity in the 
spacing of repousse dots, this does not apply to several items, 'even in an apparently 
. homogeneous group' (l983b: 16). According to him, the conclusion to be reached is that 
8 Decoration of sheet metalwork produced by hammering up projections from the back (see also 
Branigan 1983b and McCallum 1983). 
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Plate 29 
Golden diadems from the West Terrace (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 8). 
Plate 30 
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Di~~ems from Mochlos; distinctive decoration suggests an attempt to produce 
inalienability in the objects (source: Seager 1912: 28-29, Fig 9). 
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while there were some similarities between many of the finds, it is difficult to show that their 
production was orchestrated by a similar hand. Branigan's observation is a very interesting 
one. However, it is equally important to recognise that the unique character of many of these 
objects indicates their role as badges of identity particular to their owners. 
More to the point, the distinctive decoration of most of these items might have been a 
measure against theft and alienability, for given the small size of the community, it would not 
have gone without notice if any of the props was worn by some other than its rightful owner 
(cf. Gould 1966: 72). It may therefore be appropriate to see these artefacts as 'biographical 
objects' that is as objects upon which people draw in order 'to fashion their identities in a 
particular way, constructing a "self' for public consumption' (Hoskins 1998: 1). That is not to 
say, that they were merely flashy objects which conspicuously displayed the wealth or the 
prestige of their owners. Nothing would be more simplistic than an assertion of this kind. I 
believe it would be more correct to say that the objects in question were active instruments 
which constructed their possessors' reknown, fame and prestige in various ways. Following 
Munn's point that 'fame can be considered as a metaphorical body decor that ramifies as 
sound beyond the body' (1986: Ill), I would like to argue that the gold diadems, for instance, 
did not simply decorate their possessors but perhaps also echoed their prestige as they were 
worn. This is often the case with body props that are adorned with mobile attachments that 
make jingling sounds as they are carried or worn. To Munn, 
[ such] attached material decor[ s] ... add a seductive intensification of beauty to that of the body, 
and a noise (mediated by part of the added decor). The decor extends the body in space and the 
mobile decor makes a sound that ramifies this space - as if putting it into motion - so that what 
may be out of sight may nevertheless be heard (1986: 114). 
It is interesting to note, that according to Seager (1912), the occurrence of holes along the 
upper edge of most of the diadems can be taken to indicate that these props had mobile 
attachments like pendants or chains that hung down (Plate 3Ia). Davaras, on the other hand, 
has challenged thi,s view. As he rightly argues, it is difficult to imagine attachments that 
would have 'eventually dangled in front of the eyes and the nose of the wearer, as the position 
of the holes on most of the diadems would make inevitable' (Davaras 1975: 109). According 
to him, it mig~t be more correct to accept that the diadems were adorned with high antennae 
(Plate 31 b). Yet, even in this case one can still suggest that the diadems were designed in such . 
a way as to contribute actively to the making of the prestige of those who wore them. As 
Davaras himself points out, 'harmoniously upraised formations' like antennae can be seen as 
'the most efficient way of emphasising the human face, mirror of the personality' and it is no 
coincidence that they constitute 'an almost universal element of crowns in all ages' (1975: 
112). 
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Plate 31 
11, 15 
' lLlO 
a) Ornaments possibly used as mobile attachments on diadems (source: Seager 1912: 33, 
Fig. 11). 
b) Restored ~em found tightly folded in a silver ves,s~"' ~f ... om Tomb VI. The antenna 
restoration is by Davaras. Note the careful cutting of the lower edge, this may suggest 
deliberate destruction and thus an attempt to make it ~"ljenable (source: Davaras 1975: 
103, Fig. 3). ' 
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However, once the owner died and was incorporated in the realm of the ancestors, these 
props followed them to their final resting place becoming gifts to the ancestral spirits who, to 
use Mauss's words, 'are in fact the real owners of the world's wealth' (1990 [1925]: 13). 
Otherwise, how are we to explain their complete absence from EM settlement assemblages? 
Of course, we should keep in mind that so far our knowledge of Minoan prepalatial 
settlements is indeed fairly limited and that equally our knowledge 0 of the prepalatial 
settlement of Mochlos is fragmentary. However, current evidence strongly suggests the 
inalienable character of these valuable ornaments and the fact that these were not easy to give 
away in mundane transactions. In this regard, the deliberate deposition of these items in tombs 
may be seen as a strategy of keeping and resisting exchange (Weiner 1985, 1992). Particularly 
telling is I think the fact that in several gold diadems, a part or parts of the body had been 
deliberately cut off (Plate 31b). Similarly if we are to accept Davaras's premise that some 
diadems were originally adorned with high antennae that were regularly wrenched off or 
removed, again we can discern a further example of a tendency to deliberately make these 
props useless. Yet, while Davaras (1975: 110-111) considers this as an indication of a concern 
from the part of the mourners' to diminish the quantity of this precious material, namely gold, 
buried with the dead, I would see it as a further attempt towards the production of 
inalienability on the diadems themselves. By deliberately making these props useless, the 
living associated with the dead owner attempted to ensure that the objects would never again 
enter circulation among the living. The mutilation of the diadems is patterned in a particular 
way, and seems to evidence a special care and a concern with symmetry. This may suggest 
that the people charged with this task were reluctant, perhaps out of fear or respect, to 
disfigure the ornaments in a random and careless way (cf. Davaras 1975: 0111). In my view, 
this fact appears further to demonstrate that what was at stake was not so much the value of 
the raw material as Davaras holds but rather the inalienable value of the ornament itself. A 
strong concern with the production of inalienability and the protection of valuable possessions 
from loss is also demonstrated by a treasure of goldwork packed tightly together in order to fit 
into a silver vessel (Plate 17 ) recovered from tomb VI. The pieces of jewellery included a 
diadem, a chain, a pendant, a rock-crystal bead, part of a bronze pin, eight miniature strips of 
gold as well as a treasure of goldwork imitating foliage (see Davaras 1975). Interestingly, the 
diadem (Plate 31 b) which is the only one found inside a container was restored to its original 
state with great difficulty because it had been folded and refolded again and again with 
extreme care (Davaras 1975: 102)9. 
These facts, however, still leave two fundamental questions unanswered. Firstly, how and 
9 Seager (1912: 34) mentions two further examples of gold diadems which had been folded up in a sort 
of tight packet. 
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why was value created in these artefacts? That is, what did the prehistoric actors of Mochlos 
see to be significant about these objects, which compelled the people to keep them out of 
circulation and place them above exchange value? And secondly can we see these objects as 
vessels for the establishment of debt relations and consequently of relational social 
inequalities between the living? To start with the first question; one may mention the dazzling 
colours of the stone vases as well as the glittering properties of the raw· materials like gold, 
silver and bronze among others of which many of the deposited items were made. We may 
assume that the shiny or colorful matter of raw materials would have made them particularly 
attractive for the fashioning of objects. In the case of gold in particular, the attraction may 
have been even greater given the combination of its brilliant10 surface with its resistance to 
corruption (cf. MuhIy 1983: 1); in Renfrew's words, 'gold like diamonds, is forever' (l986a: 
161). At the same time, the exotic provenance of gold, silver, bronze, ivory, carnelian and 
other materials used for the production of ornaments and other categories of objects deposited 
in the tombs is commonly taken as evidence to suggest the value of these items due to their 
scarcity in Crete during the EBA (see Branigan 1991a; Davaras 1975; Soles 1978; Whitelaw 
2002). Following this idea, it might be argued that the exotic provenance of the raw materials 
conferred value upon these artefacts in relation to the principle of scarcity_ Furthermore we 
could suggest that the task of procurement itself was associated with discourses that may have 
involved facing and controlling cosmol~gical and physical dangers, dealing with strangers 
and perilous voyages (cf. HelmsI988). 
Still, I would like to suggest that although the factors mentioned above might have 
contributed to the perception of these items as valuables, it is misleading to see their 
importance to have been constructed simply in accordance with the value of the materials they 
were made of. Notwithstanding their exotic material nature, most of the so called valuables of 
MochIos were locally produced (cf. Branigan 1991a) and consumed. This warns us to be 
attentive to the entanglement of the exotic aspect of their personality with values rooted in 
local perceptions .. and performances according to which desire for these objects was 
constructed. The value of things, as I have already argued in chapter seven, is constructed 
through their usage. It is my contention that the withdrawal of MochIos' valuables from 
circulation, and their deposition into the tombs, may provide some hints surrounding the way 
in which value was created in these objects. Such practices seem to demonstrate that the items 
in question were things which could not be freely given but kept. Simply put, they had a value 
above exchange value. 
10 In some cultures brilliant substances, such as metals, pearls and even glass, are associated with light 
and are believed to carry cosmological connotations. See Saunders (1999). 
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Echoing Godelier (1999) and Weiner (1985, 1992), it might be suggested that what cannot 
be given is that which is essential, and what was essential here was the definition of the self, 
community and its identity, manifested in the objects themselves (Barrett and Damilati 2002, 
forthcoming). It is with these themes in mind that we should consider the value of the 
artefacts retrieved from the cemetery, Following Godelier's definition of the sacred, which, as 
he suggests, is 'a certain type of relationship that humans entertain with the origin of things' 
(1999: 171) we may start seeing the so called valuable objects of MochIos in a new light. I 
would argue that they may have been understood to be not the creations of people but the gifts 
of the ancestral spirits. As we have seen, the entire cemetery, but particularly the West 
Terrace, occupied the western side of the islet which can be described as a 'sea gate' or 
conspicuous landmark, which sailing boats carrying exotic raw materials would have 
approached. Taking this notion into account, we may assume that the cemetery and the West 
Terrace in particular, would have been the starting point of the lifecycle of the exotic raw 
materials coming to MochIos (Vavouranakis 2002). I would further add that these areas might 
have been acknowledged and perceived by the Mochliote population as the sacred loci of the 
origins that is the very sources of the wealth reaching the community from afar. Deposition of 
wealth with the dead possibly meant that it had effectivelly returned to its origins, to these 
indispensable anchored points that by appearing always to have existed provided ontological 
security in a world constantly subjected t~ loss and decay (Godelier 1999; Weiner 1992). 
Bearing this in mind, it might not be difficult to imagine how these items operated not 
only as a constant reminder and vessel for the perpetual initiation of debts between the 
community and the ancestors but also as instruments in the creation of debt between the 
living. Those associated with the dead who had been successful in keepmg the gifts of the 
ancestors in the face of all vagaries and intricacies of life and successfully return ~em to their 
origins as a small offering to the real owners of the world's wealth would have been shown to 
initiate a new cycle of expectations regarding the generosity of the ancestral powers for the 
well-being of the larger community. 
At the same time the South Slope seems to rival the West Terrace in the variety of the 
toilet utensils and perhaps even presents an overall larger concentration of particular 
implements belonging to this category. This seems to apply to small cutters and the depilatory 
pincers. Meanwhile, although valuable body ornaments present a higher concentration at the 
West Terrace tombs they are by no means confmed there. As we have already noted, a fair 
number of tombs on the South Slope contained valuable ornaments too. Their overall smaller 
. concentration on the South Slope - if it is not the result of taphonomic processes - might 
imply a weaker or more selective application of the particular valuation scheme that refers to 
body embellishment through jewellery. 
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Finally, the southernmost part of the cemetery manifests the same valuation scheme albeit 
through a different currency. Here body beautification and exotic materials were equally 
present and important. Nevertheless they facilitated the weaving of an entirely different 
performance. The bulk of 10.09 kg of obsidian blades and cores (Soles and Davaras 1992) is 
as exceptional and as exotic as the quantity of golden objects at the West Terrace (Plate 32a). 
Carter (1994, 1998, forthcoming) has demonstrated that obsidian blades in funerary contexts 
may have been used for the transformation of the body. This should be taken as grooming, 
tattooing or scarification. The presence of the obsidian in a non-mortuary building (N), which 
is close to the Lustral Basin commonly associated "vith initiation rites, seems to indicate that 
the particular valuation scheme of body decoration now referred to the livinglbecoming body. 
These blades might have been used in the naming and presentation of a new member of the 
community, the becoming of age, puberty, birth ceremonies, first-haircut rites, admission into 
a secret society or other rites of passage to transform body appearance in ways appropriate for 
the next stage of life. Such a suggestion is supported by ample iconographic evidence, which 
shows persons of different age and gender to have different hairstyles (Plate 32b). These 
blades were probably hoarded in building N once they ended their use life as active 
participants in many people's rituals of becoming. This again may suggest an inalienable 
character of a different type than that exhibited by the valuable ornaments and the Neolithic 
deposit. Some objects although they can. be loaned (sometimes more or less permanently in 
order to craft social relations of various kinds), are metaphorically never separated from their 
original producers or owners (Godelier 1999; Wiener 1992). By the same token, the obsidian 
blades found at Building N might have been given by their original owners as gifts to 
participate in various initiation rites but after their use they were returned to their original 
owners. Crucially, the loaning of items that may have constituted important implements in the 
transformation of individuals into full social beings would have created conspicuous debts. 
Moreover, possession of such objects acts back on the original owner who accumulates 
influence and renown through ownership of not just the object itself but of the biography and 
the memory that the object embodies. In short, I view the particular obsidian assemblage as 
participating in a gift-to-men system (Gregory 1980, 1982) which is quite different from 
obsidian assemblages found in settlements. The exchange of the latter can be seen as a 
commodity exchange, which refers to the reproduction of things and creates debts that involve 
alienable objects between independent transactors. In this case, once the debt at a particular 
rate of interest is paid, it is then immediately cancelled. Hence, although the lender will have 
. increased her economic capital in a materially productive way, the social relationship between 
her and the borrower(s) disintegrates. On the other hand, the gift-giving (this is in fact 
keeping-while-giving) of inalienable possessions, notwithstanding its lack of (an immediate) 
economic profit, binds people in more permanent social relationships and should be 
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Plate 32 
a) Obsidian pile from building N on the South Slope (source: Soles and Davaras 1992, 
Plate 91). 
b) Detail of the goddess from Xeste 3, Akrotiri, Thera; note the tattoo on her cheek 
(source: Marinatos 1993: 142, Fig. 112). 
c) Scene from the so called Chieftain's Cup from Aghia Triada showing men of different 
ages with different hair styles (source Marinatos 1993: 134, Fig. 100). 
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explained, as Gregory suggests 'with reference to the social conditions of the reproduction of 
people' (1980: 641). 
Consuming passions such as celebratory meals constitute another common practice in 
both sides of the cemetery. Again these are crafted according to, and in specific settings, by 
drawing upon distinct material paraphernalia. For example, on the West Terrace the tableware 
consists mainly of jugs and bowls (Plate 33) while the South Slope is dominated by plates. 
We may say that jugs and bowls probably point to the consumption of drink (or more liquid 
food) consumption and plates to (more solid) food consumption. These different serving 
paraphernalia might then imply different ways of building 'moments of hierarchy' (Keating 
2000) through celebratory meals of different underlying principles concerning their nature, 
preparation and details of consumption11 • Stated simply, the feasts held in the two parts of the 
cemetery were different probably both in nature and community inclusiveness. 
Enacted in the immediate vicinity of tombs, in large open spaces which imply quite 
substantial gatherings of people, feasting in the West Terrace might have been an opportunity 
for more lavish ceremonial drinking or food distributions following mortuary rites. In this 
context, food and drink consumption may have been associated with themes of ancestral 
existence such as descent, inheritance, group history or the blessing of life by the ancestors 
(see Bloch 1985). Keeping in mind the dramatic theatrical character of the West Terrace, we 
may suppose that the amounts of food and drink different people received, as well as the 
serving order, were events not only to be seen conveying information about structures of 
influence and attention, but also to construct specific moments of relational inequalities. On 
the other hand, the evidence for feasting at the South Slope comes from inside the building =: 
which, as we have already noted, may be associated with rituals referririg to the becoming 
body and themes of worldly existence such as sexuality, enjoyment and stren~ (see Bloch 
1985: 638). Here, participation may have been much more restrictive and food preparation, 
serving and consumption possible secrets of an inalienable ritual knowledge. However, 
exploring the matter further and keeping in mind that Building =: may have been the stage for 
transition rites we cannot entirely rule out the likelihood. that at least the final chapter of 
feasting, namely eating, may have taken place outside the dark interior of the building. 
Notably, any,new identity, any passage from one social position to another 'is in need of 
authenticity' (Jenkins 1996: 144; see also La Fontaine 1986). In other words, it requires 
validation by public recognition. Particularly telling in this regard, is the observation that the 
final act of most initiation rites involves greetings, gift-giving and eating together, that is 'acts 
11 See Keating (2000) for an interesting ethnographic example on the way inequality is built in feasting 
through body tactics and different serving paraphernalia. 
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Plate 33 
a) Jugs and bowls from the South Slope (source: Seager 1912, Fig. 18). 
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which publicly recognise that the purpose of the rites has been achieved' (La Fontaine 1986: 
185). 
Equally important, we may assume that food consumption was actively implicated in the 
production or maintenance of debts in both parts of the cemetery. It is true that of all material 
resources food constitutes perhaps. the most ineffectual inalienable possession, given its 
perishable nature. Still, there are communities where one can observe considerable investment 
of effort in the transformation of food into more durable things or words (Weiner 1992: 38)12. 
Generous food giving in celebratory meals, secret sacred cooking recipes, myths around their 
history, andlor sacred foods the consumption of which might have been necessary for the 
efficacy of specific performances aiming to assure the future13 through ancestral blessings or 
celebrations for the living could have acted as inalienable possessions pertinent to the creation 
of debts between their guardians and the rest of the community. Finally, orgies of eating 
andlor drinking with their emotion and sensory stimulations might have acted as effective 
mnemonic devices (Hamilakis 1998, 1999) for the remembrance and thus the maintenance of 
debts and structures of influence and attention. In the mortuary context of the West Terrace, 
the mnemonic power of food consumption might have been further accentuated by the 
experience of death and its attendant emotions of grief (cf. Hamilakis 1998) while in the 
South Slope by the exceptional bodily, emotional and sensory experiences that special 
occasions such as rites of passage genera~e. 
At this point my story-telling of EM MochIos comes to an end. I will be the first to admit 
that my analysis has only attended to a particular range of performances, that there are other 
possibilities of understanding how debt and power relations operated. Neither has it paid 
attention to the variety of processes through which value was created -in the prehistoric 
community. For example, in the absence of evidence about craft producti~n areas I 
completely sidestepped the production chapter of the social biography of objects. Likewise, I 
did not offer any account of the ways in which exotic raw materials like gold, bronze, silver 
and obsidian among others - entering MochIos and transformed locally into fmished products 
or the handful of exotic fmished artefacts - might have been unevenly acquired among the 
population. Let us recall Webster's (1990) uneasiness about models that see wealth as 
instrumental to the creation of relational social inequalities, yet they fail to describe how 
certain groups and not others get hold of this wealth. I cannot refrain from noting that 
production and acquisition of the above categories of materials was no doubt quite significant 
12 Weiner (1992: 38) notes, for example, the case of the Warrira of the Papuan coast, where the 
genealogical history of taro plants constitute sacred inalienable knowledge. Similarly, for the Merina of 
Madagascar it is inappropriate to alienate rice, by buying it from or selling it to those with whom one 
has no moral relation (see Bloch 1985: 635). 
13 The reader may find a beautiful narrative of feasting and drinking as performances assuring the 
future in Lefebvre (1991). 
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not only in the creation of value in objects and people but also in the local games of power. 
Those who attained exotic materials might have been individuals who could entertain, 
befriend and offer hospitality to foreign visitors. They may have been people who had 
knowledge of the spells and ritual observances that would ensure a safe journey or success in 
the harvesting of material. Alternatively they might have been associated with those who 
traveled and faced the perils of long-distance voyages and people in strange lands (Helms 
1988, 1993). Some, having mastered the secrets of metalworking, might have known to work 
these materials skillfully in order to transform them into finished artefacts. Others might have 
exploited the need, indifference or naivete of those who had already managed to possess such 
material wealth and fmd an opportunity to exchange objects and exotic raw materials for a 
sack of grain, a secret, or a promise. Unfortunately I cannot offer more than possible fictions 
- or in the best case - speculations about the initial acquisition of these objects and the raw 
materials necessary for their production. 
Yet, it seems to me that the case of MochIos confirms my premise that both material and 
non-material wealth by themselves are necessary, yet not sufficient conditions for the creation 
of power relations unless they are drawn upon in order to create and remind relations of debt. 
In other words, the meaning of objects does not lay simply with their ownership but in their 
enactment or what de Certeau (1984) calls usage in specific contexts of social practice. In this 
framework, the transmission through ge~erations of inalienable possessions, such as ancestral 
secrets, ritual knowledge and objects associated with the sacred origins, cosmogonic time, or 
rites of passage, would have sought to ensure the perpetuation of debt obligations, prove their 
guardians' difference and attracted both firm believers and rivals who wished a share in this 
power. Still, there is no reason to suppose that this was always a smooth process meeting no 
resistance, tension or dispute. Let it be made clear that while inalienable possessio,ns serve the 
subversion of change, at the same time they become agents of change, for as they confer 
authority to their keepers they constitute objects of desire for others and thus are prone to loss, 
fabrication and reinterpretation (Weiner 1992: 11). 
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Conclusion 
Inequality in context and implications for further 
research 
The Aegean Bronze Age is commonly treated as a crucial period in European prehistory. This 
period is assumed to have witnessed the emergence of substantial social inequalities and the 
forming of state administrative systems of power associated with palatial civilization. 
Research into the Minoan palace complexes over the last several decades has revealed 
apparently clear indicators of 'social ranking' and 'stratified' society. On the other hand, what 
are seen as egalitarian sites or non-state societies are viewed as evolutionary stepping-stones 
towards complex state societies and inequalities of the palatial times. The appearance of 
asymmetries is seen as the outcome of agricultural production and the ways in which control 
over labour and agricultural produce are translated into relations of inequality. Current 
accounts variously suggest that this process eroded the autonomy of the Domestic Mode of 
Production forming economic interdependence and the institution of the state. Moreover, the 
presence or absence of power and inequality is directly inferred, mainly by the presence or 
absence of wealth in relation to particular segments of society. Wealth is therefore considered 
as the decisive currency of value that is held not only to reflect but also to construct inequality 
through its production, circulation and reinvestment in economically productive assets. It is 
the materially productive dimension of wealth (its investment reproduces the conditions of 
production), which is considered the cornerstone of the construction of inequality. However, 
as this study makes clear, there are several problems with respect to this· intellectual 
framework. 
As I have argued the reduction of power inequalities to state hegemony leads to a narrow 
conception of the temporality of power. Power is held to emerge at a specific point in Minoan 
history during the end of the second or the beginning of the third millennium Be when the 
emergence of specific material realities, such as metal artefacts, rich burials, elaborate 
mortuary structures and palaces is documented. Thus, power borrows a temporal framework· 
for its existence simply as a coincidence of particular types of wealth an~ is assumed to be 
absent when these are missing. At the same time, the emphasis on the materially productive 
dimension of wealth (namely its connection with a growth .of the means of production) 
presents an uncritical usage of modem capitalist modes of production and consumption which 
is foisted upon prehistory. 
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My research programme has tried to challenge the upward-swinging evolutionary model 
of social change. It has sought to demonstrate that power relations and structures of influence 
and attention are omnipresent in time and space, operating and manifesting themselves in 
different contexts of society in different ways. I have therefore not attempted to frame this 
study around determining a hypothetical starting point of inequality. Non-state societies, I 
argued, are characterized by unequal relationships but they should be examined for their own 
sake, not as representing the microcosm of states. The point I wish to make is that there is no 
emergence of inequalities but different contexts and schemes of valuation concerning the way 
they were realized, performed, lived, negotiated and materialized in everyday life. I have 
further argued that the belief in truly 'egalitarian' societies is the intellectual construction of 
modernity reflecting more the ideological conditioning of modernist thinkers, rather than 
describing real societies. There is no such thing as a division between egalitarian and 
hierarchical social formations but rather societies as moral communities. Neither is there any 
historical erosion of a self-sufficient state of being, for insufficiency is inherent to the 
unfInished nature of human bodies. It is the latter that makes humans to come together in 
interaction in order to create meaning and understanding. In other words, inequalities or 
agents of power do not come about because people are inherently bad or good but rather 
because they seek to make sense of what is good or bad, what is worth of being sought after 
and what not. Being is not fIxed but is recursively formed through processes of valuation 
always presenced within the realm of current social practice. Accordingly, power relations 
and structures of influence and attention are practical accomplishments. 
In this scheme, wealth is a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for the construction of 
relational inequalities. It is only through the creation of debt obligations' that wealth enters 
into structures of domination. Debts draw upon resources whose significance ~d value are 
socially constituted and agreed upon in social interaction and practice. One of my basic ideas 
is that relational inequalities are not constructed through a universal currency of value. It 
might be said that the making of power and influence depends on a kind of capital. I defmed 
capital as the capacity to mobilize resources of vario~s kinds in order to create debt 
obligations and exert influence. But these resources and thus capital, are not confmed to 
economic resources. Rather they may include a range of conventionally unproductive 
resources, which are used and consumed without reproducing the conditions of production. 
They might be symbols, knowledge, skills of various kinds, social proximity, rituals, and 
various goods temporarily accumulated for keeping-while-giving or unproductive spending. 
Access to such resources did not necessarily build economic capital but may have enabled 
certain people to accumulate a symbolic capital which could widen their influence, promote 
their fame within society and create relations of debt. 
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By developing the above approach in the archaeological context of Early Bronze Age 
Mochlos in eastern Crete I have sought to bring to light multiple valuation schemes and 
currencies of value upon which symbolic capital was constructed. These drew upon various 
material and intangible resources that had different ways of expressing their legitimacy, 
operated over different spatial contexts of social interaction and created debt obligations and 
structures of attention and influence in different ways. More specifically, the architectural 
layout of the West Terrace can be thought of as a theatrical stage able to accommodate public 
gatherings which revolved around dramas pertinent to the ancestral presence. Here structures 
of attention and influence were built out of differences in access, bodily position and 
compartment through the performance of ritual sequences. Additionally, knowledge of the 
long-standing history of ceremonial activity, which is attested by the Neolithic deposit 
underneath tomb V may not have been equally shared by all. The deposit may have 
constituted a means of strategic remembering with respect to specific values of the local 
community. More importantly, it would have effectively introduced the ancestral presence 
within the realm of contemporary social practice. The control of this process probably 
impinged upon issues of group history, descent, inheritance, communal identity and authority. 
It was a type of information that may. have created ostensible debts through its differential 
sharing. On the South Slope, I discerned the building of debt obligations through access to 
secret knowledge and specific ritual implements in the course of rites of passage for the 
living. However, in both sides of the cemetery we noticed a generalised concern with bodily 
embellishment (Plate 34). On the West Terrace, the target of attention seems to have been the 
dead body which was accompanied by valuable ornaments made of exotic materials. On the 
South Slope, again, body beautification and exotic materials were equally present and 
important, but now through a different medium. The obsidian blades, hoarded. in the non-
mortuary building N which is close to the Lustral Basin suggest grooming or tattooing 
relevant to initiation rites. Here the target of attention appears to have been the 
livinglbecoming body. Both means of bodily embellishment were inalienable possessions. 
Jewellery was withdrawn from circulation by being offered. to the dead, while obsidian, in this 
particular context, was once and for all consumed on the spot. Thus relational inequaliti~s at 
Mochlos seem to have been constructed through performances that aimed to enact and 
reproduce relationships, debts and identities locally rather than to speculate upon future 
extensive economic and socio-political integration. 
In the end, what I have tried to offer is a renewed view of society and its workings which 
does not simplistically take the classification between state and non-state societies to stand as 
an index measuring degrees of social complexity and power intensity. My perception of 
societies as moral communities and arenas for the enactment of value was hoped to provide 
an alternative line of understanding to evolutionary paradigms of power and their attendant 
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Plate 34 
Performing Inequality: " ... aU the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely 
players. They have their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays 
many parts ... " W.Shakespeare, As You Like It, II 
The West Terrace Vs. the South Slope 
Bodily embellishment: a) Sophia Schliemann wearing the treasures of Troy (source: 
The Treasures of Troy: available at http://www.unmuseum.orgltroy.htm); b Tattooing 
(source: Atlantic Images). 
The West Terrace Vs. the South Slope 
c) The Ermine Portrait by Nicholas Hilliard (1585) (source: The faces of Elizabeth I, 
available at http://www.Iuminarium.orglrenlitlelizlface); d) punk band (courtesy of 
Effi Kartsonaki). 
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social typologies. Given the time and space limitations of my thesis, the single case study 
from the prepalatial period has been employed to illustrate that the vision of society I endorse 
is applicable, yet I offer my approach as a starting point for looking afresh into other Early 
Bronze Age contexts as well. What now matters is not the hunting down of relational 
inequalities' origins but their enactment in the realm of social practices. 
Afterword: Scope for further research 
If what I have suggested was the case at prepalatial Mochlos, and as I strongly believe in 
other prepalatial contexts as well, what about the palatial state structures of power? Finally, as 
a means of tying in my work to the broader questions of 'social complexity', I would like to 
touch on this question through a brief archaeological example from the neopalatial period. In 
neopalatial times the 'palace' is regarded as a 'prestige artefact': its architectural elaboration 
is strengthened with frescoes, access to its various quarters becomes restricted, storeroom 
areas become also restricted, while emphasis is placed on ceremonial gathering and the 
display of exotic paraphernalia more than ever (see Moody 1987; Driessen 1995). Palatial 
features appear in many places on the island in many variations, from the smaller and the less 
typical palaces of Gournia and Zakros to many Villas around Knossos and elsewhere. 
Significantly, palatial-style architecture is taken to be the insignium par excellence of Late 
Bronze Age ruling elites, since palaces and villas are assumed to be the socio-political pivots 
of economic regulation. 
Within such 'palatial-style architecture' it is possible to compare the tendency to employ 
standardised features against local improvisation in building techniques and combinations of 
these features. Standardised features are hall systems, porticoes, lustral basins, an emphasis 
on the control of access, and frescoes. On the other hand, when all these features are realised, 
local building materials are used. Accordingly, the end result might ha~e been entirely 
different. For example, the so called cultic villa at Makrygialos (see Davaras 1992, 1997) 
bears a rustic impression which is rather different from th.e well-paved courts at Nirou Khani 
and Vathypetro (see Cadogan 1992b). (Plate 35a). Apart from the different degrees of labour 
investment, one may see two codes of reference: A) standard features that relate to the 
circulation of bodies and practical functions. B) Building materials that create a visual 
contrast and overall emotional experience. Standard features allowed visitors to penetrate 
buildings more easily and for example, may actually have provided people from Knossos a 
privileged stance as they came from the palace that constituted the best example of palace-
style architecture. On the other hand, the overall rustic feeling of some buildings projected by 
local building materials may have indicated to an individual coming from Knossos a sense of 
difference and perhaps caution, as they were entering a different arena of power. As the 
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violent destruction of the Palaikastro kouros (see MacGillivray and Sackett 1991), an 
assumed emblem signifying Knossian influence, has indicated, attempts to promote Knossian 
supremacy did not pass uncontested to say the least (Plate 35b). Interestingly, a similar 
tendency has been observed for neopalatial Mochlos where there is evidence for the violent 
and deliberate destruction of an ashlar (Plate 36a). This was located in Building B.2 which 
has been described as a ceremonial centre and the central building of the settlement, since it 
bears several elements of palatial architecture such as ashlar masonry and pillar crypts (see 
Soles 1999). 
In current accounts the examples of prepalatial Mochlos and neopalatial architecture I 
have considered represent steps towards the development of early states. In the first example, 
Mochlos is presumed to represent an Early Bronze Age pre-state society with less rigid 
structures of power. In the second, Late Bronze Age architecture is assumed to come from a 
proto-state context. 
The question now becomes, what is the difference between the two examples? At 
Mochlos, value was constructed through the consumption and deliberate deposition of objects 
in the course of rites of passage. Such inalienable possessions stabilised time and space 
because their deposition and metaphysical dedication became a widely accepted point of 
reference and thus validated the cosmology and the political history of Mochlos. Furthermore, 
there is a contrast between the exotic character of gold and obsidian on one hand and the 
participation of these exotica on the other, in the local mapping of identities through reference 
to dead ancestors, and thus lineage and local history. Mochlos, then, may be characterised as a 
closely knit community, concerned with intensifying the boundaries of what constituted local 
identity. The reproduction of social relations at Mochlos aimed to fix the place of each of the 
members of the community within its boundaries. 
In the case of neopalatial architecture, a different trend may noted. Relations radiate 
outwards, to a larger, island-wide scale, through the spreading of the sa~e architectural 
vocabulary. However, the integrative and regulatory capacity of palatial architecture might 
have been undermined by its very spread, since local bui,lding materials may have produced 
end-results, that is buildings, significantly different from the original organisational priJ:lciple 
that sought to tie them together. Such diversity allowed alternative codes of value to spring 
forth from the very interstices of the dominating discourse. To the extent that the state is 
thought to reinforce its boundaries, such reinforcement is better attested at the assumed pre-
state Mochlos than in the era of the New Palaces (Plate 36b). 
What, then, sets state societies apart from pre-state ones? I admit that I feel rather uneasy 
with such distinctions. The state is not an object that happens in certain socio-historical 
contexts in order to end a primitive kind of freedom. What we may be seeing is different 
valuation schemes. Such schemes, their knowledge and appropriation define humanity in 
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Plate 35 
Vathypetro Makrygialos 
a) The villas at Vathypetro (source: Cadogan 1992: 248, Fig 42.3) and Makrygialos 
(source: Davaras 1992: 173, Fig. 23.2). 
'Knossians go 
home!' 
b) The Palaikastro Kouros (source: MacGillivray and Sackett 1991, Plate 9). 
Plate 36 
a) Aerial view of the destruction of Buildings B.2 showing ashlar blocks lying in streets 
(source: Soles 1999, Plate IVa). 
'Pre-state' Mochlos 
'Proto-state' Palatial society 
• 
b) Mochlos as more close knit community versus the state as a more permeable entity. 
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certain manners, fix identities and people within specific boundaries and build power relations 
and structures of influence. However, if the state is a form of extensive power over far-flung 
territories (Mann 1986), in the specific context of our examples, such eAiensification lacked 
the tight crafting of earlier political formations. This implies a quantitative rather than 
qualitative transformation from simple and less effective to complex and more rigid structures 
of power, since the assumed pre-state MochIos achieved a firmer grip on the imposition of 
socially accepted values. Nonetheless, reducing the question of state to the issue of scale does 
not leave me content. As a result, and instead of an answer, I would like to offer these 
thoughts as a starting point for further discussion. I end by saying that if the state is kept as a 
concept, research has to do justice to the complexity of early societies and certainly focus 
upon the importance of carving out boundaries through the enactment of value in 
performances presenced in the realm of current social practice. 
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